Abstract

This article surveys deontological retributivist thought about judgments concerning deserved punishments. A number of conceptions of desert are described: they vary with respect to their claims about consequential moral luck and the role that desert judgments play in morality. Some retributivists claim that desert claims support obligations to punish; others that they establish ceilings on permissible severity; others that they do both. Further specific conceptual issues about desert of punishment are described, for example, whether a criminal record is relevant. The evidence that retributivists offer for their desert claims are critically assessed. These usually involve appeals to moral intuition. It is argued that these are often weak. The most plausible claim is that desert establishes a ceiling on permissible severity, but no retributivist has shown what amounts of punishment are deserved, so this may not be true. Retributivists might helpfully investigate if moral theory can resolve some of their disputes.