Représentationnalisme et attention

Dialogue 52 (3):551-586 (2013)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Dans cet article, je défends le représentationnalisme contre l’objection de la saillance phénoménale, développée notamment par Chalmers, Nickel et Speaks. Selon mon approche, les déplacements couverts de l’attention améliorent la résolution des représentations perceptives au point de fixation. Cette amélioration locale permet d’expliquer l’effet de saillance, typique de l’attention focale, et de préserver l’intuition représentationnaliste.This article is a defence of representationalism against the objection of phenomenal saliency, which Chalmers, Nickel and Speaks have developed. According to my approach, covert shifts of attention enhance the resolution of perceptual representations at fixation point. This local enhancement accounts for the saliency effect, typical of focal attention, and preserves the representationalist intuition.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,854

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2014-01-23

Downloads
55 (#396,474)

6 months
9 (#511,775)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Emile Thalabard
Sorbonne Université

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

On a confusion about a function of consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
The intrinsic quality of experience.Gilbert Harman - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:31-52.
Naturalizing the Mind.Fred Dretske - 1995 - Philosophy 72 (279):150-154.

View all 26 references / Add more references