Voluntad y responsabilidad moral

Revista de Filosofía (Madrid) 38 (1):121-138 (2013)
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Abstract

In this article I argue against the idea that actions are to be morally judged only for the motive or intention out of which the agent performed or intended to perform the action. Particularly, I put forward different cases by which I discuss the contrast between will or intention and consequences; between negligence and decisions under uncertainty, and outcomes; between deliberate and inadvertent acts; and between intention and action; aiming to show the additional role played by each pair’s second element in determining the deserved moral judgment

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Sergi Rosell
University of Valencia

References found in this work

Lack of Character: Personality and Moral Behavior.John M. Doris - 2002 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Unprincipled virtue: an inquiry into moral agency.Nomy Arpaly - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Moral Luck.B. A. O. Williams & T. Nagel - 1976 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 50 (1):115-152.
The Conscience of Huckleberry Finn.Jonathan Bennett - 1974 - Philosophy 49 (188):123-134.
Taking luck seriously.Michael Zimmerman - 2002 - Journal of Philosophy 99 (11):553-576.

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