A semantical account of the vicious circle principle

Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 20 (3):595-598 (1979)
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Abstract

Here we give a semantical account of propositional quantification that is intended to formally represent Russell’s view that one cannot express a proposition about "all" propositions. According to the account the authors give, Russell’s view bears an interesting relation to the view that there are no sets which are members of themselves.

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Author Profiles

Philip Hugly
University of California, Berkeley (PhD)
Charles Sayward
University of Nebraska, Lincoln

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