Introduction: Political Implications of Moral Enhancement

Neuroethics 12 (1):1-3 (2016)
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Abstract

What should we do if climate change or global injustice require radical policy changes not supported by the majority of citizens? And what if science shows that the lacking support is largely due to shortcomings in citizens’ individual psychology such as cognitive biases that lead to temporal and geographical parochialism? Could then a plausible case for enhancing the morality of the electorate—even against their will –be made? But can a democratic government manipulate the will of the people without losing democratic legitimacy? This paper explores the problems that governmental manipulation of voters pose for democratic legitimacy and the tensions between non-manipulated input and morally acceptable output. These venerable issues of political theory resurface in light of recent suggestions to tackle today’s global mega-problems by Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu. They suggest that to avert the looming catastrophe, governments should alter psychological traits of the citizenry through biomedical means, from pharmaceuticals to genetics. However, we argue that a government cannot rule with democratic legitimacy if elected by a will of the people it manipulated before. Normatively, conferring power from the governed onto governors is a one-directional relation that is incompatible with manipulation. But while it is tempting to rebut suggestions to morally enhance the people as antithetical to essential ideas of democracy, swift rebuttals tend to overlook the deeper challenge: Majoritarian decision-making may lead to inacceptable outcomes. The dilemma between input and output runs through major works in political theory. Rather than wishfully ignoring the dangers of democracy, democratic theory has to provide answers.

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Author Profiles

Christoph Bublitz
Universität Hamburg
Norbert Paulo
University of Salzburg

Citations of this work

Mental Privacy, Cognitive Liberty, and Hog-tying.Parker Crutchfield - forthcoming - Journal of Bioethical Inquiry:1-16.

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References found in this work

Law’s Empire.Ronald Dworkin - 1986 - Harvard University Press.
Justice for hedgehogs.Ronald Dworkin - 2011 - Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Why Deliberative Democracy?Amy Gutmann & Dennis F. Thompson - 2004 - Princeton University Press.

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