Abstract

Is there any other activity as problematic as judgment? How is it possible that those who judge are at the same time judged by their own judgement, measured by the need to judge? This question splits into two subordinate problems that interact with each other. On the one side, the absence of law. This apparently negative condition translates into a positive requirement, the advantage of an obligation: we still need to find the law. On the other side, law does not coincide with natural law: it concerns instead regulations that the faculty of judgement reflectively provides for itself. Juridical norms refer to a code, and the rules of games institute procedures: the first ones make reference to a preestablished system, while the others structure processes. The first ones, in order to be legitimated, should have a reason from which they depend; the others exist just for the sake of the game based on them. There is no need to establish a general, “first”, rule. But rules are necessary and have to be defined. This is the general “law of the laws”, a law that judges reason and refers to a more inclusive idea of judgement.