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Four Kinds of Ethical Robots
Philosophy Now 72:12-14 (2009)
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Citations of this work
Moral zombies: why algorithms are not moral agents.Carissa Véliz - 2021 - AI and Society 36 (2):487-497.
Critiquing the Reasons for Making Artificial Moral Agents.Aimee van Wynsberghe & Scott Robbins - 2019 - Science and Engineering Ethics 25 (3):719-735.
Making moral machines: why we need artificial moral agents.Paul Formosa & Malcolm Ryan - forthcoming - AI and Society.
Critiquing the Reasons for Making Artificial Moral Agents.Aimee van Wynsberghe & Scott Robbins - 2018 - Science and Engineering Ethics:1-17.
A Normative Approach to Artificial Moral Agency.Dorna Behdadi & Christian Munthe - 2020 - Minds and Machines 30 (2):195-218.
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