The change of signaling conventions in social networks

AI and Society 34 (4):721-734 (2019)
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Abstract

To depict the mechanisms that have enabled the emergence of semantic conventions, philosophers and researchers particularly access a game-theoretic model: the signaling game. In this article I argue that this model is also quite appropriate to analyze not only the emergence of a semantic convention, but also its change. I delineate how the application of signaling games helps to reproduce and depict mechanisms of semantic change. For that purpose I present a model that combines a signaling game with innovative reinforcement learning; in simulation runs I conduct this game repeatedly within a multi-agent setup, where agents are arranged in social network structures. The results of these runs are contrasted with an attested theory from sociolinguistics: the ‘weak tie’ theory. Analyses of the produced data target a deeper understanding of the role of environmental variables for the promotion of semantic change or solidity of semantic conventions.

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References found in this work

Convention: A Philosophical Study.David Kellogg Lewis - 1969 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Wiley-Blackwell.
Signals: Evolution, Learning, and Information.Brian Skyrms - 2010 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Convention: A Philosophical Study.David Lewis - 1969 - Synthese 26 (1):153-157.
The Analysis of Mind.Bertrand Russell - 1921 - London, England: Allen & Unwin.

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