On salience and signaling in sender–receiver games: partial pooling, learning, and focal points

Synthese 197 (4):1725-1747 (2020)
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Abstract

I introduce an extension of the Lewis-Skyrms signaling game, analysed from a dynamical perspective via simple reinforcement learning. In Lewis’ (Convention, Blackwell, Oxford, 1969) conception of a signaling game, salience is offered as an explanation for how individuals may come to agree upon a linguistic convention. Skyrms (Signals: evolution, learning & information, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010a) offers a dynamic explanation of how signaling conventions might arise presupposing no salience whatsoever. The extension of the atomic signaling game examined here—which I will refer to as a salience game—introduces a variable parameter into the atomic signaling game which allows for degrees of salience, thus filling in the continuum between Skyrms’ and Lewis’ models. The model does not presuppose any salience at the outset, but illustrates a process by which accidentally evolved salience is amplified, to the benefit of the players. It is shown that increasing degrees of salience allow populations to avoid sub-optimal pooling equilibria and to coordinate upon conventions more quickly.

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Travis LaCroix
Durham University

Citations of this work

Using Logic to Evolve More Logic: Composing Logical Operators via Self-Assembly.Travis LaCroix - 2022 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 73 (2):407-437.
Invention and Evolution of Correlated Conventions.Daniel A. Herrmann & Brian Skyrms - 2025 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 76 (1):223-241.
Evolutionary Explanations of Simple Communication: Signalling Games and Their Models.Travis LaCroix - 2020 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 51 (1):19-43.
Models, information and meaning.Dr Marc Artiga - 2020 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 82:101284.

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References found in this work

Signals: Evolution, Learning, and Information.Brian Skyrms - 2010 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Evolution of the Social Contract.Brian Skyrms - 1996 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Convention: A Philosophical Study.David Lewis - 1969 - Synthese 26 (1):153-157.
Animal intelligence.Edward L. Thorndike - 1899 - Psych Revmonog 8 (2):207-208.

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