Endlichkeit ohne Unendlichkeit? Anmerkungen zu Heideggers Wegkreuzung mit Hegel im Seinsproblem
Abstract
In destructing traditional metaphysics, Heidegger accuses German Idealism of eliminating the finite in favour of the infinite. Particularly Hegel is criticized for ignoring the true finitude of Dasein and thereby misinterpreting being as infinite absolute. The paper explores this criticism in three steps. First, the main features of Heidegger’s early metaphysics of finite Dasein as developed in Being and Time will be traced, followed, second, by an examination of Heidegger’s claim that Hegel’s absolute has a temporal-finite origin. Taking a closer look at Heidegger’s alternative, true finitude, leads finally to a reflection on some difficulties in Heidegger’s critique of Hegel.