The rights and wrongs of consequentialism

Philosophical Studies 151 (3):393 - 412 (2010)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

I argue that the strongest form of consequentialism is one which rejects the claim that we are morally obliged to bring about the best available consequences, but which continues to assert that what there is most reason to do is bring about the best available consequences. Such an approach promises to avoid common objections to consequentialism, such as demandingness objections. Nevertheless, the onus is on the defender of this approach either to offer her own account of what moral obligations we do face, or to explain why offering such a theory is ill-advised. I consider, and reject, one attempt at the second sort of strategy, put forward by Alastair Norcross, who defends a 'scalar' consequentialism which eschews the moral concepts of right, wrong and obligation, and limits itself to claims about what is better and worse. I go on to raise some considerations which suggest that no systematic consequentialist theory of our moral obligations will be plausible, and propose instead that consequentialism should have a more informal and indirect role in shaping what we take our moral obligations to be

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 103,449

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Praise, blame, and demandingness.Rick Morris - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (7):1857-1869.
Is Norcross Right about Right?Shelly Kagan - 2025 - Utilitas 37 (1):44-56.
Right and Wrong: Assessing Scalar Consequentialism.Brian McElwee - 2024 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 27 (5):707-724.
Impartial Reasons, Moral Demands.Brian McElwee - 2011 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (4):457-466.
Moral Demands and Ethical Theory: The Case of Consequentialism.Attila Tanyi - 2013 - In Barry Dainton & Howard Robinson, The Bloomsbury Companion to Analytic Philosophy. London: Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 500-527.
Deontic Pluralism and the Right Amount of Good.Richard Y. Chappell - 2020 - In Douglas W. Portmore, The Oxford Handbook of Consequentialism. New York, USA: Oup Usa. pp. 498-512.
The rejection of scalar consequentialism.Rob Lawlor - 2009 - Utilitas 21 (1):100-116.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-10-17

Downloads
353 (#83,879)

6 months
4 (#864,415)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Brian McElwee
University of Southampton

Citations of this work

Scalar consequentialism the right way.Neil Sinhababu - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (12):3131-3144.
Degrees of Assertability.Sam Carter - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (1):19-49.
Demandingness Objections in Ethics.Brian McElwee - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (266):84-105.
Supererogation.Alfred Archer - 2018 - Philosophy Compass 13 (3):e12476.

View all 16 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

After Virtue.A. MacIntyre - 1981 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 46 (1):169-171.
Modern Moral Philosophy.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1958 - Philosophy 33 (124):1 - 19.
Moral saints.Susan Wolf - 1982 - Journal of Philosophy 79 (8):419-439.
The schizophrenia of modern ethical theories.Michael Stocker - 1976 - Journal of Philosophy 73 (14):453-466.

View all 23 references / Add more references