Reasons and the Good

Oxford, GB: Clarendon Press (2006)
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Abstract

In Reasons and the Good Roger Crisp answers some of the oldest questions in moral philosophy. Fundamental to ethics, he claims, is the idea of ultimate reasons for action; and he argues controversially that these reasons do not depend on moral concepts. He investigates the nature of reasons themselves, and how we come to know them. He defends a hedonistic theory of well-being and an account of practical reason according to which we can give some, though not overriding, priority to our own good over that of others.

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Citations of this work

Evolutionary Debunking Arguments.Guy Kahane - 2010 - Noûs 45 (1):103-125.
The distinctive feeling theory of pleasure.Ben Bramble - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):201-217.
The place of reasons in epistemology.Kurt Sylvan & Ernest Sosa - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.
Intrinsic vs. extrinsic value.Michael J. Zimmerman - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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References found in this work

Recent Debates about the A Priori.Hartry Field - 2005 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 1. Oxford University Press UK.
Welfarism in moral theory.Andrew Moore & Roger Crisp - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):598 – 613.
Hedonic pluralism.Irwin Goldstein - 1985 - Philosophical Studies 48 (1):49 - 55.
Introduction.A. R. Peacocke - 1976 - Zygon 11 (4):306-306.
Inference and insight. [REVIEW]Paul Boghossian - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (3):633–640.

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