Challenges to the Diagnosis of Functional Neurological Disorder: Feigning, Intentionality, and Responsibility

Neuroethics 16 (1):1-8 (2022)
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Abstract

The diagnosis of Functional Neurological Disorder (FND) requires differentiation from other neurologic diseases/syndromes, and from the comparatively rare diagnosis of feigning (Malingering and Factitious Disorder). Analyzing the process of diagnosing FND reveals a necessary element of presumption, which I propose underlies some of the uncertainty, discomfort, and stigma associated with this diagnosis. A conflict between the neurologist’s natural social cognition and professional judgement (cognitive dissonance) can be understood by applying a framework originally designed for the determination of moral responsibility. Understanding the source of this cognitive dissonance may effect its alleviation, and in turn, allow more compassionate treatment of patients with FND.

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Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility.John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza - 1998 - New York: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Mark Ravizza.
Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 1962 - Proceedings of the British Academy 48:187-211.
The problem of action.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1997 - In Alfred R. Mele (ed.), The philosophy of action. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 157-62.
Freedom, Resentment, and the Metaphysics of Morals.Pamela Hieronymi - 2020 - Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press.

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