Kant's theory of judgment, and judgments of taste: On Henry Allison's "Kant's theory of taste"

Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 46 (2):143 – 163 (2003)
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Abstract

Kant's use of the leading thread of his table of logical forms of judgment to analyze judgments of taste yields more results than Allison's account allows. It reveals in judgments of taste the combination of two judgments: a descriptive judgment about the object, and a normative judgment about the judging subjects. Core arguments of Kant's critique of taste receive new light from this analysis

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Béatrice Longuenesse
New York University

Citations of this work

Kant and the Pleasure of “Mere Reflection”.Melissa Zinkin - 2012 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 55 (5):433-453.
Kant-Bibliographie 2003.Margit Ruffing - 2005 - Kant Studien 96 (4):468-501.

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