The social life of prejudice

Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 67 (8):2585-2600 (2024)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

A ‘vestigial social practice' is a norm, convention, or social behavior that persists even when few endorse it or its original justifying rationale. Begby (2021) explores social explanations for the persistence of prejudice, arguing that even if we all privately disavow a stereotype, we might nevertheless continue acting as if it is true because we believe that others expect us to. Meanwhile the persistence of the practice provides something like implicit testimonial evidence for the prejudice that would justify it, making it rational for members of the next generation to acquire the corresponding prejudiced beliefs. This paper distinguishes between three different types of vestigial social practice in terms of the underlying explanatory mechanisms, and argues that the persistence of prejudicial social stereotypes is most tightly linked not to others’ beliefs or expectations, but to the ways that material infrastructure constrains options shapes social outcomes. Given that, the persistence of a practice only provides grounds to infer that most people endorse the corresponding prejudiced belief only if we are in a position to dismiss relevant alternative explanations.

Other Versions

No versions found

Similar books and articles

Prejudice, generics, and resistance to evidence.M. Giulia Napolitano - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy (8):2571-2584.
Can prejudiced beliefs be rational?Thomas Kelly - 2024 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 67 (8):2601-2618.
Implicit motivation to control prejudice.Jack Glaser & Eric Knowles - 2008 - Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 44 (1):164–72.
Norms, Constitutive and Social, and Assertion.Elizabeth Fricker - 2017 - American Philosophical Quarterly 54 (4):397-418.
Religion and reducing prejudice.Joanna Burch-Brown & William Baker - 2016 - Group Processes and Intergroup Relations 19 (6):784 - 807.
Prejudice: A Study in Non-ideal Epistemology.Jessie Munton - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (4):1057-1061.

Analytics

Added to PP
2023-10-29

Downloads
299 (#98,751)

6 months
130 (#47,039)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Renee Jorgensen
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

The Rationality of Perception.Susanna Siegel - 2017 - Oxford University Press.
Cognition as a Social Skill.Sally Haslanger - 2019 - Tandf: Australasian Philosophical Review 3 (1):5-25.

View all 9 references / Add more references