Abstract

In this article, Peirce’s conception of teleology or final causation is discussed. According to Peirce, final causes are general types that tend to realize themselves by determining processes of efficient causation. They are not future events, but general possibilities. Given any process, the symptoms of final causation are that the end state of the process can be reached in different ways, and that the process is irreversible. Peirce holds the view that, instead of being two basically different types of causation, final and efficient causation are complementary inasmuch as there is in each act of causation an efficient and a final component. He therefore rejects the idea that mechanical and teleological processes are completely heterogeneous. All processes are teleological; mechanical processes are simply teleological processes with a low grade of finality. Moreover, teleology involves objective chance, which is to say that there is an aspect of irreducible novelty at every stage of a process. And it involves novelty in the choice of the different routes that lead to a specified general end state, and in the possible evolution of the final causes themselves.