Is there an unrecognized teleology in Hume's analysis of causation?

Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 18 (1):52-60 (1998)
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Abstract

D. Hume's analysis of causation is critically analyzed in light of certain assumptions that he made regarding the classical Aristotelian causes. Using his widely cited analysis of billiard balls colliding and moving about as an example of how efficient causation is supposedly learned, the argument is made that Hume has overlooked the functioning of final causation in this learning. Thus, in order to understand how a learner might reason back from the presumed "effect" to the "cause" in efficient causation, we must appreciate that the learner is actually employing a final-cause process of predication-that is, of reasoning "for the sake of" precedents extending sequaciously to targets. As final causation underwrites telic description, it is concluded that there is an unrecognized teleology in Hume's analysis of causation. 2012 APA, all rights reserved)

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