Why and how we are not zombies

Journal of Consciousness Studies 1 (2):164-67 (1994)
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Abstract

A robot that is functionally indistinguishable from us may or may not be a mindless Zombie. There will never be any way to know, yet its functional principles will be as close as we can ever get to explaining the mind

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Stevan Harnad
McGill University

Citations of this work

A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness.J. Kevin O’Regan & Alva Noë - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):883-917.
Minds, machines and Turing: The indistinguishability of indistinguishables.Stevan Harnad - 2000 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 9 (4):425-445.
The Zombie Attack on the Computational Conception of Mind.Selmer Bringsjord - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1):41-69.
We ’re All Infected: Legal Personhood, Bare Life and The Walking Dead‘.Mitchell Travis - 2015 - International Journal for the Semiotics of Law - Revue Internationale de Sémiotique Juridique 28 (4):787-800.

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References found in this work

The symbol grounding problem.Stevan Harnad - 1990 - Physica D 42:335-346.
Consciousness: An afterthought.Stevan Harnad - 1982 - Cognition and Brain Theory 5:29-47.
Connecting object to symbol in modeling cognition.Stevan Harnad - 1992 - In A. Clark & Ronald Lutz (eds.), Connectionism in Context. Springer Verlag. pp. 75--90.
Minds, machines and Searle.Stevan Harnad - 1989 - Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 1 (4):5-25.
Minds, machines and Searle.Stevan Harnad - 1989 - Journal of Theoretical and Experimental Artificial Intelligence 1:5-25.

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