The Zombie Attack on the Computational Conception of Mind

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1):41-69 (1999)
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Abstract

Is it true that if zombies---creatures who are behaviorally indistinguishable from us, but no more conscious than a rock-are logically possible, the computational conception of mind is false? Are zombies logically possible? Are they physically possible? This paper is a careful, sustained argument for affirmative answers to these three questions.

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Selmer Bringsjord
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute

References found in this work

Brainstorms.Daniel C. Dennett - 1978 - MIT Press.
Minds, brains, and programs.John Searle - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):417-57.

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