You can't argue with a zombie

Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (4):333-345 (1995)
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Abstract

[opening paragraph}: It turns out that it is possible to distinguish a zombie from a person. A zombie has a different philosophy. That is the only difference. Therefore, zombies can only be detected if they happen to be philosophers. Dennett is obviously a zombie

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