A Theodicy for Artificial Universes: Moral Considerations on Simulation Hypotheses

International Journal of Technoethics 12 (1):21-31 (2021)
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Abstract

‘Simulation Hypotheses’ are imaginative scenarios that are typically employed in philosophy to speculate on how likely it is that we are currently living within a simulated universe as well as on our possibility for ever discerning whether we do in fact inhabit one. These philosophical questions in particular overshadowed other aspects and potential uses of simulation hypotheses, some of which are foregrounded in this article. More specifically, “A Theodicy for Artificial Universes” focuses on the moral implications of simulation hypotheses with the objective of speculatively answering questions concerning computer simulations such as: If we are indeed living in a computer simulation, what might be its purpose? What aspirations and values could be inferentially attributed to its alleged creators? And would living in a simulated universe affect the value and meaning we attribute to our existence?

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Stefano Gualeni
University of Malta

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References found in this work

The matrix as metaphysics.David J. Chalmers - 2005 - In Christopher Grau, Philosophers Explore the Matrix. Oxford University Press. pp. 132.
Are We Living in a Computer Simulation?Nick Bostrom - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (211):243-255.
Theodicy and Animal Pain.Peter Harrison - 1989 - Philosophy 64 (247):79 - 92.

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