Let's hope we're not living in a simulation

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 109 (3):1042-1048 (2024)
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Abstract

In Reality+, David Chalmers suggests that it wouldn't be too bad if we lived in a computer simulation. I argue on the contrary that if we live in a simulation, we ought to attach a significant conditional credence to its being a small or brief simulation. Our existence and the existence of many of the people and things we care about would then unfortunately depend on contingencies difficult to assess and beyond our control. Furthermore, all the badness of the world would appear to reflect the gods’ intentional cruelty or callous disregard. A large, stable rock is a more dependable and less axiologically troubling fundamental ground for reality.

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Eric Schwitzgebel
University of California, Riverside

Citations of this work

Taking the simulation hypothesis seriously.David J. Chalmers - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 109 (3):1058-1067.

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References found in this work

Are We Living in a Computer Simulation?Nick Bostrom - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (211):243-255.
Are we living in a computer simulation?By Nick Bostrom - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (211):243–255.
Epistemological solipsism as a route to external world skepticism.Grace Helton - 2021 - Philosophical Perspectives 35 (1):229-250.

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