A Logical Defence of Maher’s Model of Polythematic Delusions

Journal of Philosophical Research 35 (2):451-475 (2010)
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Abstract

We proceed to describe a model for the formation and maintenance of polythematic delusions encountered in schizophrenia, which is in adequacy with Brendan Maher's account of delusions. Polythematic delusions are considered here as the conclusions of arguments triggered by apophenia that include some very common errors of reasoning such as post hoc fallacy and confirmation bias. We describe first the structure of reasoning which leads to delusions of reference, of telepathy and of influence, by distinguishing between the primary, secondary, tertiary and quaternary types of delusional arguments. These four levels of arguments correspond to a stage the nature of which is respectively instantial, inductive, interpretative at a monothematic level and interpretative at a polythematic level. We also proceed to identify accurately the fallacious steps in the corresponding reasoning. We expose then the role of apophenia in the elaboration of delusional ideas. Lastly, we describe the role played by the hallucinations in the present model.

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Rationality, meaning, and the analysis of delusion.John Campbell - 2001 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8 (2-3):89-100.
Delusions and the background of rationality.Lisa Bortolotti - 2005 - Mind and Language 20 (2):189-208.
Experience, belief, and the interpretive fold.Tim Bayne & Elisabeth Pacherie - 2004 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 11 (1):81-86.

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