Experience, belief, and the interpretive fold

&
Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 11 (1):81-86 (2004)
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Abstract

Elisabeth Pacherie is a research fellow in philosophy at Institut Jean Nicod, Paris. Her main research and publications are in the areas of philosophy of mind, psychopathology and action theory. Her publications include a book on intentionality (_Naturaliser_ _l'intentionnalité_, Paris, PUF, 1993) and she is currently preparing a book on action and agency

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10.1353/ppp.2004.0034

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Author Profiles

Elisabeth Pacherie
Institut Jean Nicod
Tim Bayne
Monash University

Citations of this work

Delusion.Lisa Bortolotti - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Thought insertion and self-knowledge.Jordi Fernández - 2010 - Mind and Language 25 (1):66-88.

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References found in this work

Thought and talk.Donald Davidson - 1975 - In Samuel D. Guttenplan, Mind and language. Oxford [Eng.]: Clarendon Press. pp. 1975--7.
Contemporary Theories of Knowledge.Hilary Kornblith - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (1):167-171.
Monothematic Delusions: Towards a Two-Factor Account.Martin Davies, Max Coltheart, Robyn Langdon & Nora Breen - 2001 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8 (2):133-158.
Rationality, meaning, and the analysis of delusion.John Campbell - 2001 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8 (2-3):89-100.

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