The Notion of Pseudo-Argument in Perelman’s Thought

Argumentation 23 (3):351-359 (2009)
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Abstract

According to Perelman (Rhétoriques, Presses Universitaires de Bruxelles, 1989: 80), a pseudo-argument is an argument that is supposed to be convincing from a given audience viewpoint, while it is not from another audience viewpoint. Such a claim raises the traditional problem of the boundaries between the well known “convince versus persuade” dichotomy. This paper aims at investigating it from a contemporary rhetorical and argumentative perspective which will take into account the fictional dimension of persuasion. In this perspective, it will be claimed that the notion of an “as if” argument better fits to some rhetorical phenomena

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References found in this work

Rhetoric. Aristotle & C. D. C. Reeve - 2018 - Hackett Publishing Company.
The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation.Chaïm Perelman & Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca - 1969 - Notre Dame, IN, USA: Notre Dame University Press. Edited by Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca.
Sour Grapes: Studies in the Subversion of Rationality.Jon Elster - 1983 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Motivated irrationality.David Pears - 1984 - South Bend, Ind.: St. Augustine's Press.

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