Unacceptable Generalizations in Arguments on Legal Evidence

Argumentation 31 (1):83-99 (2017)
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Abstract

Arguments on legal evidence rely on generalizations, that link a certain circumstance to a certain hypothesis and warrants the claim that the circumstance makes the hypothesis more probable. Some generalizations are acceptable and others are unacceptable. A generalization can be unacceptable on at least four different grounds. A false generalization is unacceptable because membership in the reference class does not increase the probability of the hypothesis. A non-robust generalization is unacceptable because it uses a reference class that is too heterogeneous. A biastriggering generalization is unacceptable because decision makers are inclined to overestimate the evidentiary value of membership in the reference class. A discriminating generalization is unacceptable because it puts members in the reference class in an unfair disadvantage. Research funded by the Swedish Research Council.

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References found in this work

The theory of probability.Hans Reichenbach - 1949 - Berkeley,: University of California Press.
Appeal to Expert Opinion: Arguments From Authority.Douglas Neil Walton - 1997 - University Park, PA, USA: Pennsylvania State University Press.
The works of Jeremy Bentham.Jeremy Bentham & John Bowring - 1962 - New York,: Russell & Russell. Edited by John Bowring.

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