Nurses in Ghana believe that training, practise, practitioner and policy reforms are required for total nursing profession reform to be effective. Their views for role reformation in the nursing profession, which is currently needed, are not only academic but also clinically relevant in the pursuit of health equity and quality nursing care. We explored and described nurses’ views on their roles in the profession using data collected from 24 professional nurses in three regional hospitals in Ghana. Using an inductive descriptive (...) qualitative design, data were gathered and analysed using a qualitative content analysis to describe the views of the nurses. Four major themes, namely practise reforms, practitioner reforms, training reforms and policy reforms have emerged in relation to role reformation in the nursing profession. Three strategic areas, practitioner attitudes, new training modalities and policy realignment, must be reviewed and remodelled for better positioning of the nursing profession before its entire role reformation. (shrink)

Most philosophers agree that causal knowledge is essential to decision-making: agents should choose from the available options those that probably cause the outcomes that they want. This book argues against this theory and in favour of evidential or Bayesian decision theory, which emphasises the symptomatic value of options over their causal role. It examines a variety of settings, including economic theory, quantum mechanics and philosophical thought-experiments, where causal knowledge seems to make a practical difference. The arguments make novel use of (...) machinery from other areas of philosophical inquiry, including first-person epistemology and the free will debate. The book also illustrates the applicability of decision theory itself to questions about the direction of time and the special epistemic status of agents. (shrink)

Uganda is invoked as a metaphor for a host of arguments and insights about HIV/AIDS. However, much of what has been asserted about the country is not based on the available evidence. This paper reviews findings by epidemiologists and anthropologists, and draws on the author’s experiences of researching in the country since the early 1980s. It comments on various myths about HIV/AIDS in Uganda, including myths about the origin and dissemination of the disease, about the links between HIV/AIDS and (...) war, and about declining rates of infection. It shows that much less is known about Uganda than is commonly supposed, and it offers some alternative hypotheses for interpreting HIV prevalence and incidence data. In particular it draws attention to the importance of mechanisms for social compliance. It concludes by raising concerns about the current enthusiasm for provision of anti-retroviral drugs. (shrink)

The authors' attempt to explore the ability of animals to monitor how certain they are of their choice behavior, necessarily fails both in their effort to include “higher” mammals (such as monkeys and dolphins) in the class of metacognitive organisms (humans) and in their conclusion that “lower” organisms are not capable of similar behavior.

In this article I have two primary goals. First, I present two recent views on the distinction between knowledge-that and knowledge-how (Stanley and Williamson, The Journal of Philosophy 98(8):411–444, 2001; Hetherington, Epistemology futures, 2006). I contend that neither of these provides conclusive arguments against the distinction. Second, I discuss studies from neuroscience and experimental psychology that relate to this distinction. Having examined these studies, I then defend a third view that explains certain relevant data from these studies by positing the (...) double dissociation of knowledge-that and knowledge-how and that is also able to do explanatory work elsewhere. (shrink)

It is widely assumed that it is the anti-realist who stakes his case on evidence from the history of science. I argue that realists have failed to recognize the need to collect evidence from the history of science to support their methodological claims, and anti-realists do not rely on evidence from the history of science to the extent that many suggest.

Existing research has identified the importance of role models in the imitation of cooperative behaviors. This Pre-Study attempted to explore the contagion effects of cooperative models. Drawing on goal contagion theory, we proposed that encountering cooperative models could catalyze participants’ cooperation when participants joined new groups without role models, and that moral elevation and calling would play a chain-mediating role in this process. To test the hypothesis, we designed a four-person public goods game consisting of two phases in which participants (...) were formed into teams with different people in each phase. We randomly assigned 108 participants to either a consistent contributor (CC) or control condition. The only difference was that participants in the CC condition encountered a cooperative role model (i.e., CC) in the first phase, while those in the control group did not. The results moderately supported all hypotheses. Briefly, our findings provide empirical evidence supporting the two processes of goal contagion theory: when individuals encounter a CC, they first make inferences about the CC’s goal, as reflected by moral elevation, and then adopt the model’s prosocial goals (i.e., calling), resulting in increased cooperative behaviors in new groups. These findings could extend our understanding of the contagion effect of cooperative modeling, but require high-powered replication studies before such conclusions can be drawn. (shrink)

Amalgamating evidence from heterogeneous sources and across levels of inquiry is becoming increasingly important in many pure and applied sciences. This special issue provides a forum for researchers from diverse scientific and philosophical perspectives to discuss evidence amalgamation, its methodologies, its history, its pitfalls, and its potential. We situate the contributions therein within six themes from the broad literature on this subject: the variety-of-evidence thesis, the philosophy of meta-analysis, the role of robustness/sensitivity analysis for evidence amalgamation, (...) its bearing on questions of extrapolation and external validity of experiments, its connection with theory development, and its interface with causal inference, especially regarding causal theories of cancer. (shrink)

Daniel McKaughan has recently argued that conceiving faith as an ‘action-centred’ attitude whose cognitive component falls short of outright belief can play a central role in explaining how people who regard the truth of Christianity as significantly less probable than naturalism can respond with faith to the gospel proclamation without believing its core claims or presuppositions on insufficient evidence, and without violating the requirements of either pragmatic or epistemic rationality. In this paper I object to McKaughan that hope—the attitude (...) to which he assigns the cognitive role of action-centred faith—is ill-suited for the intended purpose, and that having to the core claims and presuppositions of the gospel proclamation any attitude that is suited for the intended purpose is not going to leave a person who takes her overall evidence to run against some of those claims and presuppositions ‘free to follow the arguments and evidence where it leads’. (shrink)

Peter Achinstein has gathered some prominent philosophers and historians of science for critical and lively discussions of both general questions about the ...

If the problem of induction were soluble, it should be solved inductively: by observing how scientists observe, etc. The fact is that scientific research is successful, and the real question is, will it be so in future? If there is a formula of induction by which success is achieved, then by this formula we can say, as long as it will be used science will succeed. If there is no formula it looks as if future success in scientific research is (...) most doubtful. Hence, a transcendental argument for induction goes, there is an inductive formula. Since, however, such a view of induction is rejected even by inductivists as naive, the argument collapses. Hence the question is, on what basis do we project the future success of science? My answer is that this future success is built into our social institutions and is partially institutionally safeguarded. (shrink)

In this article I summarize Friedrich Hayek’s cultural group selection theory and describe the evidence gathered by current cultural group selection theorists within the behavioral and social sciences supporting Hayek’s main assertions. I conclude with a few comments on Hayek and libertarianism.

This open issue of the Nordic Journal of Applied Ethics consists of four papers that discuss the topics covering vaccination, sustainability, development ethics research and family ethics. It also includes a book review.

사용-참신성 예측주의에 따르면, 가설 구성에 사용된 자료는 증거가 되기 어렵다. DNA 이중 나선 구조의 발견에 대한 사례 연구는 이에 대한 반례를 제공한다. 로잘린드 프랭클린의 DNA X선 회절 사진은 이중 나선 가설의 구성에 사용된 동시에 증거로도 사용되었다. 이 사례에서 증거는 제약에 의한 대안가설의 명시적 제거에 의존하는 증거와 제약들 사이의 정합성 확인에 의존하는 증거로 구분되며, 두 증거 모두 ‘사용-참신한 예측’이라는 조건에는 의존하지 않는다.

Over the past decade there has been a trend within adapted physical activity (APA) to question the hegemony of the medical understanding of disability. This debate has consequences for professional practice, which some argue should be regarded as a learning situation with a pedagogical orientation. The concept of evidence-based practice and research has spread from its origin in medicine to other allied health fields and education. In this article I discuss the limitations of applying evidence-based practice to a (...) pedagogical approach to APA. More specifically, I use the Aristotelian notion phronesis to show that professional practice of APA is essentially characterized by an indeterminacy that cannot be eradicated through the technological thinking inherent in evidence-based practice. (shrink)

Our computational studies of infant language learning estimate the inherent difficulty of Arbib's proposal. We show that body language provides a strikingly helpful scaffold for learning language that may be necessary but not sufficient, given the absence of sophisticated language in other species. The extraordinary language abilities of Homo sapiens must have evolved from other pressures, such as sexual selection.

Evidence that an animal is capable of some degree of symbolic, human language processing supports the argument that the animal's consciousness is to some degree human-like. In this paper, we reinterpret the findings of Savage- Rumbaugh et al. using the twin tools of Deacon's referential hierarchy and Systemic Functional Linguistics, with a view to providing further corroborative evidence for a Bonobo ape's symbolic processing abilities, and as a result to open a window into the consciousness of at least (...) one non-human primate. (shrink)

Conscious experience of the sensation of smell provides exemplars of the sensation exhibiting to us what it is like. These exemplars of experiences can become vehicles or terms of representation and meaning. I call this exemplar representation and the process exemplarization. The notion of exemplarization is indebted to Hume and Goodman. I modify the notion here to apply to the sensation of smell. Exemplar representation differs from verbal representation because the exemplar, like a sample, exhibits what the represented items smell (...) like, a perfume, a spice, or an animal. The exemplar represents the sensation and, at the same, represents external objects, my example is the spray of a skunk, by exhibiting what a skunk smells like. The exemplar is part of the meaning and conception of the external object. This solves the problem, as Reid insisted, of how experience of smell justifies perceptual belief in the existence of external objects. The meaning of thought and discourse about external objects is not exhausted by the exemplarization of the sensation of smell, but the exemplar becomes evidence of their existence as part of the meaning of what they smell like. The evidence and justification of the exemplar is fallible and defeasible. However, exemplar justification, when undefeated by error in the way it coheres with a background system, becomes knowledge of the external world. (shrink)

This book discusses Aristotle's methods for the establishment of gynecological facts within his natural science. It argues that many of the gynecological phenomena at stake, such the nature of menstrual blood, the role of female pleasure during sex and women's experiences of erotic dreams, their knowledge of conception and their experiences of (false) pregnancy and childbirth, were-mostly for socio-cultural reasons-not at all or not immediately accessible for a male natural scientific observer such as Aristotle. Given this lack of immediate empirical (...) evidence, Aristotle employed alternative methods for the establishment of facts-such as relying on signs and circumstantial empirical evidence or using analogical and probabilistic reasoning-and relied heavily on existing expert reports, such as mainly early medical sources but also sometimes verbal reports from women themselves"-- Provided by publisher. (shrink)

Representations of medicine in pop culture often have an iconographic character. Thereby, they set in a double sense of self-evidence. They represent on the one hand, self-evidently a medical context, and on the other hand, they act to transport or at least illustrate self-evident medical pieces of knowledge. In this contribution, we will give an overview of the current research about the visual self-evidence. Different strategies that serve the production of self-evident images in medicine are described and their (...) representation in popular culture will be displayed on the basis of three case studies. The case studies include the use of curves to record and display physiological movements, radiology as a tool to produce images from the interior of the body and neuroimaging techniques that were designed to illustrate the working brain. (shrink)

Statistical analysis is often used to evaluate the strength of evidence for or against scientific hypotheses. Here we consider evidence measurement from the point of view of representational measurement theory, focusing in particular on the 0-points of measurement scales. We argue that a properly calibrated evidence measure will need to count up from absolute 0, in a sense to be defined, and that this 0-point is likely to be something other than what one might have expected. This (...) suggests the need for a new theory of statistical evidence in the context of which calibrated evidence measurement becomes tractable. (shrink)

An integral part of the schooling of scientists, especially experimental ones, is the cultivation of the significance and role of scientific evidence. Naturally this schooling is not conducted in vacuuo. Budding scientists already have experiences of, and intuitions about, the use of evidence in everyday life. In this talk I take a sustained look at the relations between common-sense notions of evidence and scientific ones. Among other things, I argue that scientific notions of evidence and associated (...) practices are in many ways conservative extensions of what is best about our common-sense notions and practices. This contradicts a rather widely held but often tacit view that science and its notions are largely insular. (shrink)

BackgroundExpertise has been a contentious concept in Evidence-Based Medicine. Especially in the early days of the movement, expertise was taken to be exactly what EBM was rebelling against—the authoritarian pronouncements about “best” interventions dutifully learned in medical schools, sometimes with dire consequences. Since then, some proponents of EBM have tried various ways of reincorporating the idea of expertise into EBM, with mixed results. However, questions remain. Is expertise evidence? If not, what is it good for, if anything?MethodsIn this (...) article, I describe and analyze the three historical models of expertise integration in EBM and discuss the difficulties in putting each into practice. I also examine accounts of expertise from disciplines outside of medicine, including philosophy, sociology, psychology, and science and technology studies to see if these accounts can strengthen and clarify what EBM has to say about expertise.ResultsOf the accounts of expertise discussed here, the Collins and Evans account can do most to clarify the concept of expertise in EBM.ConclusionsWith some additional clarification from EBM proper, theoretical resources from other disciplines might augment the current EBM account of expertise. (shrink)

Background In the context of limited health care budgets in countries where Neglected Tropical Diseases are endemic, scaling up disease control interventions entails the setting of priorities. However, solutions based solely on cost-effectiveness analyses may lead to biased and insufficiently justified priorities. Objectives The objectives of this paper are to 1) demonstrate how a range of equity concerns can be used to identify feasible priority setting criteria, 2) show how these criteria can be fed into a multi-criteria decision-making matrix, and (...) 3) discuss the conditions under which this decision-making procedure should be carried out in a real-world decision-making context. Methods This paper draws on elements from theories of decision analysis and ethical theories of fair resource allocation. We explore six typical NTD interventions by employing a modified multi-criteria decision analysis model with predefined criteria, drawn from a priority setting guide under development by the WHO. To identify relevant evidence for the six chosen interventions, we searched the PubMed and Cochrane databases. Discussion Our in vitro multi-criteria decision analysis suggested that case management for visceral leishmaniasis should be given a higher priority than mass campaigns to prevent soil-transmitted helminthic infections. This seems to contradict current health care priorities and recommendations in the literature. We also consider procedural conditions that should be met in a contextualised decision-making process and we stress the limitations of this study exercise. Conclusion By exploring how several criteria relevant to the multi-facetted characteristics of NTDs can be taken into account simultaneously, we are able to suggest how improved priority settings among NTDs can be realised. (shrink)

In this slim but excessively priced volume, Paul Horwich attempts "to exhibit a unified approach to philosophy of science, based on the concept of subjective probability... by offering new treatments of several problems... and... by providing a more complete probabilistic account of scientific methods and assumptions than has been given before". Starting with the view that beliefs are not all-or-nothing matters but rather are susceptible to varying degrees of intensity, and interpreting this via a modified Bayesian use of subjective probability, (...) Horwich treats well-known puzzles in philosophy of science by considering the following topics: accommodation of data, statistical evidence, severe tests, surprising predictions, paradox of confirmation, the "grue" problem, simplicity, ad hoc hypotheses, diverse evidence, prediction vs. accommodation, desirability of further evidence, and realism vs. instrumentalism. Preceding treatment of these topics is an acceptance of the Bayesian principle that "the degrees of belief of an ideally rational person conform to the mathematical principles of probability theory" and a treatment of probability theory and its various standard interpretations which comprises a quarter of the text. (shrink)

Elliott Sober argues that the statistical slogan “Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence” cannot be taken literally: it must be interpreted charitably as claiming that the absence of evidence is (typically) not very much evidence of absence. I offer an alternative interpretation, on which the slogan claims that absence of evidence is (typically) not objective evidence of absence. I sketch a definition of objective evidence, founded in the notion of an epistemically (...) objective likelihood, and I show that in Sober’s paradigm case, the slogan can, on this understanding, be sustained. (shrink)

Timothy Williamson has argued that a person S ’s total evidence is constituted solely by propositions that S knows. This theory of evidence entails that a false belief can not be a part of S ’s evidence base for a conclusion. I argue by counterexample that this thesis (E = K for now) forces an implausible separation between what it means for a belief to be justified and rational from one’s perspective and what it means to base (...) one’s beliefs on the evidence. Furthermore, I argue that E = K entails the implausible result that there are cases in which a well-evidenced belief necessarily can not serve as evidence for a further proposition. (shrink)

Toward evidence‐based policy decisions: a case study of nursing health human resources in Ontario, CanadaThis paper reflects how health services research ‘evidence’ was used to influence decisions in the province of Ontario, Canada. The process involved interaction among a variety of stakeholders and decision‐makers with researchers to reduce uncertainty and to substantiate emerging service provision issues in the province. The issues presented here focus specifically on an analysis of the nursing situation completed in 1998 for the Minister of (...) Health’s Nursing Task Force, which examined key issues in service delivery. The issues were: restructured work environments; nurse supply and declining enrollments; labour trends and utilization of the nursing workforce; patient acuity and complexity of work environments and the influence on workload; and the paucity of reliable and valid data bases for analysis of nursing’s contribution to the health system. Ontarians can be confident that the Task Force recommendations were born from solid research‐based evidence and now the challenge becomes to monitor the implementation of these resolutions over time. (shrink)

Your evidence constrains your rational degrees of confidence both locally and globally. On the one hand, particular bits of evidence can boost or diminish your rational degree of confidence in various hypotheses, relative to your background information. On the other hand, epistemic rationality requires that, for any hypothesis h, your confidence in h is proportional to the support that h receives from your total evidence. Why is it that your evidence has these two epistemic powers? I (...) argue that various proposed accounts of what it is for something to be an element of your evidence set cannot answer this question. I then propose an alternative account of what it is for something to be an element of your evidence set. 1 Introduction 2 The elements of one's evidence set are propositions 3 Which kinds of propositions are in one's evidence set? 3.1 Doxastic accounts of evidence 3.2 Non-doxastic accounts of evidence 4 Elaborating and defending the LIE CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

There is a vast literature on evidence-based practice in education. What function does evidence have in practical deliberations toward decisions about what to do? Most writers on EBP seem to think of evidence largely as quantitative data, serving as a foundation from which practice could and should be directly derived. In this paper I argue that we are better served by according a different and more indirect function to evidence in practical reasoning. To establish this claim (...) I employ Toulmin’s model of argumentation. On this model the evidence-as-foundation view amounts to evidence as data/grounds. The model also offers a different function for evidence, as backing of the warrant, and I argue in this paper that this is a more adequate understanding of the function of evidence in practical reasoning. (shrink)

What is the role played by mechanisms in medical reasoning? In this paper, we provide an inferential study of the use of mechanisms in medical reasoning. Medical reasoning includes clinical reasoning and biomedical research reasoning. It is not conceived in terms of a specific form of inference, but as a complex form of reasoning involving abductions, deductions, and inductions. This methodology sheds a new light on the notion of mechanistic evidence, which has been the object of a regain of (...) interest in recent literature, but which remains unclearly defined. We claim that “mechanistic evidence” is ambiguous: it can mean “evidence of a mechanism” or “mechanism as evidence”. Then, two main groups of medical reasoning can be identified: inference _to_ mechanisms and inference _from_ mechanisms. This serves as a basis to distinguish between factual evidence and the more pragmatic notion of evidence as reasons to accept a claim. In this context, we assess the role of mechanisms in the process of producing evidence. (shrink)