In this journal, Bucci (2022) has argued that two famous experiments in the neuroscientific literature can be used to support property dualism about the mind. In what follows, I attempt to illustrate that those experiments are completely compatible with a naive identity mind-brain/body identity theory.

In this theoretical article, I propose free will to be compatible, not with determinism, but with chance. This paper provides a neurological model of how free will emerges from oscillating neuronal activity, in modules. These, representing ideas, oscillate subconsciously, competing for conscious attention; choice between them is partly random. The modules seek to maintain, homeostatically, a sense of context and consistency; and a conscious desire for a sense of character and personality. I propose that they learn from experience, using feedback (...) to rebalance, so that decisions conform to our desired will. This applies to "snap" decisions, but also to our moral core. Particular experiences influence our future moral judgments such that we accept responsibility for our generally but not entirely predictable decisions. The model explains will power, pathologies (i.e., addiction, “ego-depletion”) and links free will to creativity and humor. The Modular with Feedback theory of free will grants us freedom through a plastic control the uncertainty of which isn’t understood, but which is sufficient to preclude determinism. Key Words: free will, modular, feedback, inverse compatibilism, plastic control -/- . (shrink)

In this article, we provide a book review on Hengwei Li’s new book, "The Biotic View of Mind and Issues of Posthuman Society." The author presents a groundbreaking perspective, the biotic view of mind, which is known as the strong continuity view within the life-mind continuity thesis, resonating with pragmatism and predictive processing theory. Furthermore, this viewpoint is extended to the real-life context on intelligent technology and the forms of posthuman society, offering valuable insights for navigating the development of future (...) society. Lastly, the author addresses the opposition and conflicts between the "two cultures" in cognitive science and proposes three potential solutions to this existing predicament. Given that this book spans philosophy, biology, psychology, neuroscience, and cognitive science, we believe it can inspire researchers and advanced students alike. (shrink)

The two-visual-systems hypothesis proposed by Goodale and Milner is a radical one. If it were to be true, then our common sense such as we are acting on what we are perceiving should be completely abandoned. In this paper, I argue that the hypothesis over-generalizes what happens in simple tasks to what happens in complex tasks. By contrast, I demonstrate that what happens in complex tasks is compatible with our common sense. In a word, though what we are acting on (...) may come apart from what we are perceiving in some cases, that is not the whole story. (shrink)