Many philosophers have claimed that normative error theorists are committed to the claim ‘Error theory is true, but I have no reason to believe it’, which to some appears paradoxical. Case (2019) has claimed that the normative error theorist cannot avoid this paradox. In this paper, we argue that there is no paradox in the first place, that is once we clear up the ambiguity of the word ‘reason’, both on the error theorist’s side and those that claim that there (...) is a self-defeat problem. Upon clarification, we also raise scepticism to what exactly the nature of self-defeat is meant to be. (shrink)

Recently, Andrew Ter Ern Loke has provided a new deductive formulation of the Moral Argument for the existence of God, which states that if one believes in moral realism (the metaethical view that there are objective moral truths), then they should also believe in theism. We demonstrate how his New Moral Argument does not guarantee the conclusion that objective moral truths are metaphysically grounded in a divine personal entity. Next, we reconstruct the argument in a way that is logically exhaustive. (...) However, even once we do this, the argument remains unsuccessful, since it ignores at least one metaethical view that admits there are objective moral truths, but they are not metaphysically substantive: relaxed realism. We find five ways Loke could be motivating the claim that if there are objective moral truths, then they are metaphysically substantive truths, but we argue that these motivations do not succeed or are consistent with relaxed realism. (shrink)

In this journal, Bucci (2022) has argued that two famous experiments in the neuroscientific literature can be used to support property dualism about the mind. In what follows, I attempt to illustrate that those experiments are completely compatible with a naive identity mind-brain/body identity theory.

Parfit (2011, 2017) denies that committing to the existence of reasons is ontologically costly. To motivate his denial, Mintz-Woo (2018) thinks Parfit forwards two arguments: the plural senses argument from elimination and the argument from empty ontology. Mintz-Woo believes he has ‘debunked’ both arguments. In what follows, we do three things. First, we argue that his objections to the arguments fail or at best miss the point. Second, we argue that even if our independent responses fail, his responses meet an (...) unfortunate dilemma. Lastly, we address his concerns about the relationship between Parfit’s ontology and truth. (shrink)

Non-Realist Cognitivism is a meta-ethical theory that is supposedly objectionably unclear. Recently, Farbod Akhlaghi (2022) has provided a novel exposition of Parfit’s Non-Realist Cognitivism that employs truthmaker theory to clarify it. He illustrates that such clarification leads the non-realist cognitivist into a dilemma: either the theory has to accept truthmaker maximalism, rendering the theory inconsistent, or it has to let go of truthmaking altogether. He also attempts to undercut a “partners-in-innocence” strategy that the non-realist cognitivist utilizes to motivate the key (...) assumption of Non-Realist Cognitivism: that normative truths are truthmaker gaps. In this paper, we do three things in reply to Akhlaghi. First, we show how most of his attempts to disqualify candidate partners-in-innocence fail, or at best miss the point. Second, we provide a case for a partner-in-innocence Akhlaghi never covers, though inadvertently mentions. Third, we outline how the non-realist cognitivist could reply to Akhlaghi’s dilemma in a way that allows Non-Realist Cognitivism to come out unscathed. (shrink)

Many moral realists have employed a strategy for arguing for moral realism by claiming that if epistemic normativity is categorical and that if this epistemic normativity exists, then categorical normativity exists. In this paper, we will discuss that argument, examine a way out, and respond to the objections people have recently raised in the literature. In the end, we conclude that the objections to our way out will do little in the way of motivating those who already do not believe (...) in categorical normativity, thereby severing the power the aforementioned parity argument is designed to possess. (shrink)

Recently, non-realist cognitivism has been charged with failing to meet various semantic challenges. According to one such challenge, the non-realist cognitivist must provide a substantive non-trivial account of the meaning and truth conditions of moral claims. In this paper, we discuss the various strategies proposed to overcome this challenge. Our aim is to propose a new semantics, a Meinongian referential semantics that is based on truthmaker theory. The consequences of our proposal are two-fold. First, it alleviates objections raised against previous (...) Meinongian semantic approaches. Second, adopting the novel semantics highlights great theoretical flexibility of non-realist cognitivism. (shrink)

Normative error theorists maintain the view that normative judgements ascribe normative properties, but these normative properties don’t exist. Many philosophers have tried objecting to this view, like Case (2019) arguing that it faces self-defeat. Others, like Streumer (2013), have argued that it can’t even be believed because beliefs (in the full, rational sense) possess certain normative requirements. So, there is no self-defeating ‘belief’ in normative error theory. Recently, Taccolini (2024) has accepted that Streumer’s response to self-defeat might work, and builds (...) a stronger self-defeat argument. The argument attempts to illustrate that one cannot defend the normative error theory, regardless of whether they believe it or not. In response, we illustrate various plausible interpretations of ‘defense’ that are consistent with error theory, thereby diffusing the modal objection that one can’t defend error theory. (shrink)

Recently, Leidenhag (2021) has argued that the panpsychist should extend their belief to theism. She argues that if the panpsychist wants to tackle emergence, then they must be committed to two explanatory metaphysical principles, either the Causal Principle or the Principle of Sufficient Reason. That is one reason for the panpsychist to be a theist, since these principles favour theism over non-theism. Another reason Leidenhag illustrates is the problem of locating ‘bruteness’, which tries to show that theism is better equipped (...) to tackle this over panpsychism. In this paper, I have three aims. First, I attempt to show that the panpsychist need not accept any of those explanatory principles. Secondly, I attempt to argue that even if they must accept at least one of the principles, neither of them being true favours theism over non-theism and does not forward the dialectic from metaphysics of consciousness for support to a theological view. Third, I attempt to reject the claim that the problem of locating bruteness is any evidence for theism. (shrink)