In this article, I begin with Felski and Sedgwick’s diagnosis of the overabundance of critique in education, connecting this to Hodgson, Vlieghe, and Zamojski’s calls for a ‘post-critical pedagogy’. Rather than offering a critique of critique, I aim to think differently about the ‘uses’ of reading, taking my cue from post-critical scholarship as well as from Calvino’s experimental novel, Invisible Cities. First, I discuss how critique and post-critique differ in their orientations when engaging with a text. I argue that, instead (...) of ‘shutting down’ a text to point to its latent assumptions, post-critique opens the text up to the world by cultivating new perceptual and imaginative dimensions in our experience. This partly involves the reader being oriented towards what is worth preserving in a text—an approach that is also central to post-critical pedagogy. Second, I reflect on my own failures with respect to putting a post-critical analysis into words, since it seems that in the context of academic writing, it is difficult to avoid critique. Given this, I argue that it is more fruitful to explore three post-critical pedagogical gestures in Invisible Cities: namely, its tensions (which encourage and resist linear explanations), its fundamental but playful ambiguity (which invites both puzzlement and curiosity), and its transformative potential in relation to the everyday understandings of the cities we inhabit. These gestures encourage readers to surrender themselves to the text in a mood characterized by enchantment rather than suspicion and demonstrate to the educative potential of literature beyond critique. (shrink)

This article examines how the practice of fieldwork can enable researchers to attend to the educational environment of the school in a world-oriented way, rather than take an explanatory or demystifying approach that spirals away from what happens in the world. Finding new ways and new vocabularies to approach educational realities gains a special urgency in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), a country whose social fabric is often analysed in terms of a lack: the Congolese state is considered weak (...) or fragile and its education sector is seen as being in a deep learning crisis. Recent studies have successfully used fieldwork methods to explain the remarkable persistence of the DRC’s public education sector by ethnographically accounting for the ways it is governed on a political or bureaucratic level. We propose that fieldwork, understood as a world-oriented research practice, which instils in researchers a curiosity for the world, can also enable researchers to attend to those classroom gestures that safeguard the existence and persistence of Congolese schools on a pedagogical level. (shrink)

‘Computational thinking’ (CT) is highlighted in research literature, societal debates, and educational policies alike as being of prime significance in the 21st century. It is currently being introduced into K–12 (primary and secondary education) curricula around the world. However, there is no consensus on what exactly CT consists of, which skills it involves, and how it relates to programming. This article pinpoints four competing claims as to what constitutes the defining traits of CT. For each of the four claims, inherent (...) philosophical presuppositions are identified concerning the nature of thinking, problem-solving, and human–computer relationships. It is argued that most of these philosophical presuppositions are very similar to ones that Hubert Dreyfus and Donald Schön addressed forty to fifty years ago. Therefore, claims about the power of CT raise old discussions in a new disguise. Dreyfus and Schön argued that the presuppositions were wrong. Do their arguments hold and thus defeat contemporary claims about CT? Alternatively, has the technological development since the time of their writings proven them wrong? This article argues that it is necessary to heed the arguments of Dreyfus, Schön, and—later—Bent Flyvbjerg to ensure that CT curricula are built in accord with the value-rational nature of human practice, rather than on misconceived rationalizations of problem-solving, computer use, and computational aspects in the world. However, the pervasive integration of information technology in today's world raises new issues concerning human–machine collaborations that sidetrack the arguments of Dreyfus and Schön. A revised view of CT is required which focusses on articulating how humans can design for, partake in, and critically appraise human–machine collaborations. (shrink)

This article examines the relevance of Hegel’s theory of recognition within educational theory and practice in relation to the development of a non-affirmative theory of education. The article argues that Hegel’s theory of recognition can serve as a fruitful starting point for articulating an educational theory that can contribute to the subject’s open-ended formation in modern society. To start with, the article surveys the connection between Hegel’s educational thought and his concept of recognition. Against this backdrop, the article singles out (...) how Hegel’s theory of recognition provides a compelling theory of intersubjectivity that calls attention to the role of norms in personal development and the construction of the social world. In continuation of a non-affirmative principle, it is argued that Hegelian recognition underlines, first, that the subject’s formation can fruitfully be an open-ended and dynamic process and, second, that in order to underpin this process it is necessary to critically assess norms and norm-generating practices within an educational context. (shrink)

Evidence-based practice in education involves basing decisions about what to do on evidence about the relative effectiveness of available interventions (e.g. programmes, products, practices). This article considers two influential critiques of evidence-based education (EBE) pertaining to its treatment of values. The ‘general critique’ condemns EBE for excluding values from decisions about what to do in education. The ‘specific critique’ condemns EBE for relying on a deterministic view of causality in education which disregards the complex, value-laden nature of educational contexts. I (...) argue that virtually all versions of EBE escape the general critique, including the dominant intervention-centred approach that relies on experimental research to discover ‘what works’, because the predictions EBE aims to support are only one premise in a broader normative argument. Further, intervention-centred EBE can avoid much of the specific values-based critique because it is consistent with a probabilistic, rather than deterministic, understanding of causality. However, I argue that only a context-centred approach to EBE that relies on evidence about the specific target setting from local sources in addition to evidence from theory and mixed methods research can fully address the specific critique by accommodating critics’ descriptive claims about the nature of educational contexts. (shrink)

Challenging the way critical thinking is often considered a skill, this article explores possible discursive reasons for the skill-orientation and technicization of this concept. First, using Michel Foucault’s ‘division and rejection’ theory as a discursive analytical lens, the discussion explores the neoliberal alliance of international organizations, national governmental authorities, the media, job markets, schools, and concerned parents. It explores how this alliance promotes the discourse of skill and competence, and prepares the ground for critical thinking’s technicization. Drawing further on Foucault’s (...) decoding of human capital as the essence of neoliberalism, the article explores the way that the technicization of critical thinking fits with a conception of human beings as a complex mix of production and consumption, where, as homo economicus, they become entrepreneurs of themselves. Second, in the light of Foucault’s discursive analytical conception of the will to truth, the article traces a possible historical underpinning of critical thinking’s technicization. It argues that power-knowledge, the dark side of Enlightenment technological rationality, creates an increasingly technical conception of the world that tampers with the criticality of critical thinking. If critical thinking does not render people aware of the power impinging on them, it loses its value and meaning. The article proposes that critical thinking should rather be conceived along the lines of a Foucauldian conception of critique: the art of not being governed, which takes inspiration from Kant’s conception of enlightenment. It explores how to practise Foucauldian critical thinking, how Foucault’s technology of the self can be enacted as the protector of subjectivity against the governmentality of power. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to contribute to the outlining of the philosophical and epistemological status of post-critical pedagogy in the light of the body of scholarship (both positive and negative) that has, in the last few years, already grown in relation to this theoretical project. The article invites readers to follow its authors on a stroll in ‘Post-Criticalland’. Moreover, the article raises the question of whether post-critique is a new paradigm or merely a different attitude within the critical (...) tradition. The authors conclude by arguing for a principle of complementarity and for practices of diplomatic negotiation, on the grounds that post-critique should not be construed as dependent on critique but as complementary to it and as deserving a time and space of its own. (shrink)

We consider academic freedom in the context of broader developments in higher education. We suggest that the tenor of contemporary debates on the subject is a manifestation of pervasive forms of authoritarianism that undermine the university as a home of adventure, a place and space that is conducive to the conduct of free inquiry.It is evident that some champions of academic freedom engage in dangerously polarized forms of spectacle, engendered by a management culture that embraces showmanship and routinely favours talking (...) over listening. As such, they represent a force for conformity rather than dissent; division rather than collective action. These forms of spectacle jeopardize rather than promote the principles of academic freedom by polarizing the terms of the debate for maximum ‘impact’. We explore the implications of conceptualizations of academic freedom that focus on the rights of everyone in the university. We also suggest that the notion might usefully be extended to those on precarious contracts, and to students facing normative expectations about what constitutes ‘progress’ in academic practice. Drawing upon Timothy Snyder’s On Tyranny: Twenty Lessons from the Twentieth Century and an essay by Vaclav Havel, we reassess the notion of the ‘pursuit of truth’ that underlies conventional definitions of academic freedom.We conclude with a brief vignette, a rousing endorsement of the ineffable and irreducible qualities of friendship. This entails slaying a fictitious, three-headed dragon and embracing a form of spectacle that transcends attempts to capture why it moves us. We leave the reader with warm-blooded traces of energy, curiosity, liveliness, and quiet determination. (shrink)

Constructivism, contextualization, and critique—these three concepts are central to and representative of educational research. This article elaborates in three steps why it is important for educational research to engage epistemologically with Bruno Latour and Actor-Network Theory (ANT) in order to revise these basic concepts. The first section identifies some of the historical trajectories that helped to establish the belief in constructivism, contextualization, and critique in educational research. A second section deals with the shifts Latour proposes in order to revision constructivism (...) and contextualization, and, in doing so, to reframe critique. I suggest that this reframing may be called ‘post-critique’. A third section takes up the example of the history of educational technologies to illustrate why it is important to link epistemology and history in educational research and how exactly this can be done by ‘making’ post-critical history with Latour and ANT. (shrink)

This article examines the relevance of post-criticality as a research stance across various traditions in educational research. After problematizing the dominance of critical approaches centred on deconstruction and denunciation, the authors advocate instead for an empirical philosophy of education. This article sets the stage for a suite of articles, published in this issue, which explore affirmative, engaged methodologies that prioritize proximity to educational practices over detached critique. Collectively, the articles investigate how post-critical methodologies can produce richer understandings of educational realities (...) and foster meaningful connections between theory and practice. (shrink)

This article examines how the critical tradition initiated by Nietzsche and pursued through poststructuralism might be compatible with what is currently being described as postcritique. It does so by looking at the example of critical discourse analysis (CDA). The first section gives some indications about the state of the methodology currently known as critical discourse analysis and introduces what a ‘postcritical’ reaction could look like. The second section focuses on a concrete example and presents the main critical literature about the (...) student well-being discourse, showing that it generally limits itself to a debunking attitude. The third section explores how the affirmative and creative dimension of critique, its ‘postcritical’ dimension, has been and could be put forward to contribute to what could be called a postcritical discourse analysis methodology. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to give an example of how an exercise in post-critical educational research might be conceptualized. The example refers to an enquiry into building a public sphere around education in Poland. First, a post-critical approach in educational research is defined with reference to the two dominant perspectives of social research, namely the (neo)positivistic and the critical paradigm. Next, and following insights of Hannah Arendt and Jacques Rancière, the idea of building is presented in terms of (...) the persistent introduction of a new beginning into a social reality through acting in line with an assumption (an axiom) that, from the point of view of critical knowledge about the current status quo, seems fictional (or impossible). Such a persistent verification of an impossible axiom aims at establishing a sphere of exception from the dominant social order, offering—through the ideas of Alain Badiou and Giorgio Agamben—a nondialectical logic of social transformation. Finally, in conclusion the article focuses on the phenomenon of condensation as one of the key results of the exemplary research project analysed throughout the text. This points to the kind of knowledge that post-critical research projects are able to bring about. (shrink)

This article explores the relationship between place and Bildung, in the context of the North American African diaspora. In the process it raises questions of identity and the troubled concept of America itself, and the fatefully compromised roots of this modern democracy (‘We the People!’—but which people are we?). It begins by elaborating on the central concepts of place and Bildung in light of the classic formulations of Heidegger and the more recent critical discussions of the humanist geographer Edward Relph. (...) The development of the idea of Bildung has connected substantially with the literary form of the novel, and experiments in the novel have shaped and reshaped the understanding of what Bildung can mean. Hence, the strands of thought I have established are brought to bear, in the latter part of the article, on a consideration of one of the outstanding 20th-century Bildungsromane by a Black author, Ralph Ellison’s Invisible Man. My discussion of Ellison is intertwined with reflections on William James Booth’s ‘The Color of Memory’—which deals more explicitly with the violence of self-formation in North American colonial contexts—generating thoughts that I thematize in relation to visibility. Consideration of the novel enables an exploration of the themes of insideness and outsideness, and hence, of alienation, as well as reflection on new ways of thinking and being, in which the relation between Bildung and place are altered and in some respects weakened. (shrink)

In this article, I offer an account of the 2014 dystopian-fiction film Divergent, based on the novel by Veronica Roth. The film tells the story of Beatrice, a young woman living in a postapocalyptic Chicago, and her process of enrolment into the higher education system. I argue that Beatrice’s troubled story can help us to uncover the high tension between today’s university’s self-alienating mechanisms and the thirst for Bildung. I suggest that the notion of ‘divergence’ can help to develop an (...) account of Bildung in an innovative direction. ‘Divergence’ is a term used in the film to define individuals—like Beatrice—who cannot fit into the categories established by the government to sort students into appropriate educational pathways. I link the notion of ‘divergence’ to an interpretation of Gadamer’s account of Bildung. First, I draw on Gadamer’s thinking to suggest the metaphor of the university as a ‘crossroads’ and outline the idea of the risks and possibilities that are attached to authentic learning experience. Then I explore the self-alienating mechanisms that Gadamer saw at work within the postindustrial structure of the university. In conclusion, I develop Gadamer’s notion of self-education along the lines of the idea of divergence. While some argue that the university can still be a place for human encounter and gathering, I aim to show that, without divergence, it remains a site of displacement, or a dystopia. (shrink)

The ideal of authenticity that developed in the Romantic era emphasized that both individuals and places find their own authentic process for cultivating their identity and humanity, a notion that has become controversial in modern philosophy. This article will explore the concepts of authenticity and place and discuss their relevance for Bildung theory today. Based on the works of Charles Taylor, we will argue that Bildung can be seen as constituted by and constitutive of language and moral spaces that go (...) beyond the self and its individuality. In this view, Bildung can be understood as a ‘moral topography of the self’ with both substantial and procedural aspects. However, language and moral spaces (i.e. communities) can both enable and constrict our Bildung processes. Drawing on Rahel Jaeggi, we thus argue that alienation is an equally important concept to understand the complex and dialectical relationship between individuals and communities in our current moment. (shrink)

Although the alienating journey into the unknown as the fundamental element of transformative education may have gained a paradigmatic expression in the German concept of Bildungsreise, it is neither a solely German or even European concept, nor is it a child of the 18th century: the transformative power of travelling has been acknowledged at least since antiquity in Europe, and comparable reflections and practices have evolved in other parts of the world. This article will introduce one of those examples that (...) may, only on first view though, look quite distinct from what is suggested as Bildungsreise: the strolling on the roji (露地), the path through the tea garden, before entering the chashitsu (茶室), the tea room, to participate in chanoyu (茶の湯), the tea ceremony, as it found its classic form in 16th-century Japan. Discussing this Japanese practice will not only support an intercultural perspective on the educative nature of travel and the relevance of space for the theory and practice of transformative education or Bildung, but also—more relevant from a philosophical point of view—enable an analysis of the conceptual core of the idea of a transformative journey. As will be shown, far from being a special case of education or Bildung, this conceptual structure lies at the very heart of both. (shrink)

This introduction attempts to map out the educational and philosophical landscape in which the individual papers move. The movement from the familiar to the unknown, from alienation to homeliness, has been central to theories of Bildung since their emergence, while the role of the specific materiality of places in which Bildung takes place has remained somewhat unexplored. This special issue engages the perennial tensions and questions emerging with the notion of Bildung as these appear in literature and philosophy from the (...) vantage point of place. (shrink)

In this article, I explore the significance of place in education. The historical context is expressed by the ecological and climate crises in a world distinguished by the unjust distribution of privileges and burdens. I elucidate the concept of place by entering the tradition of the pedagogy of place. Here, the significance of place is accentuated with a sensitivity to the local context, in contrast to other educational approaches that emphasize more generic, abstract knowledge. A central premise is the notion (...) of place as a delimited unit that is distinguished from other places. This stable notion, I argue, needs to be reconsidered in the present. With reference to Massey, I accentuate relations as pivotal to a notion of place that accommodates both a sense of belonging and conflicts of power and interest. I hold that education at this time in history should be sensitive to our situatedness in everyday life’s web of relationships. Still, general knowledge is required to bring up perspectives that enable students to critically conceive the place in which they are situated. I make and discuss these claims with reference to and in critique of Young’s notion of powerful knowledge and Klafki’s reformulation of German Didaktik. A central concern is to clarify the mediation of situated knowledge and general knowledge in educational practice. In the final part of the article, I bring in elements from critical hermeneutics and utopian thinking, approaching Bildung as a process involving situatedness, distantiation, and refiguration. (shrink)

This article explores the potential of schools to enhance students’ well-being and overall quality of life. The discussion is framed through two distinct perspectives: the Bildung tradition and Aristotelian ethics. In regions where the Bildung tradition is prominent, schools are traditionally viewed as environments conducive to fostering humaneness. However, contemporary educational policies often diverge from the core values of Bildung-oriented education. The article advocates for the continued promotion of Bildung and flourishing within schools. To achieve this, certain foundational conditions must (...) be met. One such condition is acknowledging students’ need for a sense of belonging and purpose, which is essential for their flourishing. This flourishing, in turn, equips students with the courage and resilience to face an uncertain future and contribute to societal change. For schools to foster a sense of belonging, they must be meaningful places of interaction and companionship, both physically and socially. This necessitates recognizing that educational environments are situated within specific geographical and cultural contexts. Consequently, education should not be excessively standardized. The Bildung tradition provides insights into why this is important. When combined with Aristotelian ethics, it becomes possible to develop schools that offer students a sense of belonging and purpose, thereby promoting their flourishing. In this framework, Bildung and flourishing are seen as concepts that embody possibilities and optimism, offering hope and empowerment at both individual and collective levels. (shrink)

The notion of Bildung has been a catalyst for educational theories about the human relation to the material and social world. Place, both as a concrete spatial location and as metaphorical spatialization have been central to the understanding of Bildung. Nevertheless, the tradition of Bildung has treated the material world mainly as a restricting and adversarial space for human becoming. By asking why the role of belonging to a concrete place is absent from several contemporary debates on Bildung, we discuss (...) themes in Hegel’s and Humboldt’s conceptions of human formation, and argue that the preoccupation with different ideas of becoming human, through moving beyond material restrictions, centres on a notion of Bildung as a movement in time, a temporal dialectic. In contrast to conceptualizations of the world as binding and restricting, we then ask what place there is for ‘place’ in a theory of Bildung, and argue that the relation between the subject and the world can be perceived as a much more supportive dialogical relationship than these discussions suggest. With reference to insights from Rudolf Laban’s and Irmgard Bartenieff’s Movement Studies (LBMS), we illustrate an alternative perspective on the role of the material world in human physical, social, and cognitive development. These dimensions of development suggest that becoming and belonging in the world necessarily involve a simultaneously functional and expressive element, where the subject’s expressive movement of freedom and intention is balanced by their trustful resting in a concrete place. (shrink)

This article examines the problems and potential of Watsuji’s idea of education as ‘learning one’s place’. It begins with the theoretical foundations of this education in his view of space, time, and the practical nexus of acts, found in Ethics I. It then proceeds to his philosophy of education, first in Ethics II, and then in his heretofore under-researched book entitled Confucius. These will be connected to the contemporary discourse on Bildung and its implications for generality and agency in education. (...) However, Watsuji’s views bear the danger of traditional conservativism and a lack of freedom conferred on the individual, whereas individual freedom is essential to Bildung theory. These problems are explored in Ethics III via the questions of whether cultural and social change are possible as well as the role of individual agency in it. These allow us to arrive at a conditional possibility for Bildung in Watsuji that tries to connect people in a general way, while maintaining various forms of individual agency. (shrink)

Guarding against reliance on his own biography and romantic tendencies in Bildungsroman literature, I draw parallels to Ludwig Wittgenstein’s use of the journey trope and place-based inquiry in the Philosophical Investigations, as an exploration of concept development and confusion that exhorts and guides readers in traversing the borderlands of their own cultural–linguistic practices. l recall Wittgenstein’s journey in search of himself: his retreat from Cambridge to a remote hut in Norway, leading him on a philosophical search for meaning. This self-transformative (...) (Bildung) process of writing the Philosophical Investigations offers new ways for thinking the concept of ‘place’: not the bounding limit of things/beings; rather, working through the linguistic turn in philosophy, as potentially meaningful ‘sites’ in conceptually familiar/unfamiliar landscapes of native languages. The Investigations also carries ancient Heraclitian and Homeric tropes of homecoming and authenticity: ‘searching ourselves’ and ‘becoming who we are’, as found in Wittgenstein’s call to ‘know our way about’—rediscovering the grammatical order operating out of view but pervading the world as we see and know it, as well as setting its limits. Awareness of different languages of place is crucial to appreciating Indigenous discourses of Land-based education—a topic central to discussions of incorporating Indigenous knowledge while decolonizing education. Rethinking Bildungsroman literature in postcolonial terms—through the lens of reconciliation, renaissance, and resurgence —I call for careful listening to Indigenous peoples’ storied landscapes instead of fact-checking them: recognizing their sovereign right to self-govern their own education and resources. The goal is not to assess the truths of Land-based education, as in some epistemological inquiries, nor to make them accessible as pedagogical resources or instruments for non-Indigenous educators. The aim rather is to promote respect for its deep, nearly inaccessible context within Indigenous grammars and ways of life. (shrink)

Reading the significance of place as mediated through digital knowledge systems, this article expands recent debates around digital Bildung to include the semanticization of culture. The latter term refers to how data infrastructures correlate entities in their factuality in lived contexts, making them retrievable by digital devices and amenable to predictive inference by machines. Building on the analysis of others who characterize digital Bildung as the production of a semantic self-consciousness in learners, the article seeks to address the role of (...) information systems technique in this production. It locates certain core intellectual justifications for the semantic mediation of culture in the philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce. Ultimately diagnosing digital Bildung as enculturation to Peircean metaphysics, the article goes on to thematize certain conceptual limitations of our epistemic emplacement via digital systems. Relying on other philosophers to surface these limitations—Jürgen Habermas, James Williams, and Jean-Hugues Barthélémy—the article concludes more polemically by suggesting that defining digital Bildung on the basis of semantic self-consciousness as it is currently understood may exacerbate a crisis of sense in datafied societies. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to explore the spatial constitution of the university today, its relation to Bildung in the university, and the way that changes of the universities are conceptually articulated or even programmatically demanded. In the first part of the article, the concept of the so-called ‘non-places’ advanced by the French ethnologist Marc Augé is used in order to set a conceptual framework for reflecting on the place of the university. In the second part of the article, (...) it is demonstrated that the university is currently being reshaped as a non-place and more specifically, as a transit lounge. Using the example of Minerva University, it is shown how mobilization, optimization, and functionalization of learning become dominant at the expense of forming its own place. In the third part of the article, the relations between Bildung and place are reflected on following Ronald Barnett’s ecological approach of the university. In this approach, care and curation are central, as is shown in the final part of the article. (shrink)

The article explores the tensions of belonging by focusing on the clash between nostalgic and universal values. Because of the inherent tension that they share, the concepts of Bildung and nostalgia provide an opening for understanding human belonging as ranging between nostalgic rootedness and the search for universality. Johann Gottfried Herder’s and Nikolai Frederik Severin Grundtvig’s theories of Bildung, exemplify this clash between nostalgic and universal values. Wilhelm von Humboldt’s thinking offers a theory of Bildung that transcends nostalgic values and (...) points to the world as a place of belonging. In this article I problematize feelings of nostalgia, such as a sense of national belonging, by demonstrating how they might turn into educational values that exclude individuals who do not share the same idea of home and sense of belonging. I employ Agnes Heller’s term ‘value- orientational categories’ to understand how feelings might transform into values. I question and discuss nostalgia’s potential to uphold diversity, given human longing for local versions of home with different languages, cultures, and customs. I then suggest that embracing nostalgia in an educational context can provide a foundation for fostering universal values such as diversity, openness, and flexibility among citizens. Barbara Cassin’s vision of the ‘world freed from belonging’ and her idea of ‘airborne roots’ contribute to this discussion. (shrink)

In recent years there have been increasing calls to ‘decolonize’ the curriculum across different levels of education. This has been met with significant opposition at both the school and university levels. For many, there is a lack of clarity concerning why students, particularly in school, should study a decolonized curriculum. I reflect on the notion of an ‘epistemic urgency’ to decolonize the secondary school curriculum in England, and I focus particularly on History and Religious Education (RE) as examples. Using theories (...) of epistemic injustice, and my own experiences in teaching, I build the case for this ‘urgency’ from two arguments: one from justice and one from purpose. On justice, I argue that current curricula create negative epistemic consequences that we might consider to be unjust. On purpose, I argue that some curricula also fail to meet the purposes that they are intended to meet, thereby creating further negative epistemic consequences. On both arguments, I hope to show that the negative epistemic consequences create an ‘urgency’ to decolonize curricula, which I hope encourages educators in England and beyond to begin considering whether decolonizing their curricula will lead to better outcomes for their learners. (shrink)

In this article I make a case for differentiating the process of decolonization in education from the process of dismantling the values of the empire and their continuing, subliminal role in our thought and practice (the gaze of the empire). I argue that ignoring the empire within (particularly the word ‘empire’ itself) is what sustains the colonial gaze and what constitutes decolonization’s greatest obstacle. I employ a poststructuralist, Foucauldian framework, which helps me explore notions of power and knowledge through language (...) and the gaze. To illuminate discussions, I make use of some of the historical context necessary to understand the spirit and the tragedy of empire, with its language as principal instrument, as well as some of the literary aspects (Magical Realism and poetry) that have been used to gaze at the colonized and redeem the conqueror. (shrink)

This paper argues that public pedagogy—an educational activity that takes place outside of the traditional classroom setting—has had a potent impact on the history of racism in the United States of America (USA). Yet this paper questions why the education academy’s scholarship has not shown a commensurate focus on the subdiscipline of public pedagogy, particularly racialized public pedagogy. I explore these topics by first examining a fateful confluence of historical circumstances involving slave codes and indentured servant laws governing low-income white (...) workers, laws passed by the Barbados Assembly in 1661, that made their way across the Atlantic to be lifted, word for word, by leaders of colonial territories that became the USA. These laws ended up regulating not only the legal status of black slaves and white indentured servants in the USA, but also regulating social relations between those same black and white people. The resulting black–white social relations led to the evolution of racialized customs in what eventually became the USA, inspiring practices that undergirded black inferiority and white superiority for hundreds of years. Those customs contributed to the construction of what I have labelled a United States (US) values infrastructure dominated by racism, which I contend is a racialized values infrastructure that exists to this day. To gain more insight into this phenomenon, this paper considers the question: how might the complexity of racialized public pedagogy be addressed in the scholarship of education literature and be imagined in a way to fit into an anti-racist curriculum? (shrink)

In his seminal work After Whiteness: An Education in Belonging, Willie Jennings defines a concept he calls ‘whiteness’ and states that this plays the role of the ‘Paterfamilias’, a term born within the Greco–Roman period, which refers to the social system of rule and governance that was centred around the father–master archetype. During slavery, Jennings states that it was on the plantation that the life, logic, and social order of whiteness transpired. The more I engaged with Jennings’ work, the more (...) I began to realize the extent to which the religious education curriculum, and by extension the English education system curriculum, further perpetuated whiteness. Inspired by the works of Jennings and the activism of Black Lives Matter (BLM) following the murder of George Floyd, I was motivated to create and teach a unit in the religious education (RE) curriculum, ‘Black Religion and Protest’. As well as examining the teaching and reception of this unit, this article seeks to unpack the ways in which Britain’s colonial legacy maintains epistemological inequity and hierarchical knowledge. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This paper is a reflective piece on the thought processes individuals and teams have when engaging in decoloniality work in Teacher Training/Education. We argue that until the self is decolonized, the process of decolonialization becomes rhetoric. We also question how much we can decolonize whilst working in the academy whose very culture, symbols and practices are borne out of colonialism and the period of enlightenment; whose very raison d’être is to elevate some knowledge over others and to claim cultural (...) and academic superiority. The current political landscape in England approaches anti-racism as a political ideology that must be avoided in schools and education and this ideological battlefield is evident in teacher education. We aim to recognize the tensions and resistance to decolonialize, which demonstrates the messy and contingent process of moving between shifting positions and subjectivities. It confronts the challenge of the teacher–practitioner who must balance their own moral and philosophical grounding whilst attending the political imperatives of the work. This can take the form of according with the policies and procedures of the institutions in which they are situated which can often be balkanizing and debilitating. (shrink)

This article investigates whether Conversational Thinking can suitably serve as a pedagogical approach for philosophy education in African schools (primary and secondary levels). We argue that there is a need to introduce and teach philosophy in schools in Africa. Additionally, we argue that it would be apropos to adopt a decolonial approach in developing such curricula, which, amongst others, could accommodate African approaches to philosophy. We contend that African homegrown frameworks, such as Conversational Thinking, can serve as appropriate decolonial strategies (...) for philosophy education in parts of Africa. Our reason is that the proposed approach can train the emerging young generations in Africa, not only to be critical, creative, and innovative, but also to view reality from African epistemic perspectives. This stems from the fact that Conversational Thinking is one strategy amongst others that can promote African culture-inspired approaches to knowledge that combine with basic thinking skills to offer truly African forms of epistemic liberation. (shrink)

Underscoring recurrent calls for the decolonization of university curricula in South Africa are underexplored presumptions that by only disrupting theoretical content, universities might release themselves from a colonialist grasp, that continues to dominate and distort higher education discourse. While it might be the case that certain theories hold enormous authoritative, ‘truthful’ sway, as propagated through Western interpretations and norms, there are inherent problems in exclusively approaching the decolonization project as a content-based hurdle, removed from the subjectivities of students’ social, lived, (...) and learning realities. The argument advanced in this article is that until the epistemic harm of colonialism and apartheid are afforded careful recognition and attention—as in focusing on the lived experiences, realities, and stories of individuals—the hard work of delegitimizing coloniality, and its implicit structures of hegemonies and binaries cannot unfold. In addressing these harms, I commence by describing some of the contexts of epistemic harm, promulgated through colonialism and apartheid. This is followed by a consideration of decolonization, both as theory and practice-within-context. Here, I also foreground the #Rhodesmustfall campaign, as a particular moment of painful clarity about why decolonization, as well as transformation, has faltered in higher education in South Africa. In the second half, I focus on the necessity of prioritizing storytelling as a deep manifestation of decolonization. Stories, I maintain, provide access into unknown lives, and can subvert the invisible, normative framings, which dictate how we live in this world. As a manifestation of decolonization, students’ stories hold profound implications for the recognition and affirmation of pluralist identities, histories, knowledge, values, and world-views. (shrink)

Even though the university has the potential to help humanity in what amounts to a paradigmatic transition, it has been very restrictive and very selective in the kinds of knowledges it validates. In fact, the kinds of knowledges in which it has excelled are those most responsible for the paradigmatic crisis in which humanity finds itself. In a nutshell, the paradigmatic change calls for cognitive justice, justice for the different ways of knowing that circulate in society. Cognitive justice is the (...) polar opposite of ‘anything goes’. The assumption is that there is no global social justice without global cognitive justice, justice among knowledges. Looking back, while privileging one specific kind of knowledge and, indeed, granting it a cognitive monopoly, the university has been the privileged site for producing and legitimating cognitive injustice. As a result, the immense epistemic diversity of the world has been ignored or suppressed. In the following, I identify the problem and the promise for overcoming it. (shrink)

This Special Issue is focused on supporting the transformation of education called for in the decolonizing the curriculum movement by advancing discourse on the diverse philosophical ideas, concepts, and theories that can undergird practical efforts to decolonize curricula across education sectors. The special issue brings together voices from a range of backgrounds, who draw from a variety of theoretical positions within and beyond philosophies of education. The authors offer diverse forms of scholarly contributions, including philosophical articles, practice-focused reflections, and a (...) reflection on ‘education’ in the public sphere. In this introduction, we consider the relevance of educational-philosophical thinking to the pressing issue of decolonizing the curriculum. The volume is divided into two parts, with the first covering issues of university and postcompulsory education, and the second discussing issues related to schools. We discuss three interconnected themes that permeate both sections: (i) whose knowledge and whose narratives are embodied in curricula? (ii) who is the curriculum for? Who is the learner? What does it mean to be human? (iii) what implications does decolonizing the curriculum have for pedagogy? With these themes, we indicate some of the ways that the articles contribute to a critical extension of the meaning of education itself. (shrink)

Campaigns to decolonize higher education have focused mainly on decolonizing the curriculum. Although the cultural features of colonialism and its material imperatives and damage were both modes of colonial domination and exploitation, more attention has been paid to the former in recent debates about education, and it tends to dominate arguments about and characterizations of decolonization in higher education, by making knowledge and the curriculum the central focus. We argue the need to attend not only to the cultural consequences of (...) imperialism and the damage to the self so thoroughly emphasized in postcolonial and decolonial theory, but also to the material implications of colonialism and the evolution of Empire, which has persisted in new forms since formal decolonization. Decolonizing higher education and its institutions must also address new forms of Empire which have colonized the university. We argue that unless the material aspects of colonization and decolonization are adequately addressed, the university will not be substantively decolonized. Indeed, so strong is the influence of late capitalism in the form of neoliberalism on the contemporary university that its modes of practice are likely to foster superficial strategies to ‘decolonize’ the curriculum instead of addressing how capitalist structures and practices sustain current forms of coloniality. We discuss how neoliberalism, exemplified in the use of global rankings, shapes the contemporary university in today’s new age of Empire and we defend an approach to decolonizing that widens the focus of current debates beyond decolonization of the curriculum, to which we give qualified support. (shrink)

This paper will reflect on the possibility of epistemic decolonization, particularly in terms of curriculum, as a transformative educational process in the context of the South African university, and with respect to my own positionality. The argument will centre around two difficult interdependent positions. On the one hand I will argue for the university’s task as transformational, even offering, via Cornel West, the ‘salvific’ possibility that knowledge offers those who seek it. To develop this claim, I will draw on and (...) develop the notion of paideia though the work of Plato and Heidegger.On the other hand, within the postcolonial African university, the question of decolonization in the tertiary space cannot be elided, particularly since the 2015 #RhodesMustFall and #FeesMustFall movements. The university is a powerful colonial relic, and it can be used to reinforce and perpetuate epistemic violence through unreflective or unconscious pedagogical and curriculum decisions. Here I draw on decolonial thinkers such as Santos, Mignolo, Maldonado-Torres, and Mbembe: I argue for a reckoning with the forces of coloniality, and advocate for epistemic justice and criticality, as part of the decolonizing project. In conclusion, working with ideas from Cornel West, I argue to reconcile paideia, as the ‘turning of the soul’, with the decolonizing African university. (shrink)

With the calls to decolonize the philosophy curriculum, and the university more generally, which have seen a series of intellectual interventions in South Africa, this article takes its cue from Nyoka’s recommendation when he suggests moving beyond merely thinking about decolonization. In reflecting on processes of decolonizing the curriculum, this article considers the successes and failures of a course taught during a global pandemic, wherein pedagogic strategies were constrained. Reflecting on a module taught in the first semester of 2021, this (...) article thinks through the fundamental question that underpins the course, primarily: how to develop a contextually responsive philosophical approach on the southernmost tip of the African continent. Using two primary texts, Kumalo’s Decolonization as Democratization and Jansen’s Decolonization in Universities, the module analysed this question by juxtaposing, respectively, a philosophical and educational text. In this pedagogic autocritique, I reflect on ‘what obligation do intellectuals owe their students’ in a decolonizing context. (shrink)

The Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) global governance of education has been gradually increasing. Its field of interest is currently expanding from educational evaluation through the Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) to curriculum reform through the Education 2030 project. Here, it is interesting to note that the nature of the terms the OECD has been creating reveals a ‘humanistic turn’. This shows up well in the frequent occurrence of terms such as ‘well-being’, ‘attitudes and values’, ‘inclusiveness’, ‘responsibility’, (...) and ‘sustainability’ in the ongoing Education 2030 project. Perhaps this new humanistic discourse increases the likelihood of the smooth adoption of the OECD’s proposed curriculum redesign in more countries. If the OECD’s new discourse captures and transforms contemporary people’s ways of thought and practice about education, then this is related to the problem of colonialism in our era. It is also worth noting that language plays a vital role in colonization. In particular, the need for translation between different languages serves as a useful means for colonization. Conversely, it is also seen as having a potential decolonizing power. In this context, I would like to examine the new language the OECD has adopted, specifically regarding student experience and the nature of knowing. Next, I shall attempt to criticize the underlying educational assumptions in the OECD’s pronouncements. Following this, I shall explore how the OECD’s new discourse has been translated in South Korea, taking this as an example of wider experience in the East Asian context and possibly elsewhere. Finally, I shall conclude by considering the direction of curriculum decolonization in terms of translation. (shrink)

Botswana’s history is one of an unwavering exercise of self-determination and quest for self-rule. Post-independence, self-government prioritized an overarching philosophy of Kagisano or social harmony within which the aims of education were framed, in conjunction with a political commitment to Botho through democracy. For economic and social reasons the current educational policy of Botswana is driven by outcome-based education (OBE), with its metrics of quantifiable outcomes. This article argues that Olúfemi Táíwò’s analysis of decolonization provides a philosophical lens through which (...) to interpret Botswana’s current educational pathway within the prevailing decolonization discourse. OBE clearly exhibits features of neocolonialism, as it pertains to the national value principles. We draw on Ndlovu-Gatsheni’s decolonial epistemic perspective to frame the discussions. Insofar as OBE can be integrated with Botswana’s ethnically inclusive, community-based view of democracy and associated virtues, this is a worthy goal for education, and it could lead to a particular form of indigenized democracy. Substantive distinctions among the concepts of decolonization, neocolonialism, and decoloniality underwrite this thesis. We see the project of envisaging a future of education in Botswana as having to do with disentangling colonialist–imperialist cultural reproduction from indigenous aspirations. (shrink)

Calls to decolonize education systems cannot be removed from broader social struggles. Scholars have engaged in theoretical discussions on what decolonization entails, emphasizing the need for transforming thoughts, beliefs, and practices. However, the lack of sustained engagement and widespread resistance to decolonizing the curriculum remain evident, underscoring the urgency to envision new futures and explore relationalities between educators and students.In this article, we delve into the evolving terminologies surrounding decolonization, anticolonization, and Indigenization, emphasizing their pivotal roles in the broader project (...) of educational decolonization. We argue that a reassertion of Indigenous resistance and futurity in higher education forms the cornerstone of this transformative process. Through an examination and understanding of these terminologies, we aim to contribute to the ongoing dialogue surrounding educational decolonization and envision inclusive, equitable, and anticolonial learning environments that centre on Indigenous knowledge and perspectives. (shrink)

On 27 September 1943, Hans-Georg Gadamer published a brief but significant article in the conservative newspaper Leipziger Neueste Nachrichten und Handels-Zeitung, entitled ‘Wissenschaft als Beruf. Über den Ruf und Beruf der Wissenschaft in unserer Zeit’ (Science as Vocation: On the Calling and Profession of Science in Our Time). The article, which addressed the problem of the value and status of science and philosophy in the midst of the Second World War, was never reprinted in Gadamer’s work, neither in the ten (...) volumes of his collected writings published by Mohr Siebeck, nor separately in books or journals. I offer here a critical introduction to the context and main contents of this text due to its philosophical, political, and historical relevance. In particular, the introduction analyses Gadamer’s confrontation with his own time through explicit and implicit references to Max Weber’s 1917 lecture, ‘Wissenschaft als Beruf’ (Science as Vocation), and traces echoes in Gadamer’s later works that bear on contemporary challenges. Following that, I present the first English translation of Gadamer’s original German text. (shrink)

John Tillson’s Children, Religion and the Ethics of Influence develops and deploys the ‘epistemic criterion’ for deciding whether teachers should promote belief in particular propositions. He defends that criterion by arguing that it promotes human well-being and enables individuals to fulfil their duty to pursue the truth. In this article I draw on John Rawls’ conception of political liberalism to suggest that the epistemic criterion is an inappropriate basis for the political community’s shaping of children’s beliefs.

Over the past decades, science education researchers have suggested Inquiry-Based Science Education (IBSE) teaching interventions for science classes. In this article, we argue that IBSE’s basic principles can be traced back to Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s work Emile or On Education (1762). First, we will look at IBSE’s rationale. Then we will turn to Emile and outline Rousseau’s educational ideas concerning science education. We will show that Rousseau’s suggested practices for science education are very similar to those of IBSE. Yet despite their (...) vivid similarities, Rousseau seems to pursue epistemic virtues, whilst IBSE aims at epistemic skills. However, nurturing epistemic skills might be seen as the first step for cultivating an epistemically virtuous character. So, embracing Rousseau’s ideal for full character development could further inspire IBSE’s proposals. (shrink)

In this paper we explore the connection between the act of teaching and the imparting of knowledge. Our overarching aim is to demonstrate that the connection between them is less tight than one might suppose. Our stepping off point is a recent paper by David Bakhurst who (on one reading, at least) takes a strong view, opposed to our own. On our reading, Bakhurst argues that there is a tight conceptual connection between teaching and the imparting of knowledge. We argue (...) that this is not the case; the connection does not hold. We then consider several ways we might weaken the alleged conceptual connection between teaching and knowledge, finally considering two ways of severing the conceptual connection altogether, whilst at the same time allowing that much teaching does indeed lead to the imparting of knowledge. We argue that such views are to be preferred. (shrink)

John Tillson argues, on grounds of children’s well-being, that it is impermissible to teach them religious views. I defend a practice of pluralistically advocating religious views to children. As long as there are no monopolies of influence over children, and as long as advocates do not use coercion, deceit, or manipulation, children can greatly benefit without having their rational abilities subverted, or incurring undue risk to form false beliefs. This solution should counter, to some extent, both perfectionist and antiperfectionist reasons (...) against initiating children into religions. (shrink)

In Children, Religion and the Ethics of Influence, John Tillson argues that initiating children into religion is morally wrong. His argument overlaps and intersects at various points with my own argument against confessional religious education in schools. In this brief reply I consider two notable differences between our arguments.

John Tillson’s book Children, Religion and the Ethics of Influence addresses several themes: the ground and nature of ethical responsibility; the means and goals of ethical formative influence; the nature and ground of religious belief. In this article, I focus on the issue of justification for educational influence in general. Attention to this issue could avoid some intractable problems of specifically religious influence, most particularly the challenge of providing satisfactory criteria for what belongs to the category of religion. Whilst there (...) may be important reasons for examining specifically religious influence, I argue that religious influence is not fundamentally different from other forms of influence, and that the logic of the ethics of influence in general would encompass the logic of religious influence. If the educator is to justify certain forms of influence, then they should employ a kind of restraint: the educator should influence whilst simultaneously protect the influencee from that very influence. (shrink)

This paper elucidates the rights violations caused by mass formal schooling systems and explores what students may do about them. Students have rights not to be harmed and rights to liberty (not to be oppressed), as well as attendant rights to (proportionately) defend their rights if necessary. For some time now, education has been dominated by mass formal schooling systems that harm and oppress many students. Such harm and oppression violate those students’ rights not to be harmed or oppressed, which (...) may justify student nonviolent defensive (or rights-protecting) action. (shrink)

A central aim of the original Bologna Declaration in 1999 was to give the opportunity of advancement in education to every European citizen. According to the Declaration, this goal is worth achieving not simply in order to provide better-qualified workers within the European Union, rather, the aim of higher education within the European Union is understood in a holistic sense as a prerequisite for the composition of a well-functioning European civil society. How can such an ambitious goal be achieved? In (...) this article, we propose that the core capability at stake is that of empathy which, for this reason, should be central to programmes of European higher education. Empathy is not regarded as just a property of specific individuals but as an attribute which must be ascribed to specific forms of civil intercourse. Therefore, what is needed in European higher education is the provision of a social environment for students which allows for civil-cultivation, and for processes of self-cultivation. Self-cultivation, as described here, means more than a refinement of manners; rather, it refers to the development of a civil mode for approaching others: a mode that is sensitive and self-aware at the same time, and which can be regarded as arising out of a shared European heritage interconnecting rhetoric and sociability. (shrink)

John Tillson concludes the symposium on his Children, Religion and the Ethics of Influence by replying to his five respondents. The reply focusses on Michael Hand’s defence of parental rights to raise their children in their faith; Ruth Wareham’s suggestion that the value of autonomy rules out a wider range of impermissible religious influences than Tillson’s account is able to; David Lewin’s alternative criteria for ethical influence and scepticism about rationality’s objectivity; Anca Gheaus’ proposal that initiation into multiple contradictory religious (...) faiths is permissible; and Matthew Clayton’s rejection of the book’s perfectionist political morality. (shrink)

It is morally impermissible for parents, educators, and others to initiate children into religious belief systems. That is the provocative conclusion of John Tillson’s Children, Religion and the Ethics of Influence—the book which is the focus of the present symposium. This introduction briefly summarizes the book’s arguments together with the criticisms levelled against them. The symposium includes critiques by Matthew Clayton, Anca Gheaus, Michael Hand, David Lewin, and Ruth Wareham. Clayton and Wareham propose alternative bases for prohibiting religious initiation, whilst (...) Hand, Lewin, and Gheaus propose conditions under which religious initiation may be permissible. The symposium concludes with a rejoinder by Tillson. (shrink)

In Children, Religion and the Ethics of Influence, John Tillson sets out a clear and convincing case for the view that children ought not to be initiated into religious faith by their parents or others with the relevant ‘extra-parental responsibilities’. However, by predicating his thesis on an understanding of illegitimate religious influence that largely equates initiation into faith with the inculcation of a distinctive type of propositional content, I contend that Tillson misses some of the potential harms such initiation may (...) engender. Here I briefly explain why this is a problem before suggesting three ways he might respond to the criticism. (shrink)

This review provides a summary of the argument made by Christopher Martin in his book “The Right to Higher Education: A Political theory.” It outlines how Martin makes a unique and in many ways compelling argument, but argues that a significant weakness of the book is that there is a lack of clarity around the concept of ‘higher education’ as Martin conceives it.

This article explores the philosopher Alice Crary’s ideas about ethics, literature, and nonhuman animals. Through studying certain works of literature, Crary writes, readers can see aspects of animals’ moral characteristics that are difficult to perceive outside of literary study. To illustrate and extend Crary’s argument, the article presents a reading of John Steinbeck’s (1937/1993) Of Mice and Men, a novella that is taught frequently in secondary schools and that has been re-evaluated by critics as offering insights into social inequality and (...) animal welfare. Drawing upon and adapting Crary’s work, which does not address questions of pedagogy, the article describes forms of instruction that enable students reading Of Mice and Men and other works of literature to explore the moral lives of animals. Thus, a key contribution of this project is its explanation of how educators can use philosophy to open pedagogy to new ways of seeing and assessing animals’ moral characteristics. (shrink)

For philosophers of education who hold on to the optimistic hope that democracy education can play a part in halting the decline of democracy, Davids and Waghid point the way towards its potential contribution when approached by making inclusion foundational to democratic education. Taking a poststructuralist approach as the best way to articulate an expanded conception of inclusion, this book makes the case that there is an urgent need for a reconsidered conception of democratic education that appropriately addresses race, ethnicity (...) and gender. This review's critical appreciation of Davids and Waghids book explores their analysis of inclusion, noting its illuminating use of examples of exclusion in South African education which are also relevant to wider contexts beyond the specificities of apartheid and post-apartheid South Africa. In raising some questions about their arguments, I express reservations about the book's predominant focus on race, ethnicity and gender as markers of identity. This is at the expense of class and material exclusion—and hence of distributive justice as a dimension of democratic inclusion. The review concludes with a discussion of how philosophy of education itself might be democratically inclusive, in response to the authors' account of whiteness and their experiences of exclusion. (shrink)

Inspired by the work of Hannah Arendt, this response article focusses on the tension between hope in the future and lost hope in the present inherent in the modern idea of progress. The backdrop of the Suite ‘Education after Progress’ is some of the interrelated challenges that we are facing today, such as climate change, new pandemics, mass migration, and the rise of populism. Drawing on different philosophical concepts and strands, the five articles in the Suite explore what it would (...) mean to learn and educate beyond the imagery of progress. Thinking beyond, however, is never an easy task and the question becomes how to orient oneself in this new philosophical landscape without losing track of what is educationally important and meaningful. After responding to each article, focussing on five possible connections between them (change, orientation, time, situatedness, and immanence), the response article concludes with the more general question of what place, if any, concepts as the past, conservation, and preservation have in an education ‘after’ progress. (shrink)

Whenever justification of classroom punishment has been attempted it has usually been on grounds that punishment acts either appropriately pedagogically, teaching students how to behave morally, or is a necessary evil that enables the practical running of the school so that it may carry out its educational business. By itself the first justification leaves punishment in schools as only an extension of wider social attitudes about the virtue of punishing perceived moral wrongdoing, rather than providing any distinct argument for punishment (...) specific to the special circumstances of the school. By highlighting an entanglement between the moral and the conventional, and between discipline and punishment, within the context of the school, I shall argue that the essentially contested nature of education and its purpose, and the related question of the school’s suitability as a venue for it, means that the school’s most promising defence of its use of punishment—that punishment of students might somehow be necessary for enabling the important educative business of the school—becomes undone. Schooling and education are not necessarily synonymous, and as schools provide only one vision of education—and this vision is contestable—then upholding the business of any one school in order for it to achieve its particular unsettled and disputed purpose is not a morally sufficient reason to coerce a student’s compliance through regimes of ‘harm intended as harm’. (shrink)

In this paper, the endeavour to understand how to think of education ‘after progress’, viz. in an age in which progress has become problematic, is undertaken by focusing on the theme of time. Dovetailing Klaus Mollenhauer’s reflections on the rise of the Bildungszeit at the dawn of modernity with Thomas Popkewitz’s analyses of ‘cosmopolitan time’ presiding over pedagogical reform from the 19th century to the present, I shall, first, explore this temporal configuration of modern schooling (which goes hand in hand (...) with a specific understanding of the child). Against this backdrop, I shall, second, advance an interpretive hypothesis, that of substituting what will be called the ‘child-as-migrant’ for the ‘cosmopolitan child’, by appropriating, in an educational key, some insights of Thomas Nail’s ‘migrant cosmopolitanism’. I shall thereby suggest an alternative view of ‘progressivity’, construed not along modern-developmentalist lines but as a form of non-conservativeness, linked with a recognition of the ekstatikon (that is, destabilizing) character of time. This will require a revisiting of some Aristotelian intuitions about time as the rhythm of movement, reinterpreted as the affective experience of that ek-statikon without which there is no potential for the new. Accordingly, ‘progressive’ education (in the different interpretation investigated here) is the concern to allow all of us as ‘migrants’ to live actively in the abode of our ek-static and unpredictable condition and, therefore, to be vulnerable to the new, without merely remaining in a taken-for-granted ethos, cosmopolitan, inclusive, and progress-oriented though it may be. (Editor's note: This paper forms part of the suite entitled ‘Education After Progress’.). (shrink)

This paper explores the concept of time in education. It argues that the neoliberal capitalist construct of time as a resource to be deployed in service of labour—ever-accelerating—has permeated education, with implications for curriculum, teaching, and learning. To slow the effects of neoliberal capitalism in schools requires a reconsideration of time that permits both different understandings of how time is encountered and different values orienting how one spends one’s time. Using Hägglund’s argument for finitude and Levinas’ idea of time as (...) a gift, the paper articulates the philosophical rationale and pedagogical implications for making the most of one’s educational time. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to rethink the relation between education and progress, claiming that discourses of progress tend to project specific visions of the future and thereby instrumentalize education to achieve these visions while foreclosing other possible futures. The first part of the paper argues that the historical pact between education and progress has been recently recast in terms of learning. Learning receives at the same time an economic and a political interpretation in this context, turning issues such (...) as unemployment or social justice into learning problems. What both interpretations seem to share, however, is that learning is conceived of as a pathway to futures already known. Drawing on the philosophy of Isabelle Stengers, in whose work the concept of learning acquires a vital position, the article reframes learning in terms of a situated encounter made possible within an artificial environment, whereby the future is not being projected, but becomes thoroughly problematic—a matter of collective concern. Recent calls to ‘learn to live with’ Covid-19, but also the effects of climate change, form the point of departure for reworking the concept of learning from the inside out. (shrink)

The journal is delighted to include the following suite of articles on the theme of ‘Questioning Progress in Times of “No Future”: Orientations for Education’.

At a time of pedagogical exhaustion, this article wants to imagine ways to redeem education, to spare education from its unaccomplished promises, reinvent and renew its vows, and make it somehow work towards possible futures. But how can this be done when there is no longer the old inherited faith in a direction of history with an end, no ‘telos’ nor faith that educational institutions will inevitably move societies forwards? Is there any ‘after’ if the arrow of history points in (...) no direction? What can we collectively expect from education if we have no assurance that schooling can lead to anything better than what we are now, or that caring for truth will make people freer? In place of the modernist idea of progress, the alternative narrative that is being offered to school systems and teachers is what I will describe as the ‘innovation paradigm’. Within this framework what we are, what we have, and what is in place are presented as declining, inadequate, and unsatisfactory. This narrative has become so powerful that from a ‘pedagogical popular culture’ perspective it has turned into the mainstream way of thinking about our educational institutions, practices, and hopes. Would it not, however, be more pedagogically productive to speak of ‘variation’ instead of ‘innovation’? Might this be the potential path for redeeming education after progress? [Editorial note: this paper forms part of the suite of papers entitled ‘Education After Progress’.]. (shrink)

The article presents a thought experiment aimed at indicating a possibility for thinking education beyond the logic of progress. In its first part, the argument reconstructs the entanglement of the modern idea of progress (as found in Francis Bacon and Comenius) and education, while tracking down the specific coupling of obedience and conquest at work. Through such an analysis a link between the ideas of progress and of emancipation is determined, which leads to the acknowledgement of the difficulty of the (...) task of imagining education outside of the logic of progress. In the second part an attempt is made to match this task by suggesting that when studying with a teacher, the logic of progress is deactivated. A phenomenological analysis of the practices involved in studying with a teacher points to a specific way of living together that such a collective study involves. This way of living together is formed by continual exercises in the humble equality realized through shared attention to something worthy of study: this stems from attentiveness to what exists, and it develops an attitude of care and respect for being as such. (shrink)

This article analyses arguments and concerns about the emergence of feelings of anger amongst students, when issues of injustice are encountered in the study of the subject civic education. The aim is to determine the extent to which such concerns supply grounds for regulating anger as counterproductive. In particular, it is argued that to encourage students to forgo all feelings of anger that might be aroused by issues of injustice that students have encountered in civic education—in the name of positive (...) psychology and students’ well-being—not only constitutes a form of ‘affective injustice’, but also unfairly asks students to engage in harmful emotion regulation that reproduces existing exclusions. A crucial task for civic education is to provide learning spaces in which teachers and students can explore the affective complexities of political anger and its consequences. (shrink)

ABSTRACT It is a common contention that education done uncritically and unreflectively may serve to sustain and justify the status quo, in terms of mechanisms of cultural or racial privileging and marginalization. This article explores an argument made from within anti-oppressive education theory and advocated by theorist Kevin Kumashiro, namely that transformative education must entail altering harmful citational practices. I see two shortcomings in relation to this argument: first, its focus on discursive practice entails a prerequisite of high discursive literacy. (...) Second, it may lead to a failure to give credit to people’s intentions, risking a conflation of honest mistakes and wilful ignorance, and depriving us of theoretical nuance. While a well-argued and important call, I argue in this article that both shortcomings lead to the risk of a polarized conversation. Focusing on cultural, ethnic, and racial categorization, and using social studies as an illustration, it is suggested that applying notions from the theoretical concept of epistemic injustice may open up a space for granting nuanced credit to people’s intentions, thereby mitigating the risk of polarization. Rather than viewing attention to outcome and attention to intention as oppositional to one another, it is argued that both theoretical perspectives may benefit from the insights of the other. By applying needed context-specificity and nuance to categorizations of dominance and marginalization in individual discursive exchange, this can be done without granting priority to the experience of dominantly situated knowers. (shrink)

In this paper, I introduce a special case of epistemic injustice that I call ‘structural contributory injustice’. This conception aims to capture some dimensions of how policy—separately from individual agential interactions—can generate epistemic injustice at a group level. I first locate the case within Kristie Dotson’s original conception of contributory injustice. I then consider one potential case of structural contributory injustice—namely, the policy problem of significant financial risk burden on students considering university in the USA. Finally, I consider potential policy (...) reforms in response to this injustice. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that epistemic injustice can result from transformative learning. Transformative learning causes a radical change in the structure of a student’s personal epistemic resources to bring them in line with the structure of a discipline’s shared epistemic resources. When those shared epistemic resources are biased, this transformation prevents students from retaining aspects of their personal epistemic resources which it is strongly in their interests (as well as in the interests of the broader epistemic community) to retain. (...) In these cases, transformative learning causes epistemic injustice in the form of inferential injustice. (shrink)

Charles Mills posits an epistemology of ignorance that underwrites the complicity of Whites, or people of Western European descent, as signatories of the racial contract. There is prevailing discourse about the complicity of White persons in perpetuating racism and whether they can experience epistemic injustice. In this paper, the claim to hermeneutical injustice, in particular, makes a further assertion that moral blameworthiness is mitigated for a subcategory of White Americans because of being socialized into a White-dominant culture of caste-based Afroscepticism. (...) I argue, based on Peirce's conceptualization of doubt, as against Descartes, that Afroscepticism is a totalizing belief system predicated on a racial group-based social epistemology and maintains a settled stance of questioning the commensurate citizenship of Blacks or American descendants of slaves. These perceived social costs warrant educational interventions that can dismantle its reasoning architecture. White Afroscepticism poses a barrier to the teacher’s efforts to cultivate the democratic habitus in students; however, educator preparation that takes its existence into account can build on the standard classroom practices of critical social justice that promote equity, critical multicultural education, and critical thinking. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This paper examines the ‘voluntarism’ challenge for achieving testimonial justice and advocates the virtue of just acceptance of testimony as the right target for efforts to alleviate testimonial injustice. First, we review the credibility deficit case of interpersonal testimonial injustice and explain how the doxastic voluntarism problem poses a challenge to redressing such testimonial injustice. Specifically, the voluntarism problem seems to rule out straightforward control over what and whom people believe; thus, the solution to the problem of testimonial injustice (...) cannot lie in voluntarily self-correcting unjust credibility judgements and replacing them with just testimonial beliefs. Second, we identify three distinctive characteristics of acceptance of testimony, as distinct from belief, and argue that, while it might be difficult to form credibility judgements completely voluntarily, it is easier to control one’s attitude of acceptance towards a speaker’s testimony. We hold that shifting focus from testimonial belief to acceptance can overcome the problem of (synchronic) involuntarism about testimonial belief. Third, we articulate a vision of a virtue of just acceptance of testimony that can move a hearer to collect the right evidence to reliably find the answer to whether a speaker’s testimony is true. Finally, we demonstrate that encouraging people to take a virtuous attitude of just acceptance towards a speaker’s testimony forms the basis of a remedial vision of education that can play a distinctive role in fostering the virtue of just acceptance aimed at testimonial justice. (shrink)

In more than half of its states, the USA has recently passed or proposed legislation to limit or ban public educational curricular reference to race, gender, sexuality, or other identity topics. The stated justifications for these legislative moves are myriad, but they share a foundational claim; namely, these topics are asserted to be politically and socially divisive such that they ought not to be included within state-controlled schools. In this paper, we consider the claims of divisiveness regarding these topics and (...) explore whether, even if taken in good faith, the popular versions of these arguments and actions are epistemically defensible. We conclude that these bans are an epistemic injustice and therefore argue for their end. The article proceeds to consider the foundational claims of epistemic injustice, followed by the invocation of epistemic standards by which the arguments for these bans can be evaluated. The article then transitions to a close application of these standards, weighing the possible epistemic gains and losses. Before concluding, we consider objections and explore the social and epistemic significance of these issues. (shrink)

Since the publication of Miranda Fricker’s seminal book Epistemic Injustice, philosophy of education scholarship has been mostly limited to analyses of culprit-based epistemic injustice in education. This has left structural manifestations relatively underexplored with great detriment to those who are most vulnerable to experience such injustice. This paper aims to address this oversight and open avenues for further research by exploring approaches to theorizing structural epistemic injustice in education and envisioning efficacious remedies. The author identifies three approaches: one that focusses (...) on educational institutions; one that focusses on institutional processes that impact educational outcomes; and one that focusses on epistemological processes that are internal to education. Whilst the approaches differ as to their explanatory power and ease of implementation, it is argued that all three demonstrate that epistemic injustice in education is often the result of structural factors which cannot be attributed to individual epistemic agents. The author concludes by suggesting that educational philosophers must examine each of these approaches in greater depth to make significant progress in disrupting the impact of epistemic injustice in education. (shrink)

The 2007 publication of Miranda Fricker’s celebrated book Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing gave way to a burgeoning area of study in philosophy of education. The book’s arguments create a context for expanding the scope of work on epistemic issues in education by moving beyond direct explorations of the distribution of epistemic goods and the role of power in curriculum development. Since that time, the rich scholarship on epistemic injustice in philosophy of education examines a variety of (...) topics, including the impact of epistemic injustice on the experiences of teachers and learners more broadly (focussing mostly on students who are marginalized along lines of race, gender, class, and ability, amongst others) and the implications of epistemic injustice for educational research, policy, and practice. This special issue extends this line of work by compiling a set of articles that address a broad range of topics, some of which are well established in the literature and some of which open new lines of inquiry in the field. In doing so, the issue aims to establish the intersection of epistemic injustice and education as a distinct area of study that holds great significance and potential. In this paper, A. C. Nikolaidis and Winston C. Thompson introduce the issue by discussing these contributions, explaining why education is central to the study of epistemic injustice (and vice versa), and exploring the complex nature of epistemic injustice and education as revealed in the articles that comprise this collection—namely, education’s simultaneous complicity as a perpetrator and promise as a disruptor of epistemic injustice. (shrink)

In her groundbreaking book, Epistemic Injustice, renowned moral philosopher and social epistemologist Miranda Fricker coined the term epistemic injustice to draw attention to the pervasive impact of epistemic oppression on marginalized social groups. Fricker’s account spurred a flurry of scholarship regarding the discriminatory impact of epistemic injustice and gave birth to a domain of philosophical inquiry that has extended far beyond the disciplinary boundaries of philosophy. In this interview, Fricker responds to questions posed by A. C. Nikolaidis and Winston C. (...) Thompson that address the ways in which epistemic injustice intersects with education as a human endeavour and social institution. In doing so, Fricker reflects on her motivations in writing her book more than fifteen years ago and explicitly addresses some of the most significant contributions of the concept of epistemic injustice as a tool for analysing issues in education. She also offers insights on the purpose of education, outlines educational manifestations of epistemic injustice, and discusses the virtues that educators must exhibit and inculcate in their students in order for epistemic justice to obtain. (shrink)

Intellectually disabled students face particular barriers to epistemic participation within schooling contexts. While negative forms of bias against intellectually disabled people play an important role in creating these barriers, this paper suggests that it is often because of the best intentions of educators and peers that intellectually disabled students are vulnerable to forms of epistemic injustice. The author outlines a form of epistemic injustice that operates through an educational practice widely regarded as serving the interests of intellectually disabled students. ‘Epistemic (...) ability profiling’ involves the identification of the epistemic consequences of disability in the service of promoting students’ best interests, or to create opportunities for their participation in epistemic communities. Epistemic ability profiling is a double-edged sword: it is important that educators understand and attend to the ways in which differences in ability shape students’ epistemic agency, and yet epistemic ability profiling operates against the background of a conceptually ableist conceptual terrain. As a result, epistemic ability profiling runs the risk of legitimating structural forms of injustice against intellectually disabled people. (shrink)

Activists have challenged the reach of the carceral state into higher education. Whether calling out the exclusion of currently and formerly incarcerated people from higher education or the ways campus police perpetuate the racial and economic biases that plague the US criminal legal system, these voices offer insights that higher education leaders should take seriously. Yet, these challenges are often met with appeals to safety, which purport to override concerns about the harms produced by extension of the criminal legal system (...) into educational contexts. Campus safety debates offer an opportunity to examine the role of wilful ignorance in the perpetuation of systemic injustices on college and university campuses, highlighting tensions between the testimony of those challenging these systems and practices and prevailing narratives around safety. In analysing the operation of wilful ignorance in this context, we will focus on campus policing as a manifestation of carcerality in higher education. We argue that the perpetuation of policing in higher education in the USA reflects wilful White ignorance that represents both an epistemic and moral failing on the part of higher education leaders. (shrink)