Social and Political Philosophy

Philosophy &Public Affairs, Volume 53, Issue 1, Page 66-96, Winter 2025.

Philosophy &Public Affairs, Volume 53, Issue 1, Page 37-65, Winter 2025.

Philosophy &Public Affairs, Volume 53, Issue 1, Page 4-36, Winter 2025.

Most large cities of the world's most affluent countries are increasingly unaffordable in ways that raise serious normative questions. The price of purchasing and renting housing is relatively high due to political constraints on supply. These constraints do not protect the normative interests of residents of these cities, and generate a system in which development that would be mutually beneficial is prohibited. I argue that rights over commonly used urban space have the same liberty-based justification as traditional private property rights. (...) And that assigning rights over the disposition of common space to those most local to it, to use, develop, or transfer as they collectively wish, would overcome the problem. It would do so by enabling an expansion of housing supply where it is most needed, but only through a procedure that ensures it will benefit local residents, by their own lights. (shrink)

Suppose an act of caring can be at once good, even admirable, and still help sustain a system that harms people and our shared world. In this paper, I reflect on interviews with street-level bureaucrats working with civil society to maintain and repair collective capacities for problem-solving and collective reflection in segregated Swedish cities. I want to explore how seeing their work as a form of care – as caring for democracy – may help address the responsibility and distribution of (...) the labor of ‘making democracy work.’ The interviews also draw attention to the ambiguous function of caring: while caring is good in a caring society, it is frustrating in an uncaring one. Where care workers cannot challenge the terms of care, they can only choose either to withdraw, thereby causing direct harm to people even as they expose systemic flaws, or carry on and cooperate, even if it means supporting a flawed, unjust system. (shrink)

In this article, I explore concerns that have been raised regarding the relation between love and uptake of reproductive technologies, embryo selection and enhancement. Objections to (certain) uses of these technologies in terms of fractures in love, either parental or between partners, come from a variety of directions, from the conservative to the liberal. I examine two claims: (1) that the separation of procreation from sex and intimacy is a threat to love, and (2) that intervention on the traits of (...) one’s future offspring betrays inadequate parental love. I will place these concerns in a broader context of (a) technologically facilitated threats to – or aids towards maintaining – love and (b) irreversible changes to parent-child relationships that arise at the moment a prospective parent acts on the choice to select or shape the essence of their future child. (shrink)

A salient tradition in contemporary affect theory heavily relies on distinguishing between emotions and affects. The former refers to structured categories of socially coded affective states, while the latter denotes the pre-social libidinal flow underlying emotions. This distinction is commonly attributed to Spinoza and is thought to have been further developed by Deleuze. In this article, I argue that this overall historical picture is misleading and inaccurate. Deleuze radically transforms Spinoza’s theory of affect for the ends of his own ethical-political (...) philosophy. Moreover, I argue that Deleuzian and similar conceptualizations of affect fail to fulfill their political and ethical promises due to two critical problems. In the last section, I show that a unified notion of emotion inspired by Spinoza, which does not create a sharp rift between emotions and affect, can perform the same explanatory function intended by the emotion-affect distinction while allowing us to circumvent these problems. (shrink)

The basic income movement is in the midst of a substantial internal debate about the definition of basic income. The current debate focuses mostly on two questions: (1) Should the definition be restricted to a payment that is uniform with respect to income (a non-means-tested grant delivered to high- and low-income people alike)? (2) Should the definition include a threshold such as one stipulating that the grant is large enough to live on? Although this article recommends keeping the current definition (...) in place, its central point is not whether one definition is best but that the definitional issue is far more complex than simple question of how to define one term. This complex issue cannot be resolved by any organization clarifying its definition of basic income. These two questions identify a family of up to nine closely-related concepts have been and will continue to be used in the discussion of policy options along the lines of an unconditional cash payment. The discussion needs language that will allow people on all sides of the controversies behind these two questions to clearly discuss all options. That means we need not one but several terms. Therefore, the main goal of this paper is to identify the various concepts that need to be clearly identified. We need to start thinking about nonpejorative terms for the members of this family of concepts so that people on all sides of the relevant issues can share the terminology they need to have fruitful discussion. A true resolution is better found through dialogue with people on all sides of the issues rather than by the unilateral declaration of people on one side or the other. (shrink)

The starting point for the considerations in the article is the statement of Keiko Yamanaka that the Japanese know nothing about resistance to the bacterium represented by another human being. In the article, however, we put forward the thesis that Japanese culture has developed a collective immune system resulting not from individual but from shared systemic immunology in connection with the performance of family, professional and social functions. The analysis of Japanese ‘cultural immunology’ includes an examination of the ways of (...) functioning of the body in contemporary Japanese culture. To this end, we first discuss the relationship between humans and nature in Japanese religious-ethical tradition. Next, we examine the Japanese relationship to the body as a special part of nature. Then we analyze the tension in the Japanese culture between individual and sociocultural bodies. In conclusion, we show what the sociocultural body is and how it functions in the system of ‘cultural immunology’ in contemporary Japan. (shrink)

Authoritarian social movements and governments have brought about some of the greatest horrors in human history. Naturally, research in the social sciences has aimed at developing an understanding of authoritarianism. Certain kinds of authoritarian things, like personalities or governments, are better understood as a consequence, but a general concept of authoritarianism remains absent. I develop a general account of the concept of political authoritarianism which I call justificatory authoritarianism. According to this view, authoritarianism is a justification of the imposition of (...) political power over others by appeal to a prospect for considerable collective benefit, and that justification serves to suspend or suppress constraints on the exercise of political power. (shrink)

There is growing interest among political theorists in the ways in which states select which would-be immigrants to admit and which to exclude. Sahar Akhtar's book Immigration and Discrimination and Désirée Lim's book Immigration and Social Equality are both important contributions to this topic. This review contextualises and summarises both books and critically assesses the arguments in each book. In response to Akhtar's book, I raise some questions about the possibility of global status and whether the arguments for this hold. (...) In response to Lim's book, I ask whether her account of the importance of social equality applies to the immigration context and, if so, how demanding it is. I end by considering how Akhtar's focus on the global context and Lim's focus on the domestic context raises the interesting question of which context matters more in our evaluation of immigrant selection policy. (shrink)

This paper considers the prospects for a green Kantian philosophy. It does so by revisiting Steven Vogel’s postnaturalist objections against Kant. Though Descartes is part of the story, Kant is a primary environmental obstacle for Vogel. Like others in environmental philosophy, Vogel criticizes Kant for his dualism, anthropocentrism, idealism, and nonconsequentialism. The present paper looks into the first two objections. It begins by reconstructing Vogel’s argument against “nature” to appreciate his claim that modern philosophy haunts contemporary environmental philosophy. After pointing (...) out difficulties with Vogel’s objections, resources in Kant are explored to assuage Vogel’s concerns regarding noumena and non-human animals. The paper concludes with a glimpse of an alternate interpretation of Kant that has the potential to respond to the remaining worries of idealism and nonconsequentialism. (shrink)

Prioritization in public health has long been contentious, which necessitates ethical discussions. Despite efforts to develop frameworks that address these considerations, universally accepted models remain elusive, leaving decision-makers to manage independently. This study explores the previously underexplored topic of ethical principles guiding prioritization within different domains of health promotion and prevention at a local level. Interviews with decision-makers (n = 21) from Danish municipalities were analyzed thematically to uncover ethical dimensions of local prioritization of public health services. The study showed (...) that when confronted with resource constraints, decision-makers tended to prioritize preventive services for patients, often at the expense of broader health promotional initiatives. This decision appears rooted in ethical principles of assisting individuals who are deemed to be in the most immediate need. Analyzed against principles of justice and the broader literature on prioritization, the results reflect a prioritization common in the hospital sector: the principle of need. This contrasts with broader societal discussions of public health that are often based on principles of maximization of health benefits and equity. The study highlights the importance of weighing diverse ethical principles when prioritizing among and within initiatives and of considering the purpose of different domains of prevention and health promotion. (shrink)

Victims of oppressive (e.g., sexist, racist or ableist) structures sometimes internalize the unjust norms that prevail in society. This can cause these victims to develop preferences or make deci-sions that seem bad for them. Focusing on such cases, we ask: is self-discrimination disrespectful? We show that some of the most sophisticated respect theories fail to provide any clear guidance. Specifically, we show that the widely recognized view that respect has two dimensions—an interest dimension and an autonomy dimension—delivers completely opposite verdicts (...) depending on how these two dimensions (and the relation between them) are specified. A main takeaway point is that we need to distinguish between at least four different respect-based views. Whether self-discrimination caused by internalized oppression is disrespectful depends on which view one supports. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This paper intends to analyze Walter Benjamin’s critique of Heidegger’s habilitation thesis Duns Scotus’s Doctrine of Categories and Meaning. This objective will be carried out from a contrast between Heidegger’s thesis and the essay that Benjamin writes at the same time entitled On Language as Such and on the Language of Man. Likewise, the reasons that lead Benjamin to critically comment on Heidegger’s thesis will be studied from two perspectives: the problem of translation and the Heideggerian recovery of Neo-Kantianism. (...) Considering the rehabilitation of scholasticism and phenomenology at the beginning of the 20th century, an attempt will be made to reconstruct an implicit debate between the authors around 1916 to account for the distance between Heidegger’s logical conception of language and Benjamin’s theological conception of language. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This paper intends to demonstrate how the text of the Plato’s Republic allows us to discuss the status of appetites and the appetitive principle (to epithymetikon) of the soul as different, trying to demonstrate that, when we do not exchange them for one another, the platonic theory of the soul is filled with even greater clarity and enables the reader to have a sharper understanding of the problem of possible psychic unity.

Populism has taken root almost everywhere in the West. It is crucial to understand how it has come about, where its antagonistic worldview, its nativism, its illiberalism and its anti-pluralism will take us, and how we should seek to fend off this threat to liberal democracy. In particular, what could liberal answers look like? -/- This book is a collection of essays written by young and senior scholars in various fields from philosophy to economics. Part I explores populism’s nature and (...) causes, shedding light on the lure of sovereignty, the perceived representation gap and the process of radicalization, and human psychology. Part II is dedicated to observations inside the political arena, pitting liberalism and populism in a historical perspective, analyzing the risk of democratic backsliding, and asking how liberals should navigate the political need to make compromises. In Part III, the focus turns to liberal responses such as rules-based public deliberation, a liberal ethics attending to civic virtues, improved representation through the blockchain, and polycentric migration policies. Part IV, finally, houses critical engagements with influential relevant authors such as Foucault, Laclau, Berlin, and Harrington. (shrink)

Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.

In How States Think, John Mearsheimer and Sebastian Rosato argue that expected-utility maximization is too subjective to serve as the basis for making rational decisions in the realm of national security. They claim that rationality in security studies should instead be defined by whether leaders conduct deliberative, theory-driven reasoning. This essay explains why Mearsheimer and Rosato’s critique of expected-utility theory is unpersuasive, and how their conception of theory-driven reasoning ignores key aspects of decision-making that national security officials can feasibly address. (...) Lyndon Johnson’s decision to take the United States to war in Vietnam provides a vivid example of how leaders can meet Mearsheimer and Rosato’s criteria for rationality despite clear shortfalls of analytic reasoning. (shrink)

This chapter examines a variety of discussions in the Shenzi Fragments that might lead one to think that there is some sort of morality undergirding its political philosophy including: 1) positive references to conventional virtues, 2) an advocacy of according with the overarching Way, and 3) the development of a form of state consequentialism. While it would be possible to construct moral reasons in support of each of these three positions, the Shenzi Fragments does not do so. Rather, as this (...) chapter argues, the justification of each of these positions arises from practical considerations of political order. The normativity at work, then is political in nature, rather than moral. (shrink)

This chapter argues that the _Shenzi Fragments_, _Shangjunshu_, and _Han Feizi_ all contend that, from the perspective of creating and maintaining political order, the most effective method is for the state to employ the already existing motivations of those over whom it rules. Once human motivations are understood, it becomes a relatively simple task to channel those motivations to get people to act in ways that the state wishes. Implicit in this claim are at least two other commitments: 1) whatever (...) the content of human motivations, this content is sufficiently similar across all human beings that the methods employed to channel it need not vary person by person and 2) human motivations are fairly stable, and their content does not shift in any appreciable way over time. Whether these texts think it is possible to change such motivations, is less clear, though they all argue that attempts to do so at the political level will lead to disaster. While important differences arise amongst these three texts, they are most often differences in focus and detail. (shrink)

The paper explores the philosophical foundations and historical context of Fascism, tracing its roots from ancient idealist thought to its practical implementation in the 20th century. It examines the progression of ideas from Heraclitus’ doctrine of change to Plato’s Theory of Forms, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, and Hegel’s Absolute Idealism, culminating in Giovanni Gentile’s Actual Idealism. Gentile’s philosophy, which emphasizes the collective will and the subordination of individual desires to the state, serves as the intellectual basis for fascism.

In this article, I explore whether domesticated animals (DAs) of different species belonging to the same community participate in authoring and sustaining, what I call, the fabric of zoodemocracy. The fabric refers to a set of activities, social norms, and values that together sustain our democracies (e.g. cooperation, protest, and helping one’s neighbour). I explore this by situating my intervention within systemic theories of democracy and the political turn in animal rights theory. Specifically, I situate my work within Donaldson and (...) Kymlicka’s zoopolitical project, arguing that animals are owed rights to participation in decision-making as community members. Some, however, challenge the idea that DAs can actually sustain democratic communities because they do not have, for example, the rational capacities to control themselves. Others suggest that there are conceptual and normative problems with the concept of co-authorship advanced by Donaldson and Kymlicka. This article addresses these debates by (1) identifying some of the key elements needed to sustain the fabric of democratic communities; and (2) empirically testing whether DAs have the necessary capacities to sustain such communities. I do this by analysing the data I collected while conducting a multispecies ethnography at VINE sanctuary, Springfield, Vermont, US, for 8 weeks.*. (shrink)

Victimhood is commonly deemed negative. The dominant account of victimhood argues that leveraging victimhood involves asserting the moral superiority of the weak, leading to an oversimplification of complex political matters into moral binaries of good versus evil. According to this perspective, victimhood traps victims in a perennial position of weakness, thereby diminishing their agency. This paper challenges this negative perspective and argues that victimhood can enhance agency, serving as a positive political resource. When victimhood involves the acknowledgment of inherent vulnerability (...) shared by all individuals, whether they are victims or non-victims, and concerns the unjust distributions of vulnerability experiences, it can empower individuals to overcome excessive self-doubt and transform their victimization into a political agenda. By examining the subway protests organized by Korean Solidarity Against Disability Discrimination activists, I demonstrate how recognizing the agency-enhancing potential of victimhood helps us better understand the political significance of these actions. (shrink)

A birth strike is a collective refusal to have children for political ends. It has been deployed by a wide array of political movements, from the resistance of Black people to plantation slavery to contemporary campaigns around climate change. Despite this, the tactic has received little attention from political theorists. Drawing on a range of perspectives – including empirical accounts of the birth strike, broader scholarship on the politics of strikes and Black feminist work on reproductive justice – this article (...) addresses the challenges and potentialities of the birth strike as a mode of political resistance. To this end, I delineate three different forms of the birth strike: the Malthusian, which focuses on directly addressing overpopulation; the sacrificial, which emphasises the self-directed suffering of the strike to force a change in policy; and, the defiant, which involves refusing pronatalist demands to maintain or increase the population rate. The Malthusian and sacrificial forms should be avoided since the former undermines reproductive justice and the latter reinforces the patriarchal association between womanhood and motherhood. By contrast, I defend the defiant form because it forges a space where people can make autonomous decisions about childbirth. (shrink)

In our last issue, longtime Editor Derek Clifford shared reflections of his stewardship of the journal. We look forward to building on a foundation of openness to (re)thinking of ethics and social...

Social care responses to extra-familial harm require social workers to work across the binaries of welfare and justice, victim and perpetrator, parent and professional, risk and protection. This paper examines the ethical consequences of working in this manner, through qualitative data (focus groups, interviews, observations, case file analysis and documentary review) from three children's social care organisations in England who trialled new child protection pathways for significant harm outside of family homes/relationships. The extent to which these pathways created five conditions (...) for a welfare response to extra-familial harm are considered, before these results are brought into conversation with Bourdieu’s meta theory of capital, habitus and doxa, and Fenton's practice theory of ethical stress. The challenges identified evidence of the importance foregrounding social work values in the pursuit of welfare-based response to extra-familial harm. They also offer a rationale for studying theories of care ethics in social work in the context of interagency practice. (shrink)

Jacques Rancière, Dissensus: Politika ve Estetik Üzerine adlı kitabında uzlaşımı (consensus) şiar edinen post-demokratik devletin, bireyin toplumun bir parçası olarak tanımladığını belirterek politikanın Platon’un Devlet diyaloğunda sunduğu polis’e indirgendiğini öne sürmektedir. Çözüm olarak politikanın, birey (tikel) ile toplum (tümel) arasındaki uyuşmazlığın (dissensus) teşhir edilmesi olarak yeniden düşünülmesini öneren Rancière, Platon’un bir tür an-arşi olarak gördüğü demokrasinin politikayı olanaklı kılması sayesinde aslında ‘daha iyi bir yaşamı’ (eu zen) vaat ettiğini öne sürer. Böylece, post-demokraside öznelliği uzlaşıma dayanan bir söylemde karışan bireyin sesi, (...) politika aracılığı ile yeniden duyulabilir ki Rancière buna duyulurun dağılımı (distribution of sensible) adını verir. Bu makalede, filozofun politika düşüncesinde, polis ile politika kavramları arasındaki ayrım tartışılacak ve bu minvalde, kendisinin uyuşmazlık kavramı çözümlenecektir. Son olarak, Rancière’in siyaset ile estetik arasında aísthêsis (duyumsama) kavramı üzerinden kurduğu bağlantı, kendisinin ‘estetik sanat rejimi’ terimi ile demokrasi yorumu arasında kurulacak benzerlikler üzerinden açıklanacaktır. Sonuçta, post-demokratik bir devlette yalnızca birer tüketici olarak tanımlanan bireye Rancière’in düşüncesinin sağlayabileceği alternatiferden biri örneklenmiş olacaktır. (shrink)

In this article, I discuss whether, in addition to pricing emissions, we should prohibit a specific category of luxury emissions, those arising from goods and services that only the richest can afford. In the first part, I ask whether a justification for such a prohibition can be derived from emissions sufficientarianism. I argue that emissions sufficientarianism does not explain why we should prohibit only high-wealth emissions and not also the recursive production of emissions that are neither high-wealth nor subsistence. Moreover, (...) it does not provide a reason why we should prevent the production of high-wealth emissions by those who have offset them ex ante. In the second part, I ask whether a justification for the prohibition of high-wealth emissions can be based on emissions limitarianism. I argue that emissions limitarianism can explain why we should prohibit only high-wealth emissions, but it cannot account for why high-wealth emissions are bad even if they are offset ex ante. In the third part, I use two arguments, positional consumption and moral disengagement, to explain why carbon offsetting cannot be used as a means of circumventing the emissions ceiling. I conclude with a brief overview of the policy implications of this normative discussion. (shrink)

In “Modern Abstract Sacrifice in Robespierre’s Terror and Hitler’s Holocaust,” I use Hegel’s analysis of Robespierre’s Terror in the Phenomenology and Adorno and Horkheimer’s analysis of the Nazi Holocaust in the Dialectic of Enlightenment to identify what I term “modern abstract sacrifice” as the dominant kind of instrumental destruction that took place during these nation-building mass-sacrifices. As I show, these events relied upon a justificatory instrumental logic—a sacrificial story—even if that sacrificial story broke down or was abandoned in practice, in (...) which case the destruction became indiscriminate rather than targeted. First, I analyze Hegel’s critique of the Reign of Terror, which he sees as a product of the immediate identity of the general will and the individual will: the revolutionaries collapsed the will of all and the will of each, rendering individuality as such logically impossible. As a result, all individuals became objects of suspicion worthy of sacrifice by guillotine, for the sake of guaranteeing the triumph of the state based on reason. Next, I analyze Adorno and Horkheimer’s critique of the fascist sacrifice of the Jewish people using their political-economic and pathological theories of antisemitism. Adorno and Horkheimer see fascist antisemitism as a manifestation of the logic of substitution, operative in both liberal capitalist ideology—in which the Jewish people represent the forces of capital, obsolete pre-modern tradition, and statelessness—as well as fascist ideology—in which the Jewish people represent the metaphysical forces of evil and “negativity as such.” Finally, I assert that the principal commonality between modern abstract sacrifice in the Terror and the Holocaust is the fact that the victims were all reduced to exchangeable representatives of an abstract category, in spite of the fact that their unique identities were indispensable for the ideological justification of these mass-sacrifices. (shrink)

The Free Market as the synthesis of totalitarianism and anarchism --- The most efficient market is the most politically-concentrated market --- There really needs to be a single consolidated global military as a result of eradicating the military other AND a single consolidated global police as a result of eradicating the military arsenal AND simply total internalization of relations of power as a result of eradicating the polis AND the principle of radical economic sustainability which is simultaneously that of radical (...) political preservation as the single principle of total internalization of relations of power only---man is something that shall be overcome. (shrink)

A number of authors make a seemingly compelling case for holding the victim of a wrong morally obliged to accept the genuine apology of the wrongdoer. This is a crucial issue in questions of reparative justice, since reparation typically requires not just the giving but also the acceptance of an apology. Yet it is a case that we should ultimately reject. If it is credible to think that the victim might suffer anew in exercising any duty of this kind, that (...) suffering must be factored into the moral reckoning from the outset. It is only if we can be sure that the victim will not suffer again by attending to, and ultimately accepting, the wrongdoer’s apology that it would be right to impose upon her any duty of this kind. Yet, in all non-trivial cases, the victim’s burden is unknowable in advance and has the potential to be considerable. In such situations, I argue, the victim has no duty to accept the wrongdoer’s apology. There are limits, too, to the utility of the bipartite victim-wrongdoer account of reparation on which such arguments are typically predicated. For the harm the wrongdoer causes is not exclusively suffered by the immediate victim but also by the community of all potential victims. Genuine reparative justice requires more than a recalibration of the relative moral standing of the wrongdoer and the victim through the giving and receiving of an apology. I consider how this might be achieved without imposing upon the victim a burden that fails to achieve the moral reckoning anticipated. (shrink)

The study has focused on the views of Fārābī regarding the essence and foundations of the two concepts of "political philosophy" and "political jurisprudence". By elucidating and then analyzing the opinions of Fārābī, it has sought to answer the question of whether "political philosophy and political jurisprudence in Farabi's philosophy are the same". By examining what Fārābī has discussed in his works Kitāb al-Millah, Siāsat al-Madania, and Al-Madinah Fāzel'a regarding political philosophy and political jurisprudence, it can be understood that both (...) concepts exist in Fārābī's civil philosophy, and even their theoretical foundation is present in his theoretical wisdom. However, it should be noted that it is not possible to consider the essence of these two to be the same, but in terms of the foundations that include the foundations and the purpose, these two concepts can be considered as two parts of a single whole. The foundation and purpose of Fārābī's political philosophy and political jurisprudence, since they are part of the civil philosophy of Fārābī, is the same as the foundations and purpose of civil wisdom. The distinguishing feature of Fārābī's philosophical school with other philosophical schools is his emphasis on happiness, and this key concept is the foundations and purpose of civil wisdom first and then political philosophy and political jurisprudence. (shrink)

Caleb Ward interviews Black feminist writer, poet, educator, organizer, and scholar Alexis Pauline Gumbs about Audre Lorde’s spirituality, her ecological political praxis, her pedagogy, and the cross-generational scale of social change.

In this article, I develop a novel relational egalitarian theory of social exclusion that explains how society fails to treat socially excluded individuals – such as people experiencing homelessness, individuals with substance use disorders and mental illness and sex workers – as equals. I argue that society places and keeps excluded individuals at the very bottom of the social status hierarchy by treating them as socially invisible, or by rendering them physically invisible, or both. The upshot, then, is that part (...) of what is wrong with social exclusion is that it creates the invisible social class. (shrink)

The acceptance of the idea of basic equality is widely recognized as one of the most significant achievements of modernity. However, what exactly does it mean to say that we are one another’s equals in some fundamental sense? How can it possibly be true, given that we are unequals in almost every other aspect of our lives? And, who, exactly, is meant to fall within its scope? In this introductory chapter, we outline the most significant challenges that theories of basic (...) equality must face in answering these questions, as well as introducing some conceptual distinctions that clarify important aspects of this debate. This, in turn, provides background for understanding the questions that the essays in this book seek to answer. (shrink)

Much of the literature on basic equality has focused on the question of what grounds the equal moral status of persons, typically understood as fully competent adults. However, less has been said about what justifies the equal moral status of those human beings who do not hold a wide range of sophisticated cognitive capacities, such as severely cognitively disabled human beings and children. This chapter contributes to filling this gap by developing a novel theory of the basis of children’s moral (...) equality. Specifically, I argue that children’s moral equality is entailed by a commitment to a kind of respect which requires providing children with those social conditions that foster their development into well-adjusted adults who hold a proper and stable capacity for moral personality. This is because unequal consideration and treatment precludes, or at least is a significant obstacle to, the provision of some goods that are crucial to the cultivation of a proper and stable capacity for moral personality. Children’s moral equality, then, is a constitutive requirement of what is owed to them qua moral status-holders. (shrink)

That all human beings are one another’s moral equals is taken by many to be the fundamental premise of contemporary moral, political, and legal theory. It is also the demand of individuals and groups to be treated as equals that drives much of political practice and protest today. However, what does such a claim of ‘basic equality’ between human beings mean? How can it possibly be true, given that we are unequals in almost every other aspect of our lives? And, (...) who, exactly, is meant to fall within its scope? This volume brings together today’s foremost thinkers on basic equality to address these questions. Collectively, they explore the concept in history and critique, encompassing novel efforts to overcome the problem of explanation as well as scepticism about it, and discussion of its implications for inclusion and marginalization. (shrink)

Since the post-August 5 discourse among public intellectuals has centered around op-eds and commentaries, the buzzwords "reform" and "rewrite" dominate discussions about our Constitution. But how many of us have paused to explore what these terms truly mean? In this commentary, I delve into the ongoing debate about reforming vs. rewriting Bangladesh’s Constitution. My op-ed explores the semantics of these terms and insinuates a bold argument: You don’t need to invoke the “spirit of 2024” to justify rewriting the 1972 Constitution. (...) Instead, the answer lies in returning to the core spirit of Bangladesh’s 1971 Liberation War: equality, human dignity, and social justice. Even substantial reformation may fall short to abolish all elements that contradict the Liberation War. A comprehensive rewrite is the only way to uphold the true spirit of our Liberation War and lay the foundation for a genuinely democratic Bangladesh, free from Hasinocratic authoritarianism. (shrink)