At the core of Dostoevskij's philosophy and theology lies a concept according to which the Truth is antinomical: it contains both a thesis and its antithesis without expectation of synthesis. This concept can be traced to Eastern Patristics. After Dostoevskij, the theory of antinomies was elaborated by 20th century Russian religious thinkers such as Pavel Florenskij, Sergej Bulgakov, Nikolaj Berdjaev, Semën Frank, and Vladimir Losskij. Their ideas help us to understand that Dostoevskij's dialogism, made famous in its secular guise by (...) Bakhtin, has a theological underpinning. Dostoevskij's exposition of conflicting truths should therefore be seen not as a case of irresolvable contradiction or paradox but as an organic wholeness. (shrink)

У статті порушено проблему екології міського середовища як екології соціального середовища, в якому городянин виробляє певні типи поведінкових патернів. Урбаністичні поведінкові патерни розглядаються у соціально-комунікативному аспекті міського життя. Визначено іміджевий патерн в інформаційно-репрезентаційній сфері міста, інтерактивний патерн – у сфері вибору соціального оточення, і фрактальний патерн – у сфері створення комунікативних кластерів. Дані патерни забезпечують городянину мінімізацію стресу, спричиненого міським середовищем, впливають на якість життя городянина в урбанізованому середовищі та якість самого міського середовища, а також задовольняють потребу городянина у безпеці (...) міського життя. Вирізнення поведінкових патернів – інноваційний підхід у дослідженнях екології міського середовища. (shrink)

O presente estudo pretende salientar o trânsito das grandes formulações da concepção da temporalidade na tradição hindu: do tempo (kāla) à sua compreensão como instantâneo (kṣaṇa). Num ponto preliminar, salientam-se as condições linguísticas do pensar indo-europeu e a "gramática" sanscrítica a propósito do tempo. Sublinham-se de seguida os enquadramentos rituais e míticos, tanto ligados com a ciclicidade (saṃsāra), como com o imutável e eterno (ānantya). Depois percorrem-se, de forma sintética, os vários "sistemas" filosóficos salientando respectivamente: a concepção metafísica (no Vedānta (...) e Mīmānsā), a recorrência e irrealidade já num plano gnosiológico (no Sāṃkhya e no Yoga), e a formulação psicológica (tanto no Vaiśeṣika, como no Nyāya, além disso presente no Jainismo). Enfim, na última parte, faz-se menção aos principais traços característicos da doutrina budista da instantaneidade (muito característica sobretudo das escolas "subitistas"). Valoriza-se conclusivamente esta instância de um "agora" também como lição da espiritualidade hindu em geral. (shrink)

The Buddhist philosophy of causality is primarily a theory (naya) of the human world. Its methodology, however, is objective and critical. It rejects the weight of mere authority or tradition, relies upon experience and reason, and emphasizes the critical examination and verification of all opinions. Although the Buddhist conception of knowledge and truth has a strong empirical and pragmatic bias (cf. Nyāya‐bindu 1.1), its conception of experience does not exclude introspection, rational intuition or mystical intuition (cf. Nyāya‐bindu 1.7–11). Although its (...) conception of reason creates a logical gulf between reason and experience, the gulf is bridged by a transcendental illusion (avidyā). Its employment of reason is highly analytical and it seeks to discover the ultimate elements constituting the structures of objects and experience. The constituent elements as the locus of causation are regarded as more real than their composite structures – dharma, dhātu or kṣana as contrasted with saṅghāta or santāna. At the same time, it raises dialectical questions and seriously considers the possibility of the empirical world being merely a working illusion. It discounts the apparent stability of objects, stressing their transience, finally defined as momentariness (see, for example, Ratnakīrti's Kṣaṇa‐bhaṅgasiddhi). It rejects the category of substance for that of process. Causality is thus regarded not as a dynamic interaction between substances, but as a functional, many‐one relationship of order characterized by invariance and uniformity within any given type of process. (shrink)

In the later Indian Yogācāra school, yogipratyakṣa, the cognition of yogins is a key concept used to explain the Buddhist goal of enlightenment. It arises through the practice of meditation upon the Four Noble Truths. The method of the practice is to contemplate their aspects with attention (sādara), without interruption (nairantarya), and over a long period of time (dīrghakāla). A problem occurs in this position since Buddhists hold the theory of momentariness: how is possible that a yogin attains yogipratyakṣa even (...) when everything arises and perishes moment by moment. It is not possible for the momentary mind to fix on the object. Neither is the intensification of the practice possible in a stream composed of cognitions different at each moment. To provide a solution of this problem, a renown eleventh century Buddhist logician, Jñānaśrīmitra, assures us that momentariness is incompatible with duration (sthāyitā), but not with the occurrence of dissimilarity (visadṛśotpāda). Even if cognitions are momentary, the vividness of an object continues to intensify in the course of each preceding cognition-moment producing, in turn, its following moment. Jñānaśrīmitra discusses the attainment of yogipratyakṣa in terms of Buddhist ontological distinctions of moment (kṣaṇa) and continuum (santāna). At the level of the continuum, the process of enlightenment is considered gradual. By retaining a strict adherence to the final moment of the practice, on the other hand, the process is considered sudden. (shrink)