Dans cet entretien, Henry Bernstein revient sur la fondation des études agraires critiques et les principaux concepts qu’il a développés pour une étude marxiste de la sociologie rurale. Il montre comment l’opposition entre léninisme et populisme se rejoue dans l’épistémologie de la structure de classe de la paysannerie.

Summary Summary In 1908 the First International Congress of Refrigeration took place in Paris, organised by a score of French industrialists and supported by some of the major railway and shipping companies. A few months later, in January 1909, the International Association of Refrigeration was founded with the aim of encouraging the general progress of the science and industries of artificial cold. The aim of this paper consists in examining the early years of the Association with a particular focus on (...) its scientific character. The research is based on the documents published by the Association from 1908 to 1914, and on private correspondence between two of the main scientists, both Nobel Prize recipients, who played an important role in its establishment: the Swiss physicist Édouard Guillaume (1861–1938) and the Dutch physicist Heike Kamerlingh Onnes (1853–1926). Both scientists had a specific vision for their own role in the Association and for the Association itself. Their correspondence reveals a great range of tensions between the various nation-state members of the Association, its various spheres of activity, but also tensions due to personal ambitions and conflicts of interest. (shrink)

In our critical review of Doing without Concepts, we argue that although the heterogeneity hypothesis (according to which exemplars, prototypes and theories are natural kinds that should replace ‘concept’) may end fruitless debates in the psychology of concepts, Edouard Machery did not anticipate one consequence of his suggestion: Definitions now acquire a new status as another one of the bodies of information replacing ‘concept’. In order to support our hypothesis, we invoke dual-process models to suggest that prototypes, exemplars and theories (...) are ‘Type 1’ concepts (automatic, implicit) and definitions ‘Type 2’ concepts (controlled, explicit). In the context of this argument, we suggest that one must better distinguish between Type 1 theories (e.g., Bayesian causal nets) and Type 2 theories (e.g., scientific) that explicitly control definitions. (shrink)

Moral philosophers and psychologists often assume that people judge morally lucky and morally unlucky agents differently, an assumption that stands at the heart of the Puzzle of Moral Luck. We examine whether the asymmetry is found for reflective intuitions regarding wrongness, blame, permissibility, and punishment judg- ments, whether people’s concrete, case-based judgments align with their explicit, abstract principles regarding moral luck, and what psychological mechanisms might drive the effect. Our experiments produce three findings: First, in within-subjects experiments favorable to reflective (...) deliberation, the vast majority of people judge a lucky and an unlucky agent as equally blameworthy, and their actions as equally wrong and permissible. The philosophical Puzzle of Moral Luck, and the challenge to the very possibility of systematic ethics it is frequently taken to engender, thus simply do not arise. Second, punishment judgments are significantly more outcome- dependent than wrongness, blame, and permissibility judgments. While this constitutes evidence in favor of current Dual Process Theories of moral judgment, the latter need to be qualified: punishment and blame judgments do not seem to be driven by the same process, as is commonly argued in the literature. Third, in between-subjects experiments, outcome has an effect on all four types of moral judgments. This effect is mediated by negligence ascriptions and can ultimately be explained as due to differing probability ascriptions across cases. (shrink)

In the remainder of this article, we will disarm an important motivation for epistemic contextualism and interest-relative invariantism. We will accomplish this by presenting a stringent test of whether there is a stakes effect on ordinary knowledge ascription. Having shown that, even on a stringent way of testing, stakes fail to impact ordinary knowledge ascription, we will conclude that we should take another look at classical invariantism. Here is how we will proceed. Section 1 lays out some limitations of previous (...) research on stakes. Section 2 presents our study and concludes that there is little evidence for a substantial stakes effect. Section 3 responds to objections. The conclusion clears the way for classical invariantism. (shrink)

Does the Ship of Theseus present a genuine puzzle about persistence due to conflicting intuitions based on “continuity of form” and “continuity of matter” pulling in opposite directions? Philosophers are divided. Some claim that it presents a genuine puzzle but disagree over whether there is a solution. Others claim that there is no puzzle at all since the case has an obvious solution. To assess these proposals, we conducted a cross-cultural study involving nearly 3,000 people across twenty-two countries, speaking eighteen (...) different languages. Our results speak against the proposal that there is no puzzle at all and against the proposal that there is a puzzle but one that has no solution. Our results suggest that there are two criteria—“continuity of form” and “continuity of matter”— that constitute our concept of persistence and these two criteria receive different weightings in settling matters concerning persistence. (shrink)

In previous work, we presented evidence suggesting that ordinary people do not conceive of subjective experiences as having phenomenal qualities. We then argued that these findings undermine a common justification given for the reality of the hard problem of consciousness. In a thought-provoking article, Talbot has challenged our argument. In this article, we respond to his criticism.

In previous work, we presented evidence suggesting that ordinary people do not conceive of subjective experiences as having phenomenal qualities. We then argued that these findings undermine a common justification given for the reality of the hard problem of consciousness. In a thought-provoking article, Talbot has challenged our argument. In this article, we respond to his criticism.

This Festschrift is published on the occasion of Gerhard Heinzmann's 60th birthday. Its title "Construction" refers to Heinzmann's philosophical options, as well as to his exceptional involvement in the building of many scientific enterprises and new scientific institutions. Sixty authors contributed to the volume, and the gathered essays witness the various centers of interest and intellectual achievements of Heinzmann. They are organised in five sections: Henri Poincare; History and Philosophy of Mathematics; History and Philosophy of Logic; Pragmatism; and Miscellaneous.

Guillaume St-Laurent | : Dans ses récentes méditations philosophiques, Claude Romano soutient non seulement que la phénoménologie ne devrait plus être cartésienne, mais qu’elle ne peut plus l’être, car un doute universel serait lui-même foncièrement absurde du point de vue phénoménologique. L’objectif du présent essai est de contester qu’une telle réfutation phénoménologique du cartésianisme soit possible. En ce sens, nous soutiendrons que les arguments anti-sceptiques de Romano s’avèrent insuffisants parce que le doute hyperbolique est une possibilité de pensée qui, (...) bien que spéculative, demeure à la fois intelligible et plus radicale que toute description d’essence ou « réduction eidétique ». | : In his recent philosophical contributions, French phenomenologist Claude Romano maintained not only that phenomenology should not be Cartesian, but that it cannot be Cartesian because the very idea of a universal doubt would be utterly absurd from a phenomenological perspective. Our objective is to show that such a phenomenological refutation of Cartesianism is impossible. After reviewing the two main anti-skeptical arguments propounded by Romano, we will support a simple critical thesis : the hyperbolical doubt is an irreducible possibility of thought which, although “speculative,” remains nevertheless actual and more radical than any phenomenological description. (shrink)

« La bête cartésienne, remarque Richard Stalnaker dans une monographie récente (Stalnaker 2008), est une hydre qui ne se laisse pas tuer. Wittgenstein, Ryle, Quine, Sellars, Davidson (sans même mentionner Heidegger) ont peut-être coupé quelques têtes, mais elles ne cessent de repousser. Descartes n’est plus le croquemitaine qu’il était. » Qu’on le déplore, comme Stalnaker, ou que l’on s’en réjouisse, force est de constater que Descartes continue d’être cité, invoqué, critiqué dans la plu...

The Handbook of Experimental Economic Methodology, edited by Guillaume R. Fréchette and Andrew Schotter, aims to confront and debate the issues faced by the growing field of experimental economics. For example, as experimental work attempts to test theory, it raises questions about the proper relationship between theory and experiments. As experimental results are used to inform policy, the utility of these results outside the lab is questioned, and finally, as experimental economics tries to integrate ideas from other disciplines like (...) psychology and neuroscience, the question of their proper place in the discipline of economics becomes less clear.This book contains papers written by some of the most accomplished scholars working at the intersection of experimental, behavioral, and theoretical economics talking about methodology. It is divided into four sections, each of which features a set of papers and a set of comments on those papers. The intention of the volume is to offer a place where ideas about methodology could be discussed and even argued. Some of the papers are contentious---a healthy sign of a dynamic discipline---while others lay out a vision for how the authors think experimental economics should be pursued. This exciting and illuminating collection of papers brings light to a topic at the core of experimental economics. Researchers from a broad range of fields will benefit from the exploration of these important questions. (shrink)

The remarks presented here are an attempt to elaborate a global approach, in a purely formal way, to professional ethics as a philosophical problem. Following a brief analysis of the link between practice and reflection , I form a general view of the ethical dimension of existence , then analyze some characteristics of modern professional activity and conclude by stressing the necessity for giving shape — especially through institutions — to this ethical movement .In this way, my remarks are an (...) attempt to respond to the conviction that the current interest in ethical matters within the professional domain signals a significant moment in our cultural and social history. Professional practice has never had a greater impact or greater autonomy than it has today. This raises the question whether they will join the human adventure in a responsible manner, or follow their own path, one guided by the demands of technical performance, economic profitability and unbridled globalization. In its ambiguity, the ethical summons that we hear from all sides today is perhaps the sign of a kairos, an occasion requiring both lucidity and commitment.Bearing this in mind, the question with which I would like to begin my remarks is the following: how should we seize this occasion and lead it toward the future? To be more precise: what are the conditions under which professional ethics can become, not simply a pronouncement, a dream, a desire or a regret, but a dynamic of social and historical responsibility? (shrink)

This paper is divided into two sections. The first section presents a concise survey of the intellectual itinerary of the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu in the French intellectual field. Then, after a short presentation of Bourdieu’s The Social Structures of the Economy, I proceed to a broader discussion of his economic sociology. After a presentation of Bourdieu’s key conceptual contributions, I question some aspects of Bourdieusian sociology with regard to its ambition of historicising the ‘economic field’. I identify the limitations (...) of this historicising project in the extension of the metaphor of the market to virtually all fields of human activities and in a concept of capital which fails to grasp a social relation specific to the historical development of capitalism. (shrink)

Les opérations actuelles que mène Total en Afrique suivent un schéma ancien : l’exploitation, tournée vers les énergies fossiles, et la corruption des économies, des gouvernements, des sociétés et des environnements des pays en développement, le tout soutenu par la puissance étatique française. Emmanuel Macron rendit la chose tout à fait manifeste en 2021, lorsqu’il insista pour défendre le gaz possédé par Total au Mozambique (20 milliards de dollars) par une intervention militaire, menée par des soldats rwandais et sud-africains. Le (...) rôle sous-impérialiste de Pretoria explique son soutien désespéré aux nouveaux magnats du pétrole avec lesquels Total a fait alliance depuis la moitié des années 2010 pour exploiter d’importantes réserves de gaz et chercher de nouveaux gisements par dynamitage sismique. Mais depuis 2021, deux formes de résistance ont fait vaciller Total : les guérillas islamiques au Mozambique et les mobilisations écologistes et sociales déclenchées le long des côtes sud-africaines, tant du côté de l’océan Atlantique que de l’océan Indien. Mais il faudra dans les mois et les années à venir, organiser une campagne globale contre le renouveau de l’impérialisme – et du sous-impérialisme – fossile. (shrink)

I am grateful for Joshua Alexander and Jonathan Weinberg’s, Avner Baz’s and Max Deutsch’s insightful comments on Philosophy Within Its Proper Bounds. I have lea.

This article critically examines the contemporary resurgence of empiricism (or “neo-empiricism”) in philosophy, psychology, neuropsychology, and artificial intelligence. This resurgence is an important and positive development. It is the first time that this centuries-old empiricist approach to cognition is precisely formulated in the context of cognitive science and neuroscience. Moreover, neo-empiricists have made several findings that challenge amodal theories of concepts and higher cognition. It is argued, however, that the theoretical foundations of and the empirical evidence for neo-empiricism are not (...) as strong as is usually claimed by its proponents. The empirical evidence for and against neo-empiricism is discussed in detail. (shrink)

In Pieces of mind, Figdor examines how to interpret psychological predicates that scientists assign to entities that commonsensically do not have a mind such as neurons and plants. She claims that these predicates are used literally to refer to the same structures in humans and non‐human entities. I argue on the contrary that most uses of this kind are merely the extension of preexisting, possibly behaviorist senses of the relevant psychological predicates.

Experimental philosophers often seem to ignore or downplay the significance of demographic variation in philosophically relevant judgments. This article confirms this impression, discusses why demographic research is overlooked in experimental philosophy, and argues that variation is philosophically significant.

This article examines whether people share the Gettier intuition (viz. that someone who has a true justified belief that p may nonetheless fail to know that p) in 24 sites, located in 23 countries (counting Hong Kong as a distinct country) and across 17 languages. We also consider the possible influence of gender and personality on this intuition with a very large sample size. Finally, we examine whether the Gettier intuition varies across people as a function of their disposition to (...) engage in “reflective” thinking. (shrink)

The question, ‘Is cognition linguistic?' divides recent cognitive theories into two antagonistic groups. Sententialists claim that we think in some language, while advocates of non linguistic views of cognition deny this claim. The Introspective Argument for Sententialism is one of the most appealing arguments for sententialism. In substance, it claims that the introspective fact of inner speech provides strong evidence that our thoughts are linguistic. This article challenges this argument. I claim that the Introspective Argument for Sententialism confuses the content (...) of our thoughts with their vehicles: while sententialism is a thesis about the vehicles of our thoughts, inner speech sentences are the content of auditory or articulatory images. The rebuttal of the introspective argument for sententialism is shown to have a general significance in cognitive science: Introspection does not tell us how we think. (shrink)

The present research examines whether identity essentialism, an important component of psychological essentialism, is a fundamental feature of human cognition. Across three studies (Ntotal = 1723), we report evidence that essentialist intuitions about the identity of kinds are culturally dependent, demographically variable, and easily malleable. The first study considered essentialist intuitions in 10 different countries spread across four continents. Participants were presented with two scenarios meant to elicit essentialist intuitions. Their answers suggest that essentialist intuitions vary dramatically across cultures. Furthermore, (...) these intuitions were found to vary with gender, education, and across eliciting stimuli. The second study further examined whether essentialist intuitions are stable across different kinds of eliciting stimuli. Participants were presented with two different scenarios meant to elicit essentialist intuitions—the “discovery” and “transformation” scenarios. Their answers suggest that the nature of the eliciting stimuli influences whether or not people report essentialist intuitions. Finally, the third study demonstrates that essentialist intuitions are susceptible to framing effects. Keeping the eliciting stimulus (i.e., the scenario) constant, we show that the formulation of the question eliciting a judgment influences whether or not people have essentialist intuitions. Implications of these findings for identity essentialism and psychological essentialism, in general, are discussed. (shrink)

In this article, we present evidence that in four different cultural groups that speak quite different languages there are cases of justified true beliefs that are not judged to be cases of knowledge. We hypothesize that this intuitive judgment, which we call “the Gettier intuition,” may be a reflection of an underlying innate and universal core folk epistemology, and we highlight the philosophical significance of its universality.