Religion and science are altogether too different to be rationally incompatible . If—as is done here—one defends such a thesis, one seems to sever the link between religion and truth. This link seems to many to be really essential: is not the highest requirement of a person, especially a religious person, „to live in the truth” ? And is it not necessary for rational beings to try and give a rational justification for one's religious beliefs? But perhaps „the truth” which (...) is of such importance to the religious person is not a theoretical truth; perhaps „to live in the truth” is not a matter of trying not to be fooled or of being prepared to change one's views according to new and better information. Furthermore, the desire for independent justification seems either incompatible with religious belief or rather pointless. The link between religion and truth can only be seriously discussed if one understands the relationship between religious beliefs and attitudes like truthfulness, trust, obedience to authority, etcetera. One objection to our position could be that it leads to a kind of „schizophrenic” split or disconnection between religion and the scientific outlook. To this objection we reply that since the arrival of science and technology human life is full of similar kinds of disconnection between non-scientific beliefs and attitudes, and scientific beliefs and technical approaches. To want to conserve science and technology and at the same time to want to restore the „Cosy Universe”-situation, is pure wishful thinking. (shrink)

Utopias are much more prone to realization than people would have thought possible, according to Berdiaeff. In the twentieth century, we have witnessed realized totalitarian utopias (such as the ‘really existing socialism’ in East Germany). In the twenty-first century, late modern, capitalist society seems well under way towards the construction of another kind of realized utopianism. Recent developments in today’s health care system (changes in the very meaning of health and care, in medicine and nursing, and even in the ethics (...) of care) all point in the same direction: the growing hold of the utopian mind (the expression is Kolnai’s) on crucial aspects of human life and society. Must we not agree with Berdiaeff that insight in the new ‘realized’ utopianism should induce us to dream ‘of a non-utopian society less “perfect”, but more free’? (shrink)

De blinde vlek in praktijk en discussie rond orgaandonatie In countries like Belgium and The Netherlands, there seems to be overwhelming public acceptance of transplantation and organ donation. Yet, paradoxically, part of the public refuses post-mortal donation of their own organs or of those of family members. It is customary within the transplantation context to accept the refusal of organ donation by family members “in order to accommodate their feelings”. I argue that this attitude does not take seriously what is (...) really behind the refusal of donation by (at least some) family members. My hypothesis is that even in very secularized societies, this refusal is determined by cultural-symbolic attitudes vis-à-vis the (dead) human body (and some of its parts). The blind spot for this reality, both in the practice of and discussions around organ donation, prevents understanding of what is producing the paradox mentioned. (shrink)

Meaning is always threatened by chaos. This is true for semantic meaning as well as for meaning in the sense of significance. The desire to defend meaningfulness usually takes the form of trying to find unshakeable foundations for meaningfiilness ; if such foundations cannot be found one ends in scepticism. In this paper it is shown how Wittgenstein's reaction to scepticism concerning semantic meaning does not stop at showing the inconsistencies in this form of scepticism, but tries to get at (...) its real roots by relating it to the problematic of significance. This supposes that there is some linkage between the two concepts of meaning : it is suggested that there is indeed in Wittgenstein the beginnings of a general anthropological conception of meaning . It is argued that it is not this general conception of meaning which is the main target of Wittgenstein's philosophy, but rather the attainment and propagation of a kind of wisdom consisting in a capacity to live with the absence of solid foundations of significance thanks to the wonderment at human life given in his kind of philosophical reflection. (shrink)

Basically, I agree with Chen Lai's views on the difficulties of translating ancient Chinese thinking into modern Western idioms. The problem is not only due to the dependence of the meaning of terms upon their use in a specific context. The problem is already there for Chinese scholars themselves: It is the translation of words or concepts from a traditional learned context related to specific questions into modern Chinese language. In order to succeed, one has to realize, first, that modern (...) colloquial Chinese is divorced from classical Chinese categories and, secondly, that philosophical vocabulary in modern Chinese is contaminated by Western philosophical categories. (shrink)

The philosophy of Baruch Spinoza (1632-77) is an unusual,highly original, and influential reaction to the transition of Western cultureto the modern age. According to Spinoza, modern scientific thinking, if thoughtthrough, leads to a denial of humanity as the center of creation, willed by apersonal God. It is Spinoza who first formulated a philosophy which shows thatmodern scientific thinking, and the modern metaphysical view of humanity andthe world that it gives rise to, does not have to lead to despair. He understoodthat (...) engaging seriously in detached philosophical thinking could lead to anunexpected form of intellectual salvation. De Dijn's comprehensive introduction to Spinoza's philosophyis based on two key texts. He first provides an in-depth analysis of Spinoza's Treatise on the Improvement of theUnderstanding, which De Dijn characterizes as his introduction tophilosophy. This notoriously difficult text is here made accessible, even inits details. This analysis is followed by a comprehensive survey of Spinoza'smetaphysics as presented in his famous Ethics. De Dijn demonstrates howSpinoza's central philosophical project as introduced in the Treatise - thelinkage of knowledge and salvation - is perfectly realized in the Ethics. In thisway the unity of Spinoza's thought is shown to consist in his preoccupationwith the ethical question of salvation. The book also containsintroductory chapters on Spinoza's life and work, the original Latin text ofthe Treatise and its new English translation by Edwin Curley, and an annotatedbibliography on the secondary literature. (shrink)

ONE OF THE intriguing features of Spinoza's well-known work, the Ethics, is its "geometrical method." Even today, there is fundamental disagreement among interpreters concerning practically every aspect of this method. Spinoza's own explicit thoughts about philosophical method are almost exclusively to be found in a short, unfinished work, the Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione, in which Spinoza does not seem to talk about a geometrical method at all.

Startingpoint of the investigation is the Humean idea that the notion and problem of personal identity (and a fortiori of personhood) is best understood not from an epistemological-ontological perspective‚ but in the context of an analysis of ‘the concern we take in ourselves’ as in pride. It turns out that an insight in pride requires an analysis of the paradoxical relation of identification. It is argued that this relation cannot be understood in terms of a conscious strategy from the part (...) of the individual. The analysis shows that identification involves a fundamental passivity of the subject‚ but at the same time requires a certain capacity of distantiation with respect to the object(s) of identification. Pride and the identification(s) going with it‚ involve value-judgments not only concerning the value of the self as identified with certain valuable objects‚ but also concerning the mode of identification. The question is asked by whom and how the criteria of these judgments are determined. An attempt is made to give a rationale for the absence of definitive criteria in this matter. In the last parts of the paper‚ the fundamental passivity of the self in its identification(s) is interpreted as a fundamental ‘vulnerability’ which must somehow be assumed to fully be a person. (It is suggested that the analysis of pride and self-esteem in terms of ‘vulnerability’ could profit from an analysis of gratitude). (shrink)

Books and articles are written with titles like The Last Professors and The End of the University. Of course these headings should not be taken literally. What they indicate are deep changes in the nature of the university and in the understanding of what is a professor. They also demonstrate a profound malaise, especially - but not only-among academics in the Humanities. In this brief paper an attempt is made to understand what is happening. Universities have been changing from institutions (...) dedicated to specific "ends in themselves" into organizations geared towards the production of specific forms of outcome or product. Professors have become professionals in the service of such organizations. It is argued that these changes produce effects which pervert the internal aims of university teaching and research. They originate in a wider cultural, quasi-religious belief in mastery and control. (shrink)

This paper is an interpretation of the precise meaning of Spinoza's provocative theses that "right is might", and that the real basis of political and other authority is power. The possibility condition of these radically modern theses — that imply the end of traditional theologico-political thinking — is a peculiar naturalistic theology. At the same time, this paper provides a brief, but thorough introduction to Spinoza's political philosophy. Some aspects of it which are often neglected, such as the intricate relationship (...) beween the law and the mores of the people, are given their due weight. (shrink)

This article presents an overall view of Hume's philosophy as it can be found in the Treatise. It shows that Hume's position can be called a nonreductionist naturalism. Hume's philosophy is a philosophical anthropology: it begins with a discussion of what is typically human in human understanding, i.e., knowledge and probability or the belief-systems of science and philosophy. Then, morality and politics are retraced as to their origin in emotions and desires. In the final part of the article it is (...) explained in what sense Hume can be called a nonreductionist naturalist. (shrink)

Introduction -- Sagesse et savoir théorique (Spinoza I) -- Naturalisme et religion révélée (Spinoza II) -- Un naturalisme ironique (Hume I) -- Théorie et pratique, et la pratique de la théorie (Spinoza et Hume) -- Science, sens commun et sagesse -- Science et religion -- Science et éthique -- Ethique et religion -- La fin de l'histoire -- Progrès et tradition.

Two sorts of values are to be distinguished: economic values which are related to the subjective needs and desires of sensitive beings, and non-economic or spiritual values which are related to persons living in a common culture. The present 'crisis of values' has to do with a confusion between these two different kinds of values. Spiritual values and norms should also be distinguished from ideals and related principles. Ideals and principles are abstractions originating in the attempt to organize human life (...) in a strictly rational way, independently of the insertion of human beings in a common culture. Spiritual values are characterized by a certain sort of transcendence vis à vis the desires and opinions of persons. They are neither subjective, nor strictly objective; neither universal, non purely particular. Values are necessarily incarnated in concrete objects, persons, structures etc. Therefore, even transcendental values are necessarily expressed in concrete forms or symbols. As a consequence, all values are vulnerable and in principle susceptible to change and loss. The norms related to spiritual values should not be considered as fossilized forms or remnants of values. They rather refer to boundaries and distinctions without the honouring of which values cannot exist. Therefore, these norms are no obstacle to freedom, but its possibility-condition. (shrink)

This paper is a reply to my critics on three points: -My book is not an apologetics for Catholic tradition in general or traditional moral views in bio-ethics, but a plea for a philosophical-hermeneutical reappropriation of metaphors and insights from that tradition; -My book is not a defence of the traditional natural law approach, but an attempt atan hermeneutical and internal critical elucidation of ethical sensibility; -I disagree with a pragmatic attitude leading to 'monster assimilation' and with pleas for a (...) 'transcendance opératoire' of existing human nature and its cultural-symbolic 'mindedness'. (shrink)

In his book Rede en religie: Een verkenning, Michiel Leezenberg discusses three aspects of religion: religion as a belief system, as it pertains to moral values and the experience of meaning, and as a practice. Concerning each of these aspects, he asks himself the question of the relation between religion and rationality. While touching on all three, this paper focuses on Leezenberg's treatment of the second aspect of religion. Although religion is of course a system of beliefs, these beliefs are (...) strongly embedded in specific practices, making a straightforward comparison with scientific beliefs highly problematic. The central problem discussed here is that of the relation between religious values and modern, secular values. The paper argues that the opposition is not simply between religious and secular morality, but between any morality in which moral taboos play an essential role and a certain utopianism present in secular morality. This leads to an investigation of the supposed link between religion and conservatism. The paper ends with a discussion of the recent phenomenon of the 'retour du religieux' in the form of a growing interest in religious experience via 'spirituality'. (shrink)

La conception naturaliste de l'homme comme conatus n'est pas liee chez Spinoza a une conception ethique utilitariste, egoiste ou hedonique. Au contraire, et paradoxalement, elle est susceptible de s'accommoder d'une pensee ethique qui, a son stade le plus developpe, consiste en de tres hautes vertus et des sentiments religieux eleves. Ceci n'est possible que parce que le conatus est interprete comme capable d'une activite libre. Cette liberte est concue, non pas comme une realisation, par la volonte, de valeurs qui seduisent (...) sans necessitation, mais comme une activite emanant de maniere spontanee ou quasi-automatique d'une source autonome, c. a. d. non determinee par l'exterieur. (shrink)

This article contains a reply to Guido Vanheeswijck’s critical study of my book Vloeibare waarden. Politiek, zorg en onderwijs in de laatmoderne tijd. I respond to his criticisms on the following topics: what is behind the liquidity of values; conservatism and the sacred; autonomy and the transcendence of values. The discussion also contains insights relevant to these topics from the work of Leszek Kolakowki.

Until recently the central problem seemed to be the relationship between Christianity and Modernity. According to many theologians and philosophers, modernity was considered not only as the result, but even as the final realisation of Christianity. In any case, Christianity was often understood as the religion which ends all traditional religiosity. The real antithesis then was not between Christianity and modernity, but between Christianity and tradition. The philosophical question raised here is whether any religion can survive except as a tradition (...) succeeding in preserving a certain range of ‘incarnated’ meanings which gives it its specificity. The present day interest in tradition is a remarkable fact. In our post-modern context, this interest betrays however an instrumental attitude vis-à-vis these meanings, thereby constituting a new threat to Christianity different from the modern threat. (shrink)

Critical Study of Daniel Dennetts Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon. Dennets book has a double aim. The first is to defend and advocate more scientific research in religion in the hope that this will induce scepticism into believers and perhaps turn them away from religion. The second is to survey existing theories about religion as a natural phenomenon and to propose a research programme for furthering scientific understanding of it. The anti-religious plea is rather tedious and probably (...) counterproductive. The status quaestionis of existing ‘theories’ is much more interesting and nuanced. Dennett even claims that human sciences such as sociology, anthropology and history will have to play an essential part in our understanding of religions and their development. Dennetts rather cognitivist interpretation of religion prevents him from pursuing some interesting ideas and comparisons concerning religion and other spheres of human interest. (shrink)

The modern idea of the right to freedom of each human being can be briefly described as follows: it is the right to personal judgment in matters of what is true and good and to selfdetermination of one’s life and actions in view of this judgment. Today this right is considered as the most basic, or one of the most basic, unquestionable rights of the individual. At the same time, our present situation is characterized by an undeniable pluralism. We have (...) practically given up the hope that individuals, through their own judgment, will come to an agreement as to what are the central values in life, as to what is the good life. On the contrary, too much unity and agreement immediately raises the suspicion of more or less hidden constraint or indoctrination.In a pluralistic, free society, every defense of what is the good can only be seen as the defense of a particular conception of the good, which is potentially threatening for the self-determination of other individuals. The combination of the stress on freedom and the fact of pluralism, leads to an extreme importance being given to tolerance. Tolerance, together with the multiplicity of life-styles, seems to be something positive in itself. Within this perspective, the real question does not seem to be whether tolerance is something positive in itself, but whether it has any limitations. (shrink)

The professionalisation of care has resulted in ever increasing specialisation, use of technical innovations and informatisation. This has had consequences for the level and way of involvement of the care provider vis-à-vis the patient. The result has been growing alienation on the part of the patient and flight into non-classical medicine, as well as frustration on the part of medical personnel, likewise with respect to the reactions of patients.A solution is usually sought in more communication. This might be styled the (...) professional answer to alienation and frustration, whereby ‘the human factor’, it is hoped, can be better accounted for. Enhanced communication implies two elements: 1) to better cater for the feelings of patients by trained communicators, i.e. more openness, more client satisfaction; 2) to better take into account patient rights and to actually implement them.The question is whether measures in terms of communication, geared at enhancing client satisfaction and the implementation of patient rights, are the real answer to the above mentioned alienation and frustration. Perhaps the trouble has deeper reasons and requires taking other dimensions into account such as decency and human dignity, which cannot be captured simply in terms of satisfaction and rights.This would mean that the answer must be sought at a deeper level than communication. This level might be called ‘conversation’ . In the second part of the paper, the possible relationship between care and conversation will be briefly analysed. (shrink)

Spinoza and Hume are two naturalist philosophers who were among the first modern thinkers to study religion as a natural phenomenon. There undoubtedly are similarities in their accounts of the origin of religion in imagination and passion (emotion). But those who see Hume as a crypto-Spinozist are nevertheless confronted with serious differences between the two philosophers with respect to their understanding of religion and its various forms. These differences concern fundamental issues like the meaning and acceptability of the notion of (...) God and its function in different spheres, the possibility of a kind of philosophical religiosity, and the possible advantage of religion, at least in some of its forms, to individual and social life. The militant "Spinozism" of Hume belongs to a world perhaps (in part) made possible by Spinoza, but nevertheless alien to him. (shrink)

In her recent book, Liberty of Conscience: In Defence of America’s Tradition of Religious Equality the influential philosopher Martha Nussbaum defends the American way of separation between politics and religion, as against the European ways. According to her interpretation this separation implies not only the prevention of unacceptable interference in religious matters, but also the affirmation of the equal dignity of religious differences. Although this position seems to be very favourable to religion, it is based on presuppositions that are very (...) questionable. Religion is defined by Nussbaum in a very narrow way as the individual’s quest for meaning and truth. Also, the understanding of what is required politically with respect to equal dignity is found to be inadequate. Equally debatable is her idea that there can be a freestanding ethical core in politics completely divorced from religious or non-religious moral values as embedded in culture. Nussbaum’s liberal conception of religion and of its place in contemporary politics is perhaps compatible with the American view of the separation between politics and religion. Whether Europeans should change their politics according to this conception is another matter. (shrink)