The Value of Life is an exploration of the actual and perceived importance of biological diversity for human beings and society. Stephen R. Kellert identifies ten basic values, which he describes as biologically based, inherent human tendencies that are greatly influenced and moderated by culture, learning, and experience. Drawing on 20 years of original research, he considers: the universal basis for how humans value nature differences in those values by gender, age, ethnicity, occupation, and geographic location how (...) environment-related activities affect values variation in values relating to different species how vlaues vary across cultures policy and management implications Throughout the book, Kellert argues that the preservation of biodiversity is fundamentally linked to human well-being in the largest sense as he illustrates the importance of biological diversity to the human sociocultural and psychological condition. (shrink)

This special section brings together international scholars celebrating the 40th anniversary of John Harris’ book, The Value of Life: An Introduction to Medical Ethics (1985), and John Harris and his contributions to the field of bioethics more generally.

Daniel Callahan, in his short article “Hans Jonas and Death,” writes that while he appreciates the perspective on death offered by Jonas in his “The Burden and Blessing of Mortality,” he is concerned by certain omissions that suggest Jonas may not have fully appreciated the value of life. Callahan writes that Jonas does not say “a great deal about why life is worth living,” give an account of the “meaning of evolution for human life,” or describe (...) the “experiences and possibilities in the content of the lives of the human species not found in any other one”. I argue that Jonas not only explicitly addresses the meaning of evolution for human life but also develops an ethics rooted in the inherent value of all present and future life, with particular emphasis on the value of human life. (shrink)

The Ministry of Transport is planning for the construction of new roads in its territory. Many projects are being considered, and the Ministry needs to identify the worthwhile projects for which the benefits exceed the costs. Among costs and benefits are the expense of constructing the road, the time saved by motorists using the new road rather than some other road, the time saved through the reduction of congestion on other roads, and the expected increase or decrease in the number (...) of deaths due to traffic accidents. I am concerned in this paper with the last item on the list. It is, of course, difficult to estimate fatalities accurately, but this difficulty is neither unique nor central to our problem. The problem is how best to place a monetary value on fatalities, so that the expected number of fatalities can be compared with other costs and benefits in deciding whether to build a road. However chosen, the monetary value of fatalities for use in this context is what the economist means by “the value of life.” The term is almost a joke, a bit of gallows humor to exorcise the ghoulishness that inevitably clings to analysis of life and death in monetary terms. (shrink)

The present paper aims to study the issue of the value of life in Murray N. Rothbard’s work, and to examine his argument for the contention that “life _should_ be an objective ultimate value” and that “the preservation and furtherance of one’s life takes on the stature of an incontestable axiom.” Rothbard’s assumptions and presuppositions are investigated and critically assessed. Using conceptual and logical analysis rooted mostly in the praxeological method of economics (as developed by (...) Mises and Rothbard himself) and the theory of value (Scheffler, Raz, Elzenberg), it is demonstrated that Rothbard’s account is fallacious both on its own as well as on broader theoretical grounds. It is argued that what Rothbard could—under his specific assumptions about valuing—correctly claim is only that an actor values life _to some extent_, rather than that life has an objective ultimate value or preservation and furtherance of one’s life has an axiomatic status. The theoretical argument is supported by empirical illustration from suicide terrorism. The paper submits that Rothbard’s position on the value of life is unsound, and that using his argumentation as it stands cannot succeed. (shrink)

If humans eventually attain the ability to create new life forms, how will it affect the value of life? This is one of several questions that can be sources of concern when discussing synthetic life, but is the concern justified? In an attempt to answer this question, I have analyzed some possible reasons why an ability to create synthetic life would threaten the value of life in general (that is, not just of the (...) synthetic creations), to see if they really give us reason to worry. The main conclusion is that it is unlikely that a future human ability to create life will really have a great negative impact on these characteristics of life. It therefore seems unlikely that the value of life will be negatively affected by the ability to create synthetic life, though it is possible that the properties in question will be less salient in the synthetic life and thus that the value of the synthetic life will be lower than that of existing life, which in turn can lead to a disturbing difference in value between different kinds of life. (shrink)

This article considers John Harris’ work on autonomy, specifically reproductive autonomy, outlined in The Value of Life and developed throughout his career. Harris often used the concept of reproductive autonomy to make the case for liberal approaches to developments in reproductive and genetic technologies. Harris argued that reproductive autonomy should be highly valued, and therefore we need compelling arguments to justify limiting it in anyway. When discussing reproductive autonomy, Harris focused mainly on restrictions on the potential users of (...) reproductive technologies autonomy, that is, prospective parents. This article extends the discussion of autonomy and the appropriate limits to individuals exercising their autonomy to medical professionals working in this area. Given reproductive technologies have become part of routine medical practice, this article considers whether the current restrictions on both patients and clinicians, as imposed by regulators and professional guidelines, remain ethically justified. (shrink)

First published in 1985. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

A principle claiming equal entitlement to continued life has been strongly defended in the literature as a fundamental social value. We refer to this principle as ‘equal value of life'. In this paper we argue that there is a general incompatibility between the equal value of life principle and the weak Pareto principle and provide proof of this under mild structural assumptions. Moreover we demonstrate that a weaker, age-dependent version of the equal value (...) of life principle is also incompatible with the weak Pareto principle. However, both principles can be satisfied if transitivity of social preference is relaxed to quasi-transitivity. Footnotes1 The authors are grateful to Luc Bovens, Kristian Schultz Hansen, Søren Holm, Franz Huber, Wiebke Kuklys, Gabriella Pigozzi, and two anonymous referees for detailed and very helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper. Any errors and shortcomings are the responsibility of the authors alone. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The emerging discourse concerning the desirability of intervention in senescence to achieve radical life extension for persons has featured some striking blurring in traditional liberal and conservative commitments and positions. This affords an opportunity for re‐evaluation of these same. The canonical conservative view of the intrinsic value of life is re‐examined and found primarily to involve a denial of human prerogative, rather than an active underwriting of the value of life extension. A critique is (...) offered of an attempted argument against aging intervention from a proto‐conservative worry about a purported threat to human nature. Immortality is found to be a red herring, but a revealing one. Further, the classic liberal view is examined and found wanting in terms of the gravity of its own commitment to, and fullness of its account of the value of life, and the value of life extension. An analysis of the liberal conception of personhood is proposed that both defines persons necessarily as processes, and demonstrates the inalienable quality of the value of life extension to persons so defined. (shrink)

“The thing about life is that one day you’ll be dead.” Indeed. But even total and honest acceptance of this brute fact about our relationship to death does not diminish the value we see in short remaining life at the end of life. Few just “give in” and no more fight for life because death is seen as an inherent part of life. They still invest small amounts of additional life with huge (...) class='Hi'>value. How high may that value plausibly be? What is the value of a relatively short extension of life when death is inevitably near? (shrink)

The notion of the value of life is often invoked in discussions regarding medical care for the sick and the dying. This theme has figured in arguments about medical ethics for decades, but many of the phrases associated with this concept have received little serious scrutiny. It is true that some philosophers have declared a few commonly used phrases such as “the sanctity of life,” “the infinite value of life,” and “the value of (...) class='Hi'>life itself” to be unclear at best or misguided at worst. Their hasty dismissal of these phrases, however, is not the end of the story. I generally agree with this philosophical judgment but for reasons very different from those typically given by others. Moreover, the reasons I wish to .. (shrink)

Anything within the causal economy of the universe is entirely natural, including values, humans themselves, together with their artifacts and products, and lifespans either as presently the case, or else radically extended. Further, normality of itself is no predicator of normativity. In view of this, arguments concerning the appropriate length of life from naturalness or normalness, are akin to the kind of hardened prejudice manifested by Procrustes in his beliefs concerning the appropriate length of beds, and the sleepers therein. (...) Various modern commentators have taken up the suggestion, initiated in the discourse by Williams, using the example of Karel Capek's opera The Makropulos Secret, that we should not seek to extend life because it will end in boredom. For a person‐process that has achieved self‐resolution, and come to a processual end, for a true Makropulos, there would be no passion, no fear, no affect, no boredom, no disvalue, no wailing. (shrink)

Putting a specific value on human life is important in many contexts and forms part of the basis for many political, administrative, commercial, and personal decisions. Sometimes, the value is set explicitly, sometimes even in monetary terms, but much more often, it is set implicitly through a decision that allows us to calculate the valuation of a life implicit in a certain rule or a certain resource allocation. We also value lives in what looks like (...) a completely different way when we evaluate whether a particular life is being or has been lived well. Both of these ways of valuing are done from an outside or third-person perspective, but there is also a third way of valuing a life which is from the first-person perspective, and which essentially asks how much my life is worth to me. Is there any connection between these different ways of valuing life, and if so what is the connection between them? This paper provides an account of John Harris’ analysis of the value of life and discusses whether it can bridge the gap between first-person and third-person evaluations of the value of life, and whether it can do so in a way that still allows for resource allocation decisions to be made in health care and other sectors. (shrink)

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Claims (or the implicit assumption of the inherent worth of life) are pervasive and remain virtually unchallenged. I have already argued that these outright moral dictates are thinly veiled vestiges of theological ethics which, following the removal of their theological foundations, remain little more than nebulous claims supported only by fear of the consequences of a challenge. In my previous work, I rejected an a priori claim of an objective life’s worth, which is the worth that we should (...) assign to others’ lives, and elucidated a principled framework that gives rise to the said worth immediately, as a consequence of the experiences of its sentient environment. Herein, I address the complementary question of the value of one’s own life, which is the subjective value of life and, thus, Camus’s (in)famous view that “there is but one truly serious philosophical problem, and that is suicide”. As before, I rejected the inherency of a life’s worth, showing it to be contradictio in adjecto, and instead show how this worth too can in large part be seen to emerge from sentient experiences of the subject. Many of these are innately linked to experiences of other sentient beings as objects, thus erecting a framework that is both principled and thoroughly humane with Schopenhauer’s ‘loving kindness’ running through it. Practically, my framework illuminates an understanding of suicide as a real-world phenomenon, helping those who remain living to understand a deceased one’s decision, and paving the way to answering questions, such as when there should be an attempt to prevent suicide, and what means of suicide prevention are ethically permissible. (shrink)

In the Germany of the 1860s and 1870s, the problem of the value of life was urgently debated, as a consequence of the two culture-defining systems of thought that had risen to prominence in those decades—Schopenhauerian Weltschmerz and the theory of evolution—and the degree to which they could be reconciled. On one hand, the struggle for existence affirmed the pessimistic inference as to the suffering and meaninglessness of the cosmos; on the other, it appeared to promise moral and (...) material improvement in human affairs. This article reconstructs the historical connections between the emergence of pessimism and Darwinism, most clearly represented by the work of Eduard von Hartmann, and it argues that Nietzsche’s programmatic statements on life, culture, and pessimism, from the Untimely Meditations on, are best understood in light of this context and his engagement with Hartmann’s writings. (shrink)

Most of the reports on synthetic biology include not only familiar topics like biosafety and biosecurity but also a chapter on ‘ethical concerns’; a variety of diffuse topics that are interrelated in some way or another. This article deals with these ‘ethical concerns’. In particular it addresses issues such as the intrinsic value of life and how to deal with ‘artificial life’, and the fear that synthetic biologists are tampering with nature or playing God. Its aim is (...) to analyse what exactly is the nature of the concerns and what rationale may lie behind them. The analysis concludes that the above-mentioned worries do not give genuine cause for serious concern. In the best possible way they are interpreted as slippery slope arguments, yet arguments of this type need to be handled with care. It is argued that although we are urged to be especially vigilant we do not have sufficiently cogent reasons to assume that synthetic biology will cause such fundamental hazards as to warrant restricting or refraining from research in this field. (shrink)

The value of life can be viewed from moral, biologic, and economic perspectives. In connection with the development of genetics, each of these perspectives has gained importance throughout history. Whereas agricultural genetics has always been directed towards having an economic impact, from the beginning genetics research in humans has focused on all dimensions of the value of life. Today, health insurance, employers, politicians, and public health scientists view genetics research as one of the key disciplines to (...) predict costs and economic values of human beings. However, the reasoning cannot go without considering biologic health risks and moral values to the same extent. This paper examines the historical dimensions of current debates surrounding genetics and the value of life. Thus, the paper is conceptual and offers a heuristic model and analytical categories for answering the question, “what is so intriguing about genetics that it can be closely connected with different value concepts,” although the consideration of the moral, biologic, or economic value of life may lead to completely different ideas of man and society. A special emphasis will be placed on the use of genetics for the purposes of the eugenics movement. During the heyday of eugenics, the economic value of life changed the understanding of the moral value, as well as the biologic value of life by referring to genetic principles. It will be argued that an intended intertwinement of the different dimensions of the concept of “value” on the one hand increased the impact of genetics as a key discipline of the eugenics movement, and on the other hand had a lasting impact on debates about the economic usefulness of genetics as a predictive, prophylactic medical discipline. (shrink)

Answering the simplest questions satisfactorily often poses the greatest challenge and difficulty to philosophers. Since these questions concern principles underlying our everyday conduct, the inability to provide convincing answers can be exceedingly frustrating. When, during a career of teaching, John T. Goldthwait was asked by his students "Why is that good?" - in regard to art and to conduct - he realized he had no answer that would satisfy his students and himself. And so, his effort to answer his students (...) became a journey through the concept of value judgments, resulting in his book, Value, Language, and Life. What is value? What makes things good? Value, Language, and Life presents a new answer to these age-old questions through Goldthwait's adaptation of linguistic analysis and phenomenological methodology. By examining our everyday experience and use of language, he arrives at a knowledge of value that can be applied in solving problems and reconciling disputes about value. This unique approach enables us to place ethics, aesthetics, and other fields in which value is prominent on a single foundation. (shrink)

Lord Sumption, a former Justice of the Supreme Court, has been a prominent critic of coronavirus restrictions regulations in the UK. Since the start of the pandemic, he has consistently questioned both the policy aims and the regulatory methods of the Westminster government. He has also challenged rationales that hold that all lives are of equal value. In this paper, I explore and question Lord Sumption’s views on morality, politics and law, querying the coherence of his broad philosophy and (...) his arguments regarding coronavirus regulations with his judicial decision in the assisted-dying case of R v Ministry of Justice. In Nicklinson, Lord Sumption argued for restrictions on liberty given the priority of the sanctity of life principle and the protection of others who may be vulnerable, as well as for deference to policy-making institutions in instances of values-based disagreement. The apparent inconsistencies in his positions, I argue, are not clearly reconcilable, and invite critical analysis of his impacts on health law and policy. (shrink)

That life has value is a tenet eliciting all but universal agreement, be it amongst philosophers, policy-makers, or the general public. Yet, when it comes to its employment in practice, especially in the context of policies which require the balancing of different moral choices—for example in health care, foreign aid, or animal rights related decisions—it takes little for cracks to appear and for disagreement to arise as to what the value of life actually means and how (...) it should guide our actions in the real world. I argue that in no small part this state of affairs is a consequence of the infirmity of the foundations that the claim respecting the value of life supervenes upon once its theological foundations are abandoned. Hence, I depart radically from the contemporary thought and argue that life has no inherent value. Far from lowering the portcullis to Pandemonium, the abandonment of the quasi-Platonistic claim that life has intrinsic value, when understood and applied correctly, leads to a comprehensive, consistent, and compassionate ethical framework for understanding the related problems. I illustrate this using several hotly debated topics, including speciesism and show how the ideas I introduce help us to interpret people’s choices and to resolve outstanding challenges which present an insurmountable obstacle to the existing ethical theories. (shrink)

Viable Values examines the most basic foundations of value and morality, demonstrating the shortcomings of major traditional views and proposing that morality is grounded in the objective requirements of human life. Smith argues that morality depends on a proper understanding of the concept of values, and that values depend on the alternative of life or death. She proposes that human beings need to be moral in order to live, explaining how life is the standard of morality, (...) how flourishing is the proper end and reward of living morally, and how an intelligent egoism is the path to flourishing. (shrink)

This article presents an analysis of the matter of the “meaning” of life in terms of whether it should even be lived in the first place. It begins with an attempt at defining the question as an inquiry on the a priori value of attention in general, and develops into an axiological reflection distantly inspired from Martin Heidegger’s notion of “care.” The main objective of the article is to “answer” the question objectively by “playing along” with its naïve (...) logic—that is, by finding a basis for comparing the good that can be found a priori in life with the good that can be found a priori in death —and, then, to suggest why we have no good reason to feel dissatisfied with where this leaves us . Its basic conclusion is, assuming we are committed to assigning value to life in general, that we should be able to say that life is good irrespective of any explanation for its existence. (shrink)

This paper argues that the Quality Adjusted Life Year or QALY is fatally flawed as a way of priority setting in health care and of dealing with the problem of scarce resources. In addition to showing why this is so the paper sets out a view of the moral constraints that govern the allocation of health resources and suggests reasons for a new attitude to the health budget.

Friedrich Nietzsche insisted that despite what philosophers and prophets have taught, suffering is desirable because it increases vitality and provides opportunities for growth. This is why one of his main criticisms of the pessimism and nihilism of his time is that they treat suffering as an argument against the value of life and in doing so, life is devalued by them. In an effort to find an alternative mode of valuation, he proposes that human beings should adopt (...) an attitude of acceptance and affirmation toward suffering, making it possible to positively value life despite its pain. However, while some experiences of suffering are beneficial, even necessary, others are utterly destructive. Nietzsche’s critique of his culture is deeply incisive and rightly insists that a revaluation of existing values is in order, the goals of which are rooted in his commitment to “make life bearable” and increase wellbeing. However, because his interpretation of suffering fails to acknowledge destructive suffering, the value of his proposed mode of valuation is limited in two ways. First, destructive suffering, which causes only harm, undermines both of the goals of revaluation. Attempting to affirm destructive suffering would also constitute masochism, which Nietzsche finds objectionable. Second, Nietzsche’s insistence that suffering is beneficial informs his view that compassion is bad. However, attending to the suffering of others will not make it impossible to leave them in pain when that pain is necessary and preserves the possibility of interceding on their behalf when doing so will limit destructive suffering, which increases wellbeing. Furthermore, because it ignores the social aspect of our lives life affirmation cannot be used to revalue all of our values. The value of the affirmative attitude is limited and Nietzsche fails to account for this because, in regards to both one’s own experiences and the experiences of others, his account of suffering disregards the existence of destructive suffering. Ultimately, if the goals of Nietzsche’s project are to be met, the use of additional methods of revaluation will be necessary. (shrink)

According to Burri, a major reason why suicide is often irrational lies in the option value of life. Remaining alive is valuable because this allows for a larger menu of options, and the possibility of committing suicide in the future adds further value to the act of remaining alive now. In this note, I represent life as a trust game played by two selves – the young self and the old self – and I argue that (...) the possibility to commit suicide in the future can encourage committing suicide now, against what the theory of the option value of life predicts. (shrink)

When considering the social valuation of a life-year, there is a conflict between two basic intuitions: on the one hand, the intuition of universality, according to which the value of an additional life-year should be universal, and, as such, should be invariant to the context considered; on the other hand, the intuition of complementarity, according to which the value of a life-year should depend on what this extra-life-year allows for, and, hence, on the quality (...) of that life-year, because the quantity of life and the quality of life are complement to each other. This paper proposes three distinct accounts of the intuition of universality, and shows that those accounts either conflict with a basic monotonicity property, or lead to indifference with respect to how life-years are distributed within the population. Those results support the abandon of the intuition of universality. But abandoning the intuition of universality does not prevent a social evaluator from giving priority, when allocating life-years, to individuals with the lowest quality of life. (shrink)

No matter if you are broken-hearted or happy in life and no matter where you are, the lessons taught in this book offer a unique taste of contentment, solace and joy. Slivers of Life pieces together the puzzle of felicity, in a simple yet magnetic manner.

This paper argues that under conditions of uncertainty, there is frequently a positive option value to staying alive when compared to the alternative of dying right away. This value can make it prudentially rational for you to stay alive even if it appears highly unlikely that you have a bright future ahead of you. Drawing on the real options approach to investment analysis, the paper explores the conditions under which there is a positive option value to staying (...) alive, and it draws out important implications for the problems of suicide and euthanasia. (shrink)