Celem artykułu jest pokazanie, skąd się biorą nasze trudności z wyjaśnieniem, na czym polega upływ czasu, oraz przedstawienie pewnej propozycji rozwiązania tego problemu, opartej na koncepcji dynamicznego istnienia rzeczy, a rozwijającej ideę absolutnego stawania się. Rozważania oparte są na założeniu, że nasze podstawowe teorie metafizyczne – podobnie jak te stosowane w naukach przyrodniczych – powinny spełniać warunek spójności, prostoty oraz bogatej zawartości.

The paper, which is a continuation if my earlier paper devoted to the problem whether there is the flow of time in science, analyses the possibility of the reunion of the idea of passage of time and the theory of relativity.

The article explores the strategy of reconciliation of the idea of objective flow of time with science. In the first part of my paper, I analyze different conceptions of the passage of time and ponder on how we should understand it. The second part is de-voted to the problem whether there is the passage of time in science.

The author proposes a formalization of Hilary Putnam's proof of the thesis that time does not pass. This enables one to eliminate difficulties connected with the original formulation.

The authoress shows a simple way to avoid paradoxical consequences of the Czerniawski's argument.

Artykuł niniejszy jest polemiką z niektórymi tezami sformułowanymi w pracy Sabine Hossenfelder Czy Wszechświat myśli? I inne ważne pytania nauki. Podano argumenty, że 1) twierdzenie o realnym istnieniu przeszłości, teraźniejszości i przyszłości jest tylko jedną z możliwych filozoficznych interpretacji czasoprzestrzeni szczególnej teorii względności, a teza o obiektywnym upływie czasu jest możliwa do pogodzenia z fizyką współczesną; 2) determinizm jest istotnie ograniczony przez probabilistyczny charakter jednej z fundamentalnych teorii fizyki współczesnej jaką jest mechanika kwantowa; 3) podejście redukcjonistyczne jest istotnie ograniczone (...) przez teorię chaosu deterministycznego, w której zachowanie układów fizycznych jest opisywane przez nieliniowe równania różniczkowe, a także przez sytuację poznawczą w mechanice kwantowej. (shrink)

In the paper I discuss some premises of “quantum mechanics” with regard to the thesis that the time arrow does (not) exist. In this context I consider above all the famous Einstein- Podolsky-Rosen’s experiment (EPR-experiment). I also indicate Schrödinger’s interpretation of wave function “symmetrical” towards time (nomological isotropy) and the peculiar under- standing of the pair particle-antiparticle, assuming that the direction of time can be reversed. Eventually, I discuss the issue of measurement in quantum mechanics with which the existence of (...) time arrow (anisotropy) is often linked. If it comes to the interpretations of quantum me- chanics, from the point of which I consider the issues in question, then in principle I limit myself to two: the so-called Copenhagen interpretation and David Bohm’s conception of “hid- den parameters.” I arrive at a conclusion that the premises of quantum mechanics that are at issue here cannot be sufficient grounds for a conclusive recognition of the reversibility (non- existence) of time arrow. (shrink)

Space, time and probabilities not only form the arena of many physical theories, but also the arena of our everyday life. Therefore, the problem of their ontological status becomes even more interesting. It seems that this problem cannot be solved before we have the final physical theory ("theory of everything"). However, various methods of looking for such a theory lead to converging results, and are able to elucidate the problem in question. We analyze noncommutative algebraic methods, and show that, when (...) applied to model the fundamental level, they suggest a nonlocal regime in which there is no space and no time, in their usual sense, and which is essentially probabilistic (in a generalized sense). In the noncommutative approach there are many probabilistic measures (not just one "probability" as in macroscopic physics), and none of them seems to be distinguished in any way. The tentative conclusion is that space, time and probability are not "absolute categories", but rather aspects of the world structure emergent from the fundamental level. One should expect that the ultimate theory will be well off our traditional philosophical categories. This shows that our mind has a peculiar property allowing it to reach far beyond its usual limitations. (shrink)

Presentism is described as the theory according to which there is an objective time flow and that there is neither past nor future. Roman Ingarden’s ontology of time does not seem to be presentist then, since it supposedly rejects the second component of that doctrine. In this article, I show that this view misconstrues the spirit of Ingarden’s account, and I defend a certain ontology of time (inspired by Ingarden’s works) against several objections (e.g. the ‘how fast does time flow’ (...) question). Since becoming of a process (in the sense of its mode of existence) is just this process’s time, I consider in turn several possible responses to the charge of an infinite regress leveled against Ingarden’s ontology of process. If his original position is set aside, two extreme proposals will remain: the rebuttal of the objectual aspect of a process and giving up the categorial difference between objects enduring through time and processes (i.e. accepting perdurantism). While not discussing in detail the former one, I point out that the adequacy of perdurantism is an open question: in particular, reasons appealing to problems of material constitution, given by perdurantists, are unsatisfactory. (shrink)

W artykule omówiono ważniejsze argumenty przeciw operacjonizmowi Percy’ego W. Bridgmana sformułowane na przestrzeni ostatnich dekad oraz przedyskutowano operacyjne sposoby definiowania czasu w mechanice klasycznej oraz nierelatywistycznej mechanice kwantowej. O ile w mechanice klasycznej nie napotyka się większych trudności w sformułowaniu operacyjnej definicji czasu, o tyle w formalizmie teorii kwantowej zadanie to staje się niemożliwe. Co, niezależnie od dyskusyjnego statusu czasu w mechanice kwantowej, prowadzi do ogólniejszego pytania, czy można pogodzić mechanikę kwantową z podejściem operacyjnym.

The paper presents the stand of Henry Mehlberg on the nature of physical time. This is both an antirelational and relativistic outlook. It deals with the problem of ontological independence and physical reality of time, particularly in the context of discussion between relational and substantival theory of time, and criticism of the positivistic interpretation of relational theory. It outlines some arguments for reality of time, derived from the quantum physics. This conception is a philosophical basis of the causal theory of (...) time, created by Henry Mehlberg. (shrink)