_ Source: _Volume 10, Issue 1, pp 29 - 50 This essay discusses progress and directionality, both in nature, in science and in society, treating as its starting-point the reflections, parallelisms and comparisons of Ruse’s essay, ‘A Threefold Parallelism for Our Time? Progressive Development in Society, Science and the Organic World’, but reaching substantially different conclusions. The essay thus ranges over progress and directionality in the world of natural evolution, in the sciences and the humanities, and in history (...) and society. It defends non-relative progress in science and the humanities, criticising here both the approach to these disciplines of the strongly evolutionary epistemology of Hull and the more moderate evolutionary epistemology of Ruse. It further defends the possibility of progress and directionality in history and society, and also, following Rolston, in the course of evolution within the world of nature, where the kind of directionality to be found has multiple directions rather than being unilinear. Subsequently it relates conclusions about these fields to theological reflections about the creation of nature and society by a value-loving intelligence. (shrink)

Theories of picture perception aim to understand our perceptual relation to both the picture surface and the depicted object. I argue that we should talk about not two, but three entities when understanding picture perception: the picture surface, the three dimensional object the picture surface visually encodes and the three dimensional depicted object. As and can come apart, we get a more complex picture of picture perception than normally assumed and one where the notion of twofoldness, which has played an (...) important albeit controversial role in understanding picture perception is replaced by the concept of threefoldness. (shrink)

What is the relationship between our perceptions and reality? What is the relationship between the mind and the body? These are questions with which philosophers have grappled for centuries, and they are topics of considerable contemporary debate as well. Hilary Putnam has approached the divisions between perception and reality and between mind and body with great creativity throughout his career. Now, in _The Threefold Cord: Mind, Body, and World,_ he expounds upon these issues, elucidating both the strengths and weaknesses (...) of current schools of thought. With his characteristic wit and acuity, Putnam offers refreshing solutions to some of philosophy's most vexing problems. Putnam first examines the problem of realism: is objective truth possible? He acknowledges the deep impasse between empirical and idealist approaches to this question, critiquing them both, however, by highlighting the false assumption they share, that we cannot perceive the world directly. Drawing on the work of J. L. Austin and William James, Putnam develops a subtle and creative alternative, which he calls "natural realism." The second part of the book explores the mind-body question: is the mind independent of our interactions with the physical world? Again, Putnam critically assesses two sharply antithetical contemporary approaches and finds them both lacking. _The Threefold Cord_ shows the entire mind-body debate to be miscast and draws on the later work of Wittgenstein, once more advancing original views on perception and thought and their relationship with both the body and the external world. Finally, Putnam takes up two related problems--the role of causality in human behavior and whether or not thoughts and sensations have an "existence" all their own. With Putnam's lucid prose and insightful examples, _The Threefold Cord_ loosens the Gordian knots into which philosophy has bound itself over the issue of epistemology. (shrink)

This paper investigates a particular philosophical puzzle via an examination of its status in the writings of Wittgenstein. The puzzle concerns negation and can take on three interrelated guises. The first puzzle is how not-p can so much as negate p at all – for if p is not the case, then nothing corresponds to p. The second puzzle is how not-p can so much as negate p at all when not-p rejects p not as false but as unintelligible – (...) for if p is unintelligible, then p is nothing but scratches and sounds and does not seem apt for negation. And the third puzzle is how “not” could be anything but hopelessly equivocal if it sometimes (per the first puzzle) requires, and sometimes (per the second puzzle) precludes the intelligibility of p. The paper investigates these three puzzles, their respective structures, and their relations to each other. The second puzzle is expounded as the centre of gravity, and in countering two objections to the threefold puzzle, a special predicament is expounded with regard to the second puzzle’s concern with unipolar propositions – propositions that do not admit of an intelligible negation. The text concludes by indicating the first steps that could potentially lead us out of the threefold puzzle. (shrink)

Speakers often construct their utterances based on the immediately co-present utterances of dialogue partners. They array their linguistic resources parallel to their partners¿ and activate resonance. Based on the theories of dialogic syntax and cognitive linguistics, this study undertakes to explain how speakers activate resonance and how parallelism contributes to constructing linguistic forms as well as to shaping the ongoing flow of conversation. Three phases of resonance activation are illustrated in relation to cognitive processes: (a) parallelism constituted with (...) extension of multiple categories in synthesis; (b) parallelism meeting or failing the previous speaker¿s intention due to schematization; and (c) parallelism achieved as a consequence of priming through schematization and extension. It is concluded that linguistic forms develop in the ongoing flow of socially coordinated cognition, where patterns emerge through activation of mapping relations between linguistic elements. This process is anchored in speakers¿ concepts of grammatical equivalences, ability of categorization, and grasp of linguistic conventions. (shrink)

Michel Weber, The Threefold Root of Temporality. Elements of Whiteheadian Organic Metaphysics, Louvain-la-Neuve, Éditions Chromatika, 2021 ; 978-2-930517-76-6, pdf 978-2-930517-77-3 ; 120 pp. ; 16 € -/- The question of the nature of time is as old as philosophy itself. Before philosophy, time was not problematized, it was a pure common-sensical matter. There were various experiences of time, and, accordingly, different words to name it. Whitehead’s solution of the temporal conundrum lies in the concept of “creative advance of nature” (...) that is systematically elucidated only in Process and Reality (1929) To understand the creative advance of nature, one needs to interpret the togetherness of its three aspects —creativity qua concrescence, efficacy qua transition, vision qua initial subjective aim—, and this provides us with the core meaning of time: (i) genuine novelty appears in the World, (ii) past events are, so to speak, ontologically memorized, and (iii) there is an upward trend in terms of “intensity” of events. These three complementary requirements refresh in their own way the Greek triple understanding of time: time is “aiôn,” lived duration (outside physical time) and destiny, but it is also “chronos,” causal time, and “kairos,” timeliness or the appropriate moment for action. -/- Michel Weber is Director of the Centre for Philosophical Practice (Brussels) and Adjunct Professor at the Department of Educational Foundations of the University of Saskatchewan. His current research program mainly addresses the Ayurvedic understanding of the anchoring of the mind in the body and of the expression of the body in the mind. (shrink)

Robert Hartman’s parallelism argument aims to show that resultant moral luck exists. The gist of the argument is this: because there is circumstantial moral luck in a particular circumstantial luck scenario and that scenario is analogous in important ways to a particular resultant luck scenario, the resultant luck scenario is plausibly an instance of resultant moral luck. I argue that there is a principled way of denying that circumstantial moral luck is present in the circumstantial luck scenario. Doing so (...) is not enough, however, to reject Hartman’s general analogical line of reasoning since an alternative parallelism argument based on a resultant luck scenario and a circumstantial luck scenario of another kind can be made. Nevertheless, I argue that the analogy between the circumstantial luck scenario and the resultant luck scenario in both the alternative parallelism argument and its original counterpart is too weak to support the claim that resultant moral luck is present in the resultant luck scenario. (shrink)

This article describes a new theoretical, psychological model characterizing the concept, structure and functioning of spirituality in relation to the phenomenon of religiousness. The structural and processual approaches are indispensable when examining the spiritual sphere. The theory suggests that the psychological nature of spirituality can be considered from a threefold perspective: as a cognitive scheme, as a dimension of personality, as an attitude towards life. The Threefold Nature of Spirituality model binds these perspectives together and describes the phenomena (...) and processes inherent in spiritual functioning: looking for the sacred or a-sacred, for the meaning of life, and for personal fulfilment. Theoretical and empirical examples are presented here in support of the TNS, although further exploration is necessary. (shrink)

Originally published in 1961, this book originated in the belief that there was an urgent need for a greater association between philosophers and scientists and of both with men of religion. The problem of bringing this association into being is approached from different angles by the two authors, who, while agreeing on the main thesis, differ on many details, and the discussion is largely concerned with an examination of the points of difference. It ranges over the significance of scientific concepts, (...) such as ether, energy, space and time, the place of mathematics in science and of linguistics in philosophy, the nature of scientific thought in relation to the universe as a whole, problems of life, mind, ethics and theology. It also raises questions of importance concerning the present attitudes of organizations dealing with these matters towards their respective concerns. While the main purpose is always kept in view, a certain amount of discursiveness allows for the introduction of incidental matters of interest in themselves as well as in their relation to the central theme. The book has been written for the layman, and the student, while not, by over-simplification, offending the expert and the erudite. (shrink)

Normative theories of media functions require a clear distinction between the media's two roles as forum and speaker in public spheres. This article seeks to study potential violations of the rule of separating fact from opinion. The comparative content analysis takes a European political conflict, the so-called Haider debate, as a litmus test of objectivity of news reporting. The study reveals some critical consequences of the press' political involvement in the debate. In all countries under study, the press tends to (...) incorporate journalistic evaluations into the news. The Haider debate was characterized by a ‘political parallelism’ of the press in a manner which Hallin and Mancini re-defined as ‘party-press parallelism’. The newspapers favorably gave voice to speakers supporting their own positions, thus instrumentalizing opportune witnesses. As a result, the newspapers ‘synchronized’ the coverage with their editorial stances, which lead to biased news reporting in all outlets. (shrink)

We members of settler colonial culture—the latest form of what novelist and cultural critic Daniel Quinn calls Taker culture—are constrained by myriad institutions that leave us with little choice but to engage in practices that are profoundly damaging to the planet, to others, and to ourselves. Our path to living otherwise, Andrew Frederick Smith argues, lies in the threefold struggle, which is inspired by Quinn's focus on the interweaving roots of ecological, social, and personal wellbeing. These three forms of (...) wellbeing are co-implicated. We cannot enjoy one without equally enjoying the others; they are a package deal. As such, what works for people individually and collectively works for the planet, and vice versa. Reclaiming our lives and revitalizing our human and more-than-human communities are salient acts of resistance against Taker culture. They offer means of escape from our cultural captivity and an opportunity for full-spectrum wellbeing. (shrink)

One may gather from the arguments of two of the last papers published before his death that J. L. Mackie held the following three theses concerning the mind/body problem : (1) There is a distinct realm of mental properties, so a dualism of properties at least is true and materialism false.

Both Higher-Order Uni cation approaches to In linguistic theories on discourse coherence Kehler, discourse semantics Dalrymple et al., 1991; Shieber et.

It is well-known that constructions involving ellipsis share many properties with constructions that involve phonological reduction. The similarity between ECs and PRCs is semantic: the interpretation of both is constrained by the interpretation of an antecedent. Rooth and Tancredi have pointed out that this similarity follows from an independently needed theory of focus.

In this paper, I begin by showing that for Spinoza, it is unclear how the human mind can have a true idea of God. I first provide an explanation of Spinoza’s theory of parallelism of the mind and the body, followed by showing how this doctrine seems to undermine the mind’s ability to have an adequate idea of God. From there, I show that the idea of God presents a problem for Spinoza’s theory of the parallelism of the (...) attributes in general. To resolve the tension, I argue that Spinoza’s theory of parallelism does not entail a one-to-one correspondence between the modes of different attributes. From here, I show that the human mind can have an adequate idea of God, because the mind can have an idea of its own formal essences and the idea of a formal essence is itself an idea of God. (shrink)

The paper discusses Edmund Husserl’s threefold pictorial experience and the threefold aesthetic experience of pictures accordingly. It aims to show what the advantages are of the threefold account of pictorial experience, in contrast to the twofold account, to explain aesthetic experience. More specifically, it explains the role of the image object’s fold in aesthetic experience. The paper is divided into three parts. The first part explains and defends Husserl’s theory of threefold pictorial experience, which is an (...) experience of seeing-in or, in Husserl’s terminology, image consciousness. A comparison will be made with other seeing-in theories, especially with Bence Nanay’s threefold account of picture perception. The second part explains the relationship between the second and the third fold, namely the resemblance and difference between the image object and the image subject. The focus is on explaining the terms of analogizing and non-analogizing moments of the image object. The third part of the paper discusses Husserl’s theory of the threefold aesthetic experience of pictures. It will be shown that aesthetic attitude is turned toward the how of representation, instead of the what of representation. Also, a comparison between Husserl and Richard Wollheim’s theories of representation is made. More specifically, the paper will show that Richard Wollheim’s different hows of representation are similar to Husserl’s view on analogizing and non-analogizing moments of the image object. (shrink)

Mind-body parallelism is the view that mind and body stand in the same “order and connection,” as Spinoza put it, or that corresponding mental and physical states have corresponding causal explanations in terms of other mental and physical states. This dissertation investigates the nature and role of mind-body parallelism, as well as other forms of parallelism, in Spinoza’s philosophy of mind. In doing so, it also considers how Spinoza’s views relate to current discussions. In present-day philosophy of (...) mind, mind-body parallelism is almost never defended. It is seen as a historical dead-end with insurmountable problems. By contrast, I argue that parallelism powerfully responds to the post-Cartesian mind-body problem (which remains with us today) and that it points a way forward in current debates. The dissertation contains five independent chapters. After an introduction that situates parallelism in relation to both Spinoza’s time and to present discussions, Chapter 1 presents an argument for parallelism aimed at a present-day audience. Chapter 2 discusses Spinoza’s own arguments for parallelism. Both chapters help to clarify what parallelism is, in part by distinguishing between several versions of the view. Chapter 3 discusses what is often considered parallelism’s most problematic feature, its rejection of mind-body interaction. I argue that by distinguishing between the post-Cartesian context in which Spinoza wrote and present-day discussions, we can see that parallelism is compatible with mental causation. Chapters 4 and 5, finally, discuss specific ways in which parallelism is at work in Spinoza’s view of the mind. In Chapter 4, I argue that parallelism is at work in Spinoza’s interesting and distinctive positions on the nature of agency and motivation. In Chapter 5, I show the role of parallelism in his representationalist theory of consciousness. A guiding thread throughout the dissertation is that parallelism presents a distinctive and interesting way to combine realism, non-reductionism and naturalism in relation to those features of human self-understanding that seem difficult to fit into a naturalistic worldview. (shrink)

This article explores the notion of the unconscious (das Unbewusste) in terms of its nature and constitutive manifestations in consciousness. In contrast to the psychoanalytic formulation, the unconscious is conceptualized here distinctively as sedimentation (die Sedimentierung) within the Husserlian framework. All `experiences sediment and are “stored” in a darkened, affectless region of the psyche, which is nonetheless not in any sense separated from the sphere of consciousness. Rather, the sedimented experiences move dynamically between the unconscious and consciousness, constantly affecting and (...) manifesting in the upcoming conscious activities of the subject. Based on this conceptualization, I suggest a schematic understanding of the manifestations of the unconscious, or sedimentation, in consciousness. The conceptual division of consciousness into the sphere of understanding (Verstandessphäre), sphere of affect (Gemütssphäre) and sphere of volition (Willenssphäre) allows us to speak of the corresponding threefold manifestations of the unconscious in each of these spheres as type (Typus), mood (Stimmung) and habits (Habitus). Having their genetic “origin” in sedimented experiences, these structural moments play a constitutive role in upcoming conscious activities of the intentional subject. Furthermore, I demonstrate that each of these moments is characterized by a distinctive kind of horizonality, in light of which a deepened understanding of the genetic concept of horizon-consciousness (Horizontbewusstsein) is obtained. Despite the conceptual tripartition, I emphasize at the end the essential intertwinement of the three structural moments in such conscious performance as association. (shrink)

Interaction between humans and cats in urban environments is subject to dynamic change. Based on the frequency and quality of relations with humans, we can distinguish several populations of domestic cats : pedigree, pet, semi-feral, feral, and pseudo-wild. Bringing together theoretical perspectives of the Tartu school of biosemiotics and ethological studies of animal societies, we distinguish two basic types of cat cultures: the culture of street cats and the humano-cat culture of pets. The difference between these cultures is documented on (...) the level of zoosemiotic interactions, ecological relations, and human representations. We introduce a threefold model of human-animal interactions in urban environments which steer a careful course between the Scylla of realistic ontology and the Charybdis of social constructivism. A case study on Estonian cat shelters illustrates the significance of cultural representations and institutionalized actions in human-cat cohabitation. (shrink)

This paper offers a new interpretation of Spinoza's doctrine of parallelism. It argues Spinoza reinterprets the ancient doctrine of metaphysical sympathy among ostensibly disconnected and distant beings in terms of fully intelligible relations of 1) identity between formal and objective reality, and in terms of 2) "real identity," grounded in Spinoza's substance-monism. Finally, the paper argues against the standard reading of mind-body pairs as "numerically identical".

We introduce and study a variety of modal logics of parallelism, orthogonality, and affine geometries, for which we establish several completeness, decidability and complexity results and state a number of related open, and apparently difficult problems. We also demonstrate that lack of the finite model property of modal logics for sufficiently rich affine or projective geometries (incl. the real affine and projective planes) is a rather common phenomenon.

The traditional reading of Plato’s criticism of the poets and painters in Book 10 of the Republic is that they merely imitate. In light of Plato’s own image-making, the critique of imitation requires a more careful examination, especially in regards to painting. This paper argues that it is insufficient to view Plato’s critique of image-making by the painter solely in terms of the image replication that does not consider the eidos. In view of the context of Plato’s argument within Book (...) 10 and elsewhere, other considerations, such as the ideas of measure and proportion, which pertain to the notion of the beautiful, are required for a complete understanding of the argument against the painter. In light of these further considerations I argue for a threefold distinction between mimesis as replication, mimesis as false resemblance, and mimesis as true resemblance. With respect to the third kind of mimesis, which directly pertains to Plato’s own image-making, one can see in Plato a different configuration of the relation between image and original portrayed in the image. (shrink)

The Direct Reference account of the semantics of singular terms is widely assumed to be inconsistent with the traditional Individualist account of psychological states. Because of this assumption, and because of the weight of the evidence for Direct Reference, Anti-Individualism has found supporters despite its counterintuitiveness. In this dissertation, it is argued that Direct Reference and Individualism are not genuinely inconsistent, but that the inconsistency emerges only with the additional assumption of Propositionalism--the orthodox, proposition-based framework for understanding thought and language. (...) Consequently, it is not necessary to endorse Anti-Individualism in order to accept Direct Reference, so long as Propositionalism is accepted only in an attenuated form, if at all. ;It is argued that the best strategy for resolving the inconsistency is to retain all of Propositionalism apart from the Relational Analysis of belief ascriptions. An alternative analysis--the Quantified Relational Analysis --is developed and motivated. According to QRA, an ascription of the form X believes that S attributes the property of believing some member of the class of propositions containing the proposition that S and finer-grained versions of it. QRA is extended also to de re belief locutions. The conjunction of Direct Reference, Individualism, and the remnants of Propositionalism plus QRA is termed Russellian Non-Parallelism. ;Like all Direct Reference theories, Russellian Non-Parallelism has the consequence that co-referring names and other genuine terms are freely substitutable for each other, despite the datum that ordinary speakers intuitively regard such substitutions in belief contexts as suspect. These intuitions are accounted for both pragmatically and semantically. The pragmatic explanation specifies a mechanism whereby the audience sometimes infers from the choice of genuine terms the subject's way of thinking of the objects involved. The semantic explanation motivates an idiomatic reading of ascriptions, on which, under certain circumstances, the choice of co-referring terms in ascriptions literally indicates different belief contents. Russellian Non-Parallelism is then applied to enhanced substitution puzzles and to some other traditional problems, such as the contingent a priori. Finally there is a discussion of pertinent contemporary literature. (shrink)

In this chapter I advance a moderately conceptualist interpretation of Kant’s account of the threefold synthesis in the A-Deduction. Often the first version of TD, the A-Deduction, is thought to be less conceptualist than the later B-version from 1787 (e.g. Heidegger 1991, 1995). Certainly, it seems that in the B-Deduction Kant puts more emphasis on the role of the understanding in determining the manifold of representations in intuition than he does in the A-Deduction. It also appears that in the (...) A-Deduction the seemingly pre-conceptual aspects of a priori synthesis, namely those of the synthesis of apprehension and the imagination, are more prominently featured than in the B-Deduction. And the fact that in the A-Deduction judgement does not appear to play any significant role reinforces the view that the A-Deduction is less strongly conceptualist. I believe that Kant is a conceptualist also in the A-Deduction (as much as in the B-Deduction) in the sense that all syntheses, which are expounded in the second section of the A-Deduction, must be seen as involving the categories or the understanding as the seat of the categories. However, despite some apparent strong modal claims regarding apperception in the A-Deduction, I argue that Kant is a moderate conceptualist in the sense that he allows for the real possibility that some representations are apprehended that are not subsumed or subsumable under the categories, or determined or determinable by the understanding as the seat of the categories. Not all representations must be synthesised and hence be conceptualised (by means of the categories), nor are all representations necessarily conceptualisable (by means of the categories). Often it is argued that the application of the categories must be seen as separate from or prior to conceptualisation (that is, employment of concepts in a judgement), so that the categories must be considered to apply to representations at least to the extent that the productive imagination or recognitive synthesis is involved, even if no empirical concepts are applied in an actual judgement. But it is difficult to see how categories can apply outside the context of an actual judgement in which ipso facto empirical concepts are employed, because, after all, categories are nothing but logical functions of judgement (e.g. B143). More in particular, I shall argue for the claims that (1) appearances to the contrary, all three levels of syntheses in the A-Deduction, including the synthesis of recognition, are interdependent and are not to be seen as operating singly or independently of each other, and hence of the categories; (2) ‘mere’ apprehension, or ‘mere’ intuition, is not dependent on the understanding and the application or possible application of the categories; and that (3) ‘mere’ apprehension does not even invoke a priori synthesis of apprehension and hence is as such fully lawless in terms of Kantian a priori laws. In this context, I also address Kant’s argument in the A-Deduction about the role of the imagination in the production of spatial objects and explain his apt use of the example of cinnabar to show that the kind of association that is at issue here concerns the possibility of knowledge, not the possibility of mere association, as is often assumed. (shrink)

Determining whether a homoplastic trait is the result of convergence or parallelism is central to many of the most important contemporary discussions in biology and philosophy: the relation between evolution and development, the importance of constraints on variation, and the role of contingency in evolution. In this article, I show that two recent attempts to draw a black-or-white distinction between convergence and parallelism fail, albeit for different reasons. Nevertheless, I argue that we should not be afraid of gray (...) areas: a clarified version of S. J. Gould's earlier account, based on a separation of underlying developmental mechanisms from the realized trait, still represents a useful approach. (shrink)

Surprisingly enough, modified versions of the confirmation theory of Carnap and Hempel and the truth approximation theory of Popper turn out to be smoothly synthesizable. The glue between confirmation and truth approximation appears to be the instrumentalist methodology, rather than the falsificationist one.By evaluating theories separately and comparatively in terms of their successes and problems (hence even if they are already falsified), the instrumentalist methodology provides – both in theory and in practice – the straight route for short-term empirical progress (...) in science in the spirit of Laudan. However, it is argued that such progress is also functional for all kinds of truth approximation: observational, referential, and theoretical. This sheds new light on the long-term dynamic of science and hence on the relation between the main epistemological positions, viz., instrumentalism (Toulmin, Laudan), constructive empiricism (van Fraassen), referential realism (Hacking and Cartwright), and theory realism of a non-essentialist nature (Popper), here called constructive realism.In From Instrumentalism to Constructive Realism (2000) the above story is presented in great detail. The present synopsis highlights the main ways of theory evaluation presented in that book, viz. evaluation in terms of confirmation (or falsification), empirical progress and truth approximation. (shrink)

Building on Uriah Kriegel's recent work on the varieties of consciousness, I consider the question of how many irreducible and fundamental kinds of consciousness there are. This is the project of a fundamental classification of consciousness (C-taxonomy), which will be approached with reference to two figures from the (early) phenomenological tradition, i.e., Franz Brentano and Alexander Pfänder. Both philosophers advocate tripartite taxonomies, thereby opposing the still widely held view that only algedonic and sensory phenomenology exist. After explaining the project of (...) C-taxonomy, I discuss Brentano's and Pfänder's trialisms. My main aim is to show that Pfänder's view, according to which consciousness is exhausted by “object-consciousness”, feeling, and striving, when supplemented by Husserlian ideas, is to be preferred to Brentano's classification, according to which the basic mental kinds are mere presentations, judgments, and “phenomena of love and hate”. I criticize Brentano's separation of doxastically neutral presentations from “positing” judgments, as well as his unification of feelings, emotions, desires, strivings, decisions, and volitions into one basic class. Finally, I reflect on the deeper reasons for Brentano's and Pfänder's divergent taxonomies, which are rooted in their different views of the “mark of the mental” and their different approaches to the active/passive distinction within the mental realm. (shrink)

A Guide to the Threefold Lotus Sutra. Nikkyo Niwano. Translated and adapted by Eugene Langston. Kosei Publishing Co., Tokyo 1981. Distributed by Prentice/Hall International, Hemel Hempstead. 168pp. £2.10.

The aims of this paper are twofold. First, I offer a new insight into Shepherd’s theory of mind by demonstrating that she distinguishes a threefold ‘Variety of Intellect’, that is, three kinds of minds grouped according to their cognitive limitations. Following Shepherd, I call them (i) minds afflicted with idiocy, (ii) inferior understandings, and (iii) sound understandings. Second, I show how Shepherd’s distinction informs her theory of education. While Shepherd claims that her views serve to improve educational practices, she (...) does not explain how her threefold ‘Variety of intellect’ does so. I argue that Shepherd’s distinction contributes to her aim by providing pedagogues with a more comprehensive grasp of the various cognitive limitations of the people in their care. This allows the former to adjust their expectations and to provide need-oriented guidance. (shrink)

The uniqueness of the parallel lines is independent from the analogous statement on parallel planes and the usual further axioms of three-dimensional affine geometry. MSC: 51A15, 03F65.