This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Qualitative Hedonism Objections to Mill's Qualitative Hedonism: Internal Inconsistency and Value Pluralism The Judgment of Competent Agents: Self‐Development and Value Measurement Self‐Development and Virtue Ethics Further Reading.

This book explores the theory of value structure, or axiology, in metaethics and defends the thesis that aspects of “better than” comparisons may outrank each other and that value cannot always be summed up neatly.

Originally published in 1987 and re-issued in 2020 with a new Preface, this book presents and elaborates interrelated solutions to a number of problems in moral philosophy, from the location of intrinsic value and the nature of a worthwhile life, via the limits of obligation and the nature of justice, to the status of moral utterances. After developing a biocentric account of moral standing, the author locates worthwhile life in the development of the generic capacities of a creature, whether (...) human or nonhuman, and presents an account of relative intrinsic value which later generates a theory of interspecific justice. This value-theory also informs a consequentialist understanding of obligation, of moral rightness and of supererogation. The understanding thus supplied is shown to cope with the problems of integrity, of justice and of the 'Repugnant Conclusion' in population ethics. A cognitivist account of ethical conclusions such as those so far reached is then defended against non-cognitivist and relativist objections and a far-reaching naturalist theory is defended, integrating earlier conclusions with an account of the logic of the fundamental ethical concepts. This wide-ranging volume which maps the whole area of morality is thoroughly argued with reference both to contemporary philosophical developments and to classical theories. (shrink)

Many of the earliest books, particularly those dating back to the 1900s and before, are now extremely scarce and increasingly expensive. We are republishing these classic works in affordable, high quality, modern editions, using the original text and artwork.

Joseph Raz presents a penetrating exploration of the interdependence of value, reason, and the will. These essays illuminate a wide range of questions concerning fundamental aspects of human thought and action. Engaging Reason is a summation of many years of original, compelling, and influential work by a major contemporary philosopher.

A prominent member of the second generation of Cambridge Keynesians, Luigi Pasinetti has been a key player in the development of neo-Ricardian economics as well. Having studied under Piero Sraffa at Cambridge, he developed a mathematical representation of Ricardo's theory of value and distribution, as well as the reswitching problem in neoclassical capital theory: thus making him a leader of the British Cambridge side during the Cambridge Capital Controversy. Since leaving Cambridge for Rome, he has become particularly (...) interested in structural change, i.e. the responses of multi-sectoral models of the economy to technical changes. This book draws together Pasinetti's main contributions in the field of value theory. (shrink)

Friedrich Albert Lange is usually regarded as a representative of physiological neo-Kantianism or as a forerunner of the Marburg school of neo-Kantianism. In this paper I try to reconstruct Lange’s theory of values to argue that his philosophy is better framed as an intermediate point in the development of the two-world theory (facts/values) between Hermann Lotze and Southwestern neo-Kantianism.

According to a widely accepted reading of the "Ethics," Spinoza subscribes to a desire-satisfaction theory of value. A desire-satisfaction theory says that what has value is the satisfaction of one’s desires and whatever leads to the satisfaction of one’s desires. In this paper I argue that this standard reading is incorrect, and I show that in Spinoza’s view the foundation of what is truly valuable is the perfection of a person’s essence, not the satisfaction of a (...) person’s desires. (shrink)

The pres ent book aims to exemplify the latter rather than the former method, and if it should prove tedious, that fault will be due in part, at least, to the ...

Christian von Ehrenfels was a student of both Franz Brentano and Carl Menger and his thinking on value theory was inspired both by Brentano’s descriptive psychology and by the subjective theory of economic value advanced by Menger, the founder of the Austrian school of economics. Value, for Ehrenfels, is a function of desire, and we ascribe value to those things which we either do in fact desire, or would desire if we were not convinced (...) of their existence. He asserts that the needed theoretical understanding of values is to be achieved by generalizing economic laws of valuation to apply to value in general. The law of marginal utility, for example, is a law to the effect that the n+1st sample of a good which I receive is ceteris paribus less valuable than the nth sample (imagine that the samples in question are, for example, a series of identical ham sandwiches). The essay describes how Ehrenfels provides on this basis an account of the different types of values, both intrinsic and non-intrinsic. It outlines also Ehrenfels views on the problem of interpersonal value-comparisons and on the struggle for survival between different values of different types. (shrink)

Contemporary medical practice and health policy are increasingly animated by the concept of providing high value care. Nevertheless, there can be disagreements about how value is defined and from whose perspective. Individual patients suffering from terminal cancer, for example, may have a different perception of the value of an expensive chemotherapy when compared to health policymakers, insurers, or others responsible for the financial solvency of health care organizations. Thus it seems reasonable to ask what is meant by (...) “value” in high value care. In light of Edmund Pellegrino’s significant contributions to the philosophy of medicine, medical humanities, and bioethics, it seems equally reasonable to examine how he might answer it. This paper describes a Pellegrino-inspired theory of value that is instrumental, agent relative, and pluralistic. It then compares and contrasts this to the contemporary view and argues that only when individual patients incorporate concern for societal-level value into their conceptions of the highest good can the Pellegrino-inspired and contemporary views of value be reconciled. (shrink)

The thesis of this book is to develop a theory of value covering all kinds of values, based on my unified utilitarian theory. It is unique and is different from all traditional and existing theories of value. Like the views of most psychologists and decision-scientists, value is asserted to be subjective in nature because value exists only for a subject. Value and value judgment are considered statistical in nature in three dimensions, namely (...) in the dimensions of subject, object, and judge. This theory covers a modified von Neumann-Morgenstern utility theory as an integral part. The three conceptions of utility held by philosophers, economicsts, and decision-scientists are unified. The traditional and conventional classification of value into intrinsic and instrumental, which may lead to confusion, misunderstanding, and circularity, is not used. Instead, a classification based on the classification of good things in life according to the principle of exchangeability and replaceability is emphasized and used. A decision-theoretic approach is taken for the study of actions in life. All the actions in a person's life are for the pursuit of values, and all the values pursued are related, directly or indirectly, closely or remotely, to a life plan. Thus, this utilitarian general theory of value eventually leads to a philosophy of life, which is also consequential, teleological, and utilitarian. (shrink)

Excerpt from A Study in the Theory of Value The thesis which I wish to defend in the present essay is a very common one, believed, I think, by most people, but usually only approximately and only half-heartedly, and expressed vaguely if expressed at all. Some such belief is in fact present whenever we reflect upon acts that stir our interest; but the belief baldly expressed in propositions sounds fanciful or weak or sentimental, and we avoid pronouncing it (...) clearly in much the same way as that in which we hurry over an expression in an unfamiliar language - partly from modesty, but. Mostly from fear of appearing ridiculous and from inner conviction Of ignorance. Our belief, in other words, not Only seems to us sentimental and weak when we approach the formulation of it in a creed, but it actually is sentimental and weak when thus formulated, and this for the reason that we have not taken the trouble to make the formulation accurate or definite. On the one hand we are afraid of seeming. Sentimental; on the other hand we do not know what our belief really is, nor what definite formula embodying it will stand the test of logical criticism. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

Christian von Ehrenfels was a student of both Franz Brentano and Carl Menger and his thinking on value theory was inspired both by Brentano’s descriptive psychology and by the subjective theory of economic value advanced by Menger, the founder of the Austrian school of economics. Value, for Ehrenfels, is a function of desire, and we ascribe value to those things which we either do in fact desire, or would desire if we were not convinced (...) of their existence. He asserts that the needed theoretical understanding of values is to be achieved by generalizing economic laws of valuation to apply to value in general. The law of marginal utility, for example, is a law to the effect that the n+1st sample of a good which I receive is ceteris paribus less valuable than the nth sample (imagine that the samples in question are, for example, a series of identical ham sandwiches). The essay describes how Ehrenfels provides on this basis an account of the different types of values, both intrinsic and non-intrinsic. It outlines also Ehrenfels views on the problem of interpersonal value-comparisons and on the struggle for survival between different values of different types. (shrink)

As knowledge about the devastating consequences of human action on the environment grows, so does the urgency of finding answers to questions about how we ought to think about and act toward the natural world. Over the last twenty-five years, philosophers have attempted to develop an environmental ethic that can answer these questions. The most common articulations of environmental ethics set out to establish the value of nature beyond its mere usefulness to humans, a value referred to in (...) the literature as intrinsic value. I critically examine two of the leading versions of environmental ethics which attempt to establish the intrinsic value of nature and find them wanting. I then turn to an alternative, ecofeminist approach to thinking about our obligations to the non-human world that is not preoccupied with establishing the intrinsic value of nature. I highlight some of the strengths and weaknesses of such an approach. In the end, I point in a new direction for answering questions about our relationship to the environment and for solving some of the most pressing global environmental problems; one that I call an ecofeminist contextualist approach to valuing nature. (shrink)

Introduction -- Creative actualization -- Modes of value -- Moral justification -- Creative actualization and the world -- Critical evaluation of metaphysical value theories -- Critical evaluation of subjective value theories -- Critical evaluation of relational value theories -- Conclusion : value hierarchies and value autonomy.

Veber's theory of value is based on his general classification of mental phenomena. Value-experiences constitute a special variety of emotional experiences: they have a pseudo-cognitive role; that is, they "perceive" values just as ordinary presentations perceive things and their properties. Veber also makes several distinctions between different types of value-perceiving emotions. Finally he discusses the kinds of objective correlates that these experiences have and thereby distinguishes between three types of value: thing-value, person-value and (...) hagiological value. He may be criticised for inconsistency, because he starts f r om the descriptive standpoint but ends up by legislating on how we ought to value persons. (shrink)

Veber's theory of value is based on his general classification of mental phenomena. Value-experiences constitute a special variety of emotional experiences: they have a pseudo-cognitive role; that is, they "perceive" values just as ordinary presentations perceive things and their properties. Veber also makes several distinctions between different types of value-perceiving emotions. Finally he discusses the kinds of objective correlates that these experiences have and thereby distinguishes between three types of value: thing-value, person-value and (...) hagiological value. He may be criticised for inconsistency, because he starts f r om the descriptive standpoint but ends up by legislating on how we ought to value persons. (shrink)

Contemporary philosophers interested in value theory appear to be largely concerned with questions of the following sort:What is value?What is the meaning of the word ‘good’?Does the attribution of value to an object have a cognitive, or merely an emotive, significance?The first question is metaphysical; to ask it is analogous to asking in physics:What is matter?What is electricity?The others are generally treated as semantical questions; to ask them is analogous to asking in statistics:What is the meaning (...) of the word ‘probable’?Does an attribution of probability express an objective fact, or merely a subjective attitude? (shrink)

This chapter discusses different accounts of how to aggregate individual advantages, including utilitarianism, egalitarianism, prioritarianism, and leximin. It distinguishes between these principles in terms of conditions such as the Pareto principle, strong separability, relationality, and the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfer. Furthermore, it accounts for how these distributive principles may be justified and for the main strengths and weaknesses of each. In particular, it focuses on the extent to which these principles violate the separateness of persons and whether they invite the (...) leveling down objection, and if so how damaging such violations and objections are. Finally, some general worries about aggregation are considered. (shrink)

The notion of a D-ring, generalizing that of a differential or a difference ring, is introduced. Quantifier elimination and a version of the Ax-Kochen-Eršov principle is proven for a theory of valued D-fields of residual characteristic zero.

The paper deals with neo-Kantianism and the value theory in Hungarian philosophy on the threshold of the 20th century. It shows how neo-Kantianism contributed to the Hungarian philosophy’s being professionalized as well as the transformations of neo-Kantianism in the works of its leading representatives. It also offers a detailed analysis of the value theory of K Böhm, who created the first original Hungarian philosophical system.

The connection of value-experience with activity has led to the widespread modern tendency to interpret value in terms of interest. To value a thing is certainly to take an interest in it, and there can be no doubt that the value any object has for us tends to vary with the interest we take in it. The suggestion readily arises, therefore, that the value of any object simply is the interest we take in it. The (...) difficulty with views of this type is that interest is a distinctly subjective category while value is persistently spoken of as if it were somehow objective. Indeed, the term “value” would lose the most essential element of its meaning if it could not be applied to objects of common knowledge in such a way that two people could significantly discuss the question as to whether the object A is not more valuable than the object B and each, on the basis of his own interest and experience, defend a different view. I do not think the subjectivity of value can be as easily disposed of as does Laird1 in discussing the argument, “Beauty is not in the aurora. Therefore it is in the beholder's mind.” This, he says, leads to the absurdity, “Therefore the beholder's mind is beautiful.” The apparent absurdity is due to the ambiguity of the term “beautiful.” It is applied either to an experience or to the object of that experience. (shrink)

An outline of a theory ofvalues-based labeling as a social movementargues that it is motivated by the need tore-embed the agro-food economy in the largersocial economy. A review of some basic premisesof embeddedness theories derived from the workof Karl Polanyi reveals their connection toparticular values-based labeling efforts. Fromthis perspective, values-based labelingpresents itself as primarily an ethical andmoral effort to counter unsustainable trendswithin presently existing capitalism. Theselabels distinguish themselves from ordinarycommercial labels by a focus on processand on quality. Evaluating thetransformative (...) potential and progressive natureof values-based labeling poses a key challenge.One avenue for gauging this potential isconventions theory. This approach can beadapted to consider the decision makingprocesses that go on within values-basedlabeling groups, as well as consumer decisionmaking based on such labels, as instances ofwhat is termed a politics of ethical judgment.The conclusion emphasizes the need for moreresearch in this area and suggests how it couldbe furthered. (shrink)

In Emile, Rousseau claims that the value of women ought to be determined by the opinion that men have of them. Women, contrary to commodities and men, escape what I call Rousseau's “dual theory of value.” According to the latter, the apparent value of commodities and men is determined by opinion and either unrelated or inverse to “real value,” which is assessed through objective criteria. The dual theory of value is the basis of (...) Rousseau's critique of commercial society. However, women warrant an exception to this theory. As women's apparent worth is their real worth, women are the unique object in the world that ought to be subjected to the rule of opinion, which is the rule of commercial market that Rousseau so violently rejects. This article investigates why this is the case and locates three functions to the unique position of women in Rousseau's theory of value. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to study an analogue of Hilbert's seventeenth problem for functions over a valued field which are integral definite on some definable set; that is, that map the given set into the valuation ring. We use model theory to exhibit a uniform method, on various theories of valued fields, for deriving an algebraic characterization of such functions. As part of this method we refine the concept of a function being integral at a point, and (...) make it dependent on the relevant class of valued fields. We apply our framework to algebraically closed valued fields, model complete theories of difference and differential valued fields, and real closed valued fields. (shrink)

Moral philosophy and education, by H. D. Aiken.--The moral sense and contributory values, by C. I. Lewis.--Realms of value, by P. W. Taylor.--The role of value theory in education, by J. D. Butler.--Does ethics make a difference? By K. Price.--Educational value statements, by C. Beck.--Educational values and goals, by W. K. Frankena.--Conflicts in values, by H. S. Broudy.--Levels of valuational discourse in education, by J. F. Perry and P. G. Smith.--Education and some moves toward a (...) class='Hi'>value methodology, by A. S. Clayton.--You can't pray a lie, by M. Twain.--Men, machines, and morality, by J. F. Soltis.--Teaching and telling, by I. Scheffler.--Reason and habit, by R. S. Peters.--The two moralists of the child, by J. Piaget.--Causes and morality, by R. S. Peters.--On education and morals, by R. W. Sleeper.--Moral autonomy and reasonableness, by T. D. Perry. (shrink)

Psychological questions within philosophical ethics, although very often deeply distrusted, are justified if we presume the ultimate unity of the ethical and psychosocial subject. Such questions are especially well-grounded when we deal with a philosophy that is as practical as Stoicism. Because of both their contents and origins, the theories of values and emotions proposed by this ancient school may attract the suspicious attention of psychologists. For there are good reasons to suggest that the ideas in question were neurotic – (...) that they arose from and caused neurosis. This hypothesis can be verified within the framework of Paul Tillich’s multidisciplinary conception of neurosis. After a somewhat more detailed analysis, it turns out that the Stoic conception is in principle neither the result nor the cause of neurotic disturbances. Furthermore, it seems that it is quite the contrary – it causes people to flourish psychologically and existentially. It must nevertheless be emphasized that Stoic philosophy, if misunderstood or led astray, still might become neurotic in character. (shrink)

Adopting a dispositional theory of value promises to deliver a lot of theoretical goodies. One recurring problem for dispositional theories of value, though, is a problem about nonconvergence. If being a value is being disposed to elicit response R in us, what should we say if it turns out that not everybody is disposed to have R to the same things? One horn of the problem here is a danger of the view collapsing into an error (...) theory—of it turning out, on account of the diversity of agents' relevant dispositions, that nothing is really a value, since nothing is disposed to elicit R in everybody. Alternatively, there is a danger of an objectionable fragmentation of value, according to which there is no such thing as a value simpliciter, but only valuesme and valuesyou, valuesus and valuesthem. I advocate a de se relativist version of a dispositional theory of value. If we go for this sort of de-se-ified dispositional theory, we get to keep our theoretical goodies, but we avoid the problem of nonconvergence that leads to a danger of either collapse into an error theory, or else talking-past, and a loss of common subject matter. (shrink)