도덕(morality)의 기원(origins)과 본성(nature)에 관한 철학적 탐구의 역사는 장구하다. 플라톤의 『프로타고라스』(Protagoras)에서 전개된 신화적(mythical) 설명은 홉스의 신화적 설명을 거쳐 흄의 자연주의적 설명과 칸트의 형이상학적 설명으로 발전하여 적어도 19세기까지 도덕철학의 영역을 굳건하게 지켜왔다. 하지만 20세기에 와서 과학(사회생물학, 도덕심리학, 신경과학)의 놀라운 연구성과는 도덕의 기원과 본성에 관한 전통철학의 설명방식에 대해 깊은 회의와 불신을 불러일으켰다. 전통철학의 입장이 ‘위로부터의 도덕(morality from above)’을 이야기하는데 반해서 새로운 과학적 입장은 ‘아래로부터의 도덕(morality from below)’을 주창한다. 도덕의 기원과 본성에 관한 전통철학과 현대과학의 탐구성과는 이제 분명해진 것 같다. (...) 인간의 도덕을 신의 명령(divine command)이나 도덕원리(moral principles) 같은 저 높은 곳에서 초월적으로 존재하는 것이 아니라 인간존재 자체에서 진화한 결과물이라고 보는 것이 객관적으로 타당한 견해인 것 같다. 인간은 선한 본성(good nature)을 키워왔고, 도덕법칙과 종교적 교리는 인간의 이러한 본성에 따라 뒤에 만들어진 것이다. 인간은 스스로 도덕성(morality)을 갖추어 왔으며, 이 도덕성은 우리의 이성(reason)과 의지(will)에 따라 더 높은 차원으로 발달할 수 있는 것이다. 도덕은 ‘위로부터 내려온(come from above)’것이 아니라 ‘아래로부터 올라온(come from below)’것이다. 도덕은 인간의 진화의 역사에서 탄생한 발명품(invention)이다. (shrink)

Sixteenth-century Spanish thought is constitutive of an established, though insufficiently studied, tradition of European political theorizing. As against the politics of Machiavellism, the Spanish tradition argued in favor of an ethical perspective on statecraft. As an introduction to the subject, this article addresses key concepts set forth by the Dominican theologian-jurist Francisco de Vitoria regarding the natural foundations and teleology of the state and its coercive power. Terms such as "natural law", "dominium", and "perfect community" describe the Thomistic basis of (...) his political philosophy and illustrate the moral significance and legitimate basis of political society in early modern Spanish politico-theological thought. El pensamiento español del siglo XVI constituye una tradición establecida de teorización política europea poco estudiada en los círculos académicos angloparlantes. En contraste con el maquiavelismo, la tradición española argumentó a favor de una perspectiva ética en torno al arte de gobernar. Como introducción a dicha temática, se abordan los conceptos clave establecidos por Francisco de Vitoria res-pecto de los fundamentos naturales y la teleología del Estado y su poder coercitivo. Conceptos tales como "ley natural", "dominio" y "comunidad perfecta" describen la base tomista de su filosofía política e ilustran el significado moral y fundamento legítimo de la sociedad política en el pensamiento político-teológico de la época. (shrink)

It seems impossible that organisms selected to maximize their genetic legacy could also be moral agents in a world in which taking risks for strangers is sometimes morally laudable. Brian Zamulinski argues that it is possible if morality is an evolutionary by-product rather than an adaptation.Evolutionary Intuitionism presents a new evolutionary theory of human morality. Zamulinski explains the evolution of foundational attitudes, whose relationships to acts constitute moral facts. With foundational attitudes and the resulting moral facts in place, (...) he shows how they ground a plausible normative morality, give answers to meta-ethical questions, and provide an account of moral motivation. He explains the nature of moral intuitions and, thus, of our access to the moral facts. He shows that the theory makes confirmed empirical predictions, including the observable variation in moral views. The combination of intuitionism and evolutionary ethics enables Zamulinski to overcome the standard objections to both.Evolutionary Intuitionism is a unified theory of human morality that explains how an objective morality could develop naturally in a physical world like ours, among organisms like us. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Origins and Evolution of Bioethics: Some Personal ReflectionsEdmund D. Pellegrino (bio)AbstractBioethics was officially baptized in 1972, but its birth took place a decade or so before that date. Since its birth, what is known today as bioethics has undergone a complex conceptual metamorphosis. This essay loosely divides that metamorphosis into three stages: an educational, an ethical, and a global stage. In the educational era, bioethics focused on (...) a perceived “dehumanization” of medicine by the rising power of science and technology. Remedies were sought by introducing humanities, ethics, and human “values” into the medical curriculum. Ethics was one among the humanistic disciplines, but not the dominant one. In the second era, ethics assumed a dominant role as ever more complex dilemmas emerged from the rapid pace of biological research. As such dilemmas were applied to medical practice, the need for a more rigorous and more formal analysis of their moral status was clear. Philosophically-trained ethicists had an obvious role. They began to teach, write, and profoundly influence medical education and practice. In the third—and present—period, the breadth of problems has become so broad that ethicists must, themselves, draw on disciplines well beyond their expertise—e.g., law, religion, anthropology, economics, political science, psychology, and the like. The era of bioethics as a global enterprise is upon us. The original hope for humanizing medicine has not been overtly successful; however, much has been accomplished of value to patients, the profession, and society. Medical morality has been transformed into a formal, systematic study of a whole range of issues of the greatest significance to humanity. Now the major challenge is one of identity, or inter-relationships and connections between the theoretical and the practical. Bioethics has outgrown its beginnings.I have been invited to give a “personal recollection” of the early development of bioethics. Such invitations are notoriously hard to resist, but also problematic when they are the recollections of a participant [End Page 73] in the events to be described. We need only be reminded of the vagaries common to the plethora of memoirs on the book stands today. Few have escaped the perils of selective memory, self-promotion, or the settling of old scores. Yet their perils notwithstanding, memoirs may serve some useful purpose. They are the raw material—verbal kitchen middens so to speak—out of which historians can later sift fact from fancy. They enable “tribal elders” to give witness to the past from which the present can fashion some sense of continuity.I will organize my reflections around three very arbitrary time periods that represent my own way of thinking about the evolution of bioethics: (1) an era of “proto-bioethics” (1960–1972), (2) an era of philosophical bioethics (1972–1985), and (3) an era of global bioethics (1985-present). Each era, of course, overlaps with the others, and the dominant strand of each runs through the others as well.In the proto-bioethics period, the language of human values predominated; in the era of bioethics philosophically construed, it was the language of philosophical ethics; and in the era of bioethics globally construed, the social and behavioral sciences have gained greater prominence. In each period, interest in the traditional humanities other than philosophy waxed and waned. In the earlier years, religion and theology predominated. Beginning in the 1970s, philosophy took a dominant role. In the last two decades, other disciplines, like law, literature, and the social sciences, have exerted more and more influence (McNeur 1963; Pellegrino 1997; Barker 1987).I make no pretense here of writing any part of the formal “history” of bioethics. Works of this nature are beginning to appear (Rothman 1991; Jonsen 1998 ; Dell’Oro and Viafora 1996). Thomas McElhinney and I are preparing our own account of the work and influence of the Institute on Human Values in Medicine, one of the influential programs of the Society for Health and Human Values (Pellegrino and McElhinney, n.d.). Space limitations as well as prudence preclude any attempt to do justice to all the events, institutions, and people who have made the field of bioethics what it is today. I apologize for these omissions, for any unintentional lapses of... (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to examine the nature of moral and legal norms in a broader context: first, taking into account logical and methodological assumptions, second, in the perspective of psychology of emotions and legal policy. The basic subject of the research carried out by Leon Petrażycki was represented by law. Originally, it had a psychological character, not an objective, eternal, and unchanging one. To fully understand the genesis and nature of morality and law, Petrażycki (...) addressed the study of mental phenomena, especially emotional experiences. First, however, he developed appropriate rules of logic and scientific methodology. Then he developed a new classification of mental phenomena, among which the fundamental role is played by bilateral emotions. At some stage, emotions begin to cooperate with cognitive processes, first of all with imaginations. Imaginations of acts, such as theft, betrayal, murder, can cause repulsive emotions, and type imaginations, such as truthfulness, charity, justice can evoke apulsive emotions. On the basis of such associations, judgments are created over time, the content of which becomes a basis for fundamental rules of conduct, that is, for norms. There are two fundamentally different types of norms: moral norms and legal norms. The norms of the first type are imperative and represent the nature of validity, while the norms of the second type are imperative-attributive and they also always entitle someone to something, i.e. they give someone a right. This division determines a fundamental difference between morality and law. (shrink)

_The Nature of Moral Thinking_ is an introductory text to the questions of ethics, offering a solid philosophical and historical basis for understanding the central issues. Francis Snare discusses in detail the classical philosophical arguments of Plato and Butler in relation to relativism and subjectivism and treats Marx and Nietzsche in regard to the origins and explanation of morality.

This article examines Kant’s pragmatic anthropology as a specific model of perceiving a human, his nature which German philosopher started to elaborate in the beginning of 1770s. This issue found its reflections in the new course of university lectures on pragmatic anthropology that Kant read before his retirement in 1796. Basic ideas of this academic course Kant has presented in his treatise “Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View” (1798) which highlights a new model of studying human nature. (...) Based on the thorough analysis of this particular tractate and on the materials for the lectures, as well as Kant’s notes, the research on conceptual differences between pragmatic anthropology model and other human studies that German philosopher developed in his transcendental philosophy, as well as in metaphysic and naturalistic subjects, which he also taught in University of Königsberg, can be conducted. Theoretical backgrounds that enabled genesis of pragmatic view on a human are a part of this investigation. On this connection, a special attention is paid to the role of physical geography, its conceptual language in the genesis of pragmatic view on a human. It was physical geography, which Kant taught long before a new model of anthropology, which has led to a gradual metaphysical interpretation of Kant's view on a human, his soul and freedom. Conceptual matter of pragmatic anthropology model, its connection to perceiving a human as an active subject who with his own efforts constitutes his own nature, which, in its turn, is the part of the nature, is studied. Basic concepts of Kant’s anthropology are analyzed in this regard; their dissimilarities to empirical and moral dimensions with the help of which German philosopher is trying to answer the question: “What a human is?” are deliberated on. However, the answer to this question is fundamentally differing from the answers offered by Kant's pragmatic anthropology. Anthropological ideas of the German philosopher have essentially affected its pedagogical doctrine. (shrink)

The literature suggests that the moral sense is based on innate abilities. In fact, it has been shown that children show the capacity for moral discernment, emotions and prosocial motivations from an early age. However, the moral sense is a complex construct of an evolutionary and social nature that evolves under the influence of interpersonal relationships. The emergence and development of moral sense is a challenge that has prompted many research studies with the aim of achieving a clear comprehension (...) of moral development. However, success has been scarce, and studies relevant to this subject are limited. Thus, a systematic review of studies relevant to this topic was conducted to clearly establish how moral sense emerges and develops. An Ovid search was conducted to retrieve relevant items for this systematic review. The databases that were electronically visited are Cross-reference, Google Scholar and PubMed. Strict inclusion and exclusion criteria were imposed on the retrieved items to retain only relevant resources. Twenty-six studies were found valid for inclusion in this systematic review. The results of these studies were presented differently: In order to effectively analyze the selected papers and bring out the results more clearly, a categorization of the approaches adopted in the studies was carried out. The approaches identified were: “Natural Moral Sense,” “Social Relationships and Moral Development,” and “Environmental Factors and Moral Development.” The evidence that emerged from the analysis of the papers was collected to produce a general basic model that explains moral development while also serving as a link between the various studies. First, moral sense is found to be innate in humans; individuals can naturally respond morally to various dilemmas. As seen among children and young infants, moral sense naturally exists. Second, it can be socially nurtured through social interactions and exposure to various environmental factors. Various research studies were reviewed in this systematic review to obtain a consensus on how moral sense emerges and develops. From the systematic review, the moral sense is found to be innate. However, moral development is fostered by social interactions and environmental factors. (shrink)

A key question for research on the evolutionary origins of morality concerns just what the target of an evolutionary explanation of morality should be. Some researchers focus on behaviors, others on systems of norms, yet others on moral emotions. Richard Joyce (2006) offers an evolutionary explanation for the trait of making moral judgments. Here, I defend Joyce’s account of moral judgment against two objections from Stephen Stich (2008). Stich’s first objection concerns the supposed universality of moral judgments (...) as Joyce conceives of them. I respond by undermining the empirical evidence upon which this objection is based. Stich’s second objection concerns the extent of the moral domain, which he takes to include far more than the considerations of harm and fairness central to Joyce’s account. In response, I outline several strategies for reconciling Stich’s observations with Joyce’s account. (shrink)

In section 1 of An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, Hume claims that those who deny the reality of morals are disingenuous. He also notes that philosophy has had a history of disagreements about whether morals originate in reason or in sentiment. Throughout his book, Hume applies an experimental method to find the “universal principles” from which morality is ultimately derived. Then, in Appendix 1, he then argues for the origin of these principles in sentiment or taste, a (...) product of “the human fabric.” Reason, Hume says, discovers objects “as they really stand in nature, without addition or diminution.” Taste “has a productive faculty, and gilding or staining all natural objects with the colours, borrowed from internal sentiment, raises, in a manner, a new creation.” How can the quest for universal principles find a satisfactory answer in taste, a “productive” faculty? How is the notion that morality is a “new creation” consistent with an insistence on the reality of moral distinctions? Are the deliverances of taste, which are prompts to virtue, also judgments that can be evaluated as true or false? This essay shows that, on a proper reading, the elements of Hume’s moral epistemology in the second Enquiry are largely consistent. (shrink)

In order to describe the logic of morality, "contractualist" philosophers have studied how individuals behave when they choose to follow their moral intuitions. These individuals, contractualists note, often act as if they have bargained and thus reached an agreement with others about how to distribute the benefits and burdens of mutual cooperation. Using this observation, such philosophers argue that the purpose of morality is to maximize the benefits of human interaction. The resulting "contract" analogy is both insightful and (...) puzzling. On one hand, it captures the pattern of moral intuitions, thus answering questions about human cooperation: why do humans cooperate? Why should the distribution of benefits be proportionate to each person's contribution? Why should the punishment be proportionate to the crime? Why should the rights be proportionate to the duties? On the other hand, the analogy provides a mere as-if explanation for human cooperation, saying that cooperation is "as if" people have passed a contract-but since they didn't, why should it be so? To evolutionary thinkers, the puzzle of the missing contract is immediately reminiscent of the puzzle of the missing "designer" of life-forms, a puzzle that Darwin's theory of natural selection essentially resolved. Evolutionary and contractualist theory originally intersected at the work of philosophers John Rawls and David Gauthier, who argued that moral judgments are based on a sense of fairness that has been naturally selected. In this book, Nicolas Baumard further explores the theory that morality was originally an adaptation to the biological market of cooperation, an arena in which individuals competed to be selected for cooperative interactions. In this environment, Baumard suggests, the best strategy was to treat others with impartiality and to share the costs and benefits of cooperation in a fair way, so that those who offered less than others were left out of cooperation while those who offered more were exploited by their partners. It is with this evolutionary approach that Baumard ultimately accounts for the specific structure of human morality. (shrink)

In ancient Chinese thoughts, de is a comparatively complicated idea. Most of the researchers translated it directly into "virtue", but this translation is not accurate for our understanding of the idea of "de" in pre-Qin times. Generally speaking, in Pre-Qin times, the idea of"de" underwent three developmental periods. The first is the de of Heaven, the de of ancestors; the second the de of system; and the third the de of spirit and moral conducts. In a long period of history, (...) the idea of "de" never cast off the influence of tian Dao (the way of Heaven). It was in Western Zhou Dynasty that the idea of "de" shook off the dense fog of the mandate of Heaven. However, it was the thinkers in Spring and Autumn Period and Warring States who made contributions to bring it deep into people's mind. The ancient Chinese thoughts were mainly concerned with people's recognition and development of their own abilities, with people's seeking harmony and balance between human-beings and nature, and with people's seeking harmonious and balanced human relations. The development of the idea of "de" played a very important role in this context. (shrink)

The political, economic and environmental policies of a hegemonic, oligarchic, political-economic international caste are the origin and cause of the ecological and political dystopia that we are living in. An utilitarian, resourcist, anthropocentric perspective guides classical economics and sustainable development models, allowing the enrichment of a tiny part of the world's population, while not impeding but, on the contrary, directly inducing economic losses and environmental destruction for the many. To preserve the integrity of natural systems we must abandon the resourcist (...) anthropocentric ethical fiction that is the current moral foundation underlying our relationship with nature and instead promote the realization of a new developmental landmark for democratic institutions: direct democracy, i.e. democracy truly governed by the people for the people, and ultimately for nature as well. (shrink)

What is it to be morally responsible for something? Recent philosophical work reveals considerable disagreement on the question. Indeed, some theorists claim to distinguish several varieties of moral responsibility, with different conditions that must be satisfied if one is to bear responsibility of one or another of these kinds. -/- Debate on this point turns partly on disagreement about the kinds of responses made appropriate when one is blameworthy or praiseworthy. It is generally agreed that these include "reactive attitudes" such (...) as resentment and gratitude, but theorists disagree about the nature of these attitudes. They dispute the connections between moral responsibility, desert, and the justification of punishment as well. -/- Many theorists take it that, whatever the appropriate responses are, they are responses to an agent's "quality of will," but there is no consensus on what this comes to. Are the agent's beliefs about the moral status of her behavior what matter, or is it what she cares about, or what she judges important? -/- This volume presents twelve original essays from participants in these debates. The contributors include prominent established figures as well as influential younger philosophers. A substantive introduction by the editors surveys recent debates and situates the contributions within it. (shrink)

Though little known today, David Fordyce was one of the leading figures of the outburst of intellectual activity that culminated in the Scottish Enlightenment. His Elements of Moral Philosophy was one of the most widely circulated texts in moral philosophy in the second half of the eighteenth century. Apart from a very expensive facsimile edition, there has never been a modern edition of The Elements of Moral Philosophy. Moreover, the lectures in A Brief Account have never before been published. The (...) significance of The Elements is evidenced by the fact that it was the principal work in the curriculum in moral philosophy throughout the second half of the eighteenth century. It was also included practically verbatim in the first edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain (...) in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Christopher Boehm proposes that morality began when a society of hunter-gatherers punished a member for violating its rules. He claims social control of this kind is universal, and that apes have related tendencies. Emile Durkheim had a similar conception of social control in the simplest and earliest societies. But both are wrong: Hunter-gatherers rarely, if ever, handle conflict in a law-like and penal fashion, and the society as a whole rarely if ever is the agent of social control. Individuals (...) typically handle their own conflicts, and avoidance is more common than punishment. Pure sociology predicts and explains the handling of conflict with its location and direction in social space -- its social structure. The nature of morality depends, for example, on the social distance and degree of inequality between the parties, whether humans or nonhumans. Morality varies from case to case. It is relative rather than universal. Boehm therefore describes the origin of something that has never existed. All that is universal are the principles of structural relativity. (shrink)

This book rewrites the story of classical Chinese philosophy, which has always been considered the single most creative and vibrant chapter in the history of Chinese philosophy. Works attributed to Confucius, Mozi, Mencius, Laozi, Zhuangzi, Xunzi, Han Feizi and many others represent the very origins of moral and political thinking in China. As testimony to their enduring stature, in recent decades many Chinese intellectuals, and even leading politicians, have turned to those classics, especially Confucian texts, for alternative or complementary (...) sources of moral authority and political legitimacy. Therefore, philosophical inquiries into core normative values embedded in those classical texts are crucial to the ongoing scholarly discussion about China as China turns more culturally inward. It can also contribute to the spirited contemporary debate about the nature of philosophical reasoning, especially in the non-Western traditions. -/- This book offers a new narrative and interpretative framework about the origins of moral-political philosophy that tracks how the three normative values, humaneness, justice, and personal freedom, were formulated, reformulated, and contested by early Chinese philosophers in their effort to negotiate the relationship among three distinct domains, the personal, the familial, and the political. Such efforts took place as those thinkers were reimagining a new moral-political order, debating its guiding norms, and exploring possible sources within the context of an evolving understanding of Heaven and its relationship with the humans. Tao Jiang argues that the competing visions in that debate can be characterized as a contestation between partialist humaneness and impartialist justice as the guiding norm for the newly imagined moral-political order, with the Confucians, the Mohists, the Laoists, and the so-called fajia thinkers being the major participants, constituting the mainstream philosophical project during this period. Thinkers lined up differently along the justice-humaneness spectrum with earlier ones maintaining some continuity between the two normative values (or at least trying to accommodate both to some extent) while later ones leaning more toward their exclusivity in the political/public domain. Zhuangzi and the Zhuangists were the outliers of the mainstream moral-political debate who rejected the very parameter of humaneness versus justice in that discourse. They were a lone voice advocating personal freedom, but the Zhuangist expressions of freedom were self-restricted to the margins of the political world and the interiority of one's heartmind. Such a take can shed new light on how the Zhuangist approach to personal freedom would profoundly impact the development of this idea in pre-modern Chinese political and intellectual history. (shrink)

In this book, contributors who are atheists, believers, and anything in between debate the origins and nature of morality and the human impulse for good.

A recent turn in the cognitive sciences has deepened the attention on embodied and situated dynamics for explaining different cognitive processes such as perception, emotion, and social cognition. This has fostered an extensive interest in the social and ‘intersubjective’ nature of moral behavior, especially from the perspective of enactivism. In this paper, I argue that embodied and situated perspectives, enactivism in particular, nonetheless require further improvements with regards to their analysis of the social nature of human morality. (...) In brief, enactivist proposals still do not define what features of the social-relational context, or which kind of processes within social interactions, make an evaluation or action morally relevant or distinctive from other types of social normativity. As an alternative to this proclivity, and seeking to complement the enactive perspective, I present a definition of the process of moral sense-making and offer an empirically-based ethical distinction between different domains of social knowledge in moral development. For doing so, I take insights from the constructivist tradition in moral psychology. My objective is not to radically oppose embodied and enactive alternatives but to expand the horizon of their conceptual and empirical contributions to morality research. (shrink)

In 1798 the French Directory began to collect moral statistics systematically for the first time in history. The bureaucratic and scientific developments that preceded this policy are well known. Yet the reasons for its abrupt adoption, and the intellectual origins of moral statistics (as distinguished from the topographical statistics previously practiced), have until now remained obscure. This paper contends that, in the aftermath of the Terror, Joseph de Maistre sketched philosophical tools and made political observations that aided the rise (...) of the new state science. In particular, Maistre’s anti-Rousseauian essay On the State of Nature (composed 1794-1796), a critique of Rousseau’s second Discourse on the Origin of Inequality (1755), outlined theoretical concepts crucial to moral statistics. Maistre’s widely read Considerations on France (1797) later made these concepts available to the French public in an accessible and memorable style. In On the State of Nature Maistre set down his ideas on reason, human nature, human perfectibility, justice, conscience, Providence and chance. These ideas presented the agency of the moral in an innovative way that not only suggested immediate systematic applications, but also helped prepare the French sociological project. Indeed if any text made the theoretical shift away from the model of human nature to the paradigm of normal people with laws of dispersion that Ian Hacking claims set French sociology apart, it is On the State of Nature. Moreover, Maistre’s realist critique of Rousseau’s imagination augured the notion of the social fact that Comte transformed, and Durkheim defined. (shrink)

This chapter, which deals with the psychological origins of goodness in childhood, and the developmental origins of human morality, argues that the socialization model and cognitive maturation model give short shrift to the role of emotions as one of the multiple natural prerequisites for nurturing morality. The primary models of moral development in the field of developmental psychology considered moral acquisition as a derived and “nurtured” consequence of inborn tendencies to either seek knowledge or gain social (...) connection. Morality could not possibly emerge out of hierarchical socialization. Socially constructed moral codes and feelings were derivative of natural emotional appraisal tendencies built on struggles for survival. Morality and convention were psychologically bound together, unified by the syntax of moral importance. The emotional transformation of socialized conventions into underlying moral competence can be likened to the transformation of everyday language performance into the innate syntactic structures indexing linguistic competence. (shrink)

Scientists no longer accept the existence of a distinct moral organ as phrenologists once did. A generation of young neurologists is using advanced technological medical equipment to unravel specific brain processes enabling moral cognition. In addition, evolutionary psychologists have formulated hypotheses about the origins and nature of our moral architecture. Little by little, the concept of a ‘moral brain’ is reinstated. As the crossover between disciplines focusing on moral cognition was rather limited up to now, this book aims (...) at filling the gap. Which evolutionary biological hypotheses provide a useful framework for starting new neurological research? How can brain imaging be used to corroborate hypotheses concerning the evolutionary background of our species? In this reader, a broad range of prominent scientists and philosophers shed their expert view on the current accomplishments and future challenges in the field of moral cognition and assess how cooperation between neurology and evolutionary psychology can boost research into the field of the moral brain. (shrink)

There has been a considerable amount of literature in the last 70 years claiming that the American founders were steeped in modern thought. This study runs counter to that tradition, arguing that the founders of America were deeply indebted to the classical Christian natural-law tradition for their fundamental theological, moral, and political outlook. Evidence for this thesis is found in case studies of such leading American founders as Thomas Jefferson and James Wilson, the pamphlet debates, the founders' invocation of providence (...) during the revolution, and their understanding of popular sovereignty. The authors go on to reflect on how the founders' political thought contained within it the resources that undermined, in principle, the institution of slavery, and explores the relevance of the founders' political theology for contemporary politics. This timely, important book makes a significant contribution to the scholarly debate over whether the American founding is compatible with traditional Christianity. (shrink)

Morality is often defined in opposition to the natural "instincts," or as a tool to keep those instincts in check. New findings in neuroscience, social psychology, animal behaviour, and anthropology have brought us back to the original Darwinian position that moral behaviour is continuous with the social behavior of animals, and most likely evolved to enhance the cooperativeness of society. In this view, morality is part of human nature rather than its opposite. This interdisciplinary volume debates the (...) origin and working of human morality within the context of science as well as religion and philosophy. Experts from widely different backgrounds speculate how morality may have evolved, how it develops in the child, and what science can tell us about its working and origin. They also discuss how to deal with the age-old facts-versus-values debate, also known as the naturalistic fallacy. The implications of this exchange are enormous, as they may transform cherished views on if and why we are the only moral species. (shrink)

Aristotle presents his Nicomachean Ethics and Politics as an ordered pair comprising political science (hê politikê epistêmê), suggesting an axiomatic structure of theorems that are demonstratively deduced from first principles. He holds that this systematic knowledge of ethical and legislative matters provides the ‘universals’ essential to phronesis or practical wisdom, and that its acquisition begins in sound habituation. Aristotle thereby assigns habituation an epistemic role that must be understood in light of his account of the nature of a science. (...) This paper argues that what would be inductively established by, or on the basis of, sound habituation is the supposition that the natural kind of activity constitutive of living well exists; it establishes the supposition on which Aristotle’s definition of a eudaimon life rests. Having addressed this central interpretive issue, the paper sketches a psychologically grounded position on the substantive philosophical questions at stake. Are there natural signs of flourishing and failure to flourish present to us in our experience of attempts to live well? If such signs exist but are not sufficient to qualify ethical beliefs as knowledge in their own right, might they play a role in a science of what is good and bad for human beings? (shrink)

This well-produced volume is the Proceedings of the Twentieth International Colloquium of the Société Internationale pour l'Étude de la Philosophie Médiévale, Freiburg im Breisgau 2014. Sixteen cha...

The disagreement over whether Aristotle recognized rights in some form unavoidably involves disagreement over what rights are, and the theory of rights itself is still highly contested. There is no consensus concerning how " right'? is to be defined, how rights are to be theoretically grounded, or how rights theory is to be applied in particular circumstances. This is not, however, a good reason to dismiss the issue of whether there are rights in Aristotle: for Aristotle, like modern rights theorists, (...) is concerned about the moral and legal status of the individual within the community, and he expresses this in terms of claims of justice. The issue is worthy of study not only because it can lead to a deeper understanding of Aristotle's conceptions of justice and the common good, but also because it may shed valuable light on the theoretical foundations of human rights, since he offers a theory of political justice which is based on a metaphysical theory of human nature. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain (...) in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

The Enlightenment regarded language as one of the most significant achievements of man. Consequently inquiries into the origin and development of language play a central role in eighteenth-century moral philosophy. This new science of man consciously adopts the method of analysis and synthesis used in the natural sciences of the time. In moral philosophy, analysis corresponds to the search for the basic principles of human nature. Synthesis is identified with the attempt to interpret all artificial achievements of man (arts, (...) sciences and institutions) as the effect of these principles and of man's physical and social environment - an attempt known as theoretical history. The type of explanation envisaged by theoretical historians is based on the principle of causality. It consists in a genetic reconstruction of the social phenomenon under investigation. Inquiries into the origin of language follow this pattern of explanation. They form part of theoretical history and thus represent a major aspect of the eighteenth-century scientific study of man. (shrink)

The Art and Craft of Political Theory provides a critical overview of the discipline's core concepts and concerns and its development of critical thinking and practical judgment. The field's interdisciplinary strengths are deployed to grapple with emerging issues and engage afresh enduring ideals and quandaries. While conventional definitions of key concepts are provided, original and controversial perspectives are also explored, revealing continuity in a tradition of thought while emphasizing its diversity and innovations. The Art and Craft of Political Theory illustrates (...) the analytic and interpretive skills, the moral and philosophic discernment, and the historical knowledge needed to appreciate a tradition of thought, to contest its claims, and to make good use of its insights. Topics include: - Science, Ideology, and Normative Theory - Biology, Culture, Human Nature, Power and Violence - Ancient, Modern, and Postmodern Political Thought - Liberty, Equality, Justice, Reason, and Democracy - Racial, Religious, Gender, and Economic Identities - Liberalism, Socialism, Capitalism, Communism, Anarchism, Feminism, and Environmentalism - Social Media, Automation, Artificial intelligence and other Emerging Technologies This concise, lively, and accessibly written book is essential reading for all students of political theory. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The longing for total revolution described in Bernard Yack’s seminal book, which he analyzes as an effort to find a place for human freedom and morality in a world governed by natural necessity, can be traced to Reformation debates between predestinarian Calvinists and free-will theologians. These debates were reflected in Kant’s efforts to establish the very possibility of freedom and in those of Hegel, Marx, and Nietzsche. Considered in this light, the longing for total revolution is a yearning (...) not merely to overcome dehumanization but to become something more than human, which must always come up short in the face of human finitude and mortality. (shrink)

The paper is a preliminary examination of the origin and role of psychological perception or “feeling” of dignity in human beings. Following Ayala's naturalistic account of morality, a sense of emotional dignity is seen as an outcome of processes of natural selection, cultural evolution, and above all a need for social inclusion. It is suggested that the existence of emotional dignity as part of a human species-related continuum provides an explanation of why we treat those in a persistent vegetative (...) state, the severely and hopelessly mentally impaired, the senile demented, cadavers and archaeological remains with dignity and respect. For older Europeans, dissonance between physical and mental abilities, unfamiliarity with social and cultural changes and relative proximity to death may influence their emotional dignity and hence vulnerability. (shrink)

I think we will agree that there are questions that it is not always preferable to put point-blank. Among them we may class that of whether ethics belongs to the category of philosophical knowledge. We know that the custom of regarding ethics as knowledge exclusively philosophical in nature persists to this day. Such a notion, with origins in the past, expresses, in our view, the dominance of spontaneous, uncontrollable factors in the real morality of society. In Hegel's (...) expression, ethical theory usually came too late: all that was left for it to do was to interpret various changes that had taken place in moral attitudes, shifts in the world of moral reflection and moral feeling. But sometimes it entered the picture entirely too early. On the one hand, this means that ethical theory has been insufficiently oriented toward practice, limiting itself to the rationalization of spontaneously established views and preferences of moral consciousness that we were incapable of abandoning. On the other hand, it testifies that the moral regulation of people's behavior was to only a very small degree subject to the need to be equipped with theory, inasmuch as practice itself was strongly constrained within the narrow limits of the processes of life . Ethical theory, for the most part, provided the morality actually being practiced with various philosophical illusions, in the form of compensatory and adaptive viewpoints, and, along with this, offered certain regulatory notions in the area of socialization to morality. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 733 The Giving and Taking of Life: Essays Ethical. By JAMES TUNSTEAD BURTCHAELL. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1989. xiv + 304 pp. $29.95. One looks forward to the writings of James Burtchaell not only because his judgments are almost always on the side of the angels hut also because his mastery of the English language often enables him to say in a few (...) words what writers of lesser skill say in volumes. This is a collection of previously-published essays on a wide range of topics including contraception, abortion, the use of biotechnology in human reproduction, the use of fetal tissue in medical therapy, law in a pluralist society, liberation theology, the morality of terrorism and the relationship of religion to politics. In its own way, this hook poses well the moral questions of how we and " nature " are to relate to the newly emerging generation of technology. Because the articles are so diverse, it is not possible to give a detailed account or critique of each of them, and rather than doing that I will focus attention only on the issue of ethics and the newly emerging technology which will have a profound impact on not only our personal lives, hut also our society and politics. And to an even greater extent, newly emerging technological developments will have an enormous impact on the way in which our race regenerates and orients itself in the future. On a case-by-case basis, Burtchaell raises these issues with great force and clarity, even though his understanding of nature and technology is not entirely clear. He suggests that nature is far more subtle and vital than we commonly assume and that it has its own ways of fighting hack against our technological assaults against it. Our attempts to control and manipulate nature through technological means provide nature with an opportunity to protect itself hy striking hack at us in ways previously unimagined. Using technology to bend nature to our will is much like the Australian Aborigine who vainly tried to throw away his boomerang! What is most striking about this hook is the contradictory way in which Burtchaell employs the concept of nature to determine the morality of certain enterprises. This contradiction is seen most clearly hy comparing his assessments of artificial contraception and technological transmission of human life. The contrast is so sharp that the issue of the foundations of his thought can he called into question. When one compares his favorable assessment of artificial contraception to his critical evaluation of technological reproduction of human life, one wonders if there is an underlying principle guiding his moral deliberations or whether it is merely his intuitions, likes and dislikes (strongly 734 BOOK REVIEWS colored and shaped by his cultural setting) that determine his evaluations. In "'Human Life' and Human Love", Burtchaell vigorously criticizes the substance, form and arguments of the encyclical Humanae Vitae. For him, the great flaw in this encyclical was the weight it gave to the distinction between natural and artificial contraception and the absolute condemnation visited upon the latter. Seeing little difference between more natural methods of contraception like natural family planning and the use of the pill, Burtchaell argues that artificial contraception should have been given some kind of moral permissibility by Pope Paul VI (P. 99). But it is not clear why he gives limited support to artificial birth control after one reads his harsh criticisms of it: But the venture of technology overshot its original goals in several unforeseen ways. America now has the highest rate of teenage pregnancy in what we like to call the developed world. The incidence of sexual prom· iscuity, venereal disease, abortion, marital collapse, fatherless children, child abuse and abandonment, wanton breeding by the thriftless (and dusky) poor is probably higher than at any time in our national history. The founders [Margaret Sanger and Marie Stopes] did concede that their program might not immediately achieve its desired results. But that was because of the lack, in their time, of an ' ideal ' contraceptive. Its development was to be expected from further assiduous scientific research. Seventy years and much assiduous research later, the same message is still... (shrink)

Tomasello’s A Natural History of Morality is novel, compelling, and comprehensive. Drawing on past and current research in developmental psychology, as well as moral philosophy, I make the following points: (1) cooperation is a significant major hallmark of early human sociality but is also the foundation for antagonistic goals designed to enhance one’s own group’s benefit at the cost of due justice to others; (2) interdependence coexists with independent autonomous thinking, which is necessary for challenging group norms, authority, and (...) institutional mandates, and is a core aspect of morality; and (3) morality after age 5 years undergoes major, qualitative developments which shed light on what it means to view morality as an impartial obligation to uphold fairness, to recognize the breadth of moral concepts including equality, rights, and others’ welfare, and to challenge social inequality and injustice, throughout human ontogenetic development. (shrink)

This essay identifies the source, and traces both the subsequent use and the changing definition, of the expression instinctu naturae in the early history of natural law discourse. It also examines the later assimilation and endurance of the expression in English, as well as the efforts of Hobbes to proscribe the use, and Locke to limit the meaning, of the term instinct. Initially serving simply to predicate a divine stimulus as the source of human knowledge of the natural law-natura, id (...) est Deus-instinctu naturae was later understood to refer to an instinct of human nature, that is, an instinct of the reason that defined human nature, an intuitive instinct that recognized immediately, in a pre-deliberative, non-discursive way, the self-evident practical principles of the moral order, once their terms were understood. ☆ This essay complements and extends the scope of an earlier article on the same topic in the Journal of the History of Ideas, 58 (1997) 173–98: “Instinct of Nature: Natural Law, Synderesis and the Moral Sense”. (shrink)

The dispute in fact turns on two opposed conceptions of the self. The first is that shared by Leibniz, Hume, and contemporary empiricists according to which the self is nothing more than its determinate nature; the second conception is that shared by Hegel, Kierkegaard, and contemporary existentialists according, to which the self transcends its determinate nature. On the first conception, the self is an individual system of determinate conative, emotional, and cognitive dispositions, both innate and acquired. Its action (...) is the actualization of these dispositions in accordance with the laws that define them. On the second conception, on the other hand, the self is an individual, indeterminate, unconditioned power of self-determination. Its action is the actualization of that power. The self on this second conception is indeterminate prior to the action by which it makes itself determinate. For this reason, the determinate nature, with which the self is immediately identical on the first conception, is on the second a datum to which the self relates itself and which becomes its own possession only when it has made it its own. Hence, while the action of the self on the first conception is a predictable actualization of a determinate potentiality, its action on the second is an unpredictable original act of self-determination. (shrink)

An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections, with Illustrations on the Moral Sense (1728), jointly with Francis Hutcheson’s earlier work Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue (1725), presents one of the most original and wide-ranging moral philosophies of the eighteenth century. These two works, each comprising two semi-autonomous treatises, were widely translated and vastly influential throughout the eighteenth century in England, continental Europe, and America. -/- The two works had (...) their greatest impact in Scotland and influenced many well-known Scottish philosophers, particularly those writing after the last Jacobite upheaval, in 1745. This can be seen in the concern of the post-1745 generation with analyzing human nature as the foundation of moral theory, with the “moral sense” and moral epistemology more generally, with the impartial spectator and the calm passions, and with the independence of benevolence from self-interest. In addition to the influence of his writings, Hutcheson was also a famed teacher whose Glasgow students, notably Adam Smith, held sway over generations of Scottish moral philosophers. -/- Despite their impact on Scottish letters, the four treatises were in fact written in Dublin, and the philosophers to whom Hutcheson responded and with whom he debated were in the main not Scottish but English, Irish, French, Roman, and Greek. Consequently, part of Hutcheson’s legacy was a cosmopolitan outlook among enlightened Scots, who learned to turn their eyes far from home. (shrink)