The Good Life and the Ideal of Flexibility The author focuses on the issue of the "good life" in relation to a strong ideal of flexibility that operates in contemporary western culture. The era we live in may be called a "continuous stream of innovations" and can be characterized by a fundamental requirement "to adapt flexibly and cope with the new". The need for such flexibility is mentally and physically demanding; the demands also mark the approach (...) to values, the ideas of the good life and the project of the paths in life. Contemporary people in western civilization are exposed to the pressure of modern culture that has caused problems in the past decades as a result of the incompatibility of its fragmentary value systems. People today apply their abilities in a never-ending whirl of activities and effort where there is no more space available for becoming aware of and for perceiving the deeper meaning of and formulating their specific ideal of the good life. (shrink)

Recent years have witnessed a revival of scientific, political and philosophical discourse concerning the notion of ecological limits. This article provides a conceptual overview of descriptive ecological limit claims—i.e. claims that there are real, biophysical limits—and reviews work in political and social philosophy in which such claims form the basis of proposals for normative limits. The latter are classified in terms of three broad types of normative theorising: distributive justice, institutional/legal reform, and the good life. Within these three (...) categories, the article reviews normative proposals for limits on both aggregate‐level and individual‐level ecological exploitation. It also considers the relevance of political and ideological facts to the normative analysis of ecological limits, raising methodological questions about how normative theorists should respond to a world facing escalating ecological challenges. (shrink)

The Good Life, The Examined Life, and the Embodied Life The good life and the examined life have long been advocated as key philosophical goals, and they have often been closely linked together. My paper critically examines this linkage by considering arguments both for and against the value of self-examination for achieving the good life. Because somatic self-examination has been viewed as especially problematic for the philosophical project of achieving the (...) class='Hi'>good life, this form of self-examination will be given special attention in the paper, and its discussion will be situated within the larger issue of the extent to which the embodied life is central to the good life. (shrink)

Jordan's The Good Life is philosophy in the grand style and this means that the book is philosophical in method and outlook and contains no historical baggage. Whatever one may think of Jordan's views, only an extremely narrow thinker could fail to acknowledge that in this comprehensive treatment of moral issues there is to be found an instance of that constructive philosophy which, in these times, is so often lamented but so infrequently produced. The Good Life (...) stands as a profound, thorough, and original treatment of issues which in the past have been clouded over and obscured by philosophers who have been more interested in promoting the success of their own particular ism than in facing the concrete situation in all its complexity and honestly reporting as much as is given them to see and to understand. (shrink)

The Good Life and the Greater Good in a Global Context brings together scholars working in the fields of the humanities and social sciences who critically examine the notion of the "good life," understood in all of its dimensions--material, psychological, moral, emotional, and spiritual--and in relation to the greater good. In so doing, the authors provide interdisciplinary insights into what the good life means today and how a viable vision of it can (...) be achieved to benefit not just individuals but our interdependent world as well. (shrink)

The book offers a historical-systematic overview of the most important concepts of ethics, each of which is presented using three to four exemplary main representatives. Central quotations allow textual access to the respective position, which is explained compactly and clearly. With the title “The Good Life” the author points to the anthropological basis of all ethics. The book is interdisciplinary in nature, incorporating philosophical approaches as well as those from the fields of theology, biology, psychology, sociology, and politics. (...) For the 2nd edition, the book will be expanded to include the chapter “Education - Pedagogical Ethics” and a chapter on universal human rights. (shrink)

_The Good Life of Teaching_ extends the recent revival of virtue ethics to professional ethics and the philosophy of teaching. It connects long-standing philosophical questions about work and human growth to questions about teacher motivation, identity, and development. Makes a significant contribution to the philosophy of teaching and also offers new insights into virtue theory and professional ethics Offers fresh and detailed readings of major figures in ethics, including Alasdair MacIntyre, Charles Taylor, and Bernard Williams and the practical (...) philosophies of Hannah Arendt, John Dewey and Hans-Georg Gadamer Provides illustrations to assist the reader in visualizing major points, and integrates sources such as film, literature, and teaching memoirs to exemplify arguments in an engaging and accessible way Presents a compelling vision of teaching as a reflective practice showing how this requires us to prepare teachers differently. (shrink)

Chinese and Graeco-Roman ethics influence modern philosophy, yet it is unclear how to compare them. Clustered around the concepts of life and the good life, this volume offers a comparative analysis of the core concepts of both traditions: human nature, virtue, happiness, pleasure, the concept of mind, knowledge, filial piety and deliberation. It is thus an essential contribution to comparative ethics as regards both content and method.

Hartmut Rosa’s research has been extremely influential in promoting the view that modernity and late modernity are characterized by “speeding up,” or structural “dynamic stabilization.” More recently, Rosa has turned to describing the existential effects of living in late modernity, and the particular view of the good life it encourages. Late modernity began with the promise to make the world more available, attainable, and accessible. Unfortunately, however, the high-level instrumentalization that characterizes these changes led to feelings of alienation. (...) Rosa’s solution is to develop a philosophical method for fostering what he calls “resonance.” In this article, I will introduce the Daoist notions of the “mechanical heart-mind,” “self-so,” “nonaction,” “knowing satisfaction,” and “rambling” as potential complements to Rosa’s concept of resonance. I argue that they can serve to bolster Rosa’s view and provide a more active way to conceive of the good life through engagement with our social and natural environments. (shrink)

In pursuit of sustainable living, ethics researchers as well as consumers themselves have challenged the status quo of consumption as an institution. Fueled by global economic, environmental, and societal concerns, responsible consumption has become an integral part of the sustainability and consumption ethics literature. One movement toward sustainability consists of confining living space into a smaller ecological footprint. Although motivations for such a lifestyle have been examined, little research has investigated the process of how members of the tiny house movement (...) reconfigure learned consumption practices. This study investigates tiny house dwellers’ transformational experiences through the theoretical lens of contemporary institutional change. Qualitative analysis reveals that these challengers of the status quo face significant normative, regulatory, and cognitive hurdles. However, by engaging in sensemaking, validation, and change agency practices, tiny house dwellers have attempted to legitimize a new way of sustainable living that can be in conflict with existing institutions. Implications and future research are discussed in terms of how examining institutional change processes can be a vital part of ethics and sustainability research. Implications are also provided for how marketing organizations can consider modifying their market offerings to capitalize on this segment of society. (shrink)

There is no good human life outside of a state, and the good state enables us to live well together – so says Constitutivism, the theory developed in this book. Reinvigorating Aristotelian ideas, the author asks in what sense citizens of modern, populous and pluralistic societies share a common good. -/- While we can easily find examples of cooperation that benefit each member, such as insurances, the idea that persons could share a common good became (...) puzzling with modernity – a puzzlement epitomised in Margaret Thatcher’s ‘What is society? There is no such thing!’ Aristotle describes the state as the end of human development, both chronologically and normatively, but modern philosophers, from Thomas Hobbes to Carl Schmitt, conceive the relation between state and citizen as instrumental. Either the state is a means of advancing each member’s individual good or the individual is a means of advancing some collective good. From both perspectives, the Aristotelian idea that human individuals somehow realise their own good in realising some communal good appears metaphysically puzzling, even nonsensical. -/- This puzzlement, the author argues, results from our profoundly modern understanding of rational actions, which we generally see as means toward outcomes. If we allow that not only outcomes but also histories and identities can be good reasons for actions, then it makes sense to see a person’s good and the common good of their political community as constitutive of one another, as Aristotle thought. Building on this idea, the author argues that individual actions and lives exist only in conjunction with a political community. In designing our institutions, we hence also give ourselves an identity and, in that sense, constitute ourselves as persons. Her arguments shed new light on a range of traditional topics of political theory, such as the justification of state authority or the question of how to justify or challenge the design of social institutions. (shrink)

Nothing is more common in moral debates than to invoke the names of great thinkers from the past. Business ethics is no exception. Yet insofar as business ethicists have tended to simply mine abstract formulas from the past, they have missed out on the potential intellectual gains in meticulously exploring the philosophic tradition. This paper seeks to rectify this shortcoming by advocating a close reading of the so-called “great books,” beginning the process by focusing on Aristotle. The Nichomachean Ethics and (...) The Politics points to Aristotle’s emphasis on tying business morality to a universal conception of the good life. This conception defines personal happiness to chiefly consist in practicing the virtues, a life in which both desire and the pursuit of wealth is kept under check. According to Aristotle, virtue reaches its height with the exercise of the intellectual virtues of prudence and wisdom – the first manifest in the leadership of organizations, and the second in the philosophic search for truth. From an Aristotelian point of view, therefore, the greatest ethical imperative for business is to give individuals opportunities to thoughtfully participate in the management of company affairs and to contemplate the ultimate meaning of things. (shrink)

Current research in Intercultural Information Ethics is preoccupied, almost exclusively, by moral and political issues concerning the right and the just These issues are undeniably important, and with the continuing development and diffusion of ICTs, we can only be sure more moral and political problems of similar kinds are going to emerge in the future. Yet, as important as those problems are, I want to argue that researchers' preoccupation with the right and the just are undesirable. I shall argue that (...) IIE has thus far overlooked the issues pertaining to the good life . IIE, I claim, should also take into account these issues. Hence, I want to propose a new agenda for IIE, i.e. the good life, in the current paper. (shrink)

Rousseau's Emile has attracted an avalanche of critical responses. His theme of negative education, or as he defines it, “well-regulated freedom”, has been denounced as outright manipulation in disguise, which instead of respecting the child's autonomy and dignity, places him at the whim of the teacher's machinations and stratagems. His recommendation that the child's imagination be curtailed (that he may not acquire desires which cannot be satisfied) is widely held to militate against one of the most cherished goals of education: (...) the fostering of the natural curiosity of the child. Rousseau is also accused of professing an “ideology of childhood” which ignores the real needs of children. In the sterilized environment which Rousseau proposes for the growing child, affection, praise and approval, are some of the sacrifices made to this ideology. Furthermore, his views on women are considered degrading, outrageous and blatantly sexist. Yet despite the myriad criticisms leveled against his work, Rousseau's Emile highlights one of the most exacting challenges for education — how to educate the child without alienating him. Rousseau connects this issue with the larger problem of alienation: namely, that experienced by man within the modern social order. Rousseau's views anticipate the contemporary debate between virtue-based and deontological ethics. The purpose of this paper is (i) to describe Rousseau's diagnosis of the problem of alienation as it arises in the various spheres of human life, paying special attention to the moral domain, and (ii) to assess the solutions he offers to the problem of alienation. These solutions are based on a conception of the good life which, I argue, is unacceptable. I also argue that this conception dissipates one form of alienation only at the expense of creating another. The paper begins by tracing the changes which the concept of alienation has undergone, and consequently I draw a distinction between two kinds of alienation — conscious and unconscious. I demonstrate that even if Rousseau is successful in offering a remedy for conscious alienation, this very remedy itself gives rise to unconscious alienation. (shrink)

Starting from a debate which took place at the beginning of the twenty-first century between Jean Clair and Arthur C. Danto, we will focus on the link between art and disgust, because we wish to show what art is now ‘doing’ with disgust. Our hypothesis is that art is part of the general process of self-reshaping that is underway in today’s capitalist societies. Therefore, by commenting Aurel Kolnai’s phenomenological analysis of disgust, we will gain the tools to try to show (...) how disgust could be a crucial factor in the above process. Finally, we will recall the work of artists such as Pasolini, Nebreda, and McCarthy, in order to suggest how art could use disgust and have an actual political effect by orienting that process. All this is possible, because disgust has to do with the good life. (shrink)

What makes your life go well for you? In this paper, we give an account of welfare. Our core idea is simple. There are impersonally good and bad things out there: things that are good or bad period, not (or not only) good or bad for someone. The life that is good for you is the life in contact with the good. We’ll understand the relevant notion of ‘contact’ here in terms of (...) manifestation: you’re in contact with a value when it is manifest in parts of your life or parts of your life are manifest in it. So, the more the good is manifest in your life, or your life manifest in the good, the better for you. The more the bad is manifest in your life, or your life manifest in the bad, the worse for you. We’ll argue that this account is extensionally adequate: it explains the welfare value of achievements, friendships, knowledge, pleasures and virtues. Moreover, it has a number of explanatory virtues: it’s unified, elegant and explanatorily powerful. So, we’ll suggest, it’s an excellent account of welfare, and in many ways superior to its main competitors. (shrink)

The students and colleagues of Roderick Chisholm admired and respected Chisholm. Many were filled not only with admiration, but with affection and gratitude for Chisholm throughout the time we knew him. Even now that he is dead, we continue to wish him well. Under the circumstances, many of us probably think that that wish amounts to no more than this: we hope that things went well for him when he lived; we hope that he had a good life.

The unity of the Philebus: metaphysical assumptions of the good human life -- The placement of pleasure and knowledge in the fourfold articulation of reality -- Hybrid varieties of pleasure: true mixed pleasures and false pure pleasures -- The nature of pleasure: absolute standards of filling or replenishment and due measure -- Pleasures of learning and the role of due measure in experiencing them -- Plato's conception of pleasure confronting three Aristotelian critiques -- The Philebus' implicit response to (...) the aporiai of participation from the Parmenides. (shrink)

논문에서는 어떤 삶이 좋은 삶인가 하는 문제를 플라톤이 그의 우주론적인 논의와 연관해서 어떻게 밝히고 있는지를 분석해 볼 것이다.????필레보스????에 의하면, 우주 자연에서 온갖 좋은 것은 한정되지 않은 것들과 한정자들이 혼합될 때 창출된다(26b). 이 말은 ‘대립적인 것들’(한정되지 않은 것들)에 일정 비율들(한정자들)이 개입되어 ‘적도’와 ‘균형’이 이루어질 때 온갖 좋을 것이 창출된다는 것을 뜻한다. 이런 점에서 한정되지 않은 것과 한정자의 혼합은 대립적인 것들의 ‘적도나 균형을 이룬 혼합’이라고 표현할 수도 있으며, 이것이 바로 우주 자연에서 좋은 것들이 창출되는 방식이다. 다른 한편 플라톤은 인간의 좋은 삶을 위해서는 (...) 즐거움과 지식이 다 필요하다고 보고 이 둘이 혼합된 삶이 좋은 삶임을 밝힌다. 그러고는 이 혼합된 삶이 우주론적 논의에서 언급된 ‘한정자’와 ‘한정되지 않은 것’이 ‘혼합된 부류’의 일부로 간주한다(27d). 그런데 어떻게 혼합된 삶이 혼합된 부류의 일부라 할 수 있는지는 아주 불분명해 보인다. 이와 관련해서는 혼합 요소들 각각이 한정자와 한정되지 않은 것의 결합체이므로, 혼합 자체도 그런 결합체라는 견해가 있다. 그러나 이런 견해는 결합의 오류를 범한 것으로 보인다. 필자는 혼합요소들보다는 요소들의 관계를 주목해 보아야 한다고 생각하며, 특히 요소들간의 ‘불화가 없는 혼합’, ‘적도와 균형을 지닌 혼합’에 대한 분석이 필요하다고 보았다. 다음으로 우주에서 좋음이 실현되는 방식에 따라 적도와 균형을 이룬 ‘혼합된 삶’은 어떤 삶인지를 살펴보았다. 이 삶의 구성과정은 세 단계로 나눠볼 수 있다. (1) 오직 가장 참된 지식들과 가장 참된 즐거움들만의 혼합. 이것은 현실적이지 않고 이상적인 혼합이다. 이런 혼합을 추구한다면 현실을 모르는 우스운 일이 될 것이다. (2) 불가피한 지식들과 불가피한 즐거움들의 추가적 혼합. 이것은 인간의 현실적인 조건을 반영한 것이며, 따라서 현실적인 것이다. 다시 말해 그것은 인간의 좋은 삶보다는 그저 인간의 삶 자체를 가능하게 하는 것이다. (1)-(2) 단계의 혼합이 이루어지면 이상과 현실이 어우러진 혼합된 삶이 창출되는 것이다. 이 삶은 그저 삶이 아니라 좋은 삶이며, 그것도 신의 좋은 삶이 아니라 인간의 좋은 삶이다. 그리고 이 삶을 좋은 삶이 되게 한 원인은 이 삶 속에 있는 적도와 균형이다. (3) 가장 크고 가장 강렬한 즐거움을 지성을 비롯한 인지적 요소들과 섞은 혼합. 이것은 이상적인 것도 현실적인 것도 못된다. 이런 혼합은 적도와 균형을 갖지 못한 것으로서, 존속할 수 없고 그것의 요소들까지 파괴시키고 말기 때문이다. 따라서 그런 즐거움들은 삶에서 배제되어야 한다는 것이 플라톤의 생각이다. (shrink)

According to several authors, the enhancement project incorporates a quest for hyperagency - i.e. a state of affairs in which virtually every constitutive aspect of agency (beliefs, desires, moods, dispositions and so forth) is subject to our control and manipulation. This quest, it is claimed, undermines the conditions for a meaningful and worthwhile life. Thus, the enhancement project ought to be forestalled or rejected. How credible is this objection? In this article, I argue: “not very”. I do so by (...) evaluating four different versions of the “hyperagency” objection from four different authors. In each case I argue that the objection either fails outright or, at best, provides weak and defeasible grounds for avoiding enhancement. In addition to this, I argue that there are plausible grounds for thinking that enhancement helps, rather than hinders, us in living the good life. (shrink)

Fred Feldman's fascinating new book sets out to defend hedonism as a theory about the Good Life. He tries to show that, when carefully and charitably interpreted, certain forms of hedonism yield plausible evaluations of human lives. Feldman begins by explaining the question about the Good Life. As he understands it, the question is not about the morally good life or about the beneficial life. Rather, the question concerns the general features of the (...) life that is good in itself for the one who lives it. Hedonism says (roughly) that the Good Life is the pleasant life. After showing that received formulations of hedonism are often confused or incoherent, Feldman presents a simple, clear, coherent form of sensory hedonism that provides a starting point for discussion. He then presents a catalogue of classic objections to hedonism, coming from sources as diverse as Plato, Aristotle, Brentano, Ross, Moore, Rawls, Kagan, Nozick, Brandt, and others. One of Feldman's central themes is that there is an important distinction between the forms of hedonism that emphasize sensory pleasure and those that emphasize attitudinal pleasure. Feldman formulates several kinds of hedonism based on the idea that attitudinal pleasure is the Good. He claims that attitudinal forms of hedonism - which have often been ignored in the literature -- are worthy of more careful attention. Another main theme of the book is the plasticity of hedonism. Hedonism comes in many forms. Attitudinal hedonism is especially receptive to variations and modifications. Feldman illustrates this plasticity by formulating several variants of attitudinal hedonism and showing how they evade some of the objections. He also shows how it is possible to develop forms of hedonism that are equivalent to the allegedly anti-hedonistic theory of G. E. Moore and the Aristotelian theory according to which the Good Life is the life of virtue, or flourishing. He also formulates hedonisms relevantly like the ones defended by Aristippus and Mill. Feldman argues that a carefully developed form of attitudinal hedonism is not refuted by objections concerning 'the shape of a life'. He also defends the claim that all of the alleged forms of hedonism discussed in the book genuinely deserve to be called 'hedonism'. Finally, after dealing with the last of the objections, he gives a sketch of his hedonistic vision of the Good Life. (shrink)

A moral geography -- Democracy, the moral psychology, and the moral individual -- Premoral and moral culture -- Two forms of antimoralism -- Love and money: the contracting role of the family -- Moral reform and pseudo-moralism -- Cool -- Vengeance and the erosion of law -- The academy -- Science and morality.

This chapter discusses the life of Doug Forcett who's famous in the afterlife as the human who most closely guessed the afterlife's true nature in the episode Don't Let the Good Life Pass You By of the show The Good Place. In this episode, Michael and Janet visit Doug. They find him living a life of self‐denial and sacrifice. Michael and Janet had hoped that Doug's life would provide a template for how people should (...) live. One of the reasons that Michael and Janet's rejection of Doug's lifestyle is philosophically interesting is that there is a long tradition of regarding people who sacrifice for the sake of others as heroes. To be fair to utilitarianism and other theories demanding great sacrifice, Doug's self‐sacrifice goes further than merely treating everyone else's interests as being as valuable as his own. (shrink)

Amid the unrest, dislocation, and uncertainty of seventeenth-century Europe, readers seeking consolation and assurance turned to philosophical and scientific books that offered ways of conquering fears and training the mind—guidance for living a good life. _The Good Life in the Scientific Revolution_ presents a triptych showing how three key early modern scientists, René Descartes, Blaise Pascal, and Gottfried Leibniz, envisioned their new work as useful for cultivating virtue and for pursuing a good life. Their (...) scientific and philosophical innovations stemmed in part from their understanding of mathematics and science as cognitive and spiritual exercises that could create a truer mental and spiritual nobility. In portraying the rich contexts surrounding Descartes’ geometry, Pascal’s arithmetical triangle, and Leibniz’s calculus, Matthew L. Jones argues that this drive for moral therapeutics guided important developments of early modern philosophy and the Scientific Revolution. (shrink)

"Dialogue" is one of American religion's shopworn terms. Although we hear much talk about dialogue, very little of it actually takes place. Religious discourse - especially about politics and public affairs - is increasingly polarized, involving much contestation but little conversation. If truth are to be tested, however, there is no substitute for dialogue.

This article proposes an ethical framework to navigate life in the datafied world that combines the relational ethics approach of the philosopher Paul Ricoeur with the idiom of co-production from the field of Science and Technology Studies (STS). Mainstream data and computing ethics approaches, which tend to view ethics itself as a technology to produce particular outcomes, fail to adequately consider the context of the datafied world for ethics. The datafied world is a condition in which data and computing (...) technologies form the ineluctable infrastructure for daily life, structuring social order, forming power relations, and supporting visions of desirable futures. I argue that the datafied world is not just a background upon which ethics unfolds, rather it demands a novel framework for ethics that understands the contexts of data and computing technologies and their consequences for human action. The idiom of co-production suggests how action gets tied to visions of the good in the datafied world. In particular, it draws attention to the evolution of these actions in the identities, institutions, representations, and discourses of the social world, creating specific forms of life and meaning in datafied societies. (shrink)

Moderately updated version of this encyclopaedia entry.

Raymond Angelo Belliotti's Roman Philosophy and the Good Life provides an accessible picture of these major philosophical influences in Rome and details the crucial role they played during times of major social upheaval. Belliotti demonstrates the contemporary relevance of some of the philosophical issues faced by the Romans, and offers ways in which today's society can learn from the Romans in our attempt to create meaningful lives.

Emmanuel Levinas (1906-1995), French phenomenological philosopher and Talmudic commentator, is regarded as perhaps the greatest ethical philosopher of our time. While Levinas enjoys prominence in the philosophical and scholarly community, especially in Europe, there are few if any books or articles written that take Levinas's extremely difficult to understand, if not obtuse, philosophy and apply it to the everyday lives of real people struggling to give greater meaning and purpose, especially ethical meaning, to their personal lives. This book attempts to (...) fill in the large gap in the Levinas literature, mainly through using a Levinasian-inspired, ethically-infused psychoanalytic approach. All of the essays included in this book are animated by the Levinasian assumption that it is the ethical relation to the other person (and, in one case, dog!) that is primary. That is, there is a human tendency in us, an often inhibited, muted or repressed tendency, as psychoanalysts have taught us, to see the needs of others as more important (or at least as important) than our own and therefore be willing to sacrifice for others. Moreover, once this human tendency to be for the Other is consciously embraced and made part of one's way of being in the world the possibility for a greater degree of personal fulfillment and happiness is often enhanced. Thus, the art of living the "good life" involves embracing "goodness" as one's guiding metaphor, an existential orientation in which, says Levinas, "the Other counts more than myself." As social psychologists have repeatedly shown, in social life, paradoxically, it is often the case that "the more you give, the more you get." Being for the Other, in other words, is often self-affirming!. --- Product Description. (shrink)

Cover -- KIERKEGAARD'S GOD AND THE GOOD LIFE -- Title -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Contents -- Introduction -- List of Abbreviations -- Part I. Faith and Love -- 1 Love as the End of Human Existence -- 2 Love Is the Highest Good -- 3 Erotic Wisdom: On God, Passion, Faith, and Falling in Love -- 4 The Integration of Neighbor-Love and Special Loves in Kierkegaard and von Hildebrand -- 5 Kierkegaard, Weil, and Agapic Moral Fideism (...) -- Part II. Moral Psychology and Ethical Existence -- 6 Kierkegaard's Virtues? Humility and Gratitude as the Grounds of Contentment, Patience, and Hope in Kierkegaard's Moral Psychology -- 7 The Heart of Knowledge: Kierkegaard on Passion and Understanding -- 8 From Hegel to Google: Kierkegaard and the Perils of "the System"--9 An Ethics for Adults? Kierkegaard and the Ambiguity of Exaltation -- Part III. Existence Before God -- 10 Difficult Faith and Living Well -- 11 Kierkegaard and the Early Church on Christian Knowledge and Its Existential Implications -- 12 Thunderstruck: Divine Irony in Kierkegaard's Job -- 13 Kierkegaard and Pentecostal Philosophy -- Bibliography -- Index. (shrink)