The article elucidates and assesses the Marburg School’s account of the cognition. The characteristic feature of epistemology from this School is the rejection of the mirroring and acceptance of the cognitive transformation. The criticism of the mirroring theory is implicitly contained in Paul Natorp’s and Hermann Cohen’s cognitive relationism. Ernst Cassirer articulated this critical epistemology in his philosophy of the symbolic form and his conception of the symbolic representation. The historical bases of this criticism has been reconstructed as a main (...) purpose of this article. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is an analysis of the theory of knowledge as a reflection (Abbildtheorie), which was presented by Martin Heidegger in the earliest phase his philosophy, when he was under great influence of Neo-Kantian thought. The papers compare Heideggers position with the arguments of the neo-Kantians such as Heinrich Rickert and Ernst Cassirer. These early beliefs are referenced to the subsequent position, when was shown by Heidegger in the work Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik in 1929, (...) where he undertakes the polemics with the Neo-Kantianism. (shrink)

El objetivo de este trabajo es ofrecer una explicación sistemática de por qué la teoría política animal desarrollada en el marco del rawlsianismo metodológico tiene dificultades para ajustarse a los estándares de la justificación pública. Argumento, más específicamente, que el problema radica en que nuestra cultura política dificulta que los ciudadanos puedan adoptar una perspectiva coherente para reflexionar sobre los términos a través de los cuales deben conducirse las relaciones entre especies. Para salir de esta situación, sostengo, hay que introducir (...) un giro metodológico, dándole mayor peso a la teoría social, lo que supone un paso del liberalismo a la teoría crítica. (shrink)

In this work I have tried to justify the principle theses of Meinong's Theory of Objects and to criticize some ontological theses that do not seem to derive from the Theory of Objects. This work has been divided into three parts according to the fundamental classification of objects given by Meinong: object of representation, object of thought, and objects of emotion. ;In the first part I have analysed the doctrine of intentionality in relation with intentional act and content, and their (...) sorts of presentation in discussion with Brentano. ;In following I have given an interpretation of "pure object" and its status of "Assersein" by which pure object is beyond being and non-being. This is developed in close connection to the doctrine of impossible objects and the Theory of Objects as the most universal science inasmuch as it harbors both real and unreal worlds . I have built an extensive critique of Russell's theory of Descriptions and Denoting, and other opposing views. The rest of this part is devoted to both incomplete objects and objects of higher order . The theory of incomplete object is connected to our way of knowing things, and it expresses the incompleteness of our intentional attitudes. The theory of objects of higher order tries to explain the problem of space-time continuum. ;The second part began with the demonstration of "existence" and nature of Objectives . The Objective is grasped by either a judgment or an assumption, whether its true/false value is included in it or not. I have developed an extensive analysis of modalities--factuality, necessity and possibility--, and quasi-modalities--probability and truth--in order to give a complete Theory of Knowledge integrated in an Ontology. ;The last part was an analysis the objects of emotional lived experiences: the "dignitative" and the "desiderative." The dignitative harbors ethical and esthetical values, while the desiderative contains moral and esthetical laws, and in general, the "duties." The main analysis of this part treats the question of justification of the ethical objects and their grounding in intellectual objects. (shrink)

1. Teoria del diritto -- 2. Teoria della democrazia -- 3. La sintassi del diritto.

Partiendo del estudio de Mariano Álvarez-Gómez, Experiencia y sistema. Introducción al pensamiento de Hegel, este artículo estudia el concepto de experiencia en la Introdución a la Fenomenología del espíritu, de Hegel. Se exponen siete contrasentidos que Hegel atribuye a la gnoseología tradicional, que conducen a su sustitución por otro paradigma de conocimiento, denominado el de las “figuras de la conciencia”. Se estudia entonces el conocimiento desde la perspectiva fenomenológica en que la conciencia realiza la experiencia de su objeto y de (...) sí misma a través de la transformación del propio patrón de medida que define, en cada momento, la verdad. Según esta redefinición dialéctica del concepto de experiencia, es reafirmada como conclusión que la dialéctica es la experiencia elevada al nivel del concepto, así como la tesis de Álvarez-Gómez de que la experiencia está en la base de todo el conocimiento según Hegel. (shrink)

L’aspirazione a conoscere è radicata nella natura umana. Capire che cos’è la conoscenza significa acquisire consapevolezza della propria identità.

Sartre publica o Esboço de uma teoria das emoções em 1940. A obra é parte de um objetivo mais amplo de revisão de toda a psicologia. O texto se insere no projeto mais amplo de apropriação da fenomenologia de Husserl já apontado em obras anteriores. Nesse artigo acompanharemos esse texto de Sartre e sua maneira de compreender as emoções fenomenologicamente.

La verdad en cuanto ligada al lenguaje ha de ser concebida simultáneamente como coherencia y como correspondencia. Pero la palabra es siempre, a la vez, impotencia y fuerza creadora. Ahí es donde se sitúa realmente el tema de la verdad. La razón nos sitúa ante la responsabilidad de un proyecto y unos fines. La ciencia nos acerca a la verdad de lo que es la realidad en cuanto "acción racional de la razón practica". Se trata de un proceso de "empastamiento" (...) o progresiva coherencia, que no llega nunca a "tocar" la realidad. Hay una relación dialéctica entre nuestro juicio y la realidad. nuestra imputación de realidad se nos convierte en un "juicio de verdad" hermenéuticamente desvelada. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is a popularization of a book by Dan Sperber and Deirde Wilson, which is not as well-known among logicians and philosophers as it should be. It is, apart from the famous book by Lakoff and Johnson, probably the most important work on cognitive linguistics in the last two decades. All more extensive works on pragmatics and the philosophy of language written later contain references to this book. „The relevance theory” is now a term of art, (...) explicitly and forever associated with the names of the authors. It would be very easy to criticise this work, since from the logical point of view it contains many inaccuracies and dubious ideas, some of which are simply logically fallacious. However, it is a very deep and inspiring work at the same time - also for a logician. In my paper there are no supplements nor critical remarks. It is exclusively a faithful summary of the original ideas of Sperber and Wilson. (shrink)

El presente artículo realiza un estudio de la recepción en España de la Teoría crítica de la Escuela de Fráncfort, desde la década de los 60 del siglo XX hasta la actualidad. La originalidad de este trabajo es su pretensión de analizar este proceso de recepción académica y cultural sobre el trasfondo de los grandes cambios políticos que afectaron al país en este periodo. Las modificaciones del contexto político han sido adoptadas aquí como una clave interpretativa adicional y complementaria a (...) las interpretaciones intra-teóricas para iluminar en su complejidad y en sus sorprendentes vaivenes la recepción de esa corriente de pensamiento en nuestro país. El resultado es una consideración historizadora de las fases de esta recepción que posibilita y pretende impulsar una reflexión crítica de los investigadores de este ámbito sobre su pasado y su presente. (shrink)

One of the modern approaches to the laws of nature regards them as relations between universals. The most advanced version of such an approach has been presented by D. M. Armstrong. The aim of this paper is to reconstruct and interpret Armstrong’s conception but also to evaluate his theory and to point out what expectations from it are inadequate. My point of reference are two objections to Armstrong’s ideas, namely the problems of identification and inference. I claim that Armstrong’s theory (...) in general and his response to both problems in particular are based on some fundamental metaphysical principles, namely: the principle of identity for universals, the principle of non-contradiction, the relational principle of the indiscernibility of identicals and the principle of contingent necessity. The central part of my interpretation shows how from the laws of nature, properly understood, the occurrence of some states of affairs necessarily results provided that these principles are employed. (shrink)