This topical collection is dedicated to the formal representation of arguments involving temporal reasoning and tensed truths; in particular, arguments with a clear significance to everyday life. In a broad perspective, temporal reasoning can be rigorously encoded via intensional logic, treating tenses as modalities, or via extensional logic, quantifying over domains of temporal objects (e.g., instants, intervals, etc.). Nowadays there are several formal devices (languages, systems, semantics, etc.) able to deal with time in many regards. (...) Each of these devices is characterized by peculiar features, such as a certain choice of primitive notions and, arguably, a certain kind of ontological commitment (see, e.g., the surveys of approaches offered by Prior 1967, van Benthem 1983, Gabbay, Hodkinson & Reynolds 1994 and Øhrstrøm & Hasle 1995). The truth-conditions of (the propositions expressed by) statements involving tenses can be explained either in terms of the “past-present-future” opposition (McTaggart’s A-theory) or in terms of the “earlier-later” opposition (McTaggart’s B-theory). Moreover, taking into account the difference between chronologically definite propositions and chronologically indefinite propositions (Rescher 1966), it is possible to distinguish between atemporal and temporal (or tensed) notions of truth. This topical collection will primarily focus on the latter. (shrink)

Validity of dynamic temporal reasoning is semantically characterized for English and Dutch aspectual adverbs in Discourse Representation Theory. This dynamic perspective determines how the content needs to be revised and what information is preserved across updates, when the order of premises is considered relevant. Resetting contextual parameters relies on modelling the basic aspectual polarity transitions and temporal reasoning extensionally. For intensional aspectual adverbials the speaker’s attitudes regarding past alternatives to and possible continuations of the current state (...) come into play. Additional considerations are offered for generalizing this system to the full logical space for linguistic universals, lexicalized quite differently in Dutch and English. (shrink)

We focus on three main sets of topics emerging from the commentaries on our target article. First, we discuss several types of animal behavior that commentators cite as evidence against our claim that animals are restricted to temporal updating and cannot engage in temporal reasoning. In doing so, we illustrate further how explanations of behavior in terms of temporal updating work. Second, we respond to commentators’ queries about the developmental process through which children acquire a capacity (...) for temporal reasoning and about the relation between our account and accounts drawing similar distinctions in other domains of cognition. Finally, we address some broader theoretical issues arising from the commentaries, concerning in particular the question as to how our account relates to the phenomenology of experience in time, and the question as to whether our dichotomy between temporal reasoning and temporal updating is exhaustive, or whether there might be other forms of cognition or representation related to time not captured by it. (shrink)

This paper reports three studies of temporal reasoning. A problem of the following sort, where the letters denote common everyday events: A happens before B. C happens before B. D happens while B. E happens while C. What is the relation between D and EEfficacylls for at least two alternative models to be constructed in order to give the right answer for the right reason. However, the first premise is irrelevant to this answer, and so if reasoners were (...) to ignore it, then they would need to construct only one model. Experiment 1 showed that one-model problems were answered faster and more accurately than multiple-model problems. When the question preceded the premises in the statement of the multiple-model problems there was a slight tendency for the latencies of response to speed up in the predicted way. Experiment 2 modified the procedure, in part by using practice problems with many irrelevant premises, so that reasoners might grasp the advantage of ignoring them. Its results showed that when the premises preceded the question, the multiple-model problems were significantly harder than one-model problems. But when the question was presented first, the difference was significantly reduced in line with the theory's prediction. Experiment 3 used only problems with valid conclusions, and so the construction of multiple models was never necessary. However, there was still a significant difference between one-model problems and multiple-model problems. (shrink)

We report two experiments on temporal reasoning with problems, such as: John has cleaned the house. John is taking a shower. John is going to read the paper. Mary always does the dishes when John cleans the house. Mary always drinks her coffee when John reads the paper. What for Mary is the relation between doing the dishes and drinking coffee? The experiments showed that problems such as this one, which require one mental model, elicited correct answers more (...) often than did those requiring multiple models (e.g. with the second premise modified to "John has taken a shower", so that the order between the events in the first two premises is not fixed). These multiple-model problems, in turn, elicited more correct answers than did multiple-model problems with no valid answers (e.g. with the second premise modified to "John has taken a shower", and the fifth premise modified to "Mary always drinks her coffee when John takes a shower"). One-model problems were also solved more quickly than multiple-model problems, which were solved more quickly than problems with no valid answers. These results corroborated the predictions of the mental model theory of reasoning. (shrink)

Evidence from our research on young children's temporal understanding supports Hoerl & McCormack's view that young children rely on a temporal updating system to change representations over time. We propose that the shift from temporal updating to temporal reasoning is enabled by children's expanding representations of event sequences, along with developments in language, memory, and other cognitive competencies.

Modelling human reasoning characterizes the fundamental human cognitive capacity to describe our past experience and use it to form expectations as well as plan and direct our future actions. Natural language semantics analyzes dynamic forms of reasoning in which the real-time order determines the temporal relations between the described events, when reported with telic simple past-tense clauses. It provides models of human reasoning that could supplement ACT-R models.

We introduce a new way of defining metric temporal logic on a real-numbers flow of time. The idea is based on having semantics which allow us to refer to a single universal clock of arbitrary precision in order to impose metric constraints. This gives us a new metric temporal logic which is very expressive, is natural to use, can be applied in very general situations, affords a wide range of useful abbreviations and operators, has a PSPACE decision procedure, (...) and has the promise of being amenable to standard reasoning techniques. Thus it has many advantages over the existing metric temporal logics. We provide a decision procedure via conversion to a non-metric temporal logic, hence doing metric reasoning with no clocks. (shrink)

Qualitative reasoning about space and time - a reasoning at the human level - promises to become a fundamental aspect of future systems that will accompany us in daily activity. The aim of Spatial and Temporal Reasoning is to give a picture of current research in this area focusing on both representational and computational issues. The picture emphasizes some major lines of development in this multifaceted, constantly growing area. The material in the book also shows some (...) common ground and a novel combination of spatial and temporal aspects of qualitative reasoning. Part I presents the overall scene. The chapter by Laure Vieu is on the state of the art in spatial representation and reasoning, and that by Alfonso Gerevini gives a similar survey on research in temporal reasoning. The specific contributions to these areas are then grouped in the two main parts. In Part II, Roberto Casati and Achille Varzi examine the ontological status of spatial entities; Anthony Cohn, Brandon Bennett, John Gooday, and Nicholas Gotts present a detailed theory of reasoning with qualitative relations about regions; Andrew Frank discusses the spatial needs of geographical information systems; and Annette Herskovits focuses on the linguistic expression of spatial relations. In Part III, James Allen and George Ferguson describe an interval temporal logic for the representation of actions and events; Drew McDermott presents an efficient way of predicting the outcome of plan execution; and Erik Sandewall introduces a semantics based on transitions for assessing theories of action and change. In Part IV, Antony Galton's chapter stands clearly between the two areas of space and time and outlines the main coordinates of an integrated approach. (shrink)

Here I consider the possible role of the temporal updating system in the development of the temporal reasoning system. Using evidence from children's acquisition of time words, I argue that abstract temporal concepts are not built from primitive representations of time. Instead, I propose that language and cultural learning provide the primary sources of the temporal reasoning system.

After a review of situation theory and previous attempts at 'computational' situation theory, we present a new programming environment, BABY-SIT, which is based on situation theory. We then demonstrate how problems requiring formal temporal reasoning can be solved in this framework. Specifically, the Yale Shooting Problem, which is commonly regarded as a canonical problem for nonmonotonic temporal reasoning, is implemented in BABY-SIT using Yoav Shoham's causal theories.

Hoerl & McCormack discuss the benefits of temporal reasoning mainly with respect to future planning and decision making. I point out that, for humans, the ability to represent particular past times has distinct benefits, which are independent from contributing to future-directed cognition. Hence, the evolution of the temporal reasoning system was not necessarily driven primarily by its benefits for future-directed cognition.

ABSTRACTThe Moving Time metaphor and the Moving Ego metaphor are common in English speakers’ conceptualization of time. Previous research has suggested a broad range of factors influencing people’s...

A central claim by Hoerl & McCormack is that the temporal reasoning system is uniquely human. But why exactly? This commentary evaluates two possible options to justify the thesis that temporal reasoning is uniquely human, one based on considerations regarding agency and the other based on language. The commentary raises problems for both of these options.

In this paper, we continued the preparatory works of Jingde Cheng in conjunction with spatio-temporal relevant logics, and proposed several epistemic spatio-temporal relevant logics as basic logics for Mobile Multi-Agent Systems (MMAS). To establish an inference system, important elements are: semantics and syntax appropriate to it include a language, axioms and inference rules. By proving the meta-logical properties such as soundness and consistency, completeness and decidability and etc., we have a method to test the reliability of the systems. (...) Finally, we will have models and algorithms for the application of these logics in the MMAS. (shrink)

In this paper we present a theory for reasoning about actions which is based on Dynamic Linear Time Temporal Logic . DLTL is a simple extension of propositional temporal logic of linear time in which regular programs of propositional dynamic logic can be used for indexing temporal modalities. The action theory we define allows to reason with incomplete initial states, to do postdiction and to deal with ramifications and with nondeterministic actions, which are captured by possibly (...) alternative extensions . The expressiveness of temporal logic is exploited to enhance the action language by allowing the definition of general temporal constraints as well as complex actions in the specification of the domain description. We show that the temporal projection problem and the planning problem can be modelled as satisfiability problems in DLTL. (shrink)

Shastri & Ajjanagadde argue convincingly that both structured connectionist networks and parallel dynamic inferencing are necessary for reflexive reasoning - a kind of inferencing and reasoning that occurs rapidly, spontaneously, and without conscious effort, and which seems necessary for everyday tasks such as natural language understanding. As S&A describe, reflexive reasoning requires a solution to thedynamic binding problem, that is, how to encode systematic and abstract knowledge and instantiate it in specific situations to draw appropriate inferences. Although (...) symbolic artificial intelligence systems trivially solve the dynamic binding problem using computers' registers and pointers, it has remained a difficult problem for connectionist systems. S&A's temporal synchrony solution to the dynamic binding problem using synchronous firing of argument units and the entities that are bound to them illustrates one way in which connectionist networks can do thisusing a constrained but important class of long-term knowledge rules. Their structured connectionist solution allows dynamic inferencing to proceed in parallel and therefore has a number of advantages for reflexive reasoning over most other connectionist and symbolic systems. (shrink)

The interactions among the components of a biological system can be given a logical representation that is useful for reasoning about them. One of the relevant problems that may be raised in this context is finding what would explain a given behaviour of some component; in other terms, generating hypotheses that, when added to the logical theory modelling the system, imply that behaviour. Temporal aspects have to be taken into account, in order to model the causality relationship that (...) may link the behaviour of a given component to that of another one. This paper presents a hypothesis generation method for linear temporal logic theories whose formulae have a restricted syntactic form, which is however sufficient to model cellular and molecular interactions, as they are often represented by biologists. The method exploits the duality between hypothesis generation and consequence finding, and can therefore be also used to infer the consequences of a given fact. It is based on a resolution system proposed by Cavalli and Fariñas del Cerro in 1984. (shrink)

On 17 May 2016 Lucy Welsh interviewed Annelise Riles about her work on the relationship between law and time as part of Welsh’s involvement with the AHRC Regulating Time network. Annelise Riles is the Jack G. Clarke Professor of Law in Far East Legal Studies and Professor of Anthropology at Cornell, and is Director of the Clarke Program in East Asian Law and Culture. Her work examines the transnational dimensions of laws, markets and culture across the fields of comparative law, (...) conflict of laws, the anthropology of law, public international law and international financial regulation. Most recently Professor Riles has been examining the nature and meaning of the settlement made on the so-called Comfort Women, and what impact that has for locating events in the past. The Comfort Women were Korean women who were essentially captured and forced to work as sexual slaves for the Japanese army during World War Two. In 2015, Japanese and South Korean ministers agreed a settlement in what they regarded as an irreversible and final settlement of the issue. Welsh and Riles exchange over their mutual interests in time and routinisation in this interview as they discuss what the story of the Comfort Women has to tell us. (shrink)

I present a variant of with time, called, interpreted in standard Kripke semantics. On the syntactic level, is nothing but the extension of atemporal individual by: the future tense and past tense operators, and the operator of group agency for the grand coalition. A sound and complete axiomatisation for is given. Moreover, it is shown that supports reasoning about interesting normative concepts such as the concepts of achievement obligation and commitment.

This chapter argues that Williams’ criticisms of Kant’s account of morality should be viewed in light of their disagreement about the function of reason. This interpretation unearths a fundamental challenge, due to the tension between the temporal features of human agency and the allegedly categorical authority of some normative claims. This is a predicament central to any theory of practical reason. For Kant its root lies in human embodiment, finitude and fragility, and the remedy is the normative standard of (...) reason, which plays a constitutive role in unifying the agent across time. By contrast, for Williams, mortality is the condition of possibility for valuing life, and agential unity is both unfeasible and undesirable, in the face of multiple sources of practical necessity whose significance is assessed from the present stance. The contrastive analysis of these views aims to identify their respective merits. (shrink)

Hoerl & McCormack argue that comparative and developmental psychology teaches us that “neither animals nor infants can think and reason about time.” We argue that the authors neglect to take into account pivotal evidence from ethology that suggests that non-human animals do possess a capacity to represent and reason about time, namely, work done on Sumatran orangutans’ long travel calls.

We identify two pragmatic problems in temporal reasoning, the qualification problem and the extended prediction problem, the latter subsuming the infamous frame problem. Solutions to those seem to call for nonmonotonic inferences, and yet naive use of standard nonmonotonic logics turns out to be inappropriate. Looking for an alternative, we first propose a uniform approach to constructing and understanding nonmonotonic logics. This framework subsumes many existing nonmonotonic formalisms, and yet is remarkably simple, adding almost no extra baggage to (...) traditional logic. We then use this framework to propose a solution to the qualification problem. We also outline a solution to the extended prediction problem, and speculate on a possible connection between the above discussion and the concept of causation. (shrink)