Under Chinese law, the juridical status of the embryo and the foetus is unclear, mainly because the existing legislation can be subject to diverse interpretations due to its ambiguous language. Lack of clarity with the law has led to different understandings amongst Chinese legal scholars. However, although there has been no consensus, there has been a clear tendency to deprive embryos and foetuses of legal status or personhood, thereby excluding them from entitlement to fundamental rights, an understanding (...) reinforced by the Confucian view of the beginning of life. It is expected that in the near future the Chinese courts will face issues involving embryos and foetuses more often, such as disputes over in vitro embryos. The lack of legal precedent could result in contradictory resolutions, therefore, the law should clarify the legal status of embryos and foetuses and accord to prenatal life special respect and treatment. (shrink)

It is an undeniable empirical fact that a human fetus is a member of the species homo sapiens from the moment of conception. There is thus an important sense in which it is a human being in itself, and not simply part of a pregnant woman’s body, despite what defenders of abortion on demand might want us to think. It is also reasonable to suppose that all human beings, and thus human fetuses, are persons, with all that entails, but this (...) is a metaphysical presupposition as opposed to an empirical fact, and is thus contentious. It is argued, however, that this should be of little comfort to the defenders of abortion, because the mere fact that human fetuses have an inherent tendency to become persons is sufficient reason to confer a moral status upon them, which renders abortion morally problematic at best. (shrink)

Many people believe the morality of abortion stands or falls with the moral status of the fetus. Judith Jarvis Thomson’s violinist argument bypasses the question of fetal moral status; even if the fetus has a right to life, she argues the gestational mother has a right to disconnect herself from the fetus. However, should ectogenesis – a technology that would allow the fetus to develop outside the womb – become sufficiently advanced, the fetus would no longer need a (...) gestational mother to live. Recently, Joona Räsänen has argued that parents have a right to secure the death of a fetus that has been removed from the mother’s body, and that this right might extend to infanticide. However, here I argue Räsänen’s position ignores the moral status of the fetus; if the fetus is morally comparable to beings like us, then of course parents lack a right to the death of their children. However, if the fetus is morally comparable to a tumor, then the right to kill it is philosophically uninteresting. (shrink)

Judith Jarvis Thomson famously argued that abortion is permissible even if we accept that a fetus qualifies as a person and possesses a right to life. The current paper presents two arguments that undermine Thomson’s position. First, the paper sketches a contractarian argument that explores Thomson’s violinist thought experiment from behind a veil of ignorance, which suggests that if we had an equal likelihood of being an unwanted fetus and a pregnant woman, it would be rational for us to oppose (...) abortion. Second, the paper discusses the hypothetical self-aborting fetus, a thought experiment that reverses the dependence relationship between a woman and a fetus. It is argued that in this scenario, where fetuses have agency of their own, Thomson’s position would counterintuitively prohibit a woman from temporarily curtailing the freedom of her fetus even to save her own life. (shrink)

Bioethics, Volume 35, Issue 7, Page 672-679, September 2021.

The study aims to analyse the clinical proceedings in pregnant women diagnosed with brain death. Apart from the diagnostic premises and the patient’s rights, the ontological status of the foetus proves to be a severe problem. In reference to the principles of zeroth-order logic, the assumption of potential used by personalists is not a tautology.

This essay makes a case for the metaphysical status of the human fetus. I argue that personhood begins at conception as opposed to at some point in the post-conception continuum. However, there is a deep division over this matter. Defenders of the pro-life position grant that life begins at conception. In contrast, defenders of the pro-choice position deny that life begins at conception. Even if it were the case that life begins at conception, proponents of abortion claim that a (...) woman’s bodily autonomy should come first over protecting the fetus’s life. Contemporary discussions regarding this matter continue to lack a clear and adequate account of why we continue to face a stalemate in terms of settling the issue of the metaphysical status of the human fetus. In section I, I discuss what I call the less central issues that stand in the way when it comes to addressing the main question of the personhood of the human fetus. In section II, I discuss the personhood problem as it relates to the fetus. In section III, I sketch out a conception- grounded theory of fetal personhood. In section IV, I consider some objections. In section V, I discuss the origin problem as it relates to the fetus within the broader context of the challenge, we face in answering the question of the nature of life. Finally, in section VI, I conclude this paper by claiming that conception plays a decisive metaphysical role in the personhood status of the fetus. (shrink)

Book reviewed in this article: Abortion and Woman's Choice: The State, Sexuality, and Reproductive Freedom. By Rosalind P. Petchesky. Abortion and the Politics of Motherhood. By Kristin Luker.

The metaphysical status of the placenta has bearing on several ongoing discussions within Catholic moral theology. Numerous bioethicists and theologians have touched on this topic briefly, but to date no robust metaphysical argument appears in the literature. The authors aim to provide such an analysis. First, they provide an overview of the existing literature on the topic. Second, they briefly review the anatomy and physiology of the placenta. Third, they provide metaphysical and biological reasons why the placenta cannot be (...) a part of the fetus, a part of the mother, simultaneously a part of both, the border at which mother and fetus meet, or a separate individual substance. Finally, they provide reasons that support their claim that the placenta is a quasi-substance that exists in symbiosis with mother and child. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 14.2 : 295–333. (shrink)

Shiʿi jurists have three different theories with regard to gestational surrogacy and who should be recognized as the mother of the newborn: (1) the surrogate mother (2) or the ovum provider (biological mother) (3) or both of them. The religious law (al-Aḥkam al-sharʿi) regarding the title of ‘mother’ and issues such as inheritance, will (Waṣiya), marriage, and custody have been discussed by Shiʿi jurists but no exact definition of this term has been provided by them. Because the fertilized ovum is (...) considered the origin of humans and the formation of an embryo also determines the kinship of the newborn, the mother of the child is the woman that fetus created by her ovum. It is this woman who has all the rights and responsibilities of a mother; even if the surrogate mother is considered the mother of the child, she has no rights over the child nor does she have any duties towards him/her. (shrink)

In this paper we clarify some issues related to our previous article ‘After-birth abortion: why should the baby live?’.

Medical imaging is predominantly a visual field. In this context, prenatal ultrasound images assume intense social, ethical, and psychological significance by virtue of the subject they represent: the fetus. This feature, along with the sophistication introduced by three-dimensional ultrasound imaging that allows improved visualization of the fetus, has contributed to the common impression that prenatal ultrasound scans are like photographs of the fetus. In this article we discuss the consistency of such a comparison. First, we investigate the epistemic role of (...) both analogic and digital photographic images as visual information-providing representations holding a high degree of objectivity. Second, we examine the structure and process of production of ultrasound scans and argue that a comparison between two-dimensional ultrasound and photography is justified. This is in contrast to 3D ultrasound images that, due to the intensive mathematical processing involved in their production, present some structural issues that obfuscate their ontological and epistemic status. (shrink)

Many accounts of the morality of abortion assume that early fetuses must all have or lack moral status in virtue of developmental features that they share. Our actual attitudes toward early fetuses don’t reflect this all-or-nothing assumption: early fetuses can elicit feelings of joy, love, indifference, or distress. If we start with the assumption that our attitudes toward fetuses reflect a real difference in their moral status, then we need an account of fetal moral status that can (...) explain that difference. I argue that we can have or lack relational obligations to early fetuses in light of our own activities or choices, independent of the fetus’s own features or properties. Those relational obligations make the early fetus morally considerable to the persons who stand in a moral relation to it. Pregnant persons (and other participants in the procreative process) can come to have relational obligations to an early fetus just in virtue of their own decision to create a person, either by intentionally getting pregnant or by deciding to continue a pregnancy. That decision not only makes it appropriate for them to care about the fetus, but it also generates obligations to the fetus that they didn’t have before that decision. (shrink)

During the 70s and 80s ethical debate concerning the fetus became intensive. The great advances made in medical technology and research and improvements in prenatal diagnosis as well as in embryological research have led us to believe that the fetus is an individual with recognised claims to protection. In Sweden the aborted fetus has previously been considered merely as a risk-disposal problem, equivalent to dangerous and infected material and there have been no specific guidelines for the treatment of the fetus (...) after abortion. In July 1990 treatment of aborted fetuses was changed with the general guidelines from the National Board of Health and Welfare. The present paper sets out the main contents of the guidelines and discusses the gradually changing views concerning the status of the human fetus in Sweden, as well as the public debate which has been a contributing factor to these changes. (shrink)

Ectogenesis, or the use of an artificial womb to allow a foetus to develop, will likely become a reality within a few decades, and could significantly affect the abortion debate. We first examine the implications for Judith Jarvis Thomson’s violinist analogy, which argues for a woman’s right to withdraw life support from the foetus and so terminate her pregnancy, even if the foetus is granted full moral status. We show that on Thomson’s reasoning, there is no (...) right to the death of the foetus, and abortion is not permissible if ectogenesis is available, provided it is safe and inexpensive. This raises the question of whether there are persuasive reasons for the right to the death of the foetus that could be exercised in the context of ectogenesis. Eric Mathison and Jeremy Davis have examined several arguments for this right, doubting that it exists, while Joona Räsänen has recently criticized their reasoning. We respond to Räsänen’s analysis, concluding that his arguments are unsuccessful, and that there is no right to the death of the foetus in these circumstances. (shrink)

Human embryonic moral status in the embryo debate in the Indian religious school of thoughts is a challenging issue. The paper tries to figure out whether ontological status implies moral status of embryo. Consciousness is an important determinant of animation of human embryo. In this paper an attempt had been made to understand the concept of man and soul in the Hindu philosophical thought. In the process we would also make a critical review of embryology in the (...) Hindu philosophical thought. The study would adopt a conceptual elucidation of morality. The paper made an elaborative study of Puruṣa as found in the Saṃkhya Philosophy and the study of consciousness and animation would try to resolve the related question, when does life begin to have that value? Embryo-protectionist regards embryos as a potential person. The Gita says the human person is individual self-called āttmā, whose nature is of pure consciousness, Brahman/Puruṣa. Consciousness constitutes the essentiality of individual Self. Human embryo developments are elaborately studied in the Yajñavalkya Smṛti, Garbha Upaniṣad, and Suśruta Saṃhitā. The self that remain latent in the embryo gets impetus with the association of consciousness until then it cannot be a human personality. In Hinduism sanctity of life gets combined with autonomy and self-determination. The sanctity of life applies both to the fetus as well as to the overall welfare of the society. The embryo being in an interim stage and the soul not being destroyed upon body annihilation, it may be claimed that since destruction or annihilation of the physical form does not destroy the soul, beneficial embryo research should thus not be abhorrent. The Hindu ethics as examined here precludes the consideration of the situation at hand, and causing the least harm and work according to one’s dharma. (shrink)

Appeals to the moral authority of nature play an important role in ethical discussions about the acceptability of prenatal testing. While opponents consider testing a dangerous violation of the moral inviolable course of nature, defenders see testing as a new step in improving dominion over nature. In this study we explored the meaning of appeals to nature among pregnant women to whom a prenatal screening test was offered and the impact of these appeals on their choices regarding the acceptance of (...) screening. Contrary to theoretical debates we found that appeals to the moral authority of nature do not prevent women from welcoming the possibilities of controlling the outcomes of pregnancy, neither do they provide prima facie justification for (not) intervening in the natural course of events. Both acceptors and decliners believed in an inherent morality in nature that must be respected. They welcome the possibility of knowing more about the health of the fetus and to make their own reproductive decisions. Concerns for the quality of their child's life and for their capacity to assure a good life for their family and disabled child appear to play a central role in the decision regarding the use of screening. Appeals to nature can be interpreted as an attempt to justify beliefs regarding suffering that must be avoided and the impact that family interests may have on the decision. These findings have significant implications for ethical guidance in debates about the acceptability and boundaries of control of offspring characteristics by prenatal testing. (shrink)

Much of the discussion surrounding the ethics of abortion has centered around the notion of personhood. This is because many philosophers hold that the morality of abortion is contingent on whether the fetus is a person - though, of course, some famous philosophers have rejected this thesis (e.g. Judith Thomson and Don Marquis). In this article, I construct a novel argument for the immorality of abortion based on the notion of impairment. This argument does not assume that the fetus is (...) a person - indeed, I concede (for the sake of argument) that the fetus is not a person - and hence the morality of abortion is not contingent on whether the fetus is a person. I finish by answering a plethora of objections to my argument, concluding that none of them are successful. (shrink)

In recent years, a number of news stories were reported worldwide involving brain-dead pregnant women. Debates over providing life support to braindead pregnant women and delivery of their children have been around for some decades. Maintaining a woman’s life solely for fetal viability has become a major controversial social issue. Opposing opinions exist where one side supports the woman and her child should be left to die in dignity and the other side claims to protect the unborn child’s right to (...) live. Each group has strong beliefs. This paper addresses main aspects when considering the continuation of somatic support to the brain-dead pregnant woman for the purpose of fetus delivery including; human death, dignity of the woman, rights of the fetus, proportionality of acts, and the woman’s donor status, and independence of mother and fetus. Then, the authors present several diverse opinions and positions concerning the legitimacy of life support for brain-dead women based on them and critically evaluate them. We show that each and every claim can be ethically refuted. This paper also approaches to those claims from three different points of views, which are that of the brain-dead woman, her fetus and her family. We believe that the brain-dead woman’s wish and dignity, the child’s predicted wellbeing after birth, and the family’s beliefs and welfare should all be counted equally when making the final decision. In conclusion, we argue that the decision can be ethically justified only when the interests of all parties are appropriately taken into consideration and protected. (shrink)

Personhood argument is important in moral philosophy specially to determine the moral status of a being (human or non-human) and organism. Justifying moral status of these is significant and necessary because without knowing whether those substances have moral status, it is difficult to sketch a moral considering framework for moral action towards them. There are a number of standards e.g. sentience, higher cognitive capacities, the capacity to flourish, sociability, the possession of life, viability, personhood etc, to determine (...) moral status of human beings, non-human beings and organisms. In biomedical ethics it is widely discussed whether the abnormal and marginal human beings, animals and foetus are moral agents. The beings and organisms which qualify the test for moral status are considered as moral agents and the society has moral obligations to ensure their moral rights. Personhood is one of the criteria to determine a being or organism as a moral agent. In this article I will examine whether the argument of personhood is acceptable in justifying the agency of different kinds of beings and organisms. It is because the personhood requirement for the moral status is too demanding as claimed by contemporary ethicists who work for animal rights and the rights of the foetus to flourish. (shrink)

In this paper, I suggest that, if we are committed to accepting a threshold approach to personhood, according to which all beings above the threshold are persons with equal moral status, there are strong reasons to also recognise a second threshold that would be reached through human pregnancy, and that would confer on pregnant women a temporary superior moral status. This proposal is not based on the moral status of the fetus, but on the moral status (...) of the pregnant woman. It is not only the fetus which is an organism sui generis: the pregnant woman, also, is a unique being. Following almost any view on the moral status of the fetus, the pregnant woman should be regarded, herself, as more than a singular individual. She is, herself, ‘more than one’. Pregnant women are also necessary for the continued survival of the human species, and there are important justice-based reasons to recognise the higher status. Furthermore, the recognition of a superior moral status for pregnant women does not imply that pregnancy should always be viewed as desirable, or imply any position on the permissibility of abortion. My proposal is not as radical as it might seem, as it does not require that pregnant women should always receive superior treatment, but only that they should to some extent. It could have a range of potential positive practical consequences. Finally, my approach does not threaten, but rather promotes, human equality. (shrink)

This article discusses what is involved in having full moral status, as opposed to a lesser degree of moral status and surveys different views of the grounds of moral status as well as the arguments for attributing a particular degree of moral status on the basis of those grounds.

This essay considers the ways in which the various contexts – abortion, prenatal diagnosis, fetal research, and the use of fetuses in transplantation – shape the American debate on the moral standing of the fetus. This discussion gives rise to several philosophical debates on the status of the preimplantation embryo, particularly the debate over when the preimplantation embryo becomes individuated. How that question is resolved has critical ethical and policy implications.

Prabhpal Singh has recently defended a relational account of the difference in moral status between fetuses and newborns as a way of explaining why abortion is permissible and infanticide is not. He claims that only a newborn can stand in a parent–child relation, not a fetus, and this relation has a moral dimension that bestows moral value. We challenge Singh’s reasoning, arguing that the case he presents is unconvincing. We suggest that the parent–child relation is better understood as an (...) extension of an existing relationship formed during the gestational period. The change in this relation at birth is not sufficient to justify the radical change in moral status required to rule out infanticide while accepting the permissibility of abortion. Given that the moral status of orphans is also problematic under Singh’s account, we conclude that Singh has not shown that a newborn has greater moral worth than a fetus. (shrink)

The dominant conceptions of moral status in the English-speaking literature are either holist or individualist, neither of which accounts well for widespread judgments that: animals and humans both have moral status that is of the same kind but different in degree; even a severely mentally incapacitated human being has a greater moral status than an animal with identical internal properties; and a newborn infant has a greater moral status than a mid-to-late stage foetus. Holists accord (...) no moral status to any of these beings, assigning it only to groups to which they belong, while individualists such as welfarists grant an equal moral status to humans and many animals, and Kantians accord no moral status either to animals or severely mentally incapacitated humans. I argue that an underexplored, modal-relational perspective does a better job of accounting for degrees of moral status. According to modal-relationalism, something has moral status insofar as it capable of having a certain causal or intensional connection with another being. I articulate a novel instance of modal-relationalism grounded in salient sub-Saharan moral views, roughly according to which the greater a being's capacity to be part of a communal relationship with us, the greater its moral status. I then demonstrate that this new, African-based theory entails and plausibly explains the above judgments, among others, in a unified way. (shrink)

A central question in contemporary ethics and political philosophy concerns which entities have moral status. In this article, I provide a detailed analysis of the view that moral status comes in degrees. I argue that degrees of moral status can be specified along two dimensions: (i) the weight of the reason to protect an entity’s morally significant rights and interests; and/or (ii) the rights and interests that are considered morally significant. And I explore some of the complexities (...) that arise when we link degrees of moral status to the weight of reasons to protect bundles and/or the content and size of these bundles, in particular regarding the attribution of moral status to nonparadigmatic entities (e.g. people with severe cognitive disabilities, children, embryos and foetuses, robots, non-human animals, ecosystems, and rivers). (shrink)

Bypassing the question of when "human" life begins, the author seeks to determine the moral status of the fetus directly by means of a rational theory of rights. He argues that all agents with an operative rational and moral capacity are entitled to full equal rights, while the rights of those lacking these capacities are conferred by rational, moral agents. After reviewing the general considerations that would lead rational agents to confer rights, the author concludes that these agents would (...) probably not choose to restrict their liberty of abortion by conferring substantial rights on the fetus. (shrink)

This article examines two first-hand encounters with the foetus to reflect on the familial, photographic and political dimensions of 3D and 4D foetal portraits. It examines the photographic status of foetal portraits as intimates of the family album while acknowledging their public meaning in reproductive politics. The article aims to situate 3D and 4D foetal portraits within photographic history, theory and practice by examining how these camera-less images align with photographic vision.

in Abortion and the Status of the Fetus, Volume XIII of the series, “Philosophy of Medicine,” eds. William B. Bondeson, H. Tristram Englehardt, Stuart Spicker, and Daniel H. Winship (Dordrecht, Holland/Boston, Massachusetts: D. Reidel, 1983), pp. 229-245.

In the debate about the moral status of human embryos, it is not always clear which arguments are actually disputed. This book offers students and researchers, but also laypersons interested in the current debate, the opportunity to inform themselves about the current state of discussion and to learn about the most important arguments in a clear and concise form. These arguments are as follows: Since embryos as members of the species homo sapiens sapiens are human beings, they possess dignity (...) (species argument); embryos develop continuously, i.e. without morally relevant incisions, into adult human beings possessing dignity (continuum argument); embryos are identical with adult human beings possessing dignity (identity argument); embryos have the potential to become human beings, and this potential is without restriction worth protecting (potentiality argument). These arguments are each represented by a pro position and a contra position and defended or criticized. In an accompanying contribution by the editors, the four arguments in context are reconstructed, evaluated, and supported by new arguments. (shrink)

It seems that if abortion is permissible, then stem cell research must be as well: it involves the death of a less significant thing (an embryo rather than a fetus) for a greater good (lives saved rather than nine months of physical imposition avoided). However, I argue in this essay that this natural thought is mistaken. In particular, on the assumption that embryos and fetuses have the full moral status of persons, abortion is permissible but one form of stem (...) cell research is notFthe practice of creating embryos and then destroying them to extract cell.. (shrink)

Anti-abortion proponents argue that a fetus holds the status of a person akin to healthy adult human beings. The fetus possesses inherent dignity and a fundamental right to life, which must be resp...

Chervenak and McCullough, authors of the most acknowledged ethical framework for maternal–fetal surgery, rely on the ‘ethical–obstetrical’ concept of the fetus as a patient in order to determine what is morally owed to fetuses by both physicians and the women who gestate them in the context of prenatal surgery. In this article, we reconstruct the argumentative structure of their framework and present an internal criticism. First, we analyse the justificatory arguments put forward by the authors regarding the moral status (...) of the fetus qua patient. Second, we discuss the internal coherence and consistency of the moral obligations those authors derive from that concept. We claim that some of the dilemmas their approach is purported to avoid, such as the debate about the independent moral status of the fetus, and the foundation of the moral obligations of pregnant women (towards the fetuses they gestate) are not, all things considered, avoided. Chervenak and McCullough construct the obligations of physicians as obligations towards entities with equal moral status. But, at the same time, they assume that the woman has an independent moral status while the moral status of the fetus is dependent on the decision of the woman to present it to a physician for care. According to the logic of their own argumentation, Chervenak and McCullough implicitly admit a different moral status of the woman and the fetus, which will lead to different ascription of duties of the physician than those they ascribed. (shrink)

This paper defends and develops Elizabeth Harman’s Actual Future Principle with a concept called Schrödinger’s Fetus. I argue that all early fetuses are Schrödinger’s Fetuses: those early fetuses that survive and become conscious beings have full moral status already as early fetuses, but those fetuses that die as early fetuses lack moral status. With Schrödinger’s Fetus, it becomes possible to accept two widely held but contradictory intuitions to be true, and to avoid certain reductiones ad absurdum that pro-life (...) and pro-choice positions face. It also gives a simple solution to the problem of prenatal harm. (shrink)

Scientific breakthroughs rarely yield the potential to engage a foundational ethical question. Recent studies on direct reprogramming of human skin cells reported by the Yamanaka lab in Japan and the Thomson lab in Wisconsin suggest that scientists may have crossed both a scientific and an ethical threshold. The fascinating science of direct nuclear reprogramming highlights empirical data that may clarify the ontological status of cellular activity in the early stages of what could become a human fetus and justify ethical (...) options for research in this controversial field. The ontological and ethical implications that accrue here are connected with the biological or natural potentiality of these cells. (shrink)

Despite its prominence in the abortion debate and in public policy, the discourse of 'unborn patient' has not been subjected to critical scrutiny. We provide a critical analysis in three steps. First, we distinguish between the descriptive and normative meanings of 'unborn child.' There is a long history of the descriptive use of 'unborn child.' Second, we argue that the concept of an unborn child has normative content but that this content does not do the work that opponents of abortion (...) want it to do, namely, to establish the independent moral status of fetuses and their rights, the right to life in particular. Third, we argue that the normative content of 'unborn child' should be dependent moral status, not independent moral status. We conclude that the ethical concept of the fetus as a patient should replace the discourse of “unborn child” when that phrase is used normatively. (shrink)

This article begins with an introduction to the biology behind embryonic stem cell research. Next it presents briefly four views of moral status, based on four different criteria: biological humanity, personhood, possession of interests, and having a future-like-ours. On two of these views, embryos clearly lack moral status, but they most likely do not have moral status on the FLO account either. Only the biological humanity criterion combined with the view that life begins at conception results in (...) the conclusion that very early extracorporeal embryos have full moral status, making ESC research that destroys embryos morally wrong. This explains why even some who are anti-abortion are not against ESC research: they do not view the very early, extracorporeal embryo as having the same moral status as the fetus. (shrink)

Although the abortion of fetuses with Down syndrome has become commonplace, infanticide is still widely rejected. Generally, there are three ways of justifying the differentiation between abortion and infanticide: by referring to the differences between the moral status of the fetus versus the infant, by referring to the differences of the moral status of the act of abortion versus the act of infanticide, or by separating the way the permissibility of abortion is justified from the way the impermissibility (...) of infanticide is justified. My argument is that none of these ways justifies the abortion of fetuses diagnosed with Down syndrome while simultaneously rejecting infanticide. Either the justification for abortion is consistent with infanticide, or it is implausible to justify abortion while rejecting infanticide. I conclude the article by making some preliminary remarks about how one might manage the situation posed by my argument. (shrink)