This 1982 book is a history of the great age of scholastism from Abelard to the rejection of Aristotelianism in the Renaissance, combining the highest standards of medieval scholarship with a respect for the interests and insights of contemporary philosophers, particularly those working in the analytic tradition. The volume follows on chronologically from The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy, though it does not continue the histories of Greek and Islamic philosophy but concentrates (...) on the Latin Christian West. Unlike other histories of medieval philosophy that divide the subject matter by individual thinkers, it emphasises the parts of more historical and theological interest. This volume is organised by those topics in which recent philosophy has made the greatest progress. (shrink)

Psychology and Philosophy provides a history of the relations between philosophy and the science of psychology from late scholasticism to contemporary discussions. The book covers the development from 16th-century interpretations of Aristotle’s De Anima, through Kantianism and the 19th-century revival of Aristotelianism, up to 20th-century phenomenological and analytic studies of consciousness and the mind. In this volume historically divergent conceptions of psychology as a science receive special emphasis. The volume illuminates the particular nature of studies (...) of the psyche in the contexts of Aristotelian and Cartesian as well as 19th- and 20th-century science and philosophy. The relations between metaphysics, transcendental philosophy, and natural science are studied in the works of Kant, Brentano, Bergson, Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Wittgenstein, and Davidson. Accounts of less known philosophers, such as Trendelenburg and Maine de Biran, throw new light on the history of the field. Discussions concerning the connections between moral philosophy and philosophical psychology broaden the volume’s perspective and show new directions for development. All contributions are based on novel research in their respective fields. The collection provides materials for researchers and graduate students in the fields of philosophy of mind, history of philosophy, and psychology. (shrink)

I’d like to thank the Canadian Theological Society for this invitation to speak. It is a double honour to be this year’s Newman Lecturer. It is an honour to be associated with the name of Jay Newman, who made impressive and wide-ranging contributions to philosophy. Jay, as you perhaps know, was especially interested in the philosophy of culture, and I’m delighted that his legacy will ensure continued interaction between the cultures of academic philosophy and theology. It is (...) also a great honour to follow in the footsteps of the eminent previous Newman lecturers: J.L. Schellenberg, Maurice Boutin, Robert Larmer, and William Sweet (who is here today). My talk today will be divided into three parts. First, I will say a little bit about contemporary analytic philosophy of religion, and its practitioners’ beliefs. Second, I will describe and briefly evaluate four recent meta-philosophical analyses of this subdiscipline. (That’s a fancy way of saying that I’m going to air a bit of dirty laundry.) These four analyses each identify problems with this subfield, and propose solutions. Finally, I will introduce a framework for a research program in the philosophy of religion that I think these authors should all welcome. (shrink)

WHAT IS DECONSTRUCTION? So far as the mere term goes, most of us would doubtless associate it with various current assaults upon the Humanities that would appear to be taking place in several quarters these days. It is particularly from English Departments, as it would seem--notably perhaps those of Johns Hopkins and of Yale--that one hears the noise of "wars and rumors of wars" that are presumably being fought between those, on the one hand, whom one might call the traditionalists (...) with respect to the Humanities, and those, on the other hand, who are loud in their boasts that they are marching to the newly fashionable tunes of Deconstruction. Again, though, just what is Deconstruction, and just who are the Deconstructionists? (shrink)

Recent discussion, both in the academia-related popular media and in some professional academic venues, about the current state and role of mainstream Anglo-American analytic philosophy among the humanities, has revealed a certain uneasiness expressed by both champions of this approach and traditional adversaries of it regarding its perceived isolation from the other fields of humanities. The fiercer critics go as far as to claim that the image of this type of philosophizing in the contemporary world is one (...) of a discipline that is disconnected from reality, a veritable inbreeding academic cottage industry of empty scholasticism. Though I am unsympathetic to the critics who would question the very essence of how this kind of philosophy is pursued, myself being a representative of it, I nevertheless present some admittedly sketchy but, in my opinion, interesting and revealing statistical data on the evolution of several top journals of analytic philosophy over the last hundred years in terms of the style of papers that get published, which might also justify to some extent the above mentioned complaint against analytic philosophy. (shrink)

Wittgenstein's treatment of private language is the dissolution of some of the major problems in traditional philosophy. Philosophical problems, for Wittgenstein, are the conceptual confusion arising due to the abuse of language. They can be fully dispensed with by commanding a clear view of language. Language, for Wittgenstein, is on the one hand, the source of philosophical problems while, on the other hand, it is a means to dispense with them. Private language is one such issue which is ultimately (...) rooted I a mistaken conception of language and is the sources of various philosophical problems/ puzzles. (shrink)

Contemporary analytic philosophy is in the midst of a vigorous debate on the nature of causation. Each of the main proposals discussed in this chapter faces important problems: the deductive-nomological model, the counterfactual theory, the manipulability theory, the probabilistic theory and the transference theory. After having explored possible solutions to these problems, I conclude that one version of the transference approach is most promising. However, as I show in the last section, it is necessary to supplement this (...) transference approach with the notion of lawful dependency. This gives rise to the notion of causal responsibility. (shrink)

The article deals with panpsychic conceptions in contemporary analytical philosophy of mind. According to some influential philosophers, panpsychism has theoretical resources for solving both the old riddle of R. Descartes about the causal relationship between the realms of the mental and the physical, and the hard problem of consciousness by D. Chalmers — "Why do some physical systems generate conscious experience?". In the second half of the twentieth century, there were heated discussions in analytical philosophy about whether (...) certain aspects of conscious metal states, the phenomenal properties of experience, are irreducible to anything physical or functional. The strategy of contemporary supporters of panpsychic conceptions is to try to reasonably expand our ontology. They add to the microlevel a primitive analogue of the conscious experience possessed by such fundamental physical entities as elementary particles. Thus, phenomenal consciousness in its microform not only becomes a fundamental and irreducible element of reality, but also receives its causal relevance at the macro level. Nevertheless, all varieties of panpsychism face the combination problem: "How does the combination of the experience of fundamental physical entities lead to the emergence of consciousness?". The article assesses the plausibility of the main responses to different variations of the combination problem. It is shown that after revision, panpsychic conceptions lose their advantage over dualism and physicalism for various reasons. In the case of emergent and autonomous panpsychism, the concept of micro-experience becomes theoretically useless. S. Coleman's answer through the elimination of microsubjects leads to the rejection of panpsychism, and the idea of a phenomenal combination of P. Goff is burdened by the fact that we are, in principle, epistemically closed to its understanding. The author comes to the conclusion that the difficult problem of consciousness is not solvable due to the inevitability of its epistemological component, and not metaphysical or empirical. Until then, the question of the form is "does object X really have a phenomenal first-person perspective?" makes sense, we will somehow be inclined to believe that the hard problem of consciousness has not yet been solved. (shrink)

The article aims to present the study of Aristotle’s teaching on consciousness and soul conducted by the well-known contemporary scholar of ancient philosophy, Jonathan Barnes, as an example of a certain historical-philosophical style that emerged within British analytic philosophy as a whole and within the Aristotelian Society in particular during 1970-1980s. It is shown that the development of the historical-philosophical style within the Aristotelian Society at this time continues the tradition of slow reception of ideas from (...) continental philosophy, which was noted already in the early period of Society emergence and development. This is explained by certain theoretical isolation that had developed by this time in British philosophy, which had its imprint on historical-philosophical studies and is expressed in the application of conceptual analysis and the inclusion of its results into the modern philosophical context. Although Barnes considers Aristotle’s teaching on consciousness and soul through the prism of contemporary versions of physicalism and dualism, the question of what role the Aristotelian teaching plays for them remains unanswered. The author puts forward the thesis that in this case, J. Barnes’s analysis of the Aristotelian problem of consciousness and soul appears less productive than the previously developed approaches in scholasticism and phenomenology in the continental history of philosophy. (shrink)

Epistemology is a branch of philosophy that studies the origin, nature and limits of human knowledge. Contemporary epistemology is a theory of knowledge in terms of reasons, evidence, justification and explanation. This book shows how Anglo-American philosophers captivated by the power of modern science and concomitant advances in logic and mathematics mistook knowledge itself to be reducible to the propositions of science and logic. Ethics, along with metaphysics and religion, were cast off as mere expressions of sentiment at (...) best, or as utter nonsense at worst. Is science the only source of knowledge? Can ethics count as knowledge? Are there kinds of knowledge beyond epistemology? This book develops innovative answers to these and other related questions. (shrink)

This self-contained anthology collects some of the most influential primary source contributions to contemporary analytic philosophy, together with introductions and commentaries for each selection. It traces the development of a few central themes in analytic philosophy, in sufficient detail—from philosophy of mind and language, metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophical logic. Frege, Russell, Moore. Wittgenstein. Logical Empiricism. Ordinary Language Philosophy. Quine. Truth, Meaning, and Interpretation. Reference and Essence. For anyone interested in Analytic Philosophy.

이 글은 음악의 정서표현성에 대한 현대분석철학의 쟁점들과 가정들을 소개하고, 음악의 정서표현성에 대한 분석철학의 논의를 환기론과 상상이론, 그리고 인지론으로 대별하여 각각의 이론이 음악의 정서표현성에 관련된 쟁점들에 대해 제시한 견해들을 살펴본 후 음악의 정서표현성에 대한 분석철학의 가정들이 각각의 이론에서 만족된다고 주장되는 방식들을 비판적으로 고찰한다. 그럼으로써 이 글은 음악의 정서표현성에 대한 분석철학의 논의에 숨어 있는 직관과 문제점, 남겨진 과제를 미시적인 차원과 더불어 거시적인 차원에서 제시한다. 특히 이 글은 음악의 정서표현성에 대한 분석철학의 논의가 생산적인 방향으로 나아가기 위해서는 음악의 정서표현성의 본성이 갖는 이중성, 즉 음악이 (...) 표현하는 정서가 ‘음악 안’에 있다고 여겨지는 것만큼이나 ‘청자 안’에 있다고 여겨지는 특성에 대한 고려와 해명이 요청된다고 제안한다. (shrink)

My purpose in this paper is to argue for two separate, but related theses. The first is that contemporary analytic philosophy is incoherent. This is so, I argue, because its methods contain as an essential constituent a conception of intuition that cannot be rendered consistent with a key tenet of analytic philosophy unless we allow a Bayesian-subjectivist epistemology. I argue for this within a discussion of two theories of intuition: a classical account as proposed by (...) Descartes and a modern reliabilist account as proposed by Kornblith, maintaining that reliabilist accounts require a commitment to Bayesian subjectivism about probability. However, and this is the second thesis, Bayesian subjectivism is itself logically incoherent given two simple assumptions: (1) that some empirical propositions are known and (2) any proposition that is known is assigned a degree of subjective credence of 1. I establish this using a formal reductio proof. I argue for the first thesis in section 2 and for the second in section 3. The final section contains a summary and conclusion. (shrink)

This essay discusses two issues. The first concerns whether the “insider’s” or “outsider’s” perspective is more truth-conducive in the study of religion. I do not attempt to settle this very thorny question: I merely attempt to identify some aspects of what it might mean to be an insider with respect to one kind of investigation – the investigation into whether God exists. The second issue concerns how best to characterize certain philosophical positions on the axiology of ultimate reality. Here I (...) argue that it can be useful to group together certain axiological positions under one heading, while leaving their details open to interpretation. For example, two philosophers might agree that God’s existence would – or does – make the world far better than it would otherwise be, even though they have incompatible notions of what constitutes ‘far’ and ‘better’. In my view, it makes sense to call both thinkers pro-theists, despite their differences. In discussing these issues, I engage the work of Myron A. Penner and Paul Moser, both of whom published replies to a paper of mine in the most recent issue of the Toronto Journal of Theology. (shrink)

I present and discuss recent work in analytic philosophy of religion on apophaticism and divine ineffability. I focus on three questions: how can we call God ineffable without contradicting ourselves? How can we refer to an ineffable God? What is the point of talking about an ineffable God?

Avner Baz presents a critique of the working practices of analytic philosophy in recent decades. He challenges the assumptions on which the philosophical 'method of cases' rests, and he presents a pragmatist conception of language on which the method of cases as used both 'armchair' and 'experimental' philosophers is fundamentally misguided.

May 2020 marked the 25th anniversary of the death of Miguel Sánchez-Mazas, founder of Theoria. An International Journal of Theory, History and Foundations of Science, and regarded as the person who brought mathematical logic to Spain. Here we present some of his biographical features and a summary of his contributions, from his early work in the 1950s - introducing contemporary advances in logic and philosophy of science in a philosophically backward milieu dominated by the scholasticism of that (...) era in Spain - to the development of a project of Lebnizian lineage aimed at producing an arithmetic calculation that would elude some of the difficulties confronting Leibniz’s calculus. (shrink)

A survey of the emergence of early analytic philosophy as a subfield of the history of philosophy. The importance of recent literature on Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein is stressed, as is the widening interest in understanding the nineteenth-century scientific and Kantian backgrounds. In contrast to recent histories of early analytic philosophy by P.M.S. Hacker and Scott Soames, the importance of historical and philosophical work on the significance of formalization is highlighted, as are the contributions made (...) by those focusing on systematic treatments of individual philosophers, traditions, and periods in relation to contemporary issues (rule-following, neo-Fregeanism, contextualism, theory of meaning). (shrink)

I present and discuss recent work in analytic philosophy of religion on apophaticism and divine ineffability. I focus on three questions: how can we call God ineffable without contradicting ourselves? How can we refer to an ineffable God? What is the point of talking about an ineffable God?

Rejection of the philosophical relevance of history of philosophy remains pronounced within contemporary analytic philosophy. The two main reasons for this rejection presuppose that strict deduction is both necessary and sufficient for rational justification. However, this justificatory ideal of scientia holds only within strictly formal domains. This is confirmed by a neglected non-sequitur in van Fraassen’s original defence of ‘Constructive Empiricism’. Conversely, strict deduction is insufficient for rational justification in non-formal, substantive domains of inquiry. In non-formal, (...) substantive domains, rational justification is also, in part, ineliminably social and historical, for sound reasons Hegel was the first to articulate. Demonstrating this involves considering closely two key reasons many analytic philosophers (still) reject the philosophical relevance of historical philosophy (§2). As specific example of presumed, though fallacious, deductivism about justification in the non-formal domain of empirical knowledge is found in van Fraassen’s (1980) defence of ‘Constructive Empiricism’ (§3). These first two sections contend that philosophical consideration of historical philosophy is required to properly formulate key issues in non-formal domains. I next consider the further issues involved rational justification in non-formal domains, issues quintessentially posed by the Pyrrhonian Dilemma of the Criterion (§4). Finally I consider what kind of history of philosophy is required for cogent philosophy in non-formal domains (§5). (shrink)

The paper presents the latest achievements of analytic philosophers of religion in Christology. My goal is to defend the literal/metaphysical reading of the Chalcedonian dogma of the hypostatic union. Some of the contemporary Christian thinkers claim that the doctrine of Jesus Christ as both perfectly divine and perfectly human is self-contradictory (I present this point of view on the example of John Hick) and, therefore, it should be understood metaphorically. In order to defend the consistency of the conciliar (...) theology, I refer to the work of, among others, Eleonore Stump, William Hasker, Peter Geach and Kevin Sharpe. As a result, I conclude that recent findings in analytic metaphysics provide an ontological scaffolding that explains away the objection of the incompatibility of the doctrine of the hypostatic union. In order to confirm this conclusion such metaphysical topics as properties attribution (what it means for an object to have a property), relation of identity (what it means for an object x to be identical with object y), and essentialism and kind membership (what it means for an object to belong necessarily to a kind) are scrutinized in detail. (shrink)

Review of Avner Baz's book on the methodology of philosophy.

Not so long ago, the idea that analytic philosophers would be taking panpsychism seriously would have been hard to believe. That is because in its early, logical positivist, stage, the analytic movement earned the reputation of being militantly anti-metaphysical. But analytic philosophy has come a long way since the heyday of logical positivism; and, in fact, the dialectic of recent debates on the mind–body problem among analytic philosophers has pushed many of them in the direction (...) of panpsychism. In this paper, I want to explain how this has come about and take a look at some of the versions of panpsychism that have emerged. This will involve running through a quick history of debates on the mind–body problem since about 1960, focusing on how panpsychism has been proposed as a promising, though not unproblematic, way of breaking an apparent impasse that has emerged between more standard physicalist and dualist theories of mind. Along the way, I will also have occasion to comment on the prospects of panpsychism as a respectable scientific theory and how a number of scientists stand on this. (shrink)

Johnathan Cohen's book provides a lucid and penetrating treatment of the fundamental issues of contemporary analytical philosophy. This field now spans a greater variety of topics and divergence of opinion than fifty years ago, and Cohen's book addresses the presuppositions implicit to it and the patterns of reasoning on which it relies.

Frege was the grandfather of analytical philosophy, Husserl the founder of the phenomenological school, two radically different philosophical movements. In 1903, say, how would they have appeared to any German student of philosophy who knew the work of both? Not, certainly, as two deeply opposed thinkers: rather as remarkably close in orientation, despite some divergence of interests. They may be compared with the Rhine and the Danube, which rise quite close to one another and for a time pursue (...) roughly parallel courses, only to diverge in utterly different directions and flow into different seas. Why, then, did this happen? What small ingredient into the thought of each was eventually magnified into so great an effect? (shrink)

Approximately 1,500 years ago John Philoponus proposed a simple argument for the existence of God. The argument runs thus: Whatever comes to be has a cause of its coming to be. The universe came to be. Therefore, the universe has a cause of its coming to be. ;Due to the influence of William Lane Craig, this argument and the family of arguments that support it have come to be known as the "kalam" cosmological argument . Craig's account of the KCA (...) incorporates features that serve to distinguish his version as a significant advance. First, conceptual advances in mathematics now permit a clearer presentation of the argument than was previously possible. Second, contemporary Big Bang cosmology confirms the central contention of the KCA, namely, that the past existence of the universe is finite. Reflection upon the implications of using Cantorian transfinite mathematics to model physical processes allowed Craig to develop a distinctively philosophical version of the KCA which is relatively independent of changes in contemporary scientific cosmology. This dissertation is intended as a critical investigation and development of this philosophical strand of the KCA. The literature relating to the KCA has grown however to a significant bulk, and there is now danger of duplication and misassessment due to the plurality of interpretations that the argument has received. Part I of the dissertation addresses this need by laying bare the underlying logical structure of the KCA and by providing a comprehensive "state of the question" . Part II of the dissertation, comprising chapters 3 through 6, focuses upon an important species of objection made to the KCA. This species of objection relies upon thought-experiments designed to show that an actual infinity is possible. I reply: this objection is effectively answered by introducing a metaphysics of substances. In the course of presenting a systematic response I develop an interpretation of the notion of substance that is useful for analytic philosophy, present a general account of the logical requirements of KCA thought-experiments, and outline a theory of logical modality suited to the metaphysical requirements of the KCA. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 39.2 (2001) 292-294 [Access article in PDF] Secada, Jorge. Cartesian Metaphysics: The Scholastic Origins of Modern Philosophy. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Pp. xii + 333. Cloth, $59.95. Descartes scholars can welcome this book. Secada supports trends in scholarship that criticize seeing Descartes as merely an anti-skeptical foundationalist, and he challenges many prominent interpretations of Descartes's metaphysics. In addition, Secada (...) helpfully references Scholastic sources to provide context for Descartes's views. This book is also valuable for philosophers in contemporary metaphysics and epistemology. Secada uses the tools and idiom of analytic philosophy to explain and defend Descartes, and he is sympathetic to Descartes's project, even if he grants that aspects of it "are difficult to articulate clearly and convincingly" (174).The book's central theme is the contrast between Descartes's "essentialism" and the "existentialism" of Scholastics. Secada explains the distinction as follows: "Essentialism (existentialism) is the doctrine, first, that one cannot know the existence (essence) of any substance without first knowing its essence (existence), and, secondly, that one can know the essence (existence) of some substance without knowing its existence (essence)" (8). Cartesian Metaphysics interprets Descartes's corpus as a defense of essentialism in the light of Scholastic existentialism.The first three chapters set the stage. Chapter One distinguishes essentialism from existentialism. Chapter Two provides historical background necessary to understand the role of Scholasticism in Descartes's thought. Chapter Three discusses the role of Christian Platonism in both Descartes and the Scholastics, especially their shared Augustinian presupposition that knowledge of essences is of "how things are in themselves" (56).The next three chapters discuss the metaphysical status of ideas. In Chapter Four, Secada contrasts Descartes's "immanent" theory according to which "the immediate objects of ideas must exist in the mind" (85) with the "realist Scholastic" theory that "takes mental acts to be immediately directed towards things" (83). In Chapter Five, this account is applied to an interpretation of the Second Meditation as a defense of intellectualist essentialism against Scholastics and empiricists. "Contrary to the Scholastics and other empiricists, Descartes attributed to the intellect and not to the senses the power to reach the world of substances existing outside of the inner theatre of the mind" (116). Through comparing Descartes with Suarez and Gassendi, Secada argues that all the proofs of existence in the Meditations, including for the cogito, argue from [End Page 292] knowledge of essence to knowledge of existence. Chapter Six turns to Descartes's proofs for the existence of God. According to Secada, even for a posteriori proofs, knowledge of God's existence depends on knowledge of his essence.The last three chapters examine Descartes's theory of substance. Chapter Seven reconstructs Descartes's distinction between substances and properties. A substance is something that "exists without inhering" and "exists uncaused" (185). Secada discusses the nature of substance, how substances other than God can be "uncaused," and the plausibility of Descartes's sharp distinction between substances and properties. The chapter ends by arguing that Descartes's doctrine about the relationship between substances and properties inadvertently "heralds Spinoza's pantheism" (185). Chapter Eight examines real and essential properties in Cartesian metaphysics in contrast to Suarez and Fonseca, and ends with a partial defense of Descartes's ontological argument. Chapter Nine offers a detailed discussion of two fundamental substances in Descartes's metaphysics: body and mind. Secada argues that Descartes offers no satisfactory explanations of body, mind, or the relationship between the two.As is clear from this brief summary, Cartesian Metaphysics is a rich book. It presents important historical details without endless irrelevant details (see especially the sketch of Descartes's Scholastic background on 27-33). The exegetical arguments make strong cases for new interpretations of Descartes. Secada effectively shows that Descartes is more concerned with metaphysics than with refuting skepticism. Comparisons with Suarez and Fonseca shed new light on Cartesian arguments. Reconstructions of Cartesian arguments even tempt one to take Descartes seriously in contemporary metaphysics. And the criticisms of Descartes are thought-provoking.Unfortunately, the... (shrink)

In recent analytic philosophy of religion, one hotly debated topic is the veridicality of religious experience. In this paper, I briefly trace how the argument from religious experience comes into prominence in the twentieth century. This is due to the able defense of this argument by Richard Swinburne, William Alston, and Jerome Gellman among others. I explain the argument's intuitive force and why the stock objections to religious experience are not entirely convincing. I expound Swinburne's approach and his (...) application of the Principle of Credulity to religious experience. Then I critically examine four major objections to Swinburne. I conclude that the argument from religious experiences is not likely to be conclusive but it should not be dismissed either. (shrink)

Causality is without doubt one of the main topics of Hobbes's philosophy. Quite justifiably, F. Brandt stated that Chapters 9 and 10 of De Corpore, which expound Hobbes's doctrine of causality, are the most crucial ones ever written by Hobbes. According to Hobbes the quest for causes is the quintessence of all philosophical inquiry. "Philosophy is such knowledge of effects or appearances, as we acquire by true ratiocination from the knowledge we have first of their causes or generation. (...) And again, of such causes or generations as may be from knowing first their effects." Although this definition as such is quite peculiar and fraught with difficulties, the description of philosophy in terms of causal knowledge is in itself rather traditional. Hobbes himself admits that he follows the Aristotelian dictum scire est per causas scire. However, although Hobbes agrees with the Aristotelians that knowledge bears a causal character, he fundamentally disagrees with them as to "what he saw to be genuinely causative." Hobbes's doctrine of causes may be seen as a systematic attempt to discard the scholastic view on causality and replace it with strict mechanistic explanatory principles. Therefore, Hobbes's theory of causality can only be understood properly if we put it against its scholastic background, which is the line of interpretation followed in the present article. It will be made clear that Hobbes's relation to scholasticism is rather complex, ranging from downright rejection to the adoption of terminological distinctions as well as of specific arguments and doctrines. (shrink)

The careful historical and metaphilosophical attention recently bestowed upon analytic philosophy has revealed that traditional ways of defining it are inadequate. In the face of this inadequacy, contemporary authors have proposed new definitions that detach analytic philosophy from its turn of the twentieth century origins. I argue that this contemporary trend in defining analytic philosophy is misguided, and that it diminishes the likelihood of our coming to an accurate historical and metaphilosophical understanding (...) of it. This is especially unsatisfactory since such understanding is essential to finding an adequate remedy for the widely perceived ills of contemporary analytic philosophy. I suggest that a more fruitful approach to developing such understanding might begin with treating the unity of analytic philosophy as illusory. (shrink)

We can illustrate the phenomenon of model-induced escape by examining the phenomenon of spam filters. Spam filter A is, we can assume, very effective at blocking spam. Indeed it is so effective that it motivates the authors of spam to invent new types of spam that will beat the filters of spam filter A. -/- An example of this phenomenon in the realm of philosophy is illustrated in the work of Nyíri on Wittgenstein's political beliefs. Nyíri writes a paper (...) demonstrating convincingly that there are strong signals of a conservative strain of thought in the writings of Wittgenstein. This has initially a tiny effect; but then a more significant effect sets in as the authors of Wittgenstein secondary literature, consciously or unconsciously, draw attention to features of Wittgenstein which cast the conservatism thesis in a negative light. This is an example of what I call model-induced escape: the Nyíri model of Wittgenstein initiates a process which undermines the Nyíri model of Wittgenstein. -/- Wittgenstein, as obiectum philosophiae, is reduced to a constantly mutating set of interpretations of a certain body of work. -/- Perhaps this is what makes philosophy so problematic when viewed from the perspective of results, or in other words of signs of progress commonly accepted across the discipline. There are just too many ways of inducing escape from any given putative discovery; too many dimensions along which an interpretative or definitional arms race can be triggered. (shrink)

Written by Anthony Kenny, a leading figure in contemporary philosophy, this volume guides the reader through a concise and accessible explanation and assessment of Frege's radical and lasting contributions to our understanding of language, meaning, and the foundations of arithmetic.

Written for his brother Benedictine monks around 1077, Anselm's Proslogion is perhaps the best-known partially-read book of the Middle Ages. Many readers are familiar only with Anselm's well-known argument for God's existence in Chapters 2-4, which is often called the "ontological argument," a misleading appellation coined centuries later by Immanuel Kant. In this argument Anselm begins with the thought of "something than which nothing greater is able to be thought," and subsequently he leads the reader to see that such a (...) reality necessarily exists and cannot be thought not to be. This argument - which is, to be sure, crucial to the work constitutes - but a small portion of the whole. Preceding it is a profound but oft-overlooked opening chapter in which Anselm contemplates his all-too-human condition and disposes the reader to receive aptly his argument for God's existence in the next three chapters. And following this argument are 20 chapters in which Anselm artfully unfolds the depth and breadth of God's true existence as that than which nothing greater is able to be thought, showing God to be (among other things) able-to-sense, pity-hearted, just, good, and uncircumscribed. Indeed, if the reader is willing to give himself over to the work as whole, he will be compelled, under Anselm's deft guidance, to "endeavor to straighten up his mind toward contemplating God," which is how Anselm describes his own role in the work in his prefatory remarks. This edition provides a faithful yet readable English rendering of the whole Proslogion, the objections raised to Anselm's argument by his contemporary Gaunilo, and Anselm's replies to those objections. (After responding to Gaunilo, Anselm himself requested that these objections and replies be included in subsequent editions of the Proslogion.) This edition also includes an introduction that contextualizes the Proslogion within the monastic, pre-Scholastic age in which it first made its appearance. In addition, by means of notes and commentary, this edition articulates how to contextualize Anselm's famous argument in the Proslogion as a whole and in light of his replies to Gaunilo, how to appreciate the artistry whereby Anselm knit the Proslogion together into a coherent and concise unity, and how the work may be taught effectively to interested students. These features set this affordable English edition of the Proslogion apart from those currently available, which too often fail to capture accurately the beauty of Anselm's prose, which often treat the work through the lens of either later Scholasticism or contemporary analytic philosophy of religion, and which take little note of the craftsmanship whereby Anselm constructed this masterfully integrated work that is remembered too often for too few of its 24 chapters. Matthew Walz has taught in the interdisciplinary program at Thomas Aquinas College in California, and since 2008 he has been a professor in the Philosophy Department of the University of Dallas. (shrink)

For fifty years, Willard Van Orman Quine's books and articles have stimulated intense debate in the fields of logic and the philosophy of language. Many scholars in fact, regard Quine as the greatest living English-speaking philosopher; yet his views remain widely misunderstood and misinterpreted. This book provides the first major explication and defense of Quine's systematic philosophy and is ideally suited for use as a required or supplementary text in a wide variety of undergraduate and graduate courses in (...) philosophy and linguistics.The book explores the far-reaching implications of Quine's views on language for contemporary analytic philosophy. It is unique in providing a lucid and rich description and reconstruction of the historical context from which Quine's work grew, focusing in particular on the role that Russell and Wittgenstein played in shaping the problems inherited by Quine. It presents Quine's difficult later views in an accessible fashion, bringing out as no other study has the very radical nature of his position. One of the book's highlights is its careful examination and assessment of Tarski's theory of truth as it relates to the traditions of Russell and Wittgenstein and to Quine's own philosophy.George D. Romanos took his Ph.D. in philosophy under George D. W. Berry and Paul T. Sagal at Boston University. This book grew out of his dissertation with the active criticism and support of Quine himself. (shrink)

The text is divided into four chapters: 1.0 Metaphysics, transcendental philosophy and analytic philosophy; 2.0 The senses of being ; 3.0 Being and existence ; and 4.0 Modalities. After a defense of contemporary analytic philosophy against the usual charge of its supposedly superficial character and its lack of philosophical significance, Llano offers a thoughtful reading of Wittgenstein against his ancient, medieval and Kantian scholastic background. Following Gilson's historical analysis, Llano diagnoses a "tendency to reflect (...) upon concepts with the risk of forgetting the real things whose natures these concepts represent.... While the scholasticism most directly bound to Aristotle kept the consideration of real, concrete being firmly in view, Duns Scotus--in a direction already pointed out by Avicenna--was completely occupied with the concept of pure being ; a concept which, by being abstract, was understood as univocal. This perspective led him to 'prescind' from the actual reality of things, i.e., from their real existence; because, although existence itself is a notion or ratio knowable in the object, it is nevertheless required as actually belonging to the object in so far as it is knowable: 'existentia non est per se ratio obiecti, ut scibile est'". Against this background, being is taken as intelligibility, involving a relationship to the understanding that logicizes the meaning of being itself so that "the formal-essential dimension takes unto itself the whole weight of reality" and "esse is reduced to a quasi-accidental mode of the essence", which comes to be thematized in its own right as "the real modality, until a linguistic analysis, which can accept only the logical modality, passing through the logico-transcendental mediation of the gnoseological modality". Being is accordingly progressively "reabsorbed into human thought and later into various anthropological dimensions ". Section 1.3, "Toward a realist semantics," starts from Frege's attack on psychologism in the Foundations of Arithmetic and leads to a reinstatement of Aristotelian semantics in section 1.4, "Word and concept." Chapter 2 deals with the standard topics: 2.1, Predication, identity, existence; 2.2, being in propositions and being in reality; 2.3, accidental being ; and 2.4, being as it pertains to truth. Chapter 3 on being and existence suggests the thought-provoking comparison: as natura is to suppositum in Aquinas, so is Begriff to Gegenstand in Frege. Chapter 4, on the modalities of being, gets to the heart of the metaphysical issue of what happens when one of the modalities of being is substituted for being as the foundation of metaphysics. In Section 4.1, on actuality and facticity, Llano deftly centers attention on Heidegger's Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie, where Heidegger maintains that the Thomistic notion of actus essendi is merely another instance of the forgetfulness of being. Llano rightly judges that Heidegger's understanding of an opposition between essence as one thing and existence as another is derived from a position of Giles of Rome and has nothing to do with the position of Aquinas himself. Llano cites Avicenna roughly five times as often as he does Giles of Rome; Heidegger, apparently relying on hearsay reports, mentions Avicenna only once in the Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie, without citing any text, and mentions Giles of Rome three times, citing only one text. Heidegger uses a late scholastic as his authority for discrediting Aquinas. Llano quotes some of the explicit Thomistic criticisms against Avicenna including one that Heidegger partially omits ; the passage Heidegger suppresses begins "Opinio Avicennae fuit...." Though rhetorically subtle, Llano's clearly and forcefully written book is loaded with philosophical insights, bridges conversational gaps between analysts and phenomenologists, and offers a glimpse at some of the most important medieval notions sedimented within contemporary philosophy.--E. M. Macierowski, Washington, D.C. (shrink)

Introduction and the aim of the study. The paper analyzes the place and role of morphogenetic theory within a framework of contemporary socialtheoretical discourse. M. Archer’s morphogenetic theory and P. Donati’s relational conception are considered as two examples of this discourse. Methods. The authors use analytical methods (analysis, synthesis, etc.), applied in contemporary philosophy of social sciences. Scientific novelty. The key idea of the paper is analyzing morphogenetic social theory in terms of analytical scholasticism as a (...) deviant way of contemporary social theory development. Results. Morphogenetic theory is rather a sociological theory than interdisciplinary social theory; the sophisticated language of “morphogenists” mat seem difficult for other scholars to understand; morphogenetic theory demonstrates indefinite perspectives concerning interdisciplinary or transdisciplinary discourse in the context of contemporary stage of social-humanitarian knowledge development. Conclusions. The status of “morphogenetic theory” among other directions of social theory is by far “peripheral”. (shrink)

In this book, Paul Redding argues both that Hegel’s thought is making a resurgence in some quarters of analytic philosophy, and that such a resurgence is well-deserved and will bear future fruit. He begins with Bertrand Russell’s story of analytic philosophy as born out of a rejection of Hegelian thought, and traces the development of an alternative path through analytic philosophy that moves through Frege, Wittgenstein, Sellars, and Evans, and finds its fullest contemporary (...) form in Brandom and McDowell. This alternative path, he claims, has important historical roots in Hegel, although not in Russell’s caricatured version of him.Redding reads Hegel as the direct inheritor of Kant and Aristotle, especially with respect to logic, the role of the singular in thought, and the nature of evaluative judgment, and he argues that Hegel gives us the materials with which to overcome Sellars’ myth of the given productively. He also gives extended readings of Hegel’s principle of determinate negation and rejection of the principle of non-contradiction, as well as of the ontology of Hegelian Spirit as the unity of substance and subject, all designed to reveal these components of Hegelian thought as productive resources for analytic philosophers. (shrink)

Ernest Nagel’s two-part article entitled “Impressions and Appraisals of Analytic Philosophy in Europe” undoubtedly played a crucial role in the development of analytic philosophy in both Europe and the United States. Nagel articulates the shared metaphilosophical assumptions embraced by philosophers from various centres, including Prague, Vienna, Lviv, Warsaw, and Cambridge. Nevertheless, it is important to note that philosophers began to describe themselves using the term “analytical philosopher,” or a similar term, particularly within the intellectual centre of (...) Cambridge, in the early 1930s in Britain. In this article, I shall compare how these philosophers conceptualized “analytic philosophy” with the metaphilosophical assumptions outlined by Nagel. Then, I shall draw a comparison between the understanding of analytic philosophy in the early 1930s in Britain, and contemporary conceptions such as “conceptual creativity” and “conceptual engineering.” As it turns out, a part of contemporary analytic philosophy is more open to social-practical issues than it was in the early 1930s in Britain, especially in the intellectual centre that was Cambridge. (shrink)