In recent work, Peter Railton, Julia Annas, and David Velleman aim to reconcile the phenomenon of “flow”—broadly understood as describing the “unreflective” aspect of skilled action—with one or another familiar conception of agency. While there are important differences between their arguments, Railton, Annas, and Velleman all make, or are committed to, at least one similar pivotal claim. Each argues, directly or indirectly, that agents who perform skilled unreflective actions can, in principle, accurately answer “Anscombean” questions—”what” and “why” questions— about what (...) they do. I argue against this claim and explore the ramifications for theories of skilled action and agency. (shrink)

The standard model of knowledge, \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$$$\end{document}, consists of state space, Ω\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\varOmega$$\end{document}, and possibility correspondence, P\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$P$$\end{document}. Usually, it is assumed that P\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$P$$\end{document} satisfies all knowledge axioms. Violating at least one of these axioms is defined as epistemic bounded rationality. If this happens, a researcher may (...) try to look for another model, \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$$$\end{document}, which generates the initial model, \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$$$\end{document}, while satisfying all knowledge axioms. Rationalizing EBR means that the researcher finds such a model. I determine when rationalization of EBR is possible. I also investigate when a model, \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$$$\end{document}, which satisfies all knowledge axioms, generates a model, \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$$$\end{document}, which satisfies these axioms as well. (shrink)

In ‘The Epistemic Goals of the Humanities’, Stephen Grimm (2024) argues for epistemic continuities between the humanities, on one hand, and the social and natural sciences, on the other. This paper focuses on discontinuities. Drawing inspiration from Svetlana Alexievich’s literary non-fiction, I argue that if a reader is to gain a specific kind of understanding of the actions of the agents who appear in such work, they must engage in a rational evaluation of those agents’ reasons and actions. This epistemic (...) process may yield, not just understanding of another’s action, but a grip on the evaluative distance between the reader and the agents she reads about, together with a greater appreciation of normative matters. These epistemic gains are, I suggest, central to the value of the humanities, and play a key role in its corrective power. (shrink)

Russellians, Relationists, and Fregeans disagree about the nature of propositional-attitude content. We articulate a framework to characterize and evaluate this disagreement. The framework involves two claims: i) that we should individuate attitude content in whatever way fits best with the explanations that characteristically appeal to it, and ii) that we can understand those explanations by analogy with other ‘higher-level’ explanations. Using the framework, we argue for an under-appreciated form of Russellianism. Along the way we demonstrate that being more explicit about (...) the framework in which debates about attitude content take place allows us to more precisely characterize the space of possible positions and the dialectic between them. (shrink)

Focal points seem to be important in helping players coordinate their strategies in coordination problems. Game theory lacks, however, a formal theory of focal points. This paper proposes a theory of focal points that is based on individual rationality considerations. The two principles upon which the theory rest are the Principle of Insufficient Reason (IR) and a Principle of Individual Team Member Rationality. The way IR is modelled combines the classic notion of description symmetry and a new notion of pay-off (...) symmetry, which yields different predictions in a variety of games. The theory can explain why people do better than pure randomization in matching games. (shrink)

Beliefs can be evaluated from a number of perspectives. Epistemic evaluation involves epistemic standards and appropriate epistemic goals. On a truthconducive account of epistemic justification, a justified belief is one that serves the goal of believing truths and avoiding falsehoods. Beliefs are also prompted by nonepistemic reasons. This raises the question of whether, say, the pragmatic benefits of a belief are able to rationalize it. In this paper, after criticizing certain responses to this question, I shall argue that, as far (...) as beliefs are concerned, justification has an essentially epistemic character. This conclusion is then qualified by considering the conditions under which pragmatic consequences of a belief can be epistemically relevant. (shrink)

That Socrates took himself to possess a divine sign is well attested by ancient sources. Both Plato and Xenophon mention Socrates’ daimonion on numerous occasions. What is problematic for contemporary scholars is that Socrates unfailingly obeys the warnings of his sign. Scholars have worried that Socrates seems to ascribe greater epistemic authority to his sign than his own critical reasoning. Moreover, he never so much as questions the authority of his sign to guide his actions, much less its divine nature. (...) Socrates’ unquestioning obedience to his sign thus appears to be in conflict with another of Socrates’ defining characteristics: namely, his relentless rationality. However, Socrates does not seem to recognize such inconsistency. The problem of the daimonion, then, is this: is Socrates’ professed commitment to rationality consistent with his unquestioning deference to his daimonion’s warnings? And if so, how? In this paper, I first discuss several solutions to the problem of the daimonion. I aim to show that none of the accounts of Socrates’ sign that have appeared in the scholarly literature are adequate. I then propose a new account of the daimonion, which, I argue, secures the rationality of Socrates’ obedience to his divine sign. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Legislation recently adopted by the United States Congress provides producers of pandemic vaccines with near‐total immunity from civil lawsuits without making individuals injured by those vaccines eligible for compensation through the Vaccine Injury Compensation Program. The unusual decision not to provide an alternative mechanism for compensation is indicative of a broader problem of inconsistency in the American approach to vaccine‐injury compensation policy. Compensation policies have tended to reflect political pressures and economic considerations more than any cognizable set of principles. (...) This article identifies a set of ethical principles bearing on the circumstances in which vaccine injuries should be compensated, both inside and outside public health emergencies. A series of possible bases for compensation rules, some grounded in utilitarianism and some nonconsequentialist, are discussed and evaluated. Principles of fairness and reasonableness are found to constitute the strongest bases. An ethically defensible compensation policy grounded in these principles would make a compensation fund available to all individuals with severe injuries and to individuals with less‐severe injuries whenever the vaccination was required by law or professional duty. (shrink)

This article argues that the long-standing tension in Jeffrey Alexander’s work between theoretical multidimensionality and socio-cultural idealism has intensified in his recent writings, to problematical effect. Whilst Alexander has shifted of late towards a more substantive and normative style of thinking, his new emphases continue to be grounded in arguments pitched at the general theoretical level. One of these involves a particular reading of the nature of post-positivist meta-theory today, and the other, within this, is a determined effort to distinguish (...) a project of ‘cultural sociology’ from ‘sociology of culture’ approaches. I take issue with both of these theoretical moves, showing that they are rhetorically and conceptually flawed, and of a strongly idealist cast. They also run counter to those aspects of Alexander’s outlook that do seem more robustly multidimensional and sociologically promising. (shrink)

A central notion in Donald Davidson's philosophy of mind and action is "rationalization," a species of causal explanation designed in part to reveal the point or purpose of the explananda. An analogue of this notion - noninstrumental rationalization - merits serious attention. I develop an account of this species of rationalization and display its utility in explaining the production of certain desires and of motivationally biased beliefs.

This is the last of four chapters on belief democracy, and discusses how to rationalize persistent opposition in the light of Wollheim's paradox, and Bayesian considerations that make it utterly irrational for anyone ever to continue disagreeing once everyone has voted. The first section demonstrates that none of the easy and obvious ways of extending the Bayesian framework rationalize majoritarianism without derationalizing ongoing opposition. Next, various ways of moving beyond Bayes to overcome the paradox of persisting opposition are put forward; (...) these include repudiating Bayesian reasoning altogether, assuming that disagreement betokens unreliability, assuming that smaller groups are inherently more reliable, and assuming that each election is different; none of these produce the required result. Finally, political arguments are put forward more explicitly to see whether they can rationalize ongoing opposition; these include the crucial role of opposition in democratic politics, proceduralism, denying propositional content, biased perception, strategic voting, segmented information pools, and different interests. In the light of what has been presented overall, the author puts forward his own explanation, which suggests that what is wrong with Bayesian models that ask us to update our beliefs in the light of others’ votes is that those votes mix facts and values, and only one of these can reasonably be taken into account in updating our beliefs; thus, it is the epistemic power of majorities when dealing with shared facts that underwrites the rationality of majority rule, but their lack of epistemic authority when it comes to matters of evaluations that underwrites the rationality of persisting opposition. (shrink)

According to Humean theories of objective chance, the chances reduce to patterns in the history of occurrent events, such as frequencies. According to non-Humean accounts, the chances are metaphysically fundamental, existing independently of the "Humean Mosaic" of actually-occurring events. It is therefore possible, by the lights of non-Humeanism, for the chances and the frequencies to diverge wildly. Humeans often allege that this undermines the ability of non-Humean accounts of chance to rationalize adherence to David Lewis' Principal Principle (PP), which states (...) that an agent's degrees of belief should match what they take to be the objective chances. In this paper, I propose two approaches to justifying (PP) for non-Humean chance, hence defusing the Humean objection. The first approach justifies (PP) via the role it plays in informing outright beliefs about long-run frequencies. The second approach justifies (PP) by showing that adherence to (PP), even for non-Humean chance, maximizes expected epistemic utility according to the actual objective chance function. I then address an objection to this approach, concerning the alleged circularity of the derivations. (shrink)

Alan Millar examines our understanding of why people think and act as they do. His key theme is that normative considerations form an indispensable part of the explanatory framework which we use to understand each other. Millar offers illuminating discussions of reasons for belief and reasons for action, the explanation of beliefs and actions in terms of the subject's reasons, the idea that simulation has a key role in understanding people, and the limits of explanation in terms of propositional attitudes.

The increased focus on issues of gender and schooling in India over the last decade has produced several gains that include more incentive schemes to make girls attend school, greater employment of women teachers and improved efforts to incorporate female protagonists in textbooks. However, a closer reading of this ‘gender’ focus reveals an inordinate concern with numbers, i.e. enrolment. The instrumentalism that underlies these efforts is revealed through a double-move effected by existing discourses. The first is to locate the reasons (...) why girls are out of school strictly within a reading of cultural and familial practices and (secondly) to therefore fail to recognize normative practices of schooling and State policies as already deeply ‘gendered’. This double-move is epitomized in the Indian State’s more recent efforts to set up residential elementary schools for girls (Kasturba Gandhi Vidyalayas) in each district of the country; an effort that has been publicly lauded as the most effective way to overcome cultural barriers to girls’ schooling. Through a focus on policy documents that discuss this scheme, the article will interrogate the existing conflation of ‘gender’ with a biological/culturalist reading of the ‘girl child’. In what ways does this narrow focus naturalize a binary frame of reference around the traditional family/community and the empowered girl child? Why have State efforts around educating the ‘girl child’ not been subject to greater critical analysis amongst feminist scholars in India? (shrink)

ABSTRACTDecades of research demonstrate that most people have little knowledge or understanding of politics. Two recent works suggest that this reflects the limits of human cognitive capacity. Rather than being reasoned, political thinking is mostly preconscious, automatic, and recall driven. Consequently, it is vulnerable to contextual cueing, preexisting biases, and biological and genetic predispositions. However, this research is oriented by an inadequate understanding of cognition.

A common assumption among Kantians is that the feelings/inclinations constituting non-moral motivation are little different from the brute sensations and blind instinctual urges found in animals. And since this “inner animal” lacks reason, it cannot control itself. So our rational nature must step in to govern. The problem, however, is that it must do so as a nature standing above the animal as an independent ruler. I reject this understanding of our lower nature, arguing instead that reason governs from within (...) our lower nature, by giving it shape and structure. I show that this is possible because Kant actually held a cognitive theory of emotion, one in which feeling takes the form of judgments of fit between an object and the sensible needs of the subject, by which the life or well-being of the subject is promoted. Through these judgments of feeling, reason generates a complex evaluative framework that structures our practical point of view. (shrink)

The present account aims to contribute to a better characterization of the state and the dynamics of embryological knowledge at the dawn of the molecular revolution in biology. In this study, Albert Dalcq (1893-1973) was chosen as a representative of a generation of embryologists who found themselves at the junction of two very different approaches to the study of life: the first, focusing on global properties of organisms; the second focusing on the characterization of basic molecular constituents. Though clearly belonging (...) to the organismic tradition, Dalcq was already blending his experimental and explanatory practices with biochemical aspects by the 1930s. Principally based on published sources, the present analysis focuses on the conceptual definitions, modifications and interrelations on which Dalcq's explanation of development rested. Among these are variant process concepts such as gradients and fields, which are often thought to have strongly holistic implications. I will argue that Dalcq's version of these concepts was compatible with a more reductionist treatment of embryos than was accepted by most embryologists as late as the 1950s, pointing to some extent toward the recent molecular characterization of gradients by molecular geneticists such as Christiane Nüsslein-Volhard. Moreover, I will show how the embryological research program of Dalcq and his pupil Jean Brachet has been largely instrumental in the development of molecular biology in Belgium. (shrink)

Beauchamp and Childress (1994) elaborated an approach to bioethical deliberations based on four universalistic principles. This framework of ‘principlism’ has been criticized from within biomedical ethics as insufficient and problematic. However, this article considers a more radical sociological critique by John Evans (2002) that rejects the entire approach of defining ‘principles’ a priori. This sociological critique is based on classical sociologist Max Weber's (1925) distinction between instrumental (‘thin’) and substantive (‘thick’) rationality. As an exploratory assessment of Evans' critique, his conceptualization (...) of ‘thin’ versus ‘thick’ rationalization is applied to a large sample of Anglo-American press coverage ( n = 5126) of the bioethical controversy surrounding therapeutic cloning. Given the role of mainstream news media as a key arena for the discursive framing of biomedical research and its ethical implications, the findings raise important questions about principlism and the mediation of bioethical debates on issues such as therapeutic cloning. (shrink)

With a global commitment to scaling up AIDS care and treatment in resource-poor settings for some of the most HIV-affected countries in Africa, availability of antiretroviral treatment is no longer the principal obstacle to expanding access to treatment. A shortage of trained healthcare personnel to initiate treatment and manage patients represents a more challenging barrier to offering life-saving treatment to all patients in need. Physician-centered treatment policies accentuate this challenge. Despite evidence that task shifting for nurse-centered AIDS patient care is (...) effective and can alleviate severe physician shortages that currently obstruct treatment scale-up, political commitment and policy action to support task shifting models of care has been slow to absent. In this paper we review the evidence in support of task shifting for AIDS treatment in Africa and argue that continued policy inaction amounts to unwarranted healthcare rationing and as such is ethically untenable. (shrink)

Cushman's rationalization account can be extended to cover another part of his portrayal of representational exchange: thought experiments that lead to conclusions about the self. While Cushman's argument is compelling, a full account of rationalization as adaptive will need to account for the divergence in rationalizing one's actions compared to the actions of others.