Results for 'rational expectations equilibrium'

979 found
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  1.  20
    A defense of rational expectations / general equilibrium analysis against Austrian objections.Christopher Phelan - 1987 - Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society 1 (4):100-108.
  2.  58
    Arbitrage, rationality, and equilibrium.Robert F. Nau & Kevin F. McCardle - 1991 - Theory and Decision 31 (2):199-240.
    No-arbitrage is the fundamental principle of economic rationality which unifies normative decision theory, game theory, and market theory. In economic environments where money is available as a medium of measurement and exchange, no-arbitrage is synonymous with subjective expected utility maximization in personal decisions, competitive equilibria in capital markets and exchange economies, and correlated equilibria in noncooperative games. The arbitrage principle directly characterizes rationality at the market level; the appearance of deliberate optimization by individual agents is a consequence of their adaptation (...)
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  3.  11
    Individual Forecasting and Aggregate Outcomes: 'Rational Expectations' Examined.Roman Frydman & Edmund S. Phelps (eds.) - 1986 - Cambridge University Press.
    Growing out of a conference on Expectations Formation and Economic Disequilibrium held in New York City in 1981, the papers in this volume provide a complex view of market processes in which individual rationality is no guarantee of convergence to the 'correct' model and the equilibrium coordination of agents' plans. They reject the 'optimality' argument for the rational expectations hypothesis, opening the door to other hypotheses of optimal expectations of agents in the decentralized market economy.
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  4.  49
    Chance, utility, rationality, strategy, equilibrium.Anatol Rapoport - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (2):172-173.
    Almost anyone seriously interested in decision theory will name John von Neumann's (1928) Minimax Theorem as its foundation, whereas Utility and Rationality are imagined to be the twin towers on which the theory rests. Yet, experimental results and real-life observations seldom support that expectation. Over two centuries ago, Hume (1739–40/1978) put his finger on the discrepancy. “Reason,” he wrote “is, and ought to be the slave of passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey (...)
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  5.  90
    Complex dynamics in equilibrium asset pricing models with boundedly rational, heterogeneous agents.Paul M. Beaumont, Yuanying Guan & Alec N. Kercheval - 2014 - Complexity 19 (3):38-55.
  6.  12
    Equilibrium and Rationality: Game Theory Revised by Decision Rules.Paul Weirich - 1998 - Cambridge University Press.
    This book represents a major contribution to game theory. It offers this conception of equilibrium in games: strategic equilibrium. This conception arises from a study of expected utility decision principles, which must be revised to take account of the evidence a choice provides concerning its outcome. The argument for these principles distinguishes reasons for action from incentives, and draws on contemporary analyses of counterfactual conditionals. The book also includes a procedure for identifying strategic equilibria in ideal normal-form games. (...)
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  7. Rationality, coordination, and convention.Margaret Gilbert - 1990 - Synthese 84 (1):1 - 21.
    Philosophers using game-theoretical models of human interactions have, I argue, often overestimated what sheer rationality can achieve. (References are made to David Gauthier, David Lewis, and others.) In particular I argue that in coordination problems rational agents will not necessarily reach a unique outcome that is most preferred by all, nor a unique 'coordination equilibrium' (Lewis), nor a unique Nash equilibrium. Nor are things helped by the addition of a successful precedent, or by common knowledge of generally (...)
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  8.  12
    (1 other version)[Book review] equilibrium and rationality, game theory revised by decision rules. [REVIEW]Paul Weirich - 1998 - Ethics 109 (3):684-686.
    This book represents a major contribution to game theory. It offers this conception of equilibrium in games: strategic equilibrium. This conception arises from a study of expected utility decision principles, which must be revised to take account of the evidence a choice provides concerning its outcome. The argument for these principles distinguishes reasons for action from incentives, and draws on contemporary analyses of counterfactual conditionals. The book also includes a procedure for identifying strategic equilibria in ideal normal-form games. (...)
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  9.  45
    Equilibrium semantics of languages of imperfect information.Merlijn Sevenster & Gabriel Sandu - 2010 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 161 (5):618-631.
    In this paper, we introduce a new approach to independent quantifiers, as originally introduced in Informational independence as a semantic phenomenon by Hintikka and Sandu [9] under the header of independence-friendly languages. Unlike other approaches, which rely heavily on compositional methods, we shall analyze independent quantifiers via equilibriums in strategic games. In this approach, coined equilibrium semantics, the value of an IF sentence on a particular structure is determined by the expected utility of the existential player in any of (...)
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  10.  62
    A Rational Way of Playing: Revision Theory for Strategic Interaction.Riccardo Bruni & Giacomo Sillari - 2018 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 47 (3):419-448.
    Gupta has proposed a definition of strategic rationality cast in the framework of his revision theory of truth. His analysis, relative to a class of normal form games in which all players have a strict best reply to all other players’ strategy profiles, shows that game-theoretic concepts have revision-theoretic counterparts. We extend Gupta’s approach to deal with normal form games in which players’ may have weak best replies. We do so by adapting intuitions relative to Nash equilibrium refinements to (...)
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  11.  5
    Strategy: Reason and Equilibrium.David Gauthier - 1986 - In David P. Gauthier (ed.), Morals by agreement. New York: Oxford University Press.
    Morality is concerned with interaction among persons, and so with strategic choice, in which each adopts a strategy on the basis of what he expects others to do. We state three conditions of strategically rational choice, and show that on the maximizing conception of rationality they require the expected outcome of interaction to be in equilibrium, so that each person's choice is a maximizing response to the choices of the others. We mention Nash's proof that in any finite (...)
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  12.  54
    The virtues and vices of equilibrium and the future of financial economics.J. Doyne Farmer & John Geanakoplos - 2009 - Complexity 14 (3):11-38.
  13. What is rational about Nash equilibria?Mathias Risse - 2000 - Synthese 124 (3):361 - 384.
    Nash Equilibrium is a central concept ingame theory. It has been argued that playing NashEquilibrium strategies is rational advice for agentsinvolved in one-time strategic interactions capturedby non-cooperative game theory. This essaydiscusses arguments for that position: vonNeumann–Morgenstern's argument for their minimaxsolution, the argument from self-enforcingagreements, the argument from the absence ofprobabilities, the transparency-of-reasons argument,the argument from regret, and the argument fromcorrelated equilibrium. All of these argumentseither fail entirely or have a very limited scope.Whatever the use of Nash (...) is, therefore,it is not useful as a rational recommendation inone-time strategic interactions. This is good newsfor Bayesians: although this discussion does notargue directly for the Bayesian idea of rationalityas expected utility maximization, it argues againsta position that has been regarded as a contender insituations of strategic interaction. (shrink)
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  14.  12
    Coordination Mechanisms for the Two-Echelon Newsvendor Model with Rapidly Responsive and Strategic Consumers.Dai Dai, Xinyu Gou & Qiang Wei - 2021 - Complexity 2021:1-15.
    Aiming at the two-echelon newsvendor problem in which the market demand of commodities is random both in normal sales period and in liquidation period, this paper studies the pricing and ordering decision of retailers by using rational expectation equilibrium under the condition of considering consumersʼ strategic behavior and rapid response mechanism. Then, the decision-making problem under retailersʼ initial order quantity commitment is discussed, as well as the effect of commitment mechanism on supply chain performance. On this basis, both (...)
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  15. The Case against Rational Egoism in Dostoevsky's "Notes from Underground".James Patrick Scanlan - 1999 - Journal of the History of Ideas 60 (3):549.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Case against Rational Egoism in Dostoevsky’s Notes from Underground*James P. ScanlanWriting in his own voice, in letters, notebooks, and diaries, Fyodor Dostoevsky frequently attacked the philosophy of the Russian “nihilists,” as he typically called them—Nikolay Chernyshevsky, Dmitry Pisarev, and other representatives of the radical Russian intelligentsia in the third quarter of the nineteenth century. But because Dostoevsky also used fiction to argue against them, if we wish (...)
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  16.  40
    Correction to McKelvey and page, “public and private information: An experimental study of information pooling”.Robin Hanson - unknown
    In their article, McKelvey and Page note that In previous experimental work, ... [researchers] investigated how individuals use public information to augment their original private information, and whether in doing so, a rational expectations equilibrium is attained. ... [But either] the inference processes are complicated because of the enormous number of potential interactions among the individuals, and the optimal inference processes are not analyzed. ... [or] the inference process is analyzed but the working assumption is not altogether (...)
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  17.  96
    Common Knowledge of Rationality in Extensive Games.Boudewijn de Bruin - 2008 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 49 (3):261-280.
    We develop a logical system that captures two different interpretations of what extensive games model, and we apply this to a long-standing debate in game theory between those who defend the claim that common knowledge of rationality leads to backward induction or subgame perfect (Nash) equilibria and those who reject this claim. We show that a defense of the claim à la Aumann (1995) rests on a conception of extensive game playing as a one-shot event in combination with a principle (...)
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  18.  44
    Prediction, Bayesian Deliberation and Correlated Equilibrium.Isaac Levi - 1998 - Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook 5:173-185.
    In a pair of controversy provoking papers1, Kadane and Larkey argued that the normative or prescriptive understanding of expected utility theory recommended that participants in a game maximize expected utility given their assessments of the probabilities of the moves that other players would make. They observed that no prescription, norm or standard of Bayesian rationality recommends how they should come to make probability judgments about the choices of other players. For any given player, it is an empirical question as to (...)
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  19.  9
    Re-reasoning ethics: the rationality of deliberation and judgment in ethics.C. Barry Hoffmaster - 2018 - Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press. Edited by C. A. Hooker.
    How developing a more expansive, non-formal conception of reason produces richer ethical understandings of human situations, explored and illustrated with many real examples. In Re-Reasoning Ethics, Barry Hoffmaster and Cliff Hooker enhance and empower ethics by adopting a non-formal paradigm of rational deliberation as intelligent problem-solving and a complementary non-formal paradigm of ethical deliberation as problem-solving design to promote human flourishing. The non-formal conception of reason produces broader and richer ethical understandings of human situations, not the simple, constrained depictions (...)
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  20. Trust and Strategic Rationality.Bernd Lahno - 1995 - Rationality and Society 7 (4):442-464.
    The extent to which trust prevails can be measured by the subjective probability with which an agent expects another one to act in desired ways. An agent´s trust in other agents forms in repeated social interactions which typically have the structure of an elementary game of trust. The process of trust formation in such interactions may be described by a reputation function. It is argued that in view of real world processes of trust formation any adequate reputation function must satisfy (...)
     
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  21. Where did economics go wrong? Modern economics as a flight from reality.Peter J. Boettke - 1997 - Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society 11 (1):11-64.
    F. A. Hayek's realistic economic theory has been replaced by the formalistic use of equlibrium models that bear little resemblance to reality. These models are as serviceable to the right as to the left: they allow the economist either to condemn capitalism for failing to measure up to the model of perfect competition, or to praise capitalism as a utopia of perfect knowledge and rational expectations. Hayek, by contrast, used equilibrium to show that while capitalism is not (...)
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  22. Life without Virtue: Economists Rule; Review Essay of Dani Rodrik's Economics Rules.S. M. Amadae - 2020 - Economic Issues 25 (2):51-70.
    This review essay of Economics Rules situates Dani Rodrik’s contribution with respect to the 2007–2008 global economic crisis. This financial meltdown, which the eurozone did not fully recover from before the Covid-19 pandemic, led to soul- searching among economists as well as a call for heterodox economic approaches. Yet, over the past decade, instead the economics profession has maintained its orthodoxy. Rodrik’s Economics Rules offers a critique of the economics profession that is castigating but mild. It calls for economists to (...)
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  23. Non-Naturalist Moral Realism and the Limits of Rational Reflection.Max Khan Hayward - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (4):724-737.
    This essay develops the epistemic challenge to non-naturalist moral realism. While evolutionary considerations do not support the strongest claims made by ‘debunkers’, they do provide the basis for an inductive argument that our moral dispositions and starting beliefs are at best partially reliable. So, we need some method for separating truth from falsity. Many non-naturalists think that rational reflection can play this role. But rational reflection cannot be expected to bring us to truth even from reasonably accurate starting (...)
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  24.  22
    Self-fulfilling chaotic mistakes: Some examples and implications.Barkley Rosser - manuscript
    In talks given early in the 1990s, Jean-Michel Grandmont (1998) introduced the concept of the self-fulfilling mistake. This phenomenon can emerge when economic agents cannot distinguish between randomness and determinism, a situation that can occur when the underlying true dynamics are chaotic (Radunskaya, 1994), although such a situation could arise with other forms of complex nonlinear dynamics besides those involving chaotic dynamics. In such a situation, agents may be unable to discern the true dynamics and may adopt simple, boundedly (...) “rules of thumb” based on some kind of backward-looking adaptive expectations (Bullard, 1994). For certain kinds of underlying processes, agents may be able to mimic the actual dynamics with such an “incorrect” behavioral rule, an outcome known as a consistent expectations equilibrium (CEE), a concept formalized by Hommes (1998) as meaning that the two processes have identical means and also autocorrelation coefficients at all leads and lags. Sorger (1998) and Hommes and Sorger (1998) have shown how in some cases agents can learn to converge on such CEEs, or self-fulfillingly mistaken behavior. These models all involve discrete dynamics. The first realization that a discrete chaotic dynamic could be mimicked by a simple linear autocorrelation function is due to Bunow and Weiss (1979) and Sakai and Tokumaru (1980), the latter demonstrating the possibility for the case of the asymmetric tent map, a result studied in more depth by Brock and Dechert (1991) and Radunskaya (1994). (shrink)
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  25. Complexity in Economics: Macroeconomics, financial markets, and international economics.John Barkley Rosser - 2004 - Edward Elgar Pub.
    Increasingly in economics what had been considered to be unusual and unacceptable has come to be considered usual and acceptable, if not necessarily desirable. Whereas it had been widely believed that economic reality could be reasonably described by sets of pairs of linear supply and demand curves intersecting in single equilibrium points to which markets easily and automatically moved, now it is understood that many markets and situations do not behave so well. Economic reality is rife with nonlinearity, discontinuity, (...)
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  26.  72
    From Hayek to Keynes: G.L.S. shackle and ignorance of the future.Greg Hill - 2004 - Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society 16 (1):53-79.
    G.L.S. Shackle stood at the historic crossroads where the economics of Hayek and Keynes met. Shackle fused these opposing lines of thought in a macroeconomic theory that draws Keynesian conclusions from Austrian premises. In Shackle 's scheme of thought, the power to imagine alternative courses of action releases decision makers from the web of predictable causation. But the spontaneous and unpredictable choices that originate in the subjective and disparate orientations of individual agents deny us the possibility of rational (...), and therewith the logical coherence of market equilibrium over time. (shrink)
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  27.  21
    Business cycles and black holes.Clifford F. Thies - 1991 - Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society 5 (2):291-299.
    Real business cycle theory, as exemplified by Fischer Black's Business Cycles and Equilibrium, posits that business cycles are due to random?technology shocks,? and not to monetary, fiscal or other government policies. Rational expectations and complete markets are supposed to enable decision makers to avoid the costly mistakes that would otherwise result from policies that distort incentives to borrow and invest. This paper questions the assumptions of rational expectations and complete markets from an Austrian?school perspective. It (...)
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  28. Economic Concepts for the Social Sciences.Todd Sandler - 2001 - Cambridge University Press.
    The primary purpose of this book is to present some of the key economic concepts that have guided economic thinking in the last century and to identify which of these concepts will continue to direct economic thought in the coming decades. This book is written in an accessible manner and is intended for a wide audience with little or no formal training in economics. It should also interest economists who want to reflect on the direction of the discipline and to (...)
     
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  29.  20
    Lucas’ expectational equilibrium, price rigidity, and descriptive realism.Mauro Boianovsky - 2022 - Journal of Economic Methodology 29 (1):66-85.
    Robert Lucas' article on the neutrality of money represented the first effective challenge to Samuelson’s neoclassical synthesis methodological separation between static microeconom...
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  30.  62
    Rationality, Expected Utility Theory and the Precautionary Principle.Andreas Christiansen - 2019 - Ethics, Policy and Environment 22 (1):3-20.
    A common objection to the precautionary principle is that it is irrational. I argue that this objection goes beyond the often-discussed claim that the principle is incoherent. Instead, I argue, exp...
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  31.  17
    (1 other version)Darwinian rational expectations.Kobi Finestone - forthcoming - Tandf: Journal of Economic Methodology:1-11.
  32.  37
    Rethinking rational expectations in complex economic systems: Cars Hommes' resurrection of Poincaré's view.Alan Kirman - 2014 - Journal of Economic Methodology 21 (3):313-316.
  33.  20
    Towards Bounded Rationality within Rational Expectations: Some Comments from an Economic Point of View.Lutz Beinsen & Ulrike Leopold-Wildburger - 1998 - Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook 5:141-152.
    Rationality has been a principle widely assumed in economics from early on. In contrast, rationality in the formation of economic expectations is rather new. Since the term “rational expectations” has meanwhile become a kind of slogan for diverse issues in economics as in related fields, there is some danger of authors’ not always being aware of the true meaning of this technical term. Sometimes it is used, in a context where expectation formation about uncertain events is essential, (...)
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  34.  7
    The Evolving Rationality of Rational Expectations: An Assessment of Thomas Sargent's Achievements.Esther-Mirjam Sent - 1998 - Cambridge University Press.
    Inspired by recent developments in science studies, this book offers an innovative type of analysis of the recent history of rational expectations economics. In the course of exploring the multiple dimensions of rational expectations analysis, Professor Sent focuses on the work of Thomas Sargent, an instrumental pioneer in the development of this school of thought. The investigation attempts to avoid a Whiggish history that sees Sargent's development as inevitably progressing to better and better economic analysis. Instead, (...)
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  35.  37
    Comprehension priming as rational expectation for repetition: Evidence from syntactic processing.Mark Myslín & Roger Levy - 2016 - Cognition 147 (C):29-56.
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  36.  17
    The Rational Expectations Hypothesis: Theoretical Critique.Tomáš Frömmel - 2017 - E-Logos 24 (2):4-12.
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  37. Strategic behavior and counterfactuals.Cristina Bicchieri - 1988 - Synthese 76 (1):135 - 169.
    The difficulty of defining rational behavior in game situations is that the players'' strategies will depend on their expectations about other players'' strategies. These expectations are beliefs the players come to the game with. Game theorists assume these beliefs to be rational in the very special sense of beingobjectively correct but no explanation is offered of the mechanism generating this property of the belief system. In many interesting cases, however, such a rationality requirement is not enough (...)
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  38.  50
    Is it rational to have rational expectations?Alan Kirman - 2014 - Mind and Society 13 (1):29-48.
    In economics in situations where there is uncertainty one has to attribute some attitude to handling this uncertainty to individuals. The original idea was to assume that “people do not make systematic mistakes” for which Muth coined the term “rational expectations”. This was replaced by a much more formal vision which suggested that people fully understand how the economy evolves. In this paper I will argue that the foundations of the “rational expectations” hypothesis which has underpinned (...)
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  39.  28
    Steuerungsabstinenz als Ordnungsvision: Soziologische Beobachtungen zur Rational Expectations Revolution in der Makroökonomik.Hanno Pahl - 2015 - Zeitschrift für Kritische Sozialtheorie Und Philosophie 2 (2):285-313.
    Name der Zeitschrift: Zeitschrift für kritische Sozialtheorie und Philosophie Jahrgang: 2 Heft: 2 Seiten: 285-313.
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  40. Competition over agents with boundedly rational expectations.Ran Spiegler - unknown
    I study a market model in which profit-maximizing firms compete in multidimensional pricing strategies over a consumer, who is limited in his ability to grasp such complicated objects and therefore uses a sampling procedure to evaluate them. Firms respond to increased competition with an increased effort to obfuscate, rather than with more competitive pricing. As a result, consumer welfare is not enhanced and may even deteriorate. Specifically, when firms control both the price and the quality of each dimension, and there (...)
     
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  41.  69
    Soros's Reflexivity Concept in a Complex World: Cauchy Distributions, Rational Expectations, and Rational Addiction.John B. Davis - 2013 - Journal of Economic Methodology 20 (4):368-376.
    George Soros makes an important analytical contribution to understanding the concept of reflexivity in social science by explaining reflexivity in terms of how his cognitive and manipulative causal functions are connected to one another by a pair of feedback loops (Soros, 2013). Fallibility, reflexivity and the human uncertainty principle. Here I put aside the issue of how the natural sciences and social sciences are related, an issue he discusses, and focus on how his thinking applies in economics. I argue that (...)
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  42. Risk, rationality and expected utility theory.Richard Pettigrew - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (5-6):798-826.
    There are decision problems where the preferences that seem rational to many people cannot be accommodated within orthodox decision theory in the natural way. In response, a number of alternatives to the orthodoxy have been proposed. In this paper, I offer an argument against those alternatives and in favour of the orthodoxy. I focus on preferences that seem to encode sensitivity to risk. And I focus on the alternative to the orthodoxy proposed by Lara Buchak’s risk-weighted expected utility theory. (...)
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  43.  76
    Maximin play in completely mixed strategic games.Vitaly Pruzhansky - 2013 - Theory and Decision 75 (4):543-561.
    Since the seminal paper of Nash (Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 36:48–49, 1950) game theoretic literature has focused mostly on equilibrium and not on maximin (minimax) strategies. In a recent paper of Pruzhansky (Int J Game Theory 40:351–365, 2011) it was shown that under fairy general conditions maximin strategies in completely mixed games can guarantee the same expected payoff as completely mixed Nash equilibrium strategies. Based on this finding, the current paper argues that maximin strategies have important properties. (...)
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  44. Rationality and reflective equilibrium.Edward Stein - 1994 - Synthese 99 (2):137-72.
    Cohen (1981) and others have made an interesting argument for the thesis that humans are rational: normative principles of reasoning and actual human reasoning ability cannot diverge because both are determined by the same process involving our intuitions about what constitutes good reasoning as a starting point. Perhaps the most sophisticated version of this argument sees reflective equilibrium as the process that determines both what the norms of reasoning are and what actual cognitive competence is. In this essay, (...)
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  45.  36
    Legitimate Expectations, Legal Transitions, and Wide Reflective Equilibrium.Fergus Green - 2017 - Moral Philosophy and Politics 4 (2):177-205.
    Recent scholarly attention to ‘legitimate expectations’ and their role in legal transitions has yielded widely varying principles for distinguishing between legitimate and non-legitimate expectations. This article suggests that methodological reflection may facilitate substantive progress in the debate. Specifically, it proposes and defends the use of a wide reflective equilibrium methodology for constructing, justifying and critiquing theories of legitimate expectations and other kinds of normative theories about legal transitions. The methodology involves three levels of analysis — normative (...)
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  46.  24
    Rational Behaviour and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations.John C. Harsanyi - 1977 - Cambridge University Press.
    This is a paperback edition of a major contribution to the field, first published in hard covers in 1977. The book outlines a general theory of rational behaviour consisting of individual decision theory, ethics, and game theory as its main branches. Decision theory deals with a rational pursuit of individual utility; ethics with a rational pursuit of the common interests of society; and game theory with an interaction of two or more rational individuals, each pursuing his (...)
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  47.  66
    Student evaluations and moral Hazard.Nalinaksha Bhattacharyya - 2004 - Journal of Academic Ethics 2 (3):263-271.
    Most universities solicit feedback from students at the end of a course in order to assess student perceptions of the course. This feedback is used for various objectives, including for evaluating teaching by academic administrators. One would therefore expect faculty to rationally take this into account while formulating their teaching strategy. In certain cases, such strategic considerations can give rise to moral hazard. I have modelled the situation using the well-known Prisoners Dilemma game and found that in equilibrium, the (...)
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  48.  47
    The Value of a Probability Forecast from Portfolio Theory.D. J. Johnstone - 2007 - Theory and Decision 63 (2):153-203.
    A probability forecast scored ex post using a probability scoring rule (e.g. Brier) is analogous to a risky financial security. With only superficial adaptation, the same economic logic by which securities are valued ex ante – in particular, portfolio theory and the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) – applies to the valuation of probability forecasts. Each available forecast of a given event is valued relative to each other and to the “market” (all available forecasts). A forecast is seen to be (...)
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  49.  27
    Expected Utility and Rationality.John Broome - 1991 - In Weighing Goods: Equality, Uncertainty and Time. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 90–120.
    This chapter concerns with rational preferences in the face of uncertainty. The goodness of uncertain prospects is best understood in terms of rational preferences. The chapter discusses some necessary spadework. Its particular purpose is to defend some parts of expected utility theory as an account of rational preferences. It explains the general idea of expected utility theory, and particularly how it is founded on axioms. The principal axiom is also explained. It is often called the 'sure‐thing principle', (...)
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  50.  61
    Studies in Inductive Probability and Rational Expectation.Robert John Ackermann - 1981 - Philosophical Books 22 (1):44-46.
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