Results for 'rational'

961 found
Order:
See also
Bibliography: Rationality and Cognitive Science in Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Bibliography: Moral Rationalism in Meta-Ethics
Bibliography: Moral Rationality in Meta-Ethics
Bibliography: Rationality in Epistemology
Bibliography: Rationalism in Metaphilosophy
Bibliography: Operationalism in General Philosophy of Science
Bibliography: Rational Choice Theory in Philosophy of Social Science
Bibliography: Rationality-Based Accounts of Self-Knowledge in Philosophy of Mind
Bibliography: Irrationality in Epistemology
Bibliography: Rational Requirements in Epistemology
...
Other categories were found but are not shown. Use more specific keywords to find others, or browse the categories.
  1.  17
    Ending the Rationality Wars.Rationality Disappear - 2002 - In Renée Elio (ed.), Common sense, reasoning, & rationality. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 236.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2.  20
    Stephen Neale.Rational Belief - 1996 - Mind 105 (417).
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  3. Hubert L. Dreyfus and Stuart E. Dreyfus.Model Of Rationality - 1978 - In A. Hooker, J. J. Leach & E. F. McClennen (eds.), Foundations and Applications of Decision Theory: Vol.II: Epistemic and Social Applications. D. Reidel. pp. 115.
  4. Leonard M. Fleck.Care Rationing & Plan Fair - 1994 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 19 (4-6):435-443.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. Moral Faith, and Religion.".Rational Theology - 1992 - In Paul Guyer (ed.), The Cambridge companion to Kant. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 394--416.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6.  9
    Richard Samuels, Stephen Stich, & Michael Bishop.Rationality Disappear - 2002 - In Renée Elio (ed.), Common sense, reasoning, & rationality. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 236.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7.  5
    Primary works.Rational Grammar - 2005 - In Siobhan Chapman & Christopher Routledge (eds.), Key thinkers in linguistics and the philosophy of language. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. pp. 10.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8. Rational Number Representation by the Approximate Number System.Chuyan Qu, Sam Clarke, Francesca Luzzi & Elizabeth Brannon - 2024 - Cognition 250 (105839):1-13.
    The approximate number system (ANS) enables organisms to represent the approximate number of items in an observed collection, quickly and independently of natural language. Recently, it has been proposed that the ANS goes beyond representing natural numbers by extracting and representing rational numbers (Clarke & Beck, 2021a). Prior work demonstrates that adults and children discriminate ratios in an approximate and ratio-dependent manner, consistent with the hallmarks of the ANS. Here, we use a well-known “connectedness illusion” to provide evidence that (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  9. Rational Reflection.David Christensen - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):121-140.
    This paper explores an initially attractive principle connecting beliefs in general with beliefs about what beliefs are rational. The principle turns out to be violated by intuitively rational beliefs in some situations. The paper lays out some options for reacting to this fact.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   91 citations  
  10. New Rational Reflection and Internalism about Rationality.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 5.
    Numerous authors have defended the rough idea that it is irrational to fail to conform to one’s judgments about what it would be rational to do, or what doxastic states it would be rational to be in. This chapter examines rational reflection principles as an attempt to implement this idea in contexts of uncertainty about what credence distributions are rational. After outlining some problems with Old Rational Reflection, the chapter discusses what seems like a well-motivated (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   44 citations  
  11. Rational Self-Doubt and the Failure of Closure.Joshua Schechter - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):428-452.
    Closure for justification is the claim that thinkers are justified in believing the logical consequences of their justified beliefs, at least when those consequences are competently deduced. Many have found this principle to be very plausible. Even more attractive is the special case of Closure known as Single-Premise Closure. In this paper, I present a challenge to Single-Premise Closure. The challenge is based on the phenomenon of rational self-doubt – it can be rational to be less than fully (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   97 citations  
  12. Rational Polarization.Kevin Dorst - 2023 - Philosophical Review 132 (3):355-458.
    Predictable polarization is everywhere: we can often predict how people’s opinions, including our own, will shift over time. Extant theories either neglect the fact that we can predict our own polarization, or explain it through irrational mechanisms. They needn’t. Empirical studies suggest that polarization is predictable when evidence is ambiguous, that is, when the rational response is not obvious. I show how Bayesians should model such ambiguity and then prove that—assuming rational updates are those which obey the value (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  13.  90
    Rational Consensus in Science and Society: A Philosophical and Mathematical Study.Keith Lehrer & Carl Wagner - 1981 - Boston: D. Reidel.
    CONSENSUS AND PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES Various atomistic and individualistic theories of knowledge, language, ethics and politics have dominated philosophical ...
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   123 citations  
  14. Is Rationality Normative?John Broomespecial Issue On Normativity & Edited by Teresa Marques Rationality - 2007 - Special Issue on Normativity and Rationality, Edited by Teresa Marques 2 (23).
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15. cv where Vv i∈.Elephant Bird, Ameba Shark, Bird Rational & Elephant Rational - 2006 - In Paolo Valore (ed.), Topics on General and Formal Ontology. Polimetrica International Scientific Publisher.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16. The rational impermissibility of accepting (some) racial generalizations.Renée Jorgensen Bolinger - 2020 - Synthese 197 (6):2415-2431.
    I argue that inferences from highly probabilifying racial generalizations are not solely objectionable because acting on such inferences would be problematic, or they violate a moral norm, but because they violate a distinctively epistemic norm. They involve accepting a proposition when, given the costs of a mistake, one is not adequately justified in doing so. First I sketch an account of the nature of adequate justification—practical adequacy with respect to eliminating the ~p possibilities from one’s epistemic statespace. Second, I argue (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   93 citations  
  17.  44
    Rational Rules: Towards a Theory of Moral Learning.Shaun Nichols - 2021 - Oxford University Press.
    Rational Rules argues that moral learning can be understood in terms of general-purpose rational learning procedures. Nichols provides statistical learning accounts of some fundamental aspects of moral development, combining aspects of traditional empiricist and rationalist approaches.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  18. Discourses on Africa.Man is A. Rational Animal - 2003 - In P. H. Coetzee & A. P. J. Roux (eds.), Philosophy from Africa: A text with readings 2nd Edition. London, UK: Oxford University Press.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  19. (2 other versions)Rational Impressions and the Stoic Philosophy of Mind.Vanessa de Harven - 2017 - In John Sisko (ed.), in History of Philosophy of Mind: Pre-Socratics to Augustine. Acumen Publishing. pp. 215-35.
    This paper seeks to elucidate the distinctive nature of the rational impression on its own terms, asking precisely what it means for the Stoics to define logikē phantasia as an impression whose content is expressible in language. I argue first that impression, generically, is direct and reflexive awareness of the world, the way animals get information about their surroundings. Then, that the rational impression, specifically, is inherently conceptual, inferential, and linguistic, i.e. thick with propositional content, the way humans (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  20.  69
    Rational causation.Eric Marcus - 2012 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
  21. Douglas D. heckathorn.Sociological Rational Choice - 2001 - In Barry Smart & George Ritzer (eds.), Handbook of social theory. Thousands Oaks, Calif.: SAGE.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  22. The symmetry of rational requirements.Jonathan Way - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 155 (2):227-239.
    Some irrational states can be avoided in more than one way. For example, if you believe that you ought to A you can avoid akrasia by intending to A or by dropping the belief that you ought to A. This supports the claim that some rational requirements are wide-scope. For instance, the requirement against akrasia is a requirement to intend to A or not believe that you ought to A. But some writers object that this Wide-Scope view ignores asymmetries (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   41 citations  
  23.  48
    Rational Sentimentalism.Justin D'Arms & Daniel Jacobson - 2022 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    Rational Sentimentalism develops a novel theory of the sentimental values. These values, which include the funny, the disgusting, and the shameful, are profoundly important because they set standards for emotional responses that are part of our shared human nature. Yet moral philosophers have neglected them relative to their prominence in human mental life. The theory is sentimentalist because it holds that these values are emotion-dependent—contrary to some prominent accounts of the funny and the disgusting. Its rational aspect arises (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  24. The scope of rational requirements.John Brunero - 2010 - Philosophical Quarterly 60 (238):28-49.
    Niko Kolodny has argued that some (local) rational requirements are narrow-scope requirements. Against this, I argue here that all (local) rational requirements are wide-scope requirements. I present a new objection to the narrow-scope interpretations of the four specific rational requirements which Kolodny considers. His argument for the narrow-scope interpretations of these four requirements rests on a false assumption, that an attitude which puts in place a narrow-scope rational requirement somewhere thereby puts in place a narrow-scope (...) requirement everywhere. My argument against Kolodny is analogous to arguments which use holism about reasons to defend moral particularism. (shrink)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   51 citations  
  25.  37
    Rational Consensus in Science and Society.Robert F. Bordley - 1986 - Noûs 20 (4):565-568.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   55 citations  
  26.  14
    Rational Preference Utilitarianism.Thomas Young - 1988 - Philosophy in Context 18:19-27.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  27. What is Rational Belief?Clayton Littlejohn & Julien Dutant - 2024 - Noûs 58 (2):333-359.
    A theory of rational belief should get the cases right. It should also reach its verdicts using the right theoretical assumptions. Leading theories seem to predict the wrong things. With only one exception, they don't accommodate principles that we should use to explain these verdicts. We offer a theory of rational belief that combines an attractive picture of epistemic desirability with plausible principles connecting desirability to rationality. On our view, it's rational to believe when it's sufficiently likely (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  28.  43
    13 Rational theology, moral faith, and religion.Allen W. Wood - 1992 - In Paul Guyer (ed.), The Cambridge companion to Kant. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 3--394.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  29.  76
    Rational choice and agm belief revision.Giacomo Bonanno - 2009 - Artificial Intelligence 173 (12-13):1194-1203.
    We establish a correspondence between the rationalizability of choice studied in the revealed preference literature and the notion of minimal belief revision captured by the AGM postulates. A choice frame consists of a set of alternatives , a collection E of subsets of (representing possible choice sets) and a function f : E ! 2 (representing choices made). A choice frame is rationalizable if there exists a total pre-order R on..
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  30. Rational Agnosticism and Degrees of Belief.Jane Friedman - 2013 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 4:57.
    There has been much discussion about whether traditional epistemology's doxastic attitudes are reducible to degrees of belief. In this paper I argue that what I call the Straightforward Reduction - the reduction of all three of believing p, disbelieving p, and suspending judgment about p, not-p to precise degrees of belief for p and not-p that ought to obey the standard axioms of the probability calculus - cannot succeed. By focusing on suspension of judgment (agnosticism) rather than belief, we can (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   55 citations  
  31. Rational cooperation.David Gauthier - 1974 - Noûs 8 (1):53-65.
  32.  39
    Surprisingly rational: Probability theory plus noise explains biases in judgment.Fintan Costello & Paul Watts - 2014 - Psychological Review 121 (3):463-480.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  33. The Rational Faculty of Desire.T. A. Pendlebury & Jeremy Fix - forthcoming - In Carla Bagnoli & Stefano Bacin (eds.), Reason, Agency and Ethics. Oxford University Press.
    This essay is about the relationship between the notions of practical reason, the will, and choice in Kant’s practical philosophy. Although Kant explicitly identifies practical reason and the will, many interpreters argue that he cannot really mean it on the grounds that unless they are distinct, irrational and, especially, immoral action is impossible. Other readers affirm his identification but distinguish the will from choice on the same basis. We argue that proper attention to Kant’s conception of practical reason as a (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  34.  32
    The Rational and the Social.G. S. Axtell - 1993 - Noûs 27 (2):276-278.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  35.  38
    Rational Reconstruction as a Method of Political Theory between Social Critique and Empirical Political Science.Daniel Gaus - 2013 - Constellations 20 (4):553-570.
  36.  13
    On the Limits of Medical Experiment from the Perspective of Rational Choice Theory.Wojciech Załuski - 2024 - Diametros 21 (81):80-88.
    Polskie przepisy prawne formułujące warunki dopuszczalności eksperymentu medycznego, a więc ipso facto wyznaczające jego granice, można różnorako interpretować, zwłaszcza w tym zakresie, w jakim określają wymagany dla przeprowadzenia eksperymentu bilans związanych z nim możliwych korzyści i szkód. W artykułach prawniczych komentujących te przepisy w zasadzie jednak brak prób systematycznego i (na tyle, na ile pozwala na to sam przedmiot analizy) ścisłego wyróżnienia tych interpretacji w języku tzw. teorii racjonalnego wyboru (rational choice theory), teorii szczególnie przydatnej w tym kontekście z (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  37. Epistemic dilemmas and rational indeterminacy.Nick Leonard - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (3):573-596.
    This paper is about epistemic dilemmas, i.e., cases in which one is doomed to have a doxastic attitude that is rationally impermissible no matter what. My aim is to develop and defend a position according to which there can be genuine rational indeterminacy; that is, it can be indeterminate which principles of rationality one should satisfy and thus indeterminate which doxastic attitudes one is permitted or required to have. I am going to argue that this view can resolve epistemic (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  38.  42
    The Dynamics of Rational Deliberation.Brian Skyrms - 1990 - Harvard University Press.
    Brian Skyrms constructs a theory of "dynamic deliberation" and uses it to investigate rational decision-making in cases of strategic interaction. This illuminating book will be of great interest to all those in many disciplines who use decision theory and game theory to study human behavior and thought. Skyrms begins by discussing the Bayesian theory of individual rational decision and the classical theory of games, which at first glance seem antithetical in the criteria used for determining action. In his (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   138 citations  
  39.  78
    Rational belief systems.Brian David Ellis - 1979 - Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Littlefield.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   100 citations  
  40.  18
    Rational Counterattack: The Impact of Workplace Bullying on Unethical Pro-organizational and Pro-family Behaviors.Qunchao Wan, Xianchun Zhang, Na Fu, Jinlian Luo & Zhu Yao - 2021 - Journal of Business Ethics 181 (3):661-682.
    In business ethics research, little is known about why and how employees engage in unethical behavior, especially unethical pro-organizational behavior (UPB) and unethical pro-family behavior (UPFB). Based on cognitive-affective personality system theory and conservation of resources theory, this study aims to explore the mechanisms underlying the effects of workplace bullying, as a negative event, on UPB (Study 1) and UPFB (Study 2). In Study 1, workplace bullying negatively correlated with UPB where emotional exhaustion and organization-oriented moral disengagement played chain-mediating roles (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  41.  33
    Fast, frugal, and rational: How rational norms explain behavior.Nick Chater, Mike Oaksford, Ramin Nakisa & Martin Redington - 2003 - Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 90 (1):63-86.
    Much research on judgment and decision making has focussed on the adequacy of classical rationality as a description of human reasoning. But more recently it has been argued that classical rationality should also be rejected even as normative standards for human reasoning. For example, Gigerenzer and Goldstein and Gigerenzer and Todd argue that reasoning involves “fast and frugal” algorithms which are not justified by rational norms, but which succeed in the environment. They provide three lines of argument for this (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   35 citations  
  42. Rational analysis, intractability, and the prospects of ‘as if’-explanations.Iris van Rooij, Johan Kwisthout, Todd Wareham & Cory Wright - 2018 - Synthese 195 (2):491-510.
    Despite their success in describing and predicting cognitive behavior, the plausibility of so-called ‘rational explanations’ is often contested on the grounds of computational intractability. Several cognitive scientists have argued that such intractability is an orthogonal pseudoproblem, however, since rational explanations account for the ‘why’ of cognition but are agnostic about the ‘how’. Their central premise is that humans do not actually perform the rational calculations posited by their models, but only act as if they do. Whether or (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  43.  17
    The Rational Foundations of Ethics.T. L. S. Sprigge - 1989 - Philosophy 64 (247):113-114.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   25 citations  
  44. Rational animals.Donald Davidson - 1982 - Dialectica 36 (4):317-28.
    SummaryNeither an infant one week old nor a snail is a rational creature. If the infant survives long enough, he will probably become rational, while this is not true of the snail. If we like, we may say of the infant from the start that he is a rational creature because he will probably become rational if he survives, or because he belongs to a species with this capacity. Whichever way we talk, there remains the difference, (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   318 citations  
  45.  28
    Teaching Rational Entitlement and Responsibility: A Socratic Exercise.David Godden - 2014 - Informal Logic 34 (1):124-151.
    The paper reports on a Socratic exercise that introduces participants to the norm of rational entitlement, as distinct from political entitlement, and the attendant norm of rational responsibility. The exercise demonstrates that, because participants are not willing to exchange their own opinion at random for another differing opinion to which the owner is, by the participants’ own admission, entitled, they treat their entitlement to their own opinion differently, giving it a special status. This gives rise to rational (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  46. Rational Epistemic Akrasia.Allen Coates - 2012 - American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (2):113-24.
    Epistemic akrasia arises when one holds a belief even though one judges it to be irrational or unjustified. While there is some debate about whether epistemic akrasia is possible, this paper will assume for the sake of argument that it is in order to consider whether it can be rational. The paper will show that it can. More precisely, cases can arise in which both the belief one judges to be irrational and one’s judgment of it are epistemically (...) in the sense that both are supported by sufficient evidence. (shrink)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   94 citations  
  47. Rational Capacities, or: How to Distinguish Recklessness, Weakness, and Compulsion.Michael Smith - 2003 - In Sarah Stroud & Christine Tappolet (eds.), Weakness of will and practical irrationality. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 17-38.
    We ordinarily suppose that there is a difference between having and failing to exercise a rational capacity on the one hand, and lacking a rational capacity altogether on the other. This is crucial for our allocations of responsibility. Someone who has but fails to exercise a capacity is responsible for their failure to exercise their capacity, whereas someone who lacks a capacity altogether is not. However, as Gary Watson pointed out in his seminal essay ’Skepticism about Weakness of (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   134 citations  
  48.  39
    Religious Disagreement and Rational Demotion.Michael Bergmann - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 6:21-57.
    This paper defends the view that, in certain actual circumstances that aren’t uncommon for educated westerners, an awareness of the facts of religious disagreement doesn’t make theistic belief irrational. The first section makes some general remarks about when discovering disagreement (on any topic) makes it rational to give up your beliefs: it discusses the two main possible outcomes of disagreement (i.e., defeat of one’s disputed belief and demotion of one’s disputant), the main kinds of evidence that are relevant to (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  49. Rational Faith and Justified Belief.Lara Buchak - 2014 - In Laura Frances Callahan & Timothy O'Connor (eds.), Religious Faith and Intellectual Virtue. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 49-73.
    In “Can it be rational to have faith?”, it was argued that to have faith in some proposition consists, roughly speaking, in stopping one’s search for evidence and committing to act on that proposition without further evidence. That paper also outlined when and why stopping the search for evidence and acting is rationally required. Because the framework of that paper was that of formal decision theory, it primarily considered the relationship between faith and degrees of belief, rather than between (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   26 citations  
  50. Seeking Confirmation Is Rational for Deterministic Hypotheses.Joseph L. Austerweil & Thomas L. Griffiths - 2011 - Cognitive Science 35 (3):499-526.
    The tendency to test outcomes that are predicted by our current theory (the confirmation bias) is one of the best-known biases of human decision making. We prove that the confirmation bias is an optimal strategy for testing hypotheses when those hypotheses are deterministic, each making a single prediction about the next event in a sequence. Our proof applies for two normative standards commonly used for evaluating hypothesis testing: maximizing expected information gain and maximizing the probability of falsifying the current hypothesis. (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
1 — 50 / 961