A critical but underdeveloped part of the libertarian debate about immigration is the question of who, if anyone, owns public property, and the consequences of the answer to this question. Libertarians who favor restrictive immigration policies, such as Hans-Hermann Hoppe, argue that taxpayers own public property, and that the state, while it is in control of such property, should manage it on behalf of taxpayers in the same way private owners would manage their own (...) class='Hi'>property. In other words, it should be quite selective about who may enter. Walter Block, who takes an “open borders” position, does not appear to dispute the claim that taxpayers own public property, but nevertheless argues that immigrants are entitled to ignore the state’s control of, and thus may freely enter, such property. In this article I explore the question of public property ownership using Rothbardian property rights principles. I conclude that, at least with respect to a particular type of public property, neither Hoppe’s nor Block’s reasoning is consistent with these principles. I also consider the idea that the state ought to have a role in managing public property in light of some libertarian anarchist ideas about the state. I conclude that supporting a legitimate role for the state as an immigration gatekeeper is inconsistent with Rothbardian and Hoppean libertarian anarchism, as well as with the associated strategy of advocating always and in every instance reductions in the state’s role in society. (shrink)

In the ancient Greek city, was sacred land distinct from public land? Were there points of intersection or areas of overlap between the two or was there no distinction at all? First, evidence from Athens is examined through a discussion of N. Papazarkadas' recent monograph, Sacred and Public Land in Ancient Athens. Three criteria for classifying landed property as sacred are proposed in that study: the prohibition or authorization to cultivate sacred land; the use of revenues for (...) cultic purposes; and the inalienability of sacred land. But this trio of criteria does not in fact allow us to establish a clear division between sacred land and public land. The evidence from other cities shows the existence of land defined simultaneously as and the possibility of co-ownership and joint possession between god and city; a distinct place within the city's total property could also be reserved for sacred property (either land or funds). (shrink)

Libertarians often assume that a free society will be one in which all (or nearly all) property is private. I have previously expressed my dissent from this consensus, arguing that libertarian principles instead support a substantial role for public property. (" In Defense of Public Space ," Formulations, Vol. III, No. 3 (Spring 1996).) In this article I develop this heretical position further.

Political theory lacks a compelling account of public property. Addressing this gap, I present a “deep public ownership” model, according to which the body politic ultimately owns all the resources within its jurisdiction. I argue that this model is compatible with liberal intuitions regarding private property. I then contend that the model expands the scope of government’s duty to uphold the equality of all citizens, by challenging private property constraints on antidiscriminatory government policies. I anticipate (...) the worry that the model supports excessive government intrusion into private affairs. I close by discussing abuse of public property by elected leaders. (shrink)

In accordance with the principle of historical materialism, nature of the property depends primarily on the fact that the actual possession of the property, rather than on their legal ownership first. Accordingly, the Isle of Man from the stock of the "separation of ownership 'departure, the actual property is not recognized joint-stock private property, but" social property ", so they also hopes to achieve socialism in stock. However, the situation at the time, the Isle of (...) Man is sometimes still only legal private ownership of property from the stock starting to think so, sometimes with analysis of private enterprise, "Das Kapital" residual value analysis on the model of joint-stock company, joint-stock property changes on the significant underestimate, even such as the stock is still equivalent to private ownership. According to the principle of materialism, the feature of property first depends on the reality of factual possession of property, but does not first depend on its legal ownership. Hence, from the theory of share holding system of its "separdtion of ownership and manageship" , Marx and Engels considered that the property of share holding system is actually not the private property, but the "public property". They, therefore, put the hope of realizing socialism on the share holding system. But under that situation, Marx and Engels could only consider the problems from the legal private ownership of the property of share holding system by using the theory of surplus values ​​and even regard the share holding system as private ownership. (shrink)

In this paper, first, I want to clarify the nature and function of private property. Second, I want to clarify the distinction between “common” goods and property and “public” goods and property, and explain the construction error inherent in the institution of public goods and property. Third, I want to explain the rationale and principle of privatization.

In this paper I explore the limitations of liberal political theory in relation to the notions of public property and public interest. I argue that the fundamentally atomistic and individualistic ontological foundations of the liberal tradition preclude any coherent notion of public goods and public interest.

Generally, in liberal democratic systems, it is assumed that government should forbear from interference with existing individual property entitlements. It is assumed that existing individual property entitlements should be respected, with government reluctant to interfere. Despite the ubiquity of this assumption, the theoretical underpinning for it is not obvious. A sovereign must respond to the needs of all of the members of the greater community for which it speaks. In view of this obligation, irrevocably assigning property rights (...) to some, and not to others, is an inherently troublesome proposition. In this Article, the reasons for this state of affairs are examined. The conclusion is reached that conventional theories advanced by courts and commentators for government forbearance — such as protecting individual reliance interests, or advancing other independent policies — fail to explain the forbearance phenomenon. A more convincing reason can be found in a public fiduciary theory of government. However, recognition of this reveals that the property/sovereignty relationship is far more complex than a simple forbearance model would dictate. In fact, it mandates — in some circumstances — government nonforbearance, as well. (shrink)

The impending missions to exploit natural resources of celestial bodies may at some point start interfering with the scientific interests, including those of astrobiology, in these bodies. While the legal status of celestial bodies at the highest level is clear, uncertainty has arisen as to the extent private property rights over such objects or over their resources are legally acceptable, legally impossible, or potentially legal. This also provides for a considerable amount of uncertainty regarding how the legal framework could (...) or may need to be changed to accommodate private interests. The article analyzes the two main international treaties relevant from this perspective, as well as their backgrounds, in order to outline the current legal status of celestial bodies and the resulting legal rights and obligations pertinent to both private exploitation and exploration. Based on such an analysis, it concludes by highlighting an approach that could actually incentivize the private sector and the science community to work together in a manner conducive to their interests in exploitation and exploration respectively. (shrink)

The right to private property is among the most fundamental in liberal theory. For many liberals the idea of the state is grounded in its role as a protector of private property. If the liberal state is justified by its ability to protect property, the modern welfare state is often justified by its ability to meet needs. According to a view commonly referred to as “welfarism,” the very fact that needs exist implies there is a moral obligation (...) to meet them. In this Article I appeal to Rawlsian contractualist justification, including the “criterion of reciprocity,” in developing a third manner of thinking about the relationship between property and welfare. I argue that welfare rights are necessary conditions for justifying a role for the state in enforcing the “right to exclude,” a fundamental element of private ownership. My Article thus aims to use Rawls’ account of justification, outlined in his later works, to theorize the notion of property-owning democracy from Theory of Justice. (shrink)

The impending missions to exploit natural resources of celestial bodies may at some point start interfering with the scientific interests, including those of astrobiology, in these bodies. While the legal status of celestial bodies at the highest level is clear, uncertainty has arisen as to the extent private property rights over such objects or over their resources are legally acceptable, legally impossible, or potentially legal. This also provides for a considerable amount of uncertainty regarding how the legal framework could (...) or may need to be changed to accommodate private interests. The article analyzes the two main international treaties relevant from this perspective, as well as their backgrounds, in order to outline the current legal status of celestial bodies and the resulting legal rights and obligations pertinent to both private exploitation and exploration. Based on such an analysis, it concludes by highlighting an approach that could actually incentivize the private sector and the science community to work together in a manner conducive to their interests in exploitation and exploration respectively. (shrink)

This article is part of a Symposium that examines the legal and policy issues raised by the Schwarzenegger bobblehead doll litigation, in which a Hollywood star-turned-governor sued under California's right of publicity laws and under federal copyright law to stop a small Ohio company from selling a bobblehead doll depicting Schwarzenegger in a business suit, with a bandolier of bullets, and brandishing an assault rifle. The article contends that defendants' unauthorized use of the Schwarzenegger image on dolls and their accompanying (...) packaging was permissible as First Amendment-protected free speech under California's right of publicity laws and also constituted fair use under federal copyright law. The article rejects the argument that a First Amendment defense to plaintiff's right of publicity claims was unavailable because a bobblehead doll is not a "traditional" medium of expression for ideas. The article recognizes that overly expansive assertions of rights of publicity and other intellectual property rights threaten to stifle creative expression and diminish the cultural commons. The article also calls for clearer and more consistent recognition of defenses to right of publicity claims, particularly for cases where a defendant's unauthorized appropriation of another's image or likeness is for purposes of caricature, parody, or satire¿especially where the image is that of a politician. It concludes that the settlement of the Schwarzenegger bobblehead doll case illustrates how "strategic" assertions of even objectively non-meritorious rights of publicity can allow powerful plaintiffs to censor unflattering depictions of them and to unduly expand intellectual property rights without full adjudication on the merits of such claims.This insight is critical, because while other scholars have suggested that the "over-protection" of intellectual property rights (including rights of publicity) has a deleterious effect on freedom of expression and the public domain, these criticisms focus almost exclusively on published appellate cases. Yet, as this article reminds us, most cases settle and never become litigated cases, much less published appellate decisions. And most disputes - including intellectual property disputes - never result in formal litigation in the first instance. As with most other areas of the civil disputing process, intellectual property disputes are processed in the "shadow of the law", where repeat players have strategic advantages to shape the outcomes of disputes in their favor. Thus, if we want to know whether intellectual property rights are over-protected, we need to know what happens (and why) in the shadow of intellectual property law. This insight is the basis for the author's empirical research-in-progress focusing on "strategic intellectual property enforcement" by owners of trademarks, copyrights, and patents, including enforcement that never results in litigation and is thus under the radar of what most legal scholars in this area of law examine. (shrink)

No natural rights theory justifies strong intellectual property rights. More specifically, no theory within the entire domain of natural rights thinking – encompassing classical liberalism, libertarianism and left-libertarianism, in all their innumerable variants – coherently supports strengthening current intellectual property rights. Despite their many important differences, all these natural rights theories endorse some set of members of a common family of basic ethical precepts. These commitments include non-interference, fairness, non-worsening, consistency, universalisability, prior consent, self-ownership, self-governance, and the establishment (...) of zones of autonomy. Such commitments have clear applications pertaining to the use and ownership of created ideas. I argue that each of these commitments require intellectual property rights to be substantially limited in scope, strength and duration. In this way the core mechanisms of natural rights thinking ensure a robust public domain and categorically rule out strong intellectual property rights. (shrink)

May a hotel owner that objects to same-sex marriage on religious grounds refuse to host a same-sex wedding in its ballroom or deny the couple the right to book the honeymoon suite? Do public accommodation laws oppress religious dissidents by forcing them to act contrary to their religious beliefs or does discriminatory exclusion threaten equal access to the market economy and deny equal citizenship to LGBTQ persons? Answering these questions requires explaining why one property claim should prevail over (...) another and why one liberty should prevail when it clashes with another. And answering those questions requires analysis of the relationship between property and sovereignty. Sovereign power both creates and regulates the types of property rights that can be tolerated in a free and democratic society that values each person equally. Should we view sovereignty as a threat to property or property as a threat to sovereignty? Libertarians choose the first and liberals the second. But this is the wrong way to understand the relation between property and sovereignty. Property and sovereignty are not separate and independent concepts or spheres of social life that can be brought into relationship with each other. Rather, they are imbricated; they overlap like roof tiles. Our aspiration to live in a free and democratic society places certain constraints on both property and sovereignty. Such societies do not recognize absolute power, whether public or private. Free and democratic societies are committed to a substantive vision of both social relations and politics. We have fruitful debates about property and sovereignty and, in the end, must construct a legal system that effects an acceptable compromise between access and exclusion in the property regime. Our historic practices regarding racial and other forms of discrimination and our evolving norms suggest that public accommodation laws enable access to the marketplace without regard to invidious discrimination. Religious freedom cannot operate to deny equal citizenship or opportunity. For that reason, a same-sex couple should not have to call ahead to see if they are welcome to book the honeymoon suite. Public accommodation laws do not infringe on legitimate property rights or religious freedoms; rather, they define the legitimate contours of liberty and property in a society that treats each person with equal concern and respect. (shrink)

Natural Property Rights presents a novel theory of property based on individual, pre-political rights. The book argues that a just system of property protects people's rights to use resources and also orders those rights consistent with natural law and the public welfare. Drawing on influential property theorists such as Grotius, Locke, Blackstone, and early American statesmen and judges, as well as recent work in in normative and analytical philosophy, the book shows how natural rights guide (...) political and legal reasoning about property law. It examines how natural rights justify the most familiar institutions in property, including public property, ownership, the system of estates and future interests, leases, servitudes, mortgages, police regulation, and eminent domain. Thought-provoking and comprehensive, the book challenges leading contemporary justifications for property and shows how property both secures individual freedom and serves the common good. (shrink)

For many readers, Rousseau's views on property represent the most ambiguous and contradictory aspect of an already undeveloped economic theory. In this paper, I re-examine this popular criticism from the standpoint of the philosopher's well-known critique of public opinion to argue that property is a more consistent and systematically articulated concept in Rousseau's writings than may appear. I argue that opinion, rather than private property, poses the greatest danger to self-made law and that the narrowness and (...) peculiarity of its political threat demonstrates Rousseau's restrictions against private wealth to be less comprehensive than many believe. (shrink)

Abstract: This paper restates the thesis of 'The Requirements of Justice and Liberal Socialism" where it was argued that liberal socialism best meets Rawlsian requirements of justice. The recent responses to this paper by Jan Narveson, Jeppe von Platz, and Alan Thomas merit examination and comment. This paper shows that if Rawlsian justice is to be met, then non-personal property must be subject to public control. If just outcomes merit the public control of non-personal property and (...) this control is not utilized, then justice has been subordinated to the objectively less important institution of private property. (shrink)

This paper applies aspects of Hugo Grotius's theologically informed theory of property to contemporary issues concerning access to the human DNA sequence and patenting practices. It argues that Christians who contribute to public debate in these areas might beneficially employ some of the concepts with which he worked--notably "common right," the "right of necessity," and "use right." In the seventeenth century, wars were fought over trading rights and access to the sea. In the twenty-first century, information and intellectual (...) property are the issues of the day. Grotius's writings serve to correct the overemphasis in modern liberalism on individual rights, and have practical application to the debate concerning the reduction of the human genome to the status of private property. (shrink)

En 1885, le Bureau des longitudes se voit contraint d’adapter les éphémérides de la Connaissance des temps aux besoins des navigateurs. En procédant à un audit sur les éphémérides en usage dans les ports, le Bureau redécouvre que depuis 1836 sont publiées à Saint-Brieuc des Éphémérides maritimes,véritables extraits de la CDT. Nous avons ainsi identifié une affaire de contrefaçon d’éphémérides nautiques. Les pièces de son jugement par un tribunal rennais posent la question cruciale de la propriété intellectuelle des calculs astronomiques. (...) Au-delà de cette affaire concernant des imprimeurs-libraires briochins et parisiens, nous interrogeons aussi l’insuffisance de la réponse apportée par le Bureau des longitudes aux demandes répétées de simplification des éphémérides à destination des marins. (shrink)

Concern about the commercialization of research is rising, notably in testing new drugs. The problem involves oversimplified, polarizing assumptions about research and development (R&D) and intellectual property (IP). To address this problem this paper sets forth a more complex three phase RT&D process, involving Scientific Research (R), Technological Innovation (T), and Commercial Product Development (D) or the RT&D process. Scientific research and innovation testing involve costly intellectual work and do not produce free goods, but rather require IP regulation. RT&D (...) processes involve an unrecognized IP shift from a common IP right in public goods like information and knowledge to private IP in products and other hard assets. The question then is, what kind of IP right: private or common? Since scientific research and innovation testing require openness about adverse findings, and wide, low cost diffusion of results, they require a common, inclusive IP right. Common IP is appropriate to both sharing knowledge goods and recovering the cost of production. Research is furthermore compatible with commercialization and support by other social interests. On the other hand it is incompatible with the exclusionary private IP rights that permit restrictive publication or total suppression of information. Private IP rather than commercialization conflicts with the openness requirements of scientific research and innovation testing. Commercial funding, however, is in principle compatible with research and testing, especially when regulated by a common IP right. This reflects a pragmatic view of the fundamental interconnections of knowledge and other social interests. (shrink)

Property rights are the rules governing ownership in society. This Element offers an analytical framework to understand the origins and consequences of property rights. It conceptualizes of the political economy of property rights as a concern with the follow questions: What explains the origins of economic and legal property rights? What are the consequences of different property rights institutions for wealth creation, conservation, and political order? Why do property institutions change? Why do legal reforms (...) relating to property rights such as land redistribution and legal titling improve livelihoods in some contexts but not others? In analyzing property rights, the authors emphasize the complementarity of insights from a diversity of disciplinary perspectives, including Austrian economics, public choice, and institutional economics, including the Bloomington School of institutional analysis and political economy. (shrink)

The negotiations of the intergovernmental group known as the ‘IGWG’, undertaken by the Member States of the WHO, were the result of a deadlock in the World Health Assembly held in 2006 where the Member States of the WHO were unable to reach an agreement on what to do with the 60 recommendations in the report on ‘Public Health, Innovation and Intellectual Property Rights submitted to the Assembly in the same year by a group of experts designated by (...) the Director General of the WHO. The result of these negotiations was the ‘Global strategy and plan of action on public health, innovation and intellectual property’ which was approved by the World Health Assembly in 2008. The intention of the Global Strategy and Plan of Action (GSPOA) which was produced by the IGWG was to substantially reform the pharmaceuticals' research and development system in view of the findings that this system, whose purpose is to produce medicines for diseases which affect the greater part of the world population which lives in developing countries, had failed. The intellectual property rights imposed by the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and the recent trade agreements could become one of the main obstacles to access to medicines. The GSPOA makes a critical analysis of this reality, and opens the door to searching for new solutions to this problem. (shrink)

Intellectual property Rights (IPRs) is protected by different systems of laws. Journals must choose a definitive form of systems. Some Blackwell journals use copyright system and some Blackwell use license from authors. Now a days online journals are using creative common licenses. Under creative common license journals are open access, allowed to download, copy, distribute, and display derivative works with proper attribution to author or owner for noncommercial purpose at a free cost. Education on IPRs will support to comprehend (...) ones rights, professional code of conduct and the doctrine of "fair use" in publication. One cannot do anything with once writing. Researchers, academic, editors and readers must have the basic knowledge on who owns the rights in a publication and what users can do with the publication by law. (shrink)

Property, or property rights, remains one of the most central elements in moral, legal, and political thought. It figures centrally in the work of figures as various as Grotius, Locke, Hume, Smith, Hegel and Kant. This collection of essays brings fresh perspective on property theory, from both legal and political theoretical perspectives, and is essential reading for anyone interested in the nature of property. Edited by two of the world's leading theorists of property, James Penner (...) and Michael Otsuka, this volume brings together essays which consider, amongst other topics, property and public law, the importance of legal forms in property theory, whether use or exclusion are most essential to our understanding of property, distributive justice, Lockean and Grotian theories, the common ownership of the Earth, and Confucian ideas of property. (shrink)

Waters aries that the demands of indigenous bio-prospecting programs need to be considered against the needs of indigenous communities. Issues of sovereignty and rights to self-determination need to be resolved in the context of negotiating bio-prospecting plans. By setting out clear guidelines and priorities, as determined through the eyes and values of indigenous peoples, indigenous communities may have an opportunity to participate in the global sharing of biomedical information and healing for all our relations. Before any projects get underway, however, (...) social, political, and legal issues ought to be settled so that informed decision can be made on the part of indigenous communities to partake of the invitation to bio-prospecting, or not. (shrink)

Efforts to protect endangered species by regulating the use of privately owned lands are routinely resisted by appeal to the private property rights of landowners. Recently, the 'wise-use' movement has emerged as a primary representative of these landowners' claims. In addressing the issues raised by the wise-use movement and others like them, legal scholars and philosophers have typically examined the scope of private property rights and the extent to which these rights should influence public policy decisions when (...) weighed against other moral considerations. Whether from an anthropocentric standpoint or from a perspective of moral extensionism, the key question seems to be the extent to which prima facie property rights are overridden by other moral interests, not whether such rights claims can reasonably be appealed to at all in public discussions of environmental justice. I argue, however, that a morally extensionist perspective not only introduces more potential defeaters of prima facie property rights, but actually strips appeals to private property rights of their moral significance. Hence, I argue on Rawlsian grounds that appealing to private property rights in the way that the wise-use movement does is unreasonable in a pluralistic society. In so doing, I show that a Rawlsian perspective may be more congenial to the interests of moral extensionists than is typically thought. (shrink)

Since the publication of David Lewis's ''New Work for a Theory of Universals,'' the distinction between properties that are fundamental – or perfectly natural – and those that are not has become a staple of mainstream metaphysics. Plausible candidates for perfect naturalness include the quantitative properties posited by fundamental physics. This paper argues for two claims: (1) the most satisfying account of quantitative properties employs higher-order relations, and (2) these relations must be perfectly natural, for otherwise the perfectly natural properties (...) cannot play the roles in metaphysical theorizing as envisaged by Lewis. (shrink)

Philosophers have given relatively little attention to the ethical issues surrounding the nature of intellectual property in spite of the fact that for the past ten years the public policy debate over "fair use" of copyrighted materials in higher education has been heating up. This neglect is especially striking since copyright ethics are at stake in so many aspects of academic life: the photocopying of materials for classroom use and scholarly work, access to electronic texts, and the cost (...) and availability of single-source information technology such as Dialogue, library card catalogues, the Oxford English Dictionary, and a variety of other print and electronic resources. Of course, the ethics of copyright are not only an issue for those of us in the business of education: recent allegations of copyright infringement by Texaco, which regularly photocopied articles from scientific and technical journals for its employees, suggests that questions about copyright ethics may arise regularly for every corporation and business. While the current lawsuit against Kinko's Copies(1) and Texaco may settle some public policy questions in the short run, the legal discourse on fair use depends upon competing ethical intuitions which are not likely to be resolved soon. (shrink)

From a pre-publication review by the late Austrian economist, Don Lavoie, of George Mason University: -/- "The book's radical re-interpretation of property and contract is, I think, among the most powerful critiques of mainstream economics ever developed. It undermines the neoclassical way of thinking about property by articulating a theory of inalienable rights, and constructs out of this perspective a "labor theory of property" which is as different from Marx's labor theory of value as it is from (...) neoclassicism. It traces roots of such ideas in some fascinating and largely forgotten strands of the history of economics. It draws attention to the question of "responsibility" which neoclassicism has utterly lost sight of. It is startlingly fresh in its overall approach, and unusually well written in its presentation. ... It constitutes a better case for its economic democracy viewpoint than anything else in the literature." . (shrink)

Public-private partnerships are established to specifically harness the potential of Big Data in healthcare and can include partners working across the data chain—producing health data, analysing data, using research results or creating value from data. This domain paper will illustrate the challenges that arise when partners from the public and private sector collaborate to share, analyse and use biomedical Big Data. We discuss three specific challenges for PPPs: working within the social licence, public antipathy to the commercialisation (...) of public sector health data, and questions of ownership, both of the data and any resulting intellectual property or products. As a specific example we consider the case of the UK National Health Service providing patient data to Google’s DeepMind AI program to develop a diagnostic app for kidney disease. This article is an application of the framework presented in this issue of ABR. Please refer to that article for more information on how this framework is to be used, including a full explanation of the key values involved and the balancing approach used in the case study at the end. We use four specific values to help analysis these issues: public benefit, stewardship, transparency and engagement. We demonstrate how the Deliberative Framework can support ethical governance of PPPs involving biomedical big data. (shrink)

La confrontation de l’Open Access avec la propriété intellectuelle demeure mesurée dès lors que l’exercice du droit d’auteur n’est nullement antinomique avec un modèle de gratuité pour l’utilisateur final. L’existence de prérogatives morales fortes présente les garanties mêmes que la communauté scientifique appelle de ses vœux, à savoir l’identification de la source et la traçabilité de la version originale de la publication. Le constat est sans doute moins angélique s’agissant du mouvement du Public Access, lequel ne se soucie plus (...) guère des intérêts des auteurs, mais est tout entier tourné vers la diffusion des savoirs comme remboursement des tributs versés par les contribuables dans le financement de la recherche. La logique suivie devrait à terme nier l’existence même de droits d’auteurs de la part des chercheurs lesquels verraient la diffusion de leurs travaux leur échapper en totalité. Il n’est cependant pas certain que l’alternative proposée conduise à des résultats souhaitables car le chercheur doit pouvoir bénéficier d’une certaine liberté dans sa recherche et dans sa parole pour être incité à produire des travaux de qualité ; court-circuiter son contrôle intellectuel sur le destin de ses recherches risque, au contraire de le brider. La rencontre des deux aspirations est sans doute possible. Il n’est pas nécessaire pour atteindre le libre accès de détruire la libre recherche.The incipient clash between open access and intellectual property need not come to a head as long as the exercise of authorship rights does not contradict free access for end users. The existence of strong moral prerogatives offers the very guarantees that the scientific community is pressing for: identification of sources and traceability of the original version of a publication. The picture is not so well-tempered in the case of the Public Access movement, which has little concern for authorship and is entirely geared to knowledge dissemination as compensation for the taxpayers’ money spent on research. Taken to its logical conclusion, this would deny the very existence of authorship rights for researchers, who would lose all control over the dissemination of their work. However, the alternative solution proposed may not necessarily produce the desired results, since researchers need to have a certain amount of freedom in their work and in their communication to motivate high-quality output. Short-circuiting their intellectual control over the fate of their research is more likely to inhibit them than otherwise. But the clash between these two aspirations may yet be resolved: achieving free access does not necessarily mean destroying freedom for research. (shrink)

While it is sometimes thought that free Athenian women were hemmed in by surveillance within the oikos, this article argues that the obstacle that impeded them when they attempted to control property was that they were excluded from the impersonal and formal systems of surveillance of male citizens. Athenian public life, lived in the view of others, dramatically extended the agency of those within it. While women could compensate for their legal incapacities by cultivating the personal trust of (...) men, this required them to treat some of the people closest to them instrumentally, thus transforming their affectionate relationships. (shrink)

This article considers the interplay between intellectual property rights and classic property rights raised by Hoffman v. Monsanto (2005) and advances the idea that intellectual property law can serve as an autonomous source of liability for intellectual property owners. The article develops the conceptual advantages of demarcating physical and intellectual properties and allocating rights and responsibilities based on the respective property sphere. It introduces a theoretical Hohfeldian framework, in which the grant of a positive limited-term (...) monopoly right entails a corresponding duty, to establish intellectual property law as a source of internal limits on intellectual property rights. The article is a prolegomena to a detailed matrix of those rights and duties within intellectual property law. This matrix could support patentee duties that go beyond public disclosure of the invention and could establish patent law as an alternative legal framework to tort law to address harms caused by inventions. (shrink)

The present study aims to assess the restriction of private ownership on the cultural-historical property based on the public interest and evaluate how this restriction is explained and what restrictions the cultural heritage rules and regulations impose on the private ownership. The present descriptive and analytical study seeks to examine the above-mentioned questions using the library method. Based on the results, statute law has defined a large number of restrictions for the owner including the owner restriction in the (...) obligation to declare, implement protection plans, as well as sale and transfer of the cultural-historical property. Theories such as public interest are considered as the basis for the restriction of ownership on historical-cultural property. (shrink)

Surveys the contributions that economic theory has made to the often contentious debate over the government's use of its power of eminent domain, as prescribed by the Fifth Amendment. It addresses such questions as: when should the government be allowed to take private property without the owner's consent? Does it depend on how the land will be used? Also, what amount of compensation is the landowner entitled to receive? The recent case of Kelo v. New London revitalized the debate, (...) but it was only the latest skirmish in the ongoing struggle between advocates of strong governmental powers to acquire private property in the public interest and private property rights advocates. Written for a general audience, the book advances a coherent theory that views eminent domain within the context of the government's proper role in an economic system whose primary objective is to achieve efficient land use. (shrink)

The conception of property is usually moulded upon diverting historical and political-philosophical frameworks. The current interest on the commons illustrates these divergences when they come up between a ‘pure’ public and a ‘pure’ private form of ownership. This conceptual triad misleads by conflating private property with an absolute property right while equating public property with a centralised political regime. This article traces the republican conception of property in order to show how it draws (...) a legal and philosophical continuum around different forms of ownership, based on a fiduciary principle underlying the relationship between the sovereign or principal and its agent. Despite modern socialism apparently left aside the question of the commons, the republican-fiduciary rationale was reformulated according to the modern industrial capitalist society. (shrink)

The two questions I seek to address in these pages are what is public property and why does it matter. Public property, like property more generally, is a powerful legal arrangement of allocating control and use rights with respect to resources. Unlike private property, public property does not establish normative powers with which private individuals can shape their practical affairs in and around social spheres such as housing, work, commerce, and worship. Rather, (...) its distinctive value lies in extending autonomous agency to the construction of public spaces and resources. Public property places individuals in a position of collective self-government, manifested in the following two particular ways: first, expressing the ideas and commitments that the political community as a whole affirms; and second, exerting control over the construction and direction of the resources that make up the environment they occupy. (shrink)