In a recent article [AJP, 2013], Saul Smilansky argues that our own existence is regrettable and that we should prefer not to have existed at all. I show why Smilansky's argument is fallacious, if we understand terms like ‘regrettable’ and ‘prefer’ in a straightforward non-deviant way.

Interest in the use of medical data for health research is increasing. Yet, as Elizabeth Ford and colleagues rightly note, there are open questions about the suitability of existing ethical and regulatory oversight frameworks for these research approaches. In their feature article, ‘Should free text data in electronic medical records be shared for research? A citizen’s jury study in the United Kingdom’, Ford et al report the results of a deliberative engagement study in which 18 members of the public were (...) asked whether and under what conditions free text data from medical records should be shared for research purposes. The authors’ explicit aim was to inform national policy on sharing medical text. Public attitudes—stated otherwise, the attitudes of patients whose medical information will ultimately be used under any data sharing policy—are a necessary input into ethical and regulatory decision-making about use of medical data for health research. Though public attitudes will rarely be determinative, they must be weighed in order to uphold the ethical principle of respect for persons.1 Ford et al ’s article is, therefore, an important contribution to …. (shrink)

Recently a new question has emerged in the philosophy of religion: not whether God exists, but whether God’s existence is or would be preferable. The existing literature on the subject is sparse. The present essay, in dialogue form, is an attempt to marshal and evaluate arguments on both sides.

Existence value refers to the value humans ascribe to the existence of something, regard­less of whether it is or will be of any particular use to them. This existence value based on preference satisfaction should be taken into account in evaluating activities that come with a risk of species extinction. There are two main objections. The first is that on the preference satisfaction interpretation, the concept lacks moral importance because satisfying people’s preferences may involve no good or well-being for them. (...) However, existence value can be based on a restricted version of the preference satisfaction theory, which is not vulnerable to the skeptical arguments about the link between preference satisfaction and well-being. The second objection is that even if preference satisfaction can be linked to well-being, understanding existence value in terms of individual preference satisfaction is incoherent, because existence value reflects disinterested preferences that involve no benefits to the individual. However, the fact that existence value may involve disinterested preferences does not threaten the coherence of the concept, but suggests that it does not fit smoothly into the “utilitarian” or “welfarist” framework it is commonly considered within. A pluralistic normative approach based on prima facie duties can be an alternative to standard utilitarian-style approaches for considering existence value in concrete cases involving a risk of species extinction, such as through deep sea mining. (shrink)

We can morally compare possible alternative states of affairs, judging that various actual historical occurrences were bad, overall—the Holocaust, World War I, and slavery, for example. We should prefer that such events had not occurred, and regret that they had occurred. But the vast majority of people who now exist would not have existed had it not been for those historical events. A ‘package deal’ is involved here: those events, together with oneself; or, the absence of the historical calamity, (...) and the absence of oneself. So, all considered, ought one to prefer never to have existed, and to regret that one exists? Not in itself, of course, but as part of the conjunction? There seems to be a strong case for saying that morally one must wish and prefer that certain historical events had not occurred, even if that would have meant that one would never have existed. One ought to regret, all considered, that the aggregate state of affairs that includes one's existence is the one that materialized. After setting out this idea, I explore arguments against it, and attempt to reach a conclusion. (shrink)

For many centuries, philosophers have debated this question: “Does God exist?” Surprisingly, they have paid rather less attention to this distinct – but also very important – question: “Would God’s existence be a good thing?” The latter is an axiological question about the difference in value that God’s existence would make (or does make) in the actual world. Perhaps the most natural position to take, whether or not one believes in God, is to hold that it would be a (...) very good thing if such a being were to exist. After all, God is traditionally thought to be perfectly powerful and good, and it might seem obvious that such a being’s existence would make things better than they would otherwise be. But this judgment has been contested: some philosophers have held that God’s existence would make things worse, and that, on this basis, one can reasonably prefer God’s non-existence. We first distinguish a wide array of axiological positions concerning the value of God’s existence which might be held by theists, atheists, and agnostics alike. We next construe these positions as comparative judgments about the axiological status of various possible worlds. We then criticize an important recent attempt to show that God’s existence would make things worse, in various ways, than they would otherwise be. (shrink)

Considérons deux mondes épistémiquement possibles qui sont aussi similaires que possible, sauf que l’athéisme est vrai dans un monde et que le théisme est vrai dans l’autre monde. Quel monde est-il rationnel de préférer? J’examine la défense la plus forte de l’affirmation quelque peu contre-intuitive selon laquelle il est rationnel de préférer le monde athée. Je discute également de la conclusion opposée, à savoir qu’il est rationnel de préférer le monde théiste. Étonnamment, ma conclusion est qu’il est difficile de dire (...) s’il faut préférer le théisme ou l’athéisme en général. (shrink)

Dans un célèbre article de 1998, John Doris avance que la psychologie situationniste remet en question l’éthique de la vertu aristotélicienne, laquelle présuppose l’existence de vertus qui sont à la fois fixes et indépendantes d’une situation. Son argument prend la forme d’un dilemme. Le présent article, qui a pour but de répondre à ce dilemme, s’appuie sur des recherches récentes menées dans les domaines de la psychologie et des sciences cognitives afin de démontrer que l’éthique de la vertu, en tant (...) que théorie dispositionnaliste et non-codifiable, constitue une psychologie morale plus adéquate au plan empirique que les autres approches reconnues. (shrink)

One of the fundamental debates that theologians have held to discuss the possibility of and to facilitate understanding of the bodily resurrection is iʿādat al-maʿdūm; that is, the restoration of the non-existent. Despite some differences in their perspectives, theologians, including the Muʿtazilites, have considered iʿādat al-maʿdūm possible. Avicenna, who opposed the classical views of theologians by rejecting iʿādat al-maʿdūm, provoked a new discussion and fuelled controversy about this issue. Later Islamic philosophers and theologians who were influenced by him took his (...) path and reformulated his arguments about the impossibility of iʿādat al-maʿdūm. Likewise, the theologians of the mutaʾakhkhirūn period, who defended the possibility of iʿādat al-maʿdūm, in support of the classical view, voiced new criticisms against these recontructed arguments. Thus, the debate turned into a highly controversial issue between Islamic philosophers and theologians. In fact, unlike the theologians who included the issue of iʿādat al-maʿdūm in the subsections of the samʿiyyāt chapters as an extension of the resurrection debates, Islamic philosophers did not consider it possible and preferred to address it under the subheadings of the umūr al-āmma chapters on existence and non-existence, in which metaphysical issues were discussed. This is because Avicenna considered iʿādat al-maʿdūm a metaphysical issue related to non-existence. On the one hand, some philosophers, who considered iʿādat al-maʿdūm impossible, deployed the new argument that things that existed and then disappeared could not be recreated in the same way. On the other hand, others expressed their criticisms against these arguments in the disputatious style (jadali) and tried to defend the restoration of the non-existent in the same way. Therefore, the theologians who addressed these issues in their works helped answer the question of whether it is possible to recreate the non-existent. This is because the texts provided detailed and important information about the course of the debate, such as who rejects and accepts iʿādat al-maʿdūm, the background and context of the debate between philosophers and theologians, the proofs put forward for the rejection of recreation, the criticisms in response to these proofs, and the evidence put forward for recreation. Therefore, the present study aims to discuss the arguments for iʿādat al-maʿdūm; that is, whether maʿdūm can be recreated in the same way, and the criticisms against these arguments, which have become a subject of debate between theologians and philosophers. Avicenna’s ideas are also highlighted in the study as he is the source of the arguments for the impossibility of iʿādat al-maʿdūm. In terms of its scope, the present study is based on the major works of the prominent theologians of the mutaʾakhkhirūn period and the main commentaries written on these works. (shrink)

I find much to like in Craig Callender's [2022] arguments for the rational permissibility of non-exponential time discounting when these arguments are viewed in a conditional form: viz., if one thinks that time discounting is rationally permissible, as the social scientist does, then one should think that non-exponential time discounting is too. However, time neutralists believe that time discounting is rationally impermissible, and thus they take zero time discounting to be the normative standard. The time neutralist rejects time discounting because (...) they think it is rationally impermissible to prefer to live a worse life in expectation because of arbitrariness. Callender’s attack on the time-neutralist position is the following: the time-neutralist’s non-arbitrariness intuition assumes the existence of nonexistent ‘pure’ time preferences. In response, I aim to clarify the time-neutralist position and show that the non-arbitrariness argument does not rely on the existence of pure time preferences. Instead, the debate between time neutralism and permissivism about time discounting boils down to a methodological question: can we ever criticize the content of preferences? If so, we should embrace time neutralism. (shrink)

BackgroundFollowing the increased presence of the Right-to-Die Movement, improved end-of-life options, and the political and legal status of aid-in-dying around the globe, suicide tourism has become a promising alternative for individuals who wish to end their lives. Yet, little is known about this from the perspective of those who engage in the phenomenon.MethodsThis study applied the qualitative research approach, following the grounded theory tradition. It includes 11 in-depth semi-structured interviews with Israeli members of the Swiss non-profit Dignitas who contemplated traveling (...) to Switzerland for aid-in-dying.ResultsSeven themes emerged from the data analysis, including health and functioning; feelings regarding survivorship and existence; interacting with the health sector; attitudes regarding death and dying; suicide; choosing death; and choosing suicide tourism. A significant portion of the participants had experienced suicidal thoughts and had even previously attempted suicide, some more than once. Most of them referred to chronic illnesses, functional disability, and social isolation. They understand suffering within the subjective dimension, namely only by the person who is actually subjected to the disease, ailments, and disability. Participants regarded aid-in-dying in Switzerland as positive thanks to its guaranteed outcome: "beautiful death", compared to "disadvantaged dying" which places a burden on the participants' loved ones throughout the prolonged dying. Most of them do not necessarily want to have their loved ones beside them when they die, and they see no significant meaning in dying in a foreign country to which they have no emotional or civil attachment.ConclusionThe desirable approval or tragic refusal by Dignitas to participants' requests for suicide tourism enhances the paradox between the perception of aid-in-dying as a mechanism for fulfilling controlled death and its bureaucratic and materialistic characteristics specifically reflected in a paid, formalized approach to aid-in-dying that cultivate dependency and collaboration. (shrink)

It is usually assumed that individuals base their preferences for products or other items on the utility or value associated with the items. However, there is evidence that the attentional selection of an item alone already modulates the preference for that item. For instance, Janiszewski, Kuo, and Tavassoli (2013, Journal of Consumer Research) used unknown consumer products in a series of studies and found that, in a preference choice task, former target products in a visual-search task were preferred to former (...) distractor products. However, it remained unclear whether such effects can be observed when individuals have pre-existing attitudes towards products and whether attentional-selection can change the perceived value of products. Hence, the aim of the present research was to replicate the attentional-selection effect on choice with known products and examine whether selective attention affects the perceived value of products beyond choosing the items. In two experiments, we replicated the attentional-selection effect on item preference in a choice task. Items that had served as targets in the search task were preferred to previous distractors. Introducing a response deadline in the preference-choice task in Experiment 2 did not further increase this effect. However, the value of former targets was rated higher than that of former distractors. Hence, the present results indicate that attentional selection not only affects preference choices but can also increase the value of attended and selected items. (shrink)

argued that there are two options for what he called a realistic solution to the quantum measurement problem: (1) select a preferred set of observables for which definite values are assumed to exist, or (2) attempt to assign definite values to all observables simultaneously (1810–1). While conventional wisdom has it that the second option is ruled out by the Kochen-Specker theorem, Vink nevertheless advocated it. Making every physical quantity determinate in quantum mechanics carries with it significant conceptual costs, but (...) it also provides a way of addressing the preferred basis problem that arises if one chooses to pursue the first option. The potential costs and benefits of a formulation of quantum mechanics where every physical quantity is determinate are herein examined. The preferred-basis problem How to solve the preferred-basis problem Relativistic constraints Conclusion. (shrink)

This paper deals with various connections that are found to exist between statistical estimation methods for decision-making and rules of group choice in the social choice area. Initially the aggregation of individual opinions is formulated as a pattern recognition problem; firstly it is shown that individual preferences lead to a natural representation in terms of binary patterns. Then we proceed to show how the search for a group preference pattern can be conducted by classifying the input preference patterns into (...) various ‘pattern classes’ and using the resulting classification boundaries to define the area of mutual agreement over some of the available alternatives. This leads to a decision-theoretic problem which consists in defining a decision rule (for classification) that is least likely to lead to misrecognition of arbitrary preference patterns. A maximum likelihood solution is obtained and compared with some well-known rules of group decision-making. Other solutions are also possible, on the basis of different optimality criteria, and their social choice interpretation is suggested. Finally, a method using Coleman's linear model for attributes is applied to yield group decision rules by feature weighting of election issues. (shrink)

Music exists not to be parsed, categorized, or otherwise processed, but because it provides enjoyment. Thus methodologies that concentrate on the cognitive aspects of music alone omit what is essential about this aesthetic form. This paper provides an alternative approach by proposing a measure of musical preference. Specifically, it is argued that a musical passage will be preferred to the extent that it induces synchrony in those brain structures that are responsible for processing the passage. It is first shown that (...) this conception is consistent with time-honored principle of unity in diversity. It is then argued that the synchrony measure follows from more recent results regarding a possible solution to the binding problem. The bulk of the paper, however, is concerned with verifying the measure via simulation. It is shown, in particular, that the measure applied to a network of interacting integrate and fire neurons responsible for the processing of musical stimuli produces results consistent with human musical preference. This was carried out in three areas in the context of Western classical and popular musical forms. First, the model was applied to the laws of voice leading and other principles developed in the period of common harmonic practice. Next, it was shown that the three most salient aspects of melody, the preponderance of stepwise transitions, the theme and variation nature of phrase development, and increased positive affect with exposure all follow directly from the model. Finally, it was demonstrated how a steady rhythm can increase neural synchrony and presumably positive affect. Additional simulations run on Turkish art songs show that the synchrony measure may have some applicability to non-Western musical forms. The paper concludes by arguing that the synchrony measure may, in certain cases, apply to non-musical aesthetic stimuli. (shrink)

This paper analyses the relationships between corporate community involvement activities, the organizational structures within which they are managed, the firm's industry and evolving stakeholder attitudes and preferences in a sample of 148 U.K. based firms who have demonstrated a clear desire to be socially responsible. The research highlights significant associations between the allocation of responsibility for community involvement within the firm, its industry and the extent of its community involvement activities. Consistent with the view that managerial structures may play a (...) significant role in the implementation of community initiatives, the results identify significant variations in community involvement policies across alternative organizational forms. However, important similarities in corporate community policies across alternative structures are also shown to exist suggesting that corporate community involvement activities may be influenced by the preferences of societal stakeholders. (shrink)

Argues that objective value is capable of explaining, not just our believing this or that, but also the very existence of order. The natural order exists because it is good that it should do so. This idea, I claim, is a natural extension of ordinary thinking. I also argue that the explanation of the existence of the world directly in terms of goodness is to be preferred to an account that introduces a mediating God, who creates the world because he (...) perceives that it would be good that such a world should exist; and further, that it is reasonable to prefer it to an account according to which the existence of the world has no explanation. (shrink)

It is shown that a fundamental question of revealed preference theory, namely whether the weak axiom of revealed preference (WARP) implies the strong axiom of revealed preference (SARP), can be reduced to a Hamiltonian cycle problem: A set of bundles allows a preference cycle of irreducible length if and only if the convex monotonic hull of these bundles admits a Hamiltonian cycle. This leads to a new proof to show that preference cycles can be of arbitrary length for more than (...) two but not for two commodities. For this, it is shown that a set of bundles satisfying the given condition exists if and only if the dimension of the commodity space is at least three. Preference cycles can be constructed by embedding a cyclic $(L-1)$ -polytope into a facet of a convex monotonic hull in $L$ -space, because cyclic polytopes always admit Hamiltonian cycles. An immediate corollary is that WARP only implies SARP for two commodities. The proof is intuitively appealing as this gives a geometric interpretation of preference cycles. (shrink)

In this paper I argue in favour of a new definition of presentism that I call ‘existence presentism’ (EP). Typically, presentism is defined as the thesis that ‘only present objects exist’, or ‘nothing exists that is non-present’.1 I assume these statements to be equivalent. I call these statements of presentism ‘conventional presentism’ (CP). First, in §2, I rehearse arguments due to Ulrich Meyer that purport to show that presentism is not adequately defined as CP. In §§2.1–2.4 I show that (...) considerations of the sort raised by Meyer infect attempts to define presentism, due to Thomas Crisp, Tom Stoneham, and Theodore Sider. Thus the first half of the paper is constituted by a negative project that looks to show how extant definitions of presentism fail. In the second half of the paper, I continue in the negative theme in §3, before laying out EP and demonstrating that it solves the problems faced by CP and offering explanations of how to make sense of certain key notions that lie at the heart of EP. I conclude that EP is preferable to CP. (shrink)

England and Wales are moving toward a model of ‘opt out’ for use of personal confidential data in health research. Existing research does not make clear how acceptable this move is to the public. While people are typically supportive of health research, when asked to describe the ideal level of control there is a marked lack of consensus over the preferred model of consent. This study sought to investigate a relatively unexplored difference between the consent model that people prefer and (...) that which they are willing to accept. It also sought to explore any reasons for such acceptance. (shrink)

Existence monism is defended against priority monism. Schaffer's arguments for priority monism and against pluralism are reviewed, such as the argument from gunk. The whole does not require parts. Ontological vagueness is impossible. If ordinary objects are in the right ontology then they are vague. So ordinary objects are not included in the right ontology; and hence thought and talk about them cannot be accommodated via fully ontological vindication. Partially ontological vindication is not viable. Semantical theorizing outside the ontology room (...) and semantical theorizing in the doorway. Existence monism is theoretically preferable to priority monism. (shrink)

Ruth Chang has argued for the existence of a fourth positive value relation, distinct from betterness, worseness and equality, which she calls “parity.” In an earlier article I seemed to criticize Chang's suggestion by offering an interval model for the values of items that I claimed could accommodate all the phenomena characteristic of parity. Wlodek Rabinowicz, offering his own model of value relations, endorsed one central feature of my proposal: the need to distinguish permissible preferences from required ones. But he, (...) along with Chang, correctly pointed out that my own model suffered from serious formal problems. The present article offers an improved interval model, but the main point is not the model itself. Rather, it is the derivation of the model from a response-dependent account of practical rationality. This derivation helps explain why we have a concept for which Rabinowicz's model is appropriate, and therefore supplements Chang's existence arguments. My conclusion is that we can take Chang's view, Rabinowicz's and mine as providing a reinforcing set of views. (shrink)

On the standard view for something to exist is for one thing to exist: in slogan form, to be is to be countable. E.J. Lowe argues something can exist without being countable as one, however. His primary example is homogenous “stuff,” i.e., qualitatively uniform and infinitely divisible matter. Lacking nonarbitrary boundaries and being everywhere the same, homogenous stuff lacks a principle of individuation that would yield countably distinct constituents. So, for Lowe, homogenous stuff is strongly uncountable. Olson (...) rejects Lowe’s view and defends the orthodox connection between existence and number. He argues that if there is any stuff, there is a number of portions of stuff. Sider also rejects a stuff ontology, claiming it is incompatible with his preferred view that the familiar quantifiers of predicate logic carve at nature’s joints. Against these arguments, I defend the uncountability of stuff and the possibility of existence without countability. If to be is to be countable, more is needed than the arguments that Olson and Sider provide. (shrink)

Political philosophers tend to notice their differences more than their similarities. I suggest that contemporary analytic political philosophy in fact exhibits a 'dominant paradigm', the main features of which are a commitment to liberal capitalism and a preference for the designing of 'just institutions.' To subscribe to this paradigm involves making a decision about how to manage the philosophical 'agenda.' In order to focus on certain issues within this paradigm, alternatives, most notably socialism, have to be excluded from prolonged consideration. (...) A popular way of supporting this policy is by reference to the perceived failure of 'real existing socialism.' Taking the late political philosopher Brian Barry, among others, as an example, I argue that this argumentative strategy is unconvincing, and furthermore that its deployment tells a worrying story about the practice of political philosophy. (shrink)

Consider a group of people whose preferences satisfy the axioms of one of the current versions of utility theory, such as von Neumann-Morgenstern (1944), Savage (1954), or Bolker-Jeffrey (1965). There are political and economic contexts in which it is of interest to find ways of aggregating these individual preferences into a group preference ranking. The question then arises of whether methods of aggregation exist in which the group’s preferences also satisfy the axioms of the chosen utility theory, and in (...) which at the same time the aggregation process satisfies certain plausible conditions (e.g., the Pareto conditions below). (shrink)

This article explores some issues having to do with the use of experimental results from one‐shot games to reach conclusions about the existence of social preferences that are taken to figure in the explanation of cooperation in repeated interactions in real life. †To contact the author, please write to: Division of Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA 91125; e‐mail: [email protected].

This paper is an attempt to clarify the concept of demonstrated preference in the economic analysis of the Austrian School of Economics. It considers several interpretations of this concept: (1) as a thymological concept which matters in empirical interpretations of concrete human actions; (2) as a preference expressed in voluntary actions; (3) as the only existing preference; (4) as the only preference which matters in economics; (5) as the only preference which matters in the economy. It is argued that despite (...) the Austrian insistence on (4), the only interpretation resistant to criticism is (5). Unfortunately, it is not sufficient to draw or reinforce the conclusions that Murray N. Rothbard and his followers reach in their considerations on welfare economics, monopoly theory, public goods theory, and game theory. A number of additional clarifications are also made (e.g., the concepts of “voluntariness” and “psychologizing” in economics). (shrink)

This book is intended as an introduction to the philosophical problems of space and time, suitable for any reader who has an interest in the nature of the universe and who has a secondary-school knowledge of physics and mathematics. In particular, it is hoped that the book may find a use in philosophy departments and physics departments within universities and other tertiary institutions. The attempt is always to introduce the problems from a twentieth-century point of view. It is preferable to (...) introduce the history of the topic if and when that history becomes relevant to the development and solution of the problems, rather than to introduce a problem that was of importance in some previous age and to trace the development of it down the years. (shrink)

This paper examines methodological issues raised by revealed preference theory in economics: particularly contemporary revealed preference theory. The paper has three goals. First, to make the case that revealed preference theory is a broad research program in choice theory—not a single theory—and understanding this diversity is essential to any methodological analysis of the program. Second, to explore some of the existing criticisms of revealed preference theory in a way that emphasizes how the effectiveness of the critique depends on the particular (...) version of revealed preference under consideration. Finally, three additional criticisms are presented that are aimed specifically at contemporary revealed preference theory. (shrink)

Does the visual system adapt to number? For more than fifteen years, most have assumed that the answer is an unambiguous “yes”. Against this prevailing orthodoxy, we recently took a critical look at the phenomenon, questioning its existence on both empirical and theoretical grounds, and providing an alternative explanation for extant results (the old news hypothesis). We subsequently received two critical responses. Burr, Anobile, and Arrighi rejected our critiques wholesale, arguing that the evidence for number adaptation remains overwhelming. Durgin questioned (...) our old news hypothesis — preferring instead a theory about density adaptation he has championed for decades — but also highlighted several ways in which our arguments do pose serious challenges for proponents of number adaptation. Here, we reply to both. We first clarify our position regarding number adaptation. Then, we respond to our critics’ concerns, highlighting seven reasons why we remain skeptical about number adaptation. We conclude with some thoughts about where the debate may head from here. (shrink)

This paper is a partial review of the literature on ‘social preferences'. There are empirical findings that convincingly demonstrate the existence of social preferences, but there are also studies that indicate their fragility. So how robust are social preferences, and how exactly are they context dependent? One of the most promising insights from the literature, in my view, is an equilibrium explanation of mutually referring conditional social preferences and expectations. I use this concept of equilibrium, summarized by means of a (...) figure, to discuss a range of empirical studies. Where appropriate, I also briefly discuss a couple of insights from the (mostly parallel) evolutionary literature about cooperation. A concrete case of the Orma in Kenya will be used as a motivating example in the beginning. (shrink)

When assessing the cost effectiveness of health care programmes, health economists typically presume that distant events should be given less weight than present events. This article examines the moral reasonableness of arguments advanced for positive discounting in cost-effectiveness analysis both from an intergenerational and an intrapersonal perspective and assesses if arguments are equally applicable to health and monetary outcomes. The article concludes that behavioral effects related to time preferences give little or no reason for why society at large should favour (...) the present over the future when making intergenerational choices regarding health. The strongest argument for discounting stems from the combined argument of diminishing marginal utility in the presence of growth. However, this hinges on the assumption of actual growth in the relevant good. Moreover, current modern democracy may be insufficiently sensitive to the concerns of future generations. The second part of the article categorises preference failures (which justify paternalistic responses) into two distinct groups, myopic and acratic. The existence of these types of preference failures makes elicited time preferences of little normative relevance when making decisions regarding the social discount rate, even in an intrapersonal context. As with intergenerational discounting, the combined arguments of growth and diminishing marginal utility offer the strongest arguments for discounting in the intrapersonal context. However, there is no prima facie reason to assume that this argument should apply equally to health and monetary values. To be sure, selecting an approach towards discounting health is a complex matter. However, the life-or-death implications of any approach require that the discussion not be downplayed to merely a technical matter for economists to settle. (shrink)

The subject of this paper is a critique of the pronatalist metaphysics that underlies bioethics and shapes the thinking and discourse on reproductive rights. The point of reference is the philosophy of antinatalism presented by Marcus T. L. Teo. Seemingly arguing in favor of antinatalism, Teo mixes antinatalist concepts with pronatalist intuitions. The consequence of combining the impossible is the restoration of negative eugenics on the one hand, and a series of contradictions on the other. The article shows that philosophical (...) antinatalism is a universal position that indicates that procreation always, everywhere and for everyone is wrong. The paper simultaneously exposes and criticizes the metaphysics of pronatalism underlying bioethical discourse. Weakening pronatalism in bioethics and turning more attention to antinatalism could bring good results for women, the environment, and bioethics itself in terms of its thematic preferences. (shrink)

Most approaches to iterated belief revision are accompanied by some motivation for the use of the proposed revision operator (or family of operators), and typically encode enough information in the epistemic state of an agent for uniquely determining one-step revision. But in those approaches describing a family of operators there is usually little indication of how to proceed uniquely after the first revision step. In this paper we contribute towards addressing that deficiency by providing a formal framework which goes beyond (...) the first revision step in two ways. First, the framework is obtained by enriching the epistemic state of an agent starting from the following intuitive idea: we associate to each world x two abstract objects x⁺ and x⁻, and we assume that, in addition to preferences over the set of worlds, we are given preferences over this set of objects as well. The latter can be considered as meta-information encoded in the epistemic state which enables us to go beyond the first revision step of the revision operator being applied, and to obtain a unique set of preferences over worlds. We then extend this framework to consider, not only the revision of preferences over worlds, but also the revision of this extended structure itself. We look at some desirable properties for revising the structure and prove the consistency of these properties by giving a concrete operator satisfying all of them. Perhaps more importantly, we show that this framework has strong connections with two other types of constructions in related areas. Firstly, it can be seen as a special case of preference aggregation which opens up the possibility of extending the frame-work presented here into a full-fledged framework for preference aggregation and social choice theory. Secondly, it is related to existing work on the use of interval orderings in a number of different contexts. (shrink)

Research has found that both cisgender and transgender androphilic males (i.e., males sexually attracted to and aroused by other adult males) have female-typical occupational preferences when compared with gynephilic males (i.e., males sexually attracted to and aroused by adult females). Moreover, whereas cisgender androphilic males’ occupational preferences tend to be intermediate between those of gynephilic men and androphilic women, transgender androphilic males tend to have occupational preferences that are more similar to androphilic women. No study has directly compared both types (...) of androphilic males within the same culture. The present study investigated occupational preference and its relation to childhood sex-atypical behavior (CSAB), among gynephilic men (_n_ = 208), androphilic women (_n_ = 138), and cisgender (_n_ = 132) and transgender (_n_ = 129) androphilic males from the Istmo region of Oaxaca, Mexico, where androphilic males are recognized as third gender, _muxes_. The study found large sex differences in occupational preferences (_d_ = 2.80). Furthermore, both cisgender _muxe nguiiu_ (_d_ = 2.36) and transgender _muxe gunaa_ (_d_ = 3.44) reported having more sex-atypical occupational preferences compared with men. However, _muxe gunaa_ reported higher female-typical occupational preferences than women (_d_ = 0.59) and _muxe nguiiu_ (_d_ = 0.57), whereas _muxe nguiiu_ and women did not differ (_d_ = 0.08). These findings are consistent with the conclusion that sex-atypical occupational preferences are a cross-culturally universal aspect of male androphilia. Finally, CSAB was associated with sex-atypical occupational preferences among all participants. These findings suggest that a developmental continuity exists between childhood and adulthood sex-atypicality. (shrink)

Experimental evidence suggests that individual consumption has not only personal value but also enters the social part of the utility. Existing models of social preferences make ad hoc parametric assumptions about the nature of this duality. This creates a problem of experimental identification of preferences since without such assumptions it is impossible to distinguish whether consumption or social concerns are driving the behavior. Given observed choice, the Axiomatic model of preferences in this article makes it possible to unambiguously determine personal (...) and social utility without any assumptions about their relationship. The unique separation can be achieved only if the individual choices in different subgroups of other people are available. Preferences over consumption and status are used as an example to demonstrate how the utility is constructed. The model shows what kind of information about choice is needed to empirically determine the nature of social preferences without making restrictive assumptions. This can help to estimate whether personal consumption or social value is more important in economic decisions. (shrink)

An individual is said to have a taste for a particular menu, i.e. a subset of available commodities, if he is indifferent between all commodity bundles that contain the same quantity for each commodity which actually is in the menu, whatever the rest of the bundle. Then, a taste is directly defined as a deep property of preferences. As a first result, it is shown that a complete and transitive preference relation over the commodity bundles is equivalent to regular tastes (...) where regularity means that tastes can be derived from a pure qualitative relation between the different commodities. Besides, a preference family based on preference relations corresponding to each particular commodity is said to be rationalizable if there exists a metapreference over commodity bundles which consistently summarizes the preference family and then allows to decide. As a second result, it is shown that if a preference family is rationalizable, then the tastes are organized thanks to a reflexive and transitive qualitative relation between the different commodities. (shrink)

International law lacks many of the standard features of domestic law. There are few legislative or judicial bodies with exclusive authority over particular jurisdictions or subject matters, the subjects regulated by international law typically must affirmatively consent to be bound by it, and supranational authorities with the power to coerce states to comply with international obligations are rare. How can a legal system with these features generate changes in state behavior? For many theories, the ability of international law to inform (...) and change individual preferences provides the answer. When voters care that treaty commitments be kept, or that international norms be honored, the theory goes, leaders are more likely to be able to make choices consistent with international obligations. Over the last decade, a literature has emerged testing these theories using surveys and experiments embedded in surveys. Multiple U.S. studies find that international law and international norm arguments shift public opinion in the direction of greater compliance by 4 to 20 percentage points. However, studies in foreign contexts are more mixed, with some backlash reported in countries in which international law is highly politicized. This Article describes the state of current knowledge about whether international law actually does change preferences, explains the limitations with existing research, and proposes avenues for future study. (shrink)

Although different perspectives on the essence and qualities of the absolute existence have been put forward by the philosophers, theologians, and Sufī philosophers, in the context of this article, we will examine whether absolute existence has a causal efficacy in addition to special existence in the unity of the First Principle and the first effect. We will discuss the views of two Ottoman scholars, Baghdādīzāda (who lived in the second part of the 10th/16th century) and Arpacīzāda (d.1033/1623), who analyzed the (...) effect of absolute existence with its aforementioned qualities on the simplicity of the First Principle and its being a part of the complete cause as an incomplete cause. It is generally accepted by the philosophers that the First Principle is the simple complete cause of the first effect by virtue of its essence without the need for conditions, tools, or the removal of any obstacle. Therefore, the First Principle must be the cause of the first effect with its simple existence that does not consist of any sensory or intellectual parts. Therefore, the decisive issue in the discussions regarding the definition of the complete cause is the inclusion of both simple and compound entities. Because the definition of a complete cause that includes only simple or compound causes would be incomplete since it does not include all entities. The definition of complete cause preferred by philosophers such as al-Asīr al-Dīn al-Abharī (d.663/1265) and Najm al-Dīn al-Kātibī (d.675/1277), who made important contributions to the conceptualization of complete and incomplete causes, as the totality of the things on which the maʿlūl depends in its existence, can only include composite entities. As a matter of fact, al-Sayyīd Sharīf al-Jurjānī (d.816/1413), in his Sharh al-Mawāqif and Hāshiya al-Tajrīd, states that the aforementioned definition of complete cause, which was mentioned by his predecessors al-Abharī and al-Kātibī has the possibility of including only composite entities, but he expresses that this situation is not a necessity with the example that a simple substance can be formed from a simple complete cause. The Ottoman scholar al-Khatībzāda (d.901/1496), who supported al-Jurjānī's sentiment that the aforementioned definition of the complete cause could only include composite entities, emphasized in his commentary on Tajrīd al-iʿtikād the possibility of accepting absolute existence as a necessary element for the realization of the complete cause, which led to the writing of separate treatises following the traces of this problem. In the context of al-Jurjānī and al-Khatībzāda's explanations, al-Baghdādīzāda addressed the possibility of absolute existence being a part of the complete cause without damaging the simplicity of the First Principle and wrote a separate treatise emphasizing that absolute existence does not eliminate the First Principle”s being a simple complete cause. Arpacīzāda was another Ottoman scholar who wrote a critical text in response to this treatise, which analyzed the effect of absolute existence on the existence of the first effect as a part of the complete cause and its relation to the special existence of the First Principle. In this article, we will try to reveal the effect of absolute existence on the First Principle's being a simple complete cause and the possibility of accepting it as a part of the complete cause through these individuals and treatises. (shrink)

As Cuba achieves one of the lowest per capita ecological footprints in the world, the country’s overshoot day was on 1 December 2019, while some European countries already reach this limit in February (e.g., Luxembourg), monitoring the environmental preferences of the Cuban younger generation may offer valuable behavioral or pedagogical insights into such a society. As accepted standardized measures exist in the scales of 2-Major Environmental Values (2-MEV) and the General Ecological Behavior (GEB), both measures are following the necessary (...) psychometric requirement, as they have the unique advantage of repeated independent confirmation (and thus provide an external validity). These captured 40 items of reported behavior originating in six subscales that total in a single main cover score. The first one (2-MEV) monitors individual biocentric and anthropocentric preferences with a 20 item-set by relying upon these two higher-order factors of “Preservation” (PRE) and “Utilization” (UTL). Although many language versions already exist (33 in the case of the 2-MEV) for verifying validities and reliabilities of both scales, a country such as Cuba may affirm that this is due to expected cultural differences as well as their exceptionally low global footprint. Additionally, neither the individual connectedness with nature nor the diurnal preferences within the linear structural model showed a substantial relationship to PRE or UTL. Nevertheless, all the regression scores follow the expected positive or negative directions, albeit not all the fit scores turned out as satisfactorily. Apparently, the applied measures secure a good basis for measuring the attitudinal and behavioral framework, but will need further fine tuning to completely monitor the environmental preferences of Cuban adolescents. (shrink)

One of the major problems of intrusion detection concerns the large amount of alerts that intrusion detection systems (IDS) produce. Security operator who analyzes alerts and takes decisions, is often submerged by the high number of alerts to analyze. In this paper, we present a new alert correlation approach based on knowledge and preferences of security operators. This approach, which is complementary to existing ones, allows to rank-order produced alerts on the basis of a security operator knowledge about the system, (...) used IDS and his preferences about alerts that he wants to analyze or to ignore. Our approach is based on the development of a new non-classical logic for representing preferences, called FO-MQCL (First Order - Minimal Qualitative Choice Logic). Our logic extends a fragment of the first order logic by adding a new logical connective. The general idea is to present only alerts that fully fit security operator's preferences and knowledge. And if needed, less preferred alerts can also be presented. (shrink)

In recent years the quantum foundations community has seen increasing interest in the possibility of using retrocausality as a route to rejecting the conclusions of Bell’s theorem and restoring locality to quantum physics. On the other hand, it has also been argued that accepting nonlocality leads to a form of retrocausality. In this article we seek to elucidate the relationship between retrocausality and locality. We begin by providing a brief schema of the various ways in which violations of Bell’s inequalities (...) might lead us to consider some form of retrocausality. We then consider some possible motivations for using retrocausality to rescue locality, arguing that none of these motivations is sufficient to show that local retrocausal theories should always be preferred to nonlocal retrocausal theories, and therefore there is no clear reason to focus research efforts entirely on seeking local retrocausal models. Next, we examine several different conceptions of retrocausality, concluding that ‘all-at-once’ retrocausality is more coherent than the alternative dynamical picture. We then argue that since the ‘all-at-once’ approach requires probabilities to be assigned to entire histories, locality is not playing any crucial role within this picture. Thus we conclude that using retrocausality as a way to rescue locality may not be the right route to retrocausality. Finally, we demonstrate that accepting the existence of nonlocality and insisting on the nonexistence of preferred reference frames leads naturally to the acceptance of a form of retrocausality, albeit one which is not mediated by physical systems travelling backwards in time. We argue that this is the more natural way to motivate retrocausal models of quantum mechanics. (shrink)

Libertarianism about free will is the conjunction of two theses: the existence of free will is incompatible with the truth of determinism, and at least some human beings sometimes exercise free will (or act freely, for short). 1 Some libertarian views feature agent causation, others maintain that free actions are uncaused, and yet others – event-causal libertarian views – reject all views of these two kinds and appeal to indeterministic causation by events and states. 2 This article explores the relative (...) merits of two different views of this third kind. One is Robert Kane's prominent view, and the other is the ‘daring libertarian’ view that I floated in Free Will and Luck. 3 (I labeled the view ‘daring’ to distinguish it from a more modest libertarian view that I floated a decade earlier.) 4 I say ‘floated’ because I am not a libertarian. I do not endorse incompatibilism; instead, I am agnostic about it. But if I were a libertarian, I would embrace my daring libertarian view (or DLV, for short). This article's thesis is that event-causal libertarians should prefer DLV to Kane's ‘dual or multiple efforts’ view. (shrink)

The heart of philosophy is metaphysics, and at the heart of the heart lie two questions about existence. What is it for any contingent thing to exist? Why does any contingent thing exist? Call these the nature question and the ground question, respectively. The first concerns the nature of the existence of the contingent existent; the second concerns the ground of the contingent existent. Both questions are ancient, and yet perennial in their appeal; both have presided over the (...) burial of so many of their would-be undertakers that it is a good induction that they will continue to do so. For some time now, the preferred style in addressing such questions has been deflationary when it has not been eliminativist. Ask Willard Quine what existence is, and you will hear that "Existence is what existential quantification expresses. "! Ask Bertrand Russell what it is for an individual to exist, and he will tell you that an individual can no more exist than it can be numerous: there 2 just is no such thing as the existence of individuals. And of course Russell's eliminativist answer implies that one cannot even ask, on pain of succumbing to the fallacy of complex question, why any contingent individual exists: if no individual exists, there can be no question why any individual exists. Not to mention Russell's modal corollary: 'contingent' and 'necessary' can only be said de dicto (of propositions) and not de re (of things). (shrink)

Most models of rational action assume that all possible states and actions are pre-defined and that preferences change only when beliefs do. But several decision and game problems lack these features, calling for a dynamic model of preferences: preferences can change when unforeseen possibilities come to light or when there is no specifiable or measurable change in belief. We propose a formally precise dynamic model of preferences that extends an existing static model. Our axioms for updating preferences preserve consistency while (...) minimising change, like Hansson’s :1–28, 1995). But unlike prior models of preference change, ours supports default reasoning with partial preference information, which is essential to handle decision problems where the decision tree isn’t surveyable. We also show that our model avoids problems for other models of preference change discussed in Spohn. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Back to the Nineteenth Century Is ProgressJeffrey L. Geller (bio)Keywordshistory, monomania, impulse control disorders, DSMJohn Sadler Eloquently Makes the case that the phenomena of criminality, wrongful conduct, and mental illness are befuddled in current diagnostic manuals, for example, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM)-IV-TR. The lack of clarity in the “vice–mental disorder relationship” reflects centuries old struggles to create clear demarcations between “mad” and “bad.” Sadler points out that (...) the DSMs have been and are both the products of historical, cultural, and social forces and the purveyors of defining boundaries that shape contemporary psychiatric and judicial practices. Sadler does American psychiatry a great service by resurrecting a discussion that was quite rich in the nineteenth century, but generally dormant in the twentieth. I thought I could best use this commentary by bringing to the attention the readers of Philosophy, Psychiatry & Psychology the scope of the debate amongst Sadler’s nineteenth-century predecessors.Sadler’s PredecessorsPhilippe Pinel, who presented the first clear modern description of the form of mental illness subsequently named moral insanity appeared well aware, in the early years of the nineteenth century, of the difficulties there would be accepting the concept of a limited or partial moral mania:There are certain rare examples of a peculiar turbulent and embittered character, who otherwise show no evidence of disturbed reason. Ought they to be included under the heading of “mania without delirium?” At any rate the authorities have preferred to have them admitted to asylums rather than let them mix with delinquents in houses of correction.(As cited by Walk 1954, 821)James Cowles Prichard, a British physician, is credited with “inventing” the term moral insanity, which he defined as “a morbid perversion of the feelings, affections, and active powers, without any illusion or erroneous conviction impressed upon the understanding” (Prichard 1837, 20; 1842). Prichard warned against the failure to recognize this form of insanity, illustrating his point with what we might now refer to as pyromania:Many lunatics, whose disorder was merely a destructive propensity, have set fire to houses or public buildings, and it is not to be doubted that men have been occasionally executed as criminals for such actions, who, if they had been kept in confinement, would have proved to be insane. Until the existence of moral insanity is distinctly recognized, there will always be a danger of this event ensuing in the trials of mischievous lunatics.(Prichard 1837, 287)Prichard referred to such acts as “instinctive madness” (Prichard 1842). [End Page 19]Isaac Ray, the first American to specifically address these matters (in the first edition of his Treatise on The Medical Jurisprudence of Insanity (1838), defined “partial moral mania,” indicating that, “In this form of insanity, the derangement is confined to one or a few of the affective faculties, the rest of the moral and intellectual constitution preserving its ordinary integrity” (p. 186). Ray highlighted those partial moral mania he considered to “have the most important legal relations” (p. 187): “an irresistible propensity to steal,” “an inordinate propensity to lying,” “erotic mania,” “a morbid propensity to incendiarism,” and “homicidal insanity” or “homicidal monomania” (pp. 187–234). Ray cogently described what we would categorize today as an impulse disorder: “Amid the rapid and tumultuous succession of feelings that rush into his mind, the reflective powers are paralyzed, and his movements are solely the result of a blind, automatic impulse with which the reason has as little to do, as with the movements of a newborn infant” (p. 261). Ray believed these monomanias “completely annulled... all moral responsibility for acts committed under their influence,” and consequently “the laws can rightfully inflict no punishment on their unfortunate subjects” (p. 276).Ray, like his European predecessors, was not insensitive to the conundrum these partial moral manias would likely produce:True, cases of a disputable character sometimes occur—cases in which we may well doubt whether the active principle is depravity or disease. I have no wish to conceal any difficulty which this subject may present(Ray 1861, 120).The English translation of Esquirol’s treatise in 1854 supported Ray’s views. In a lengthy chapter on the different forms of... (shrink)

Controversies in economics often fizzle out unresolved. One reason is that, despite their professed empiricism, economists find it hard to agree on the interpretation of the relevant empirical evidence. In this paper I will present an example of a controversial issue first raised and then solved by recourse to laboratory experimentation. A major theme of this paper, then, concerns the methodological advantages of controlled experiments. The second theme is the nature of experimental artefacts and of the methods devised to detect (...) them. Recent studies of experimental science have stressed that experimenters are often merely concerned about determining whether a certain phenomeonon exists or not, or whether, when, and where it can be produced, without necessarily engaging in proving or disproving any theoretical explanation of the phenomenon itself. In this paper I shall be concerned mainly with such a case, and focus on the example of preference reversals, a phenomenon whose existence was until quite recently denied by the majority of economists. Their favourite strategy consisted in trying to explain the phenomenon away as an artefact of the experimental techniques used to observe it. By controlled experimentation, as we shall see, such an interpretation has been discredited, and now preference reversals are generally accepted as real. The problem of distinguishing an artefact from a real phenomenon is related to methodological issues traditionally discussed by philosophers of science, such as the theory-ladenness of observation and Duhem's problem. Part of this paper is devoted to clarifying these two philosophical problems, and to arguing that only the latter is relevant to the case in hand. The solutions to Duhem's problem devised by economic experimentalists will be presented and discussed. I shall show that they belong in two broad categories: independent tests of new predictions derived from the competing hypotheses at stake, and ‘no- miracle arguments’ from different experimental techniques delivering converging results despite their being theoretically independent. (shrink)

According to normative decision theory there exists a principle of procedure invariance which states that a decision maker's preference order should remain the same, independently of which response mode is used. For example, the decision maker should express the same preference independently of whether he or she has to judge or decide. Nevertheless, previous research in behavioral decision making has suggested that judgments and choices yield different preference orders in both the risky and the riskless domain. In the latter, the (...) prominence effect has been demonstrated. The main purpose of the present series of experiments was to test cognitive explanations which account for the prominence effect. One of the explanations provided a psychological account based primarily on decision-strategy compatibility. Two other explanations built on information structuring approaches. In the first one, the general idea was that decision makers differentiate between alternatives by value and belief restructuring. In the second approach, violations of invariance were assumed to be attributed to the information structure of the task which in many cases demand problem simplification. A prominence effect was in most experiments found for both choices and preference ratings. This finding spöke against the strategy compatibility explanation. Instead, the different forms of cognitive restructuring provided a better account. However, none of these provided a single explanation. Yet, the structure compatibility explanation appeared to be the more viable one, in particular of the relation between experimentäl manipulations and response mode outcomes. The predictions of the value-belief restructuring explanation, on the other hand, seemed to be more valid for the prominence effect found in choice than for preference ratings. (shrink)

Based on a unique data set on US direct microloans, we study the funding determinants of interest-free peer-to-peer crowdlending aimed at borrowers in the US. By performing logistic regressions on funding success and Tobit regressions on the reversed funding time, the existence of a social underwriting by a third-party trustee and information in the description texts fostering the investors’ trust are shown to be the main predictors of successful funding. Regarding social impact, the possibility to empower women and groups of (...) borrowers appeals to the investors, whereas empowerment of the family or community beyond the borrowers themselves appears to remain unappreciated. When examining the vulnerability of the borrowers as a predictor, the results manifest differences amongst the attitudes of the investors towards social impact. In the subsample of non-endorsed loans, the investors appear to prefer to support borrowers with an immigration background. In contrast, this is not the case with endorsed loans. (shrink)

Retailers are faced with a dilemma of whether to share demand information with other supply chain members, and if so, how to share it. Our research interest is motivated by the grounds that the value of downstream retailers’ sales information to upstream manufacturers is to improve the accuracy of manufacturers’ order forecasting. This problem is particularly important in the remanufacturing of closed-loop supply chains. In this study, we consider a retailer as the demand information holder, who sells new and remanufactured (...) products in wholesale to a manufacturer and, simultaneously, she and the manufacturer competitively collect used products from the customers. We explicitly characterize the role of information sharing in a CLSC. We contributed to the information-sharing literature by integrating the existing information-sharing model with dual recycling channels and channel power structure. Previous literature suggests that retailers prefer to share demand information with other firms when the market demand is high. However, surprisingly, we find that when the manufacturer does not play a leading role, the retailer shares her forecast demand information with the manufacturer if the market demand is low. We also show that information sharing reduces the overall profit of the supply chain when the manufacturer dominates the market. In addition, our results also illustrate that information sharing affects the performance of the supply chain mainly by affecting the wholesale price. (shrink)