Morally, We Should Prefer to Exist: A Response to Smilansky

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (4):817-821 (2015)
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Abstract

In a recent article [AJP, 2013], Saul Smilansky argues that our own existence is regrettable and that we should prefer not to have existed at all. I show why Smilansky's argument is fallacious, if we understand terms like ‘regrettable’ and ‘prefer’ in a straightforward non-deviant way

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Sean Johnson
Victoria University of Wellington

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Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Foundations of Language 13 (1):145-151.
Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Philosophy of Science 42 (3):341-344.
Counterfactuals. [REVIEW]William Parry - 1973 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 44 (2):278-281.
Morally, should we prefer never to have existed?Saul Smilansky - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):655-666.

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